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DOS

TAGS: PINS, TH, LA

Amconsulate Udorn

DATE: APRIL 19, 1973

SUBJECT: The Insurgency in Northeast Thailand During 1972

REF : Udorn A-3, May 18, 1972

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SUMMARY

The small Northeastern insurgency continued to gather strength steadily in 1972 despite an increase in Royal Thai Government resources committed to counterinsurgency.

[redacted] the number of armed jungle insurgents increased during the year by about 34%. Violent incidents rose by 32%, RTG casualties by 61% and insurgent initiated incidents, both violent and non-violent, by 8%. Outside support, particularly weapons of Communist manufacture, apparently trickled in at a faster rate, although little information was available in this area. A growing number of insurgents were armed with Communist weapons which require ammunition and parts to be supplied from outside Thailand. The insurgents, however, continued to be almost all indigenous and to depend on local villagers for much of their support such as food and supplies. The insurgents in 1972 concentrated on improving and consolidating their existing organization, and the overall geographical area affected by the insurgency remained about the same as in 1970-71.

The RTA and, to a lesser extent, the police raised the ante on the RTG side by increasing their forces committed to counterinsurgency. RTG efforts lacked, however, the combination of aggressiveness, commitment and coordination necessary to halt the steady insurgent gains.

The insurgency nevertheless remained very small when compared to the Northeast's population and size. At the end of 1972 there were

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an estimated 2340-2420 armed jungle insurgents out of a total Northeastern population of more than 12 million, and the insurgents had some influence in only about 400 or 2½% of the 16,000 villages in the Northeast, in an area almost the size of South Vietnam. Out of 178 RTG districts and subdistricts in the region, only 18 were seriously affected by the insurgency (10 or more violent incidents) in 1972, about the same number as in 1971.

We believe that the insurgency is likely to grow during the next five years at roughly the same rate as in the recent past, but it will be building from such a small base that it is not likely to seriously threaten RTG control of the region during that time period. END SUMMARY.

THE INSURGENCY

Military Organization. The Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) military organization in Northeast Thailand consists of main force and local force armed jungle insurgents and Village Militia Units (VMUs), which are generally not armed except when deployed infrequently on military operations. Main force units are the elite which, theoretically can be deployed anywhere in Thailand, but generally they do not move outside their operating areas within the region. Local force units are normally less well trained and their activities are restricted geographically to the general vicinity of their base camps and nearby villages. These units all participate to some extent in political activities, and their military responsibilities are supposed to further the CPT's political aims. The VMUs are responsible for maintaining political control of the village in which they have been organized as well as for assassinating "enemies of the people" and supporting the main and local guerilla forces. VMU joined the armed jungle soldiers in several attacks on RTG outposts during 1972.

Military Strength. [redacted] armed jungle insurgents in the Northeast totalled 2340-2420 men as of January, 1973. This is an increase of roughly 600 men or 35% since the end of 1971 and 58% over late 1969. Most of the additional insurgents identified during 1972 were in the CPT Nakhon Phanom operational area. Armed insurgent strength also rose in four of the five other CPT operational areas in the Northeast, while it held steady in the Korat-Buriram-Prachinburi area (see Enclosure 1, page 13, for a map of CPT operating areas, and Enclosure 2, page 14, for armed insurgent strength in the Northeast, 1970-1972).

[redacted] at least 5000 villagers have been organized into VMUs in the CPT Nakhon Phanom operational area, of whom about 4000 are in Na Kae district of Nakhon Phanom province. The establishment of VMUs was also called for in the work plans of the other CPT operational areas for 1972, but few have yet been identified [redacted]

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Some of the increased strength estimates are attributable to better reporting, but the rate of growth of the armed jungle insurgent forces was undoubtedly high and we expect it to remain high during the foreseeable future for the next four or five years. The number of armed insurgents is very low, however, compared to the Northeast's population of more than 12 million in an area slightly smaller than all of South Vietnam. Even if the current rate of growth continues, armed jungle insurgents will number only about 10-11,000 in five years, which would still not be a serious threat to the RTG except in the vicinity of the insurgent base camps.

The Organizational Hierarchy. The CPT military forces support an organizational hierarchy designed in the long run to rival and eventually take control from the RTG at all levels. The Northeast insurgency is directed by the Northeast branch of the CPT Central Committee. The other organizational levels are provincial district, area, tambon (township) and village. [redacted] five provincial organizations in the Northeast, several district, and many area, tambon and village organizations. [redacted] the jungle insurgents in the CPT Udorn organizational area send requisitions for supplies to a supporting organization in Udorn city where they are promptly filled or referred to Bangkok for action. We have reports of contacts between the jungle soldiers and other Northeastern cities as well. Our information on the entire insurgent infrastructure including the CPT's urban support organization remains sketchy, however.

[redacted] during 1972 the number of middle-level CPT cadre increased, although there was still a shortage of well-trained and motivated leaders at this level. Procedures for recruitment and promotion were also refined, and the strength and discipline of village organizations improved in many areas of insurgent activity. Basic training of insurgents in such fields as medicine, reading and writing, and military tactics also continued in several base areas in Thailand. The CPT demonstrated an ability for region-wide coordination on August 14 when insurgents simultaneously distributed identical leaflets in several provinces to commemorate the seventh anniversary of the first shots fired in the Northeastern insurgency. The year 1972 also brought further evidence of insurgent cooperation between the Northeast and other regions. [redacted] for example, an exchange of cadre between the Northeast and North, and some urban support cadre from Bangkok were reportedly sent to work briefly in the Udorn area for a "baptism by fire."

The CPT organization, despite improvements during 1972, still formed no more than the embryo of an alternative government to the RTG with varying amounts of authority over roughly 100,000 villagers. Finding trustworthy people of sufficient calibre to fill out the infrastructure and teaching them the discipline and knowledge required by Party precepts was proving a slow process.

Geographical Coverage. Insurgents initiated incidents in 85 of the Northeast's districts and subdistricts in 1972, about the same number as in 1970 and 1971, compared to a total of 178 districts and subdistricts in the Region. Violent

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incidents (which include ambushes, attacks, sabotage, assassinations, clashes, minings and firing at aircraft) occurred in 58 of these districts, but only 18 districts had 10 or more violent incidents and were what we would consider seriously affected by the insurgency. They were located primarily in southern Nakhon Phanom and Sakon Nakhon provinces, the northern reaches of Kalasin province, western Udorn and eastern and western portions of Loei province (see Enclosure 3, page 15, for a summary of incidents by CPT operational areas and Enclosure 4, page 16, for a list of incidents by RTG district and subdistrict as well as CPT operational area).

The large geographical area over which incidents were initiated during 1972 is a poor index, however, of the insurgents' organizational strength. Their activities in many districts were infrequent. [redacted] only about 400 or 2½% of the estimated 16,000 villages in the Northeast were under some kind of insurgent influence during 1972. Many of these villages did little more than provide food to the jungle insurgents because of family ties, threats, or persuasion. Others contain what the insurgents call "mass organizations" such as the Patriotic Youth of Thailand and the Farmers' Liberation Association. [redacted] several well-organized or "strategic" villages in the CPT Nakhon Phanom area. These were replete with mass organizations, VMU, a village committee and one or more members of the CPT.

Insurgents expanded somewhat the number of villages under their influence during 1972, but most of their effort went to consolidating or simply maintaining their position in villages they had been working in for some time.

Outside Support. AK-47 Automatic Assault Rifles and other weapons of Communist manufacture continued to trickle into the Northeast during 1972. [redacted] the CPT Nakhon Phanom operational area received 2-20 Communist weapons per month. Insurgents used 60 millimeter mortars once and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG-2s) several times during 1972.

[redacted] money was channeled from the People's Republic of China through Hong Kong and the CPT apparatus in Bangkok to CPT provincial organizations in the Northeast during 1972. Part of this money went to purchase of supplies and American weapons, particularly M-79 grenade launchers, smuggled into Thailand from Laos, and part went to salaries for jungle soldiers who earned up to 1000 baht a year, when paid. (No one has yet joined the insurgency to get rich, but 1000 baht is more than many farmers can earn from the arid, infertile Northeastern soil during a year).

Insurgents continued to go in small numbers for training in China, North Vietnam and Laos during 1972. The thoughts of Mao continued to permeate the insurgents' training and form the ideological basis for the insurgency. Jungle soldiers kept red stars on their hats, Mao's picture on their uniforms and the Little Red Book close at hand.

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Unconfirmed reports persisted during 1972 that foreigners, particularly North Vietnamese, Chinese and Pathet Lao, were working with the Northeast insurgents, and that the insurgents were supported by helicopters in several of their operational areas. RTA personnel who claim to have seen unidentified helicopters are anxious to shoot one down to find out who is flying them. Meanwhile the helicopter mystery, which has received widespread publicity in the Thai press, continues unsolved.

All indications are that external assistance is increasing at about the same rate as the insurgency grows in size and sophistication. The insurgents are becoming more dependent on weaponry from abroad, but almost all their personnel and supplies come from Northeastern villages.

Tactics. Insurgents continued to use violence to eliminate opponents, put the fear of God in the neutral, and impress supporters. Their violent tactics were designed, in their words, "to cause thunderclaps which give no time to cover the ears." They planned and executed their attacks with increasing skill and daring. Several Village Protection Teams were overrun during 1972, and three district officers ambushed in separate incidents: one was killed, one escaped unhurt and one was captured, advised never again to leave his desk, and released. In November the insurgents sneaked into Na Kae town, fired at the district officer's house, blew up the municipal generator and then waited in ambush for the reaction of RTG forces (who decided discretion was the better part of valor and stayed hidden behind their sandbags).

The RTG forces suffered their heaviest losses from ambushes initiated by command detonated mines. Insurgents also shot down aircraft in northwestern Udorn and western Loei provinces and burned over 20 bridges in the CPT Nakhon Phanom operational area during late 1972, a tactic used during previous dry seasons, but never on such a large scale.

The non-violent techniques of persuasion, education, propaganda and threats continued to dominate insurgent operations. They did not instigate any large demonstrations as in 1971, but developed a new technique of countering RTG pressure on village organizations: They instructed all supporters in a village to turn themselves in to the local authorities when the RTG appeared to have identified some of them. RTG officials, without adequate interrogation or detention facilities, recorded the supporters as defectors, sent them home, and normally left them alone thereafter. The technique worked well for the insurgents in Na Kae where the CPT has deep roots. In Khao Wong subdistrict of Kalasin province, however, the CPT's techniques may have backfired. [redacted] CPT cadre in the area complained they could not trust villagers who turned themselves in to the RTG.

[redacted] the Thai insurgents assisted the NVA sappers who attacked the U.S. Air Force tenanted Udorn airbase in October 1972, the first significant indication of Thai involvement in an attack on a U.S. occupied base. A sapper captured at Udorn revealed during interrogation that insurgents guided his sapper unit while in Thailand and may also at the same time

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have fed the sappers, but so far as is known this was the extent of the CPT support. During 1972 sappers, all believed to be NVA, attacked Ubon airbase twice, Udorn once, and Utapao once. Sappers previously attacked Ubon in 1969 and 1970 and Udorn in 1968.

Casualties. Total RTG casualties for 1972 were 384 killed and 303 wounded. The combined figures were 61% higher than in 1971 and more than double the figures for 1970. Only 88 insurgents were reported killed and 37 wounded during 1972. Reported insurgent casualties have risen steadily since 1970, but remain comparatively low, at least in part because of the insurgent policy of removing their dead and wounded from the scene of a clash if at all possible (Enclosure 5, page 21, lists casualties by year and type).

Insurgent Initiated and Violent Incidents. The Bangkok Mission's monthly statistical report on the insurgency shows that the insurgents initiated 1,821 incidents in the Northeast during 1972, an eight percent increase over 1971 and a 34% increase over 1970. Insurgent initiated incidents in the Northeast during 1972 were about 51% of the 3,569 incidents initiated nationwide, down from 54% during 1971.

There were 794 violent incidents in 1972, a 35% increase over the preceding year. Both insurgent attacks and RTG initiated violent incidents increased sharply during 1972 while assassinations (of which there were 189) declined slightly from 1971 but remained higher than 1970 (Enclosure 3, page 15, summarizes these statistics by CPT operational area).

The CPT Nakhon Phanom Operational Area had almost half the violent incidents recorded in the Northeast during 1972. The violence was concentrated mainly in Na Kae, but five other districts had more than 10 violent incidents. In the CPT Sakon Nakhon Area during 1972 the number of incidents of all sorts was less than in 1971, but at about the same level as 1970. The insurgents in the CPT Sakon Nakhon area reportedly suffered from poor leadership during 1972 and had difficulty maintaining the support of villagers in several districts. The jungle insurgents in the area increased their strength, however, from an estimated 405 in 1971 to 470 in 1972 and completed the year virtually unscathed by RTG CI operations.

Violent incidents in the remaining five CPT operational areas within the Northeast increased substantially, a consequence of more RTG suppression activities and greater maturity, strength and boldness on the part of the insurgents.

COUNTERINSURGENCY

Royal Thai Army. The RTA during 1971 and the first three and a half months of 1972 committed an average of only about six infantry companies to counter-insurgent operations at any one time, primarily in the CPT Nakhon Phanom and

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and Sakon Nakhon operational areas. The RTA supplemented these operations by Army Training Tests (ATT) at the beginning and end of 1971 and first part of 1972 in areas of known insurgent activity. In early 1972, for example, company-sized ATT were conducted in western Udorn, the Korat-Buriram-Prachinburi (KBP) area and southern Ubon, and a divisional ATT was held in Khao Wong subdistrict of Kalasin province and neighboring districts. From January through April, 1972, the RTG also carried out Joint Training Exercise (JTX) 15, otherwise known as Operation Phu Kwang, in the Tri-province area of Petchabun/ Phitsanulok/Loei. JTX 15 did little or nothing to improve security in the lowland villages in western Loei under pressure from the insurgents and left untouched the insurgent base areas in Loei's mountainous southwestern corner.

In mid-April 1972 the RTA committed three additional infantry companies to extended civilian/police/military (CPM) operations in the CPT areas of Southern Ubon, Udorn and KBP. In October the RTA committed 10 infantry companies and associated support units to JTX 16, one of the largest operations ever conducted in the Northeast. During JTX 16, which continued through the end of January, 1973, CPM forces operated in Na Kae district of Nakhon Phanom and surrounding districts, and the RTA made the deepest and most sustained penetration into the extensive insurgent redoubts in the Na Kae mountains since the insurgency began.

The RTA during JTX 16 uncovered numerous base camps in the mountains of Na Kae, captured some equipment, hampered the flow of the insurgents' food supplies and communications, forced the insurgents to disperse for the duration of the exercise and hurt their morale for a time, all damage from which they were expected to recover in short order.

The other RTA operations conducted during 1972, with a few exceptions, had little lasting effect on the insurgent organization and left almost unscathed the growing force of armed jungle insurgents. Separate 30 to 60 day operations during the first eight months of 1972 in southwestern Sakon Nakhon, northern Kalasin, and northwestern Sakon Nakhon and neighboring areas briefly set back the insurgents' organizational efforts. CPM operations in That Phanom district of Nakhon Phanom province and southern Nakhon Phanom/northern Ubon were conducted, with brief interruptions, for several months during 1972. The insurgents were forced to become more circumspect in these areas, but continued to operate with little known damage to their organization.

The CPM operation in western Udorn initially pushed the insurgents out of the RTG area of operations after several clashes, but as it continued through the end of 1972 (after a brief interruption in September and October), the insurgents learned to work around the RTG forces. The two-month CPM operation in the KBP area forced the insurgents to disperse for several months. [redacted] they were back at work by the end of 1972 in more villages than before the operation. RTG forces did little during the extended CPM operation in southern Ubon, according to local Thai officials [redacted]

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These operations were all either very short (one to two months) or, when longer, were generally characterized by little aggressiveness on the part of the participating RTG forces. Their impact on the insurgency was correspondingly limited. The RTA company stationed in Khao Wong subdistrict throughout 1972 was an exception. It combined psyops and civic action with small unit patrols in and around the villages and on the slopes of the nearby mountains. These activities kept the insurgents' local village organization in the disarray it had fallen into during the last seven months of 1971 when a Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol company of Red Berets worked continuously in the subdistrict.

Police. The police participated to some extent in all the CPM operations during 1972, and added to their forces targetted against the insurgency in the Northeast. Most of these additional police went into Na Kae district where police strength was increased during 1972 to over 540 men under CSOC Plan 14/15, including about 150 Special Action Force members from three SAF platoons previously assigned elsewhere in the Northeast, a Border Patrol Police (BPP) heavy weapons platoon, a police aerial reinforcement platoon from outside the Northeast, five Special Branch police, and more Provincial Police. A SAF platoon from Chaiyaphum also temporarily supplemented the police forces in the JTX 16 area of operations during December 1972 and January 1973. The additional police units in Na Kae patrolled primarily in the vicinity of the Na Kae district town during 1972 and had little discernible effect on the insurgent organization.

The reorganization of the BPP resulted in only a few changes in BPP deployment during 1972 and most of the BPP units remained strung out along the border with the primary mission of stopping infiltration from abroad rather than directly tackling the domestic insurgency.

Police arrested over 30 suspects in the Northeast as part of a nationwide round-up of members of the CPT and supporters. [redacted] the 30 suspects were all low-level village supporters. This was nevertheless the first evidence of police Special Branch activity directed against the infrastructure in the Northeast since the last round-up in 1970.

Paramilitary Forces. At the start of 1972 almost all Volunteer Defense Corps (VDC) members were deployed in small Village Protection Teams (VPTs) of about 15 men each or in district Target Area Headquarters set up under the provisions of CSOC Plan 0910. During the year, however, the provinces of Udorn, Sakon Nakhon, Kalasin and Nakhon Phanom began to consolidate their VDC into fewer, larger units. We concluded from our travels around the Northeast that the consolidation was mainly motivated by official concern for the safety of the small VPTs, which were no match for the increasing aggressiveness and fire power of the insurgents.

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Officials also explained, however, that the VDC were being withdrawn from the villages to implement the more recent CSOC Plan 110, which calls for the VPTs to be combined into large Tambon Protection Teams (TPTs) to provide mobile defense around the villages in a tambon and reinforce when necessary the armed Village Security and Development Units (VSDUs) assigned to internal village security.

The hitch in carrying out Plan 110 was that the RTG did not arm the VSDU. Therefore when VDC Village Protection Teams were withdrawn from the villages to form the TPTs, the number of villages with a continued armed RTG presence was reduced without an adequate substitute. The RTG, in recognition of these problems, began to make plans toward the end of 1972 to arm VSDU in Na Kae and to reorganize, enlarge and improve the arms and training of the VDC throughout Thailand.

Psychological Operations. The RTG placed a high priority on activities they thought would win the hearts and minds of the people during 1972. The army training exercises and JTX 16, for example, emphasized psyops. These programs were usually short-lived, however, and suffered from the lack of continued follow-up.

The BPP also became increasingly preoccupied during 1971-72 with their Village Scout program, under which by January, 1973, 28,000 villagers had completed five days of training in rudimentary scoutcraft and patriotic ideals. The National Executive Council, which ruled the country from November 1971 to December 1972, also pressed RTG officials to get out and visit with the people and respond to their needs.

Civilian officials did seem to move out among the villages more frequently during 1972, and a steady improvement in the caliber of district officials undoubtedly helped the RTG image locally. RTG officials, however, spent at least as much time entertaining their superiors as in visiting with villagers, an index of the basically inward looking character of the Thai bureaucracy. Allegations of widespread corruption continued unabated.

Development Programs. Road construction by the Highway Department and Office of Accelerated Rural Development (ARD) continued during 1972 to be the most prominent developmental activity in the Northeast. The improved mobility, commerce, and communications fostered by the burgeoning road network proved a mixed blessing, however. It helped the more energetic and talented to better themselves, but also allowed the poor villagers to learn of their sorry lot compared to that of people in the urban centers. The new roads relieved some of the pressure of the population explosion in the Northeast by facilitating settlement in new areas, but often the roads passed through national forest reserve land where settlement was illegal which created friction between villagers and RTG authorities.

The RTG did respond to increasing pressure on land by starting a program to survey holdings and give preliminary title deeds to villagers in Na Kae and two districts in Korat. The RTG also continued a variety of programs to improve local income during 1972. In particular Phat

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Bunyarataphan, the new Director General of the Community Development Department and former governor of Ubon, attempted to revitalize and enlarge the CD program. He gave priority under CSOC Plan 14/15 to Na Kae district where in October he assigned a specially trained CD task force over twice the size of the district's previous complement of CD workers.

Work progressed during 1972 on several hydroelectric and irrigation projects around the Northeast. We found during several visits to the Lam Pao and Lam Nam Oon irrigation projects, however, that compensation and resettlement of people from the reservoir areas behind these dams have been slow and fraught with problems. Although the projects may produce substantial benefits sometime in the future, so far on balance they have probably created more ill than good will toward the RTG on the part of the local villagers.

Planning and Coordination. The RTG had completed by the end of 1972 all the annexes and subannexes to CSOC Plan 14/15; the police and army resources called for in the plan were in place; and implementation of the civilian annexes was beginning, albeit slowly. During 1972 theRTG also began work on a national counterinsurgency plan and a plan to improve local defense forces. Police and civilian officials joined in the numerous CPM operations during the year, although the RTA played the dominant role in both planning and execution. None of the CPM operations came close to providing the subtle mix of carrot and stick necessary to damage the insurgents' village organization on a large scale.

Coordination and planning of counterinsurgency at the provincial level was almost non-existent. The provincial CSOC military advisors (redesignated during 1972 as deputy provincial CSOC directors) were for the most part a lackluster lot, with those in the insurgent-affected provinces of Kalasin, Udorn and Loei among the worst. Even the few relatively good ones were hamstrung because only a small proportion of the officials assigned to the provincial CSOCs spent much time on CSOC functions, and they devoted most of their attention to routine administrative matters or to organizing occasional CI operations of short duration.

At the district level, shortages of personnel and resources were even more serious, except in Na Kae. The priority given to Na Kae under CSOC Plan 14/15 brought an improved caliber of officials to the district, but many of them seemed to have little to do. While the district Operations Coordinating Center, according to CSOC Plan 14/15 was supposed to direct all CI resources in the district, in practice the police, army and most civilian elements there responded primarily to their own chains of command.

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CONCLUSION

The increased resources, particularly those of the RTA, committed to counterinsurgency during 1972 probably slowed the growth of the insurgency to less than it would have been without such efforts, but they did not halt its steady expansion. If the insurgency grows in the next 10 years at about the same rate as it did in 1972, it would pose a serious threat at the end of that time to the RTG's control of much of the rural Northeast. Whether or not the rate of growth can be sustained for that long depends, however, on the extent of outside support and the RTG response as well as what the insurgents themselves do. These factors in turn depend on such currently imponderable considerations as the evolution of foreign policy in China and North Vietnam, and the policies of a younger generation of leaders which will eventually take over the RTG from the present aging leadership.

The crystal ball reveals a much clearer picture of the probable evolution of the insurgency in the next five years. We expect outside assistance will continue to be increased as the insurgents' absorptive capacity rises. The insurgents' dependence on Communist-made weapons will grow, but the insurgency will remain a predominantly indigenous movement. Insurgent strength will probably continue to grow at roughly the same rate as it has in the past few years.

On the one hand it will be constrained by RTG counterinsurgency programs and the difficulties of politicizing and teaching a foreign ideology to the relatively apolitical Thai in the Northeast; but on the other hand it will be fed by the poverty of Northeastern villagers, official corruption and an inward looking rather than responsive administration. The RTG will probably continue to increase the resources applied to counterinsurgency and will make marginal improvements in their use. The present leadership will nevertheless be unwilling, in our opinion, to make the major organizational changes required to halt the growth of the insurgency. Such changes would be more of a threat to the RTG leaders than the insurgency now is.

Even if the insurgency continues to grow at about the same rate in the foreseeable future as it has in the past, however, it will still be small compared to the total size and population of the Northeast. Mao taught that the insurgents are like fish and the people like water. The insurgents in the Northeast now are like goldfish swimming in a pond. In the next four or five years they may grow to the size of lake carp, but the RTG will not yet be endangered by man-eating sharks.

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Enclosures:

1. Map of Insurgent Operational Areas in Northeast Thailand
2. Armed Jungle Insurgent Strength in Northeast by Communist Party of Thailand Operational Areas, 1970-72
3. Summary of Incidents by CPT Areas, 1970-72
4. Incidents by RTG District or Subdistrict and CPT areas, 1970-72
5. RTG and Insurgent Casualties, 1970-1972


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MAP OF INSURGENT OPERATIONAL AREAS IN NORTHEAST THAILAND



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ARMED JUNGLE INSURGENT STRENGTH IN NORTHEAST BY INSURGENT OPERATIONAL AREAS, 1970-72[1]

Operational Area	1970[2]	1971[3]	1972[4]
Nakhon Phanom Scope: Most of Nakhon Phanom; Khao Wong and Kuchinarai of Kalasin; Muang of Sakon Nakhon; Northeastern Roi-et	650-725	735	1190-1230
Sakon Nakhon Scope: Sakon Nakhon (except Muang district), Northern Kalasin (except Khao Wong and Kuchinarai), eastern Udorn	275-325	405	470
Udorn Scope: Western Udorn, eastern Loei, western Nong Khai	170-190	220	240
Northern Ubon Scope: Don Tan and part of Mukdahan of Nakhon Phanom and northern Ubon	75-100	100	120-130
Southern Ubon Scope: Southern Ubon, southeastern Sisaket	150-175	135-180	160-190
Korat/Buriram/Prachinburi (KBP) Scope: Khon Buri of Korat, southwestern Buriram, Watthana Nakhon of Prachinburi	80-100	150-175 (not all armed)	160
TOTAL	1490-1615	1745-1815	2340-2420

[1]Not including insurgents operating in western Loei, part of CPT tri-province operational area.

[2]Mission estimate as of 9/70.

[3][redacted] as of 1/72

[4][redacted] as of 1/73

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SUMMARY OF INCIDENTS BY CPT OPERATIONAL AREA, 1970-72[1]

CPT Operational Area	CT Initiated Incidents (Violent and Non-Violent)[2]			VIOLENT INCIDENTS											
				Assassinations			CT Attacks[3]			RTG Initiated Clashes[4]			Total Violent Incidents		
	1970	1971	1972	1970	1971	1972	1970	1971	1972	1970	1971	1972	1970	1971	1972
CPT Nakhon Phanom Area	497	588	677	91	112	88	75	78	105	98	101	160	264	291	354
CPT Sakon Nakhon Area	460	495	469	33	59	44	29	43	23	43	54	46	105	156	102
CPT Udorn Area	152	188	234	9	20	18	5	9	26	8	21	49	22	50	93
CPT Southern Ubon Area	155	309	260	2	9	15	6	18	15	10	7	27	18	34	57
CPT Northern Ubon Area	35	36	74	6	6	13	5	2	9	10	8	17	21	16	39
CPT Korat-Buriram-Prachin-buri Area	69	24	27	6	1	6	4	1	7	10	5	11	20	7	24
CPT Loei-Phitsan-ulok-Petchabun Area (Northeast Districts)	Unk	61	80	Unk	8	5	Unk	14	45	Unk	16	74	Unk	38	125
TOTAL	1365	1691	1821	147	215	189	124	165	230	179	212	384	450	589	794

[1] Our experience from numerous visits to insurgent troubled areas in the Northeast is that many more incidents occur than are reported in the MACTHAI monthly incident reports from which the figures in this table are drawn, but the figures give a fairly accurate picture of relative trends for comparative purposes.

[2] Includes armed propaganda, food supply, information collection, kidnapping, and recruiting (non-violent incidents), and insurgent initiated violent incidents (assassinations and attacks as defined in footnote 3 below).

[3] Includes insurgent attacks, harassment, sabotage and anti-aircraft incidents.

[4] Includes all violent incidents involving RTG units when they are in the field such as clashes, ambushes sprung by insurgents as well as RTG forces, and mine and boobytrap incidents.

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INCIDENTS BY RTG DISTRICT OR SUBDISTRICT AND CPT OPERATIONAL AREA, 1970-72*

RTG District or Subdistrict	CT Initiated Incidents (Violent and Non-Violent)			Total Insurgent and RTG Initiated Violent Incidents		
	1970	1971	1972	1970	1971	1972
CPT Nakhon Phanom Operational Area						
Na Kae, Nakhon Phanom	156	168	248	143	112	196
Khao Wong, Kalasin	47	75	77	26	45	58
Kham-cha-i, Nakhon Phanom	21	33	34	13	28	26
That Phanom, Nakhon Phanom	27	28	25	31	39	25
Muang, Sakon Nakhon	184	203	219	12	15	20
Pla Pak, Nakhon Phanom	14	17	17	16	15	16
Mukdahan, Nakhon Phanom	18	23	18	13	13	9
Kuchinarai, Kalasin	15	21	28	3	9	1
Muang, Nakhon Phanom	6	6	3	5	7	1
Renu, Nakhon Phanom	0	2	1	0	3	1
Tha Uthen, Nakhon Phanom	4	2	3	1	1	0
Ban Phaeng, Nakhon Phanom	5	9	2	1	3	0
Nong Phok, Roi-et	0	1	2	0	1	1
TOTAL	497	588	677	264	291	354

*See Enclosure 1 for a map of Northeastern provinces and insurgent operating areas. Districts with no violent incidents in 1970 or 1971 and three or less non-violent insurgent initiated incidents are omitted for the sake of brevity.

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RTG District or Subdistrict	CT Initiated Incidents (Violent and Non-Violent)			Total Insurgent and RTG Initiated Violent Incidents		
	1970	1971	1972	1970	1971	1972
Sakon Nakhon Operational Area						
Sawang Daen Din, Sakon Nakhon*	173	110	95	35	40	28
Kut Bak, Sakon Nakhon	125	107	119	12	11	19
Sahatsakhan, Kalasin**	24	47	45	10	24	15
Somdet, Kalasin	6	34	17	2	14	11
Ban Muang, Sakon Nakhon	2	14	41	4	11	10
Bung Kan, Nong Khai	16	29	24	7	14	9
Tha Khan Tho, Kalasin	1	11	29	0	0	5
Si That, Udorn	11	8	5	8	3	2
Phannanikhom, Sakon Nakhon	34	29	38	3	1	1
Wannoniwat, Sakon Nakhon	30	25	6	9	8	1
Akat Amnuai, Sakon Nakhon	1	0	4	3	1	1
Waritchaphum, Sakon Nakhon***	21	37	17	4	14	0
Ban Dung, Udorn	6	18	7	4	6	0
Nong Han, Udorn	4	13	13	3	4	0
Seka, Nong Khai	3	9	3	1	3	0
Phon Phisai, Nong Khai	2	3	6	0	1	0
Phen, Udorn	1	1	0	0	1	0
TOTAL	460	495	469	105	156	102

*Includes Song Dao Subdistrict
**Includes Huai Mek and Kham Muang Subdistricts
***Includes Phang Khon District

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RTG District or Subdistrict	CT Initiated Incidents (Violent and Non-Violent)			Total Insurgent and RTG Initiated Violent Incidents		
	1970	1971	1972	1970	1971	1972
CPT Udorn Operational Area						
Nam Som, Udorn	34	58	67	7	23	32
Na Klang, Udorn	16	23	34	2	3	21
Pak Chom, Loei	0	0	30	0	0	10
Nuang, Udorn*	24	20	12	4	8	6
Nong Bua Lamphu, Udorn	26	34	11	1	9	4
Kumphawapi, Udorn	4	21	12	0	4	4
Sangkhom, Nong Khai	4	6	18	0	0	4
Nuang, Loei	8	1	11	0	0	4
Ban Phu, Udorn	15	4	4	2	1	2
Si Bun Ruang, Udorn	12	9	11	3	0	2
Phu Kradung, Loei	0	1	9	0	0	2
None Sang, Udorn	1	1	4	1	0	1
Muang, Nong Khai	0	0	4	0	0	1
Chiang Khan, Loei	4	3	2	2	2	0
Wangsaphung, Loei	4	7	5	0	0	0
TOTAL	152	188	234	22	50	93

*Includes Nong Wua Saw and Kut Chap Subdistricts.

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RTG District or Subdistrict	CPT Initiated Incidents (Violent and Non-Violent)			Total Insurgent and RTG Initiated Violent Incidents		
	1970	1971	1972	1970	1971	1972
CPT Southern Ubon Operational Area						
Buntharik, Ubon	63	113	92	7	14	23
Det Udom, Ubon*	3	67	85	0	11	8
Nam Yuen, Ubon	68	98	38	8	3	7
Kantharalak, Sisaket	2	4	13	0	3	6
Warin, Ubon	1	0	6	0	0	5
Phibun Mangsahan, Ubon	14	18	14	2	2	4
Nuang, Ubon	3	3	5	1	1	3
Khong Chiam, Ubon**	0	3	3	0	0	1
Khun Han, Sisaket	1	3	4	0	0	0
TOTAL	155	309	260	18	34	57
CPT Northern Ubon Operational Area						
Don Tan, Nakhon Phanom	16	16	47	15	8	31
Chanuman, Ubon	5	14	10	2	2	4
Amnat Charoen, Ubon	7	1	7	1	5	3
Trakan Phut Phon, Ubon	1	1	2	0	0	1
Loeng Nok Tha, Yasothon	3	3	3	2	0	0
Kutchum, Ubon	3	1	0	1	1	0
Khemmarat Ubon	0	0	5	0	0	0
TOTAL	35	36	74	21	16	39

*Includes Nachaluai Subdistrict.
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RTG District or Subdistrict	CT Initiated Incidents (Violent and Non-Violent)			Total Insurgent and RTG Initiated Violent Incidents		
	1970	1971	1972	1970	1971	1972
CPT Korat-Buriram-Prachinburi Operational Area (Korat and Buriram only						
Khemburi, Korat	10	6	7	4	3	13
Lahansai, Buriram	26	11	13	9	3	6
Nuang, Buriram	0	2	1	0	1	1
Nang Rong, Buriram	33	5	6	7	0	4
TOTAL	69	24	27	20	7	24
CPT Loei-Phitsanulok-Petchabun (Tri-Province) Area (Northeast Districts Only)*						
Dan Sai, Loei	Unk	44	64	Unk	32	123
Bamnet Narong, Chaiyaphum	0	1	1	0	0	2
Na Haeo, Loei	Unk	12	15	Unk	2	0
Tha Li, Loei	Unk	4	0	Unk	4	0
Khon San, Chaiyaphum	1	0	0	1	0	0
TOTAL	Unk	61	80	Unk	38	125

*Figures for Loei districts during 1971 are only estimates determined by doubling statistics for last six months of 1971. Consulate did not keep records on Loei during 1970 or first six months of 1971.

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RTG and Insurgent Casualties 1970-1972[1]

	Insurgents		RTG Forces		RTG Civilian Officials		Other Civilians		Total RTG Casualties	
	KIA	WIA	KIA	WIA	KIA	WIA	KIA	WIA	KIA	WIA
1970	67	16	70	74	27	2	82	15	179	91
1971	79	29	111	91	37	16	137	18	285	125
1972	88	37	229	256	29	7	126	40	384	303
TOTAL	234	82	410	421	93	25	345	73	848	519

[1]Figures collated from the Bangkok Mission's Monthly Composite Statistical Report on the Insurgency.

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