Australian Government | NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF AUSTRALIA
Your story, our history

These copies are provided for research or study purposes. Before making use of the material for other purposes (for example publication) you should familiarise yourself with any copyright obligations.

NAA: A1838, TS687/7/3

Series number: A1838

Control symbol: TS687/7/3

Barcode: 842193

Number of pages: 57

ANZAM. The threat to Malaya if SEATO fails in the defence of Thailand.

FILE No. 687/7/3

~~(Secret Part)~~

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.

[88/9190] DFAT 12.4.91

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

TOP SECRET.

SUBJECT.
ANZAM The Threat to Malaya if Australia fails in its Defence of Thailand

PREVIOUS	
NEXT	

53.55

ARCHIVAL FILE

PLEASE RETURN TO ARCHIVES REPOSITORY AFTER USE.

TRIM NO.(Archives use only):

OLD88/9190

RELATED PAPERS.

FILE No.	SUBJECT.

DFAT ARCHIVES
FILE [illegible]US
MAY 1989
88/9190
Signature

1732/56....

By Authority: A. J. ARTHUR, C'wealth Govt. Printer, Canberra.

PLEASE KEEP
THIS TAG
ON TOP OF FILE

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

TOP SECRET.

(7)

GG:MK Copy No. 9. I.3790

Dated: 20th March, 1953.
1922

FROM: Rec'd: 21st March, 1953.
0830

Australian Commissioner's Office,
SINGAPORE.

245. TOP SECRET. PRIORITY.

From McIntyre.

Five Power Staff Agency.

British Defence Co-ordination Committee yesterday formulated general guidance for their planning staff to use in preparing detailed brief for the United Kingdom representative regarding the preliminary meeting Honolulu 6th April. Guidance was prepared on the basis of a directive from the United Kingdom Chief of Staff which I have not seen in full. General line of B.D.C.C. thinking is as follows.

(a) General.

It is assumed that the forthcoming meeting will be confined essentially to considering how co-ordination might be improved and what organization might be required to assist the Agency in bringing this about. In view of expected United States reluctance to go beyond an examination of those arrangements with limited functions there is considerable uncertainty about the form of the organization likely to emerge; but B.D.C.C. who fully share the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff desire to make the utmost out of the Agency feel some basic machinery and procedures are essential and will press for them. Although detailed discussion on questions of substance is not expected at this meeting the United Kingdom representative will be appropriately briefed in case discussion should arise.

(b) Supreme Command A.N.Z.A.M. A.N.Z.U.S.

United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff have directed that whilst it remains United Kingdom aim to be admittance to A.N.Z.U.S. as a full member United Kingdom representative at this meeting must adhere wholeheartedly to A.N.Z.A.M. concept. B.D.C.C. do not expect this matter or related questions of possible Supreme Command in Far East and South East Asia in global war to be raised at Honolulu; but if United States should raise Supreme Command question they would like United Kingdom representative to be authorized to support the idea in principle. They are seeking London's views. At the same time they are aware of possible Australian and New Zealand objections and United Kingdom representative is to discuss the whole matter with the Australian and New Zealand representatives as soon as possible after arrival Honolulu.

...../(c)

(c) Machinery.

Although B.D.C.C. thinking on Machinery, permanent staff etc., is still somewhat fluid their proposals are likely to be somewhat on the following lines:-

(i) Secretariat. B.D.C.C. feels that the responsibility for circulating papers, telegram etc., amongst members should not be left haphazardly to individual Governments. They consider either Singapore or Honolulu should act as Secretariat either permanently or alternately.

(ii) Planning and Liaison. A combined planning and Liaisonstaff established permanently at a single Headquarters is not envisaged. The suggestion is that each member of the Agency would nominate senior officer (of perhaps Brigadier rank and preferably a planner) as its liaison officer with the Agency. He would be based at his own headquarters, but would join his opposite numbers from time to time at meetings of the Agency or on specific planning projects. (E.G., if Agency should call for planning in respect of Indo-China basis of such planning would be carried out at Saigon jointly by existing French planning staff and five liaison officers on the spot.)

(iii) Chairmanship. B.D.C.C. have no firm views. Their thought is that Radford might be made Chairman for say 1 year (irrespective of where the Agency might meet) during which future procedure might be decided. They assume, however, Chairmanship and Secretariat ought to go hand in hand which could mean that the Chairmanship might be confined to United States and United Kingdom alternately.

(d) Geographical Scope.

B.D.C.C. assume that some definition of Geographical Scope of the Agency may have to be laid down at preliminary meeting. They do not want any such definition to have the affect of limiting discussions solely to South East Asia. I shall therefore, be likely to propose that while focus of discussions and planning is to be South East Asia this should not preclude consideration of other matters and possible manifestations of Chinese aggression any of which must affect South Asia. United Kingdom Representative may in fact be authorized to discuss informally with Radford's headquarters possible inclusion of CINCFE in the Agency. He will also be prepared to discuss Hong Kong if the Americans raise it.

The foregoing outlines may be subject to modification after Planners have worked on it and after further discussions with London. Moreover, I gather Agenda for meetings may not yet be finally settled.

...../You

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

TOP SECRET.

15

3.

I.3790

You may already know the United Kingdom delegation to Honolulu will be led by Major-General E.K. Sixsmith Chief of Staff Far East Land Forces.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M's.

21st March, 1953.

Received from External Affairs Office,
LONDON

Personal & Top Secret letter. dated

28th February, 1955.

To Mr Plimsoll from Mr. L McIntyre.

Signature: J. Plimsoll

Appointment: Acting Secretary

Date: 15 Mar 55

To be retained by addressee

TOP SECRET 69

TEMPLE BAR 6611.
TEMPLE BAR 1567. 2435

In reply quote No.

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
AUSTRALIA HOUSE.
STRAND.
LONDON, W.C.2.

Personal & Secret (TOP)

28th February, 1955.

Dear Jim,

Arthur has gone off this morning with the P.M. I think he found his visit here useful on various counts; he saw quite a lot of people, one way or the other, and I hope he regards the period since the conference ended as well spent.

Before he left I gave him the attached brief note on the question of the Malaya commitment. It is an attempt to project in short form a few points that I have been trying to sow in his mind since he arrived here. I sense a bit of a tendency towards what is perhaps a natural excess of caution over the Malaya commitment; we seem to want to be absolutely sure that the risks are cut to a minimum which is unrealistic in these days and which to my mind does not square too well with our avowed preoccupation with our security. Moreover, I am continually asking how much thought has been given by our people to the alternatives of non-acceptance of the commitment, which it seems to me will need to have been thoroughly considered before the time comes for us to decide whether to take the commitment on, and about which I find a slightly disturbing lack of contemplation. I would like to think that we as a Department were giving a nudge in the direction of Malaya, rather than holding back. We are generally regarded as a fairly responsible country nowadays, but to stay that way we must continue to measure words with actions.

Another subject on which I may be putting some thoughts on paper is disarmament. Personally, I can't summon up much enthusiasm for attempts to bring about disarmament by general agreement in the world as it is; I am not absolutely certain that it is wise in principle, and in any event I can't really convince myself that the slim prospects of success justify the hazards of the exercise. But I accept the fact that, politically, any government anywhere has to be for disarmament as staunchly as against sin. The British have decided that if the game is to be played at all it must be played seriously, with an eye to public opinion and also to the general objective of putting the Communists on the spot in the cold war. They have accordingly decided that they must be ready to put forward something fairly concrete and far-reaching which, while containing what they regard as essential safeguards if the Russians should by any chance come along with it, is at the same time striking enough to use to put the Communists at a moral disadvantage if they turn it down. The one percent population formula which they have again resorted to is doubtless faulty on principle, but the British will claim that, coupled with the provision banning any build-up of armed forces after disarmament actually begins it will provide the fairest reflection of the practical situation. I sense that we, in our preoccupation with our "isolated position", are wanting to have our cake and eat it. We may be right, but the onus, it seems to me, is squarely on us to find a satisfactory alternative formula which will satisfy us (and the inevitably numerous countries that will claim the same special treatment as ourselves) and will at the same time amount to serious proposal for disarmament, which contains some element of an act of faith and can be turned to propaganda advantage if it gets nowhere. I believe myself that such a formula is going to be very hard to find. But I hope (as our telegram urged yesterday) that we shall be pressing on with it, and that Cabinet can be got down to

/considering

TOP SECRET

43

Secret 2.

considering the problem in something other than airy generalisations. We do not yet know, of course, how the United States feels about optimum levels of armaments; this will obviously have an important bearing on our thinking. But the Government might get itself into an awkward position if a majority of countries were by any chance to go along with something like the British formula and we, while continuing to assert our undying devotion to the cause of disarmament, were to appear to be dragging our feet through insistence on special treatment. I think we are right to look upon any simple formula with a very cautious eye, and I think some of our misgivings about the one percent idea have substance; but if we are dissatisfied we must put up ideas of our own, supported by water-tight arguments, and not content ourselves with merely pushing back other people's ideas.

I expect I'm beginning to be looked on as hopelessly out of touch with Australian thinking on these matters. But I can only say that this is how they look to me from here.

Yours sincerely,

Jim McIntyre

(L. R. McIntyre)

James Plimsoll, Esq.,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra, A.C.T.

P.S. The P.M. as usual made an extremely good impression here. Although I did not myself get in on any of the conference meetings I am told by all United Kingdom people who were there that he made a much greater contribution to the discussions than any of the other Dominion representatives, and appeared to stand head and shoulders above them in intellect and grasp. (The old gentleman of 10 Downing Street more than held his own, I gather, and surprised some of his own people by his performance, even though he was a bit off the ball at times). Just before he left here Menzies did a Television interview for distribution in the United States, and though I have not yet seen it myself I am told by those who have that it was a superb performance.

LRMc

P.P.S. Can't somebody quietly cut that wretch Hewitt's throat? You might look at my separate memo in this bag about Japanese assets.

LRMc

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

42

POSSIBLE COMMITMENT TO MALAYA

1. I am assuming that we are not going to get any firm undertakings from the Americans in the next few months - in respect of interdiction in South East Asia (nuclear or other); or in respect of equipment; or in respect of reinforcements of any kind in the S.E.A. area; or in respect of the practical problem of taking over the Songkla position. When I say firm, I mean the sort of undertakings that we may at present consider crucial.

2. I hope I am wrong, and that we get assurances from the Americans that are sufficiently firm, and in adequate balance, to enable the Australian Government within the next few months to decide that the Malaya commitment is "on" and that the consequential measures must be launched - whatever the political hazards.

3. But assuming that the American undertakings are minimal, or at best vague, I would like to think that any decisions the Australian Government might take were taken with a full awareness of all the consequences, both short-term and long-term, as they appear from here - and without the events of February 1942 assuming an emotional or political significance beyond their due.

4. The question that worries me above all is - Where do we go if we decide against the Malaya commitment? Putting it at its starkest, I am inclined to wonder whether we would be any worse off (from the point of view of our middle or long term security) through having committed ourselves to the defence of Malaya and having lost substantial forces in trying to hold it than through having decided not to help defend it at all. Has this been thought through? I am assuming that if the Government decides not to make the Malaya commitment there is unlikely to be any pressure for change in the traditional Australian approach on the matter of military preparedness.

5. If this last assumption should be right - and I would still like to think it was wrong - we shall in my opinion certainly lose face here. Having abandoned the Middle East, we shall be without any kind of tangible military commitment to SEATO, to ANZUS, or to ANZAM. Polite words will be uttered here about our dilemma. But no amount of argument from us about our being a developing country, aiming to build up our population, and industrialize our economy, and act as an essential food producer in the event of global war will really go down much longer - either here or, I would think, in the United States - while we seem to continue to enjoy our present relatively high wages and low taxation (compared with the United Kingdom) and our apparent quota of leisure. We shall stand in danger of being taken progressively less seriously when we talk about the vital importance, from the point of view of our own security, of stemming Communism in South East.Asia. Finally, we may be

/well

TOP SECRET 41

well on the way to ushering the British politically and militarily out of the Far East - and would the Americans take up the slack? - or could they?

6. It must surely be a matter of calculating opposing risks. Will we be prepared to accept the certain risks implicit in a commitment to defend Malaya? If not, what do we do? It must be remembered that in the last resort it is not the United Kingdom or the United States which are seeking favours from us, but we from them. It is our security that is at stake, not theirs.

7. On the matter of risks, it is as well to remember that the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada can all be said to stand at the present time under the risk of losing substantial forces in Europe - in much the same way as the British in May, 1940, were only saved by chance from losing virtually the whole of their effective land forces.

8. It may be a right decision that Malaya is not an acceptable risk; but I would like to feel sure that the consequences of non-acceptance were fully considered before it was refused.

(L.R.McI.)
27.2.55.

SECRET

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
25 FEB 1955
CANBERRA.

With the Compliments

of the Secretary

Prime Minister's Department.

Mr. J. Plimsoll,
Acting Secretary,
Department of External Affairs.

Forwarded for your information.

Received 25/2/55

23rd February, 1955.

COPY.

RECORDS OF TALKS WITH MAJOR-GENERAL BISHOP AND GENERAL BROWNJOHN

SECRET

39

Monday, 24th January:

General Sheehan took me along to see Major-General Alex Bishop, Chief Staff Officer to the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations.

General Bishop said that C.R.O. regarded the Conference as being very important from the defence side. I said that Mr. Menzies similarly regarded it and that the ANZAM countries needed to get right down to things following the Singapore talks.

I gathered that the planning papers from Singapore have not yet been considered by the Chiefs-of-Staff in the U.K., let alone by Ministers. I also gathered that little thought has yet been given to how to achieve cover for the ANZAM meeting. At any rate no ready made solution has yet occurred to the U.K.

I threw in the thought that on the occasion of the Prime Ministers' Conference at the end of 1952, ANZAM had been discussed at a special meeting between the three Prime Ministers after the main Conference had finished.

In discussing the outlook for Malaya I made the four points of

1. The importance of combatting the non-military activities of Communism.

2. The need for U.S. air and naval support.

3. The difficulty in meeting the timings set by the planners for land forces.

4. A general reference to equipment.

Bishop kept the discussion fairly general but he did deal at some length, still in a general way, with three particular matters.

Firstly he referred to the need to get together with the U.S. and just how that would be achieved covertly so as not to insult the other SEATO partners. He said that the U.K. had thought of two alternatives for this - one was that there should be four power ad hoc meetings in Washington. The second was that there should be achieved at ANZUS meetings plus U.K. There seemed little doubt that he favoured the latter and was quite happy about it. He also said that Lord Swinton accepted it. I gained the impression that the Minister of Defence and his Ministry would also accept ANZUS plus, but would prefer to embrace it only as the last resort.

"/2..

SECRET

SECRET

38

Secondly, he talked at some length on how forthcoming the U.S. were likely to be. I gathered from him that General Whiteley had told Admiral Radford of the ANZAM talks in November/December. Bishop said that Whiteley had always found Radford particularly dumb and unforthcoming so far as making known to the U.K. and/or the ANZAM countries U.S. military thinking about South East Asia. However, in the last two or three weeks Radford had given some indication to Whiteley that the U.S. would be prepared to talk about the relation between their thinking and the efforts which the ANZAM countries were making.

Thirdly, Bishop talked of the subsequent approach to be made to the U.S. after the three ANZAM Prime Ministers had discussed the area in London. For a moment I thought he was going to propose that the U.K. would make that subsequent approach through their Joint Services Mission but quite surprisingly he came out with the suggestion that the subsequent approach should be made by Mr. Menzies on his way home. I said I thought this would be a good way to handle it.

On Tuesday, 25th January, I had a long talk with General Brownjohn more related to the organization of the War Office and the Defence Committees structure but he did, in the course of the conversation, deal with the question of achieving covert four power military talks on South East Asia. He only mentioned the possibility of ad hoc four power talks in Washington and particularly mentioned that he thought Washington was the only place where these could be held without arising press interest. I said we thought that most things in Washington seemed to lead to the press sooner or later and some better cover was desirable if this were possible.

In addition to the above, General Bishop also mentioned Mr. Casey as desiring to put some troops in Thailand. He said the U.K. Chiefs-of-Staff were instinctively opposed to the idea since the troops would be hostages to fortune. I said that there was a similar instinctive opposition to the idea in Australia but that I could see strong political reasons to support it particularly that the agreement under which they went in could subsequently justify taking up a position in the Kra and I wondered myself on the planners' time tables for the Chinese defence whether there was not more than sufficient time to take the troops out again in the event of war. General Bishop gave me the impression that the U.K. had not yet got round to giving this thorough consideration but that it deserved to be carefully considered.

(A.D. McKnight)
London.
26/1/1955.

SECRET

COPY.

TOP SECRET

37

NOTE ON CONVERSATION WITH
GENERAL SIR CHARLES LOEWEN

Tuesday, 18th January:

I indicated to Loewen's Military Secretary that I had some time to spare and that if the General saw any point in further discussion, I would be available.

General Loewen saw me at his Headquarters without his Chief-of-Staff or anyone else being present and we had a very general rambling talk, the substance of which is set out in the following programmes.

Initially, General Loewen referred to quarters for Australian troops. He would make barracks available to any battalion we contributed to the strategic reserve but he indicated that quarters might have to be phased over a period of several months as he would have to transfer step by step the married couples at present in the barracks he had in mind for the Australians.

He said that it was particularly troublesome in Singapore to find accommodation for married personnel as there was virtually no "middle" housing. You could either get very expensive accommodation or Asian accommodation. He was certain in his own mind that in a city with that pattern of housing, there was no alternative to building special Army accommodation for married NCO's and junior officers. I said that I thought it might be a good idea if Newman, the head of the Treasury Defence Division, paid a visit to Singapore and assessed the problems on the spot well ahead of the event so that he would have the necessary background.

General Loewen then referred to the point made by Malcolm McDonald the night before about the possible political difficulties with the Sultans. He said he hoped that this would not lead us to mark time pending its solution. I said that I could see no reason why the planning and thinking should not proceed even though the Sultans had not politically accepted Australian participation as it was the Commissioner-General's job to get them on side if Australia's participation was required.

General Loewen told me of General Rowell's proposals for sub-units of specialised branches like artillery to be included in any contribution to the strategic reserve. He said that while nobody liked sub-units, and particularly after the experience in Korea, he would accept them as the benefit of the experience to be gained by the Australian participants outweighed any administrative difficulties.

As to integrated staffs he had received a signal from Australia to say that the Minister had approved the appointment of an Australian Brigadier to his staff. I told him that I did not think he could expect early action for Australian appointments to the complete range

"/2..

TOP SECRET

of posts he had discussed with General Rowell as I felt Ministers might prefer to determine that question and to make appointments, if any, after the Prime Ministers had returned from abroad and the complete picture had been considered by Cabinet. I feel pretty certain that, apart from the Brigadier, General Loewen is not particularly concerned to have early appointments in the integrated staff. He did however, ask me when Brigadier Daly was likely to be reposted from his present post and there is no doubt that he himself would very much like to have Daly as the first appointment. I said that was a matter of course which he could discuss informally with C.G.S.

He asked me generally as to the Australian Government's reactions to the Singapore planners' papers. I said that it had in the first place helped to crystalise in the minds of Ministers the importance of the cold war period before any hot military threat arose and the necessity to take what action was open to us to combat the non-military activities of the Communists.

I said that in addition the need for U.S. air and sea support was emphatically pointed up in the planners' papers. I also said that our preliminary feeling was that the timings we were expected to fulfil were probably beyond our capacity and therefore, everything possible must be done to increase the delay which could be imposed on the Chinese by interdiction. This required a greater U.S. air and sea effort than had been assumed by the planners; and I also posed the possibility of a battalion or two of U.S. Marine Commandos.

General Loewen agreed with this idea and said that we should take some hope from the fact that the U.S. strategic reserve in the Pacific, consisted of three Marine divisions; with all due respect to their notion of their going in wherever there was trouble, in relaity it appeared that the only place where they could go in would be Malaya.

This part of the conversation was very general and rambling but at one point General Loewen did express some scepticism as to the U.S. confidence that they would blot out the Saigon airfields. He thought that you could put them out, they would be restored and you would have to put them out again, and that it required a continuing process to deny their use to the enemy.

I asked him whether the planning papers were not, to some extent, a counsel of perfection. He said you could, with every prospect of success, carry out Operation Warrier with less forces than the planners envisaged.

He also referred to what he had heard of Mr. Casey's views on present military plans and said he thought that Mr. Casey imagined the military people were being defeatist in proceeding on the basis that there was no defence line north of the Kra; Mr. Casey was overlooking the major premise that that conclusion was based on the forces likely to be available. He indicated that if he had an opportunity to talk to Mr. Casey during the latter's visit to Bangkok, he would make this point.

He also told me of a plan of General Donovan's to build a U.S. air base in the Peninsula, thus giving us occupation rights.

He also referred (as he did in September last when I saw him) to the need for bringing home to the Malayan political parties that independence went hand in hand with defending yourself. He is obviously very keen on building up the indigenous forces and he referred openly to his own feeling that Australia would replace or at least become equal with the United Kingdom as senior political guide to a new and independent Malaya. He said he would hope to see some of the officers of indigenous forces trained in Australia.

I referred to the fact that we had Burmese in some of our schools and I expressed my own view that we should do no less for the Malays. He is thinking of our training two or three officers annually at our Officer Cadet Schools and said he would mention this to General Wells. He did, however, throw out a hint that he would find it extremely difficult to get the money to do this.

We talked also briefly of equipment required for Malaya and he said he thought there was a possibility which could be investigated whereby.

(i) initial supplies of equipment would come from the United Kingdom;

(ii) Australian manufacturing potential would be developed to maintain supplies of certain items of that equipment which we could most efficiently make; and

(iii) the further suppliers of the remainder should be sought from the United States.

In his mind this meant you could get on with the job without first having to solve the question of whether to standardise on United States or British equipment and it would also mean that we would seek assistance from the U.S. having done all we can for ourselves first. In other words, he thought that some such arrangement was the most effective practical arrangement.

(Sgd.)(A.D. McKnight)
London

24/1/1955.

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA. **No 9283**

DEPT. OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

To Mr Plimsoll Date 17/2/55 Time

Received the following TOP SECRET Cables :—

Reg. No. I-2187/8/9 Copy No. 4

DEPT. OF E.A. ONLY.
RETURNED.
RETAINED ON FILE.
.....

Signature Date Time

2896...

NOTE.—Please return this receipt promptly to External Communications Officer.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

TOP SECRET 34

ABK:MFP COPY NO. 4. I. 2187/8/9

Sent: 16th February, 1955
1515

FROM: Rec'd: 17th February, 1955
0830

Australian High Commission,
L O N D O N.

415 TOP SECRET IMMEDIATE.

From Prime Minister to Acting Prime Minister.

1. On 10th February, Defence discussion were held between the United Kingdom Ministers for Defence and Supply and Townley and myself. Following is a Summary.

2. Proposed Songkhla Operation. I handed in memorandum which referred to the Defence Committee's views on the vital importance of operation warrior to the Defence of Malaya if Siam turns Communist. It then stated that before further steps are taken to commit Australian forces to Malaya the three A.N.Z.A.M. Governments and subsequently, United States of America, should agree that the operation will be carried through if need for it should arise. The memorandum suggested as a better alternative that the four Governments should agree upon how best to secure position by some means other than by forcible seizure which clearly involves serious political problems. It was added that one possible method would be prior agreement with non-Communist Siamese Government under the Manilla Treaty.

3. In the course of the discussion I stressed the following points:

(1) The importance of United States participation in Defence of Malaya.

(11) (a) the necessity to secure firm United States agreement to the Songkhla operation if need for it should arise.

(b) Consideration should be given to possible means of securing the position by some means other than forcible seizure.

(c) Various possibilities were mentioned. Military and political objections were raised to a token force in Bangkok. Another possibility was the building of airfields in Southern Siam in peacetime as a basis for occupying them if necessary. I suggested the possibility of an agreement in broad general terms stating that all member states of SEACDT and all states guaranteed by that treaty would welcometroops from participating countries in the event of war or threat of war. United Kingdom Minister for Defence is to discuss with Foreign Secretary political implications of Songkhla operation with object of further discussion between A.N.Z.A.M. Governments and with United States.

4. Commonwealth Strategic Reserve.

The following was agreed:-

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

(a) Programme of capital expenditure and sharing of it should be examined by A.N.Z.A.M. Defence machinery in conjunction with the respective treasury representatives. Proposals should then be submitted to the three Governments for consideration.

(b) The A.N.Z.A.M. Defence Committee should submit to the Governments concerned a drafted directive regarding the employment of reserve.

5. Force Requirements and Deficiencies for the Songkhla Operation.

United Kingdom Minister for Defence suggested that an opportunity might arise at Bangkok for Eden, Dulles and Casey to have some discussions on United States assistance to remedy deficiencies shown in report of A.N.Z.A.M. planners. It was agreed that in light of these discussions a complete list of force requirements and deficiencies should be drawn up for discussion in A.N.Z.A.M. and with United States. Any additional information that may be received before the Bangkok Conference will be forwarded for the information of Casey.

6. Administrative implications of Songkhla Operation.

It was agreed that the joint A.N.Z.A.M. administrative planning staffs should be instructed to make a detailed investigation of requirements for submission through the A.N.Z.A.M. Defence Committee to respective Governments for consideration and decision as guide to planning and providing for these needs if ultimately approved.

7. The Defence of Malaya in Global War.

As stated in paragraph 12 of my cablegram of 5th February it was agreed at meeting on 4th February that Bangkok Conference would afford a convenient opportunity for United States to be informed of serious deficiencies which existed in forces and equipment available for the defence of South East Asia and the need for American assistance in remedying this. For this purpose United States Government might be prevailed on to facilitate the supply of equipment to Commonwealth members of S.E.A.C. defence Treaty by arrangements comparable with those which exist for members of N.A.T.O.

I informed meeting that I proposed to discuss these matters in Washington.

It was agreed that in order to determine more precisely what are the requirements the probable source of supply after my Washington talks and the production and financial implications, A.N.Z.A.M. joint administrative planning staffs with representatives of joint war production committees might then examine matter and report through A.N.Z.A.M. Defence Committee to respective Governments. Standardization according to source of supply should also be considered.

8. Relation of Nuclear Weapons to Scale of Attack.

As indicated in report of A.N.Z.A.M. planners and comments of Defence Committee and United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff, it is essential to ascertain United States intentions in use of Nuclear weapons and relation of their effect on the probable

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM. TOP SECRET

I. 2187/8/9

scale of attack on Malaya. The meeting noted my intention to raise this matter in Washington.

9. Intelligence appreciation.

In their comments on report of A.N.Z.A.M. Planners, United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff considered that certain measures should be taken now to prepare intelligence background for further planning covering period from end of 1957 to end of 1959. They have proposed that intelligence appreciation should be made by joint intelligence committee London and considered later by combined joint intelligence committees of Australia, New Zealand and the Far East.

I suggested that as I am to raise in Washington questions of United States co-operation and support and as Americans have suggested an inner group of United States, United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand for S.E.A.C. Defence treaty planning, it would appear that if possible United States should ultimately be associated with this appreciation. This was agreed to and I was invited to make this proposal to United States administration.

10 Please repeat to Casey. McCauley should be informed for new briefing.

A/P.M. & DEPT.
A/MIN. & DEPT. OF E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. OF DEFENCE

17th February, 1955

SEC A/Ss(U.N.)(ADMIN.) MR. QUINN? MR. BOOKER.?

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA. No 9513

DEPT. OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

To Mr Pleasnell Date 15/3/55 Time 1000

Received the following TOP SECRET Cables:—

Reg. No. I-3423 Copy No. 5

DEPT. OF E.A. ONLY.
RETURNED.
RETAINED ON FILE.
.....

Date..... Time.....

Signature.....

2896...

NOTE.—Please return this receipt promptly to External Communications Officer.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS TOP SECRET

CABLEGRAM.

I.3423

VA:CEB

Dated: 14th March, 1955.
1215
Rec'd: 15th March, 1955.
0830

COPY NO. 5.

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON

288 TOP SECRET

For Plimsoll only from Tange.

Your 193.

Following is message Eden to Menzies.

Begins:-

You wrote to Harold MacMillan on 24th February about the political implications of the "Songkhla Operation". Unfortunately MacMillan was not able to discuss this with me before my departure for Bangkok. You will, however, have seen the record of a discussion on this subject at the Commonwealth Relations Office on the 26th February with Tange and other Australian Representatives, which will, I hope, be of some use to you for your talks with the Americans.

2. So far as the United Kingdom is concerned, plan Warrior has been approved by our Chief of Staff as a basis for military planning. We fully accept that it would have to be carried out if the necessity arose, but of course we cannot foresee precisely what the circumstances would be when the time came to take such a decision, or how it could best be put into effect. We should like to give further thought to some of the alternatives you, yourself, suggested, including the possibility of negotiating an agreement in broad general terms stating that all Member States of S.E.A.T.O. would welcome troops from participating countries in the event of war or a threat of war. Our object would be to find ways and means of developing a political situation in which the operation, if carried out, would have the approval and support of the Government of Siam. We welcome your proposal to raise the question with the Americans, and hope that you will be able to make some progress in exploring the possibilities with them. In the meantime we should prefer that the matter should not be put to the United States authorities as one which requires a cut and dried political decision at this moment.

3. We should like to keep in continuous touch with you about this, and suggest that we might have further consultations in London with Australian and New Zealand Representatives when you are able to let us know the results of your talks in Washington.

4. I have shown this message to Swinton who agrees with its terms. Ends.

15th March, 1955.

THE RT. HON. R.G. CASEY SIR PHILIP MC BRIDE
BRIG. F.O. CHILTON MR. A.S. BROWN

TOP SECRET

SEC MR. QUINN

30

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.

AUSTRALIA HOUSE,
LONDON, W.C.2.

TOP SECRET

17th February, 1955.

Dear Allen,

Reference cable from London No. 415.

I took a fairly full note of this meeting and I think it best for you to have some record from me in addition to the cable.

There were present:

Mr. Harold MacMillan
Mr. Selwyn Lloyd
C.I.G.S.
C.A.S.
Sir Harold Parker, Secretary Defence
General Brownjohn, Chief Staff Officer to Minister of Defence
Geoff Clark, C.R.O.
John Wilson (Supply)

The Prime Minister
Mr. Townley
Sir Frederick Shedden
Hicks,
Air Vice Marshal Hancock and myself

A note was taken of the meeting by somebody from the United Kingdom Defence Department and the Minutes were circulated in draft. I have not seen them but I understand the Australian Delegation has suggested some rather extensive amendments.

Mr. MacMillan opened the meeting by saying that its aim was to get precise information on what was needed to defend Malaya and to examine the question of working the United States in.

Mr. Menzies referred to the Melbourne Herald report of the 5th February and said that he had ascertained that it had been cabled from Trevor Smith for London. He emphasised that he must handle in his own way on his return any questions affecting the defence of Malaya. He said that

in the light of his London discussions he would submit the result and questions to Cabinet and he told the meeting of the line he had taken at his Press Conference on Wednesday, 9th February.

He went on to say that so far the discussion had centered on land defence but we were assuming United States naval and air support. C.I.G.S. said that we must have United States naval and air support and United States participation in planning was therefore essential. Mr. Menzies said that with Australian memories of the 8th Division being infiltrated in the absence of air and naval support, he must stress this need on the United States. Their participation in the air and at sea made the feasibility of defending Malaya certain.

C.A.S. said he thought we might not be faced with this difficulty; the United States were in South Viet Nam and Thailand; and the Communists could not advance without attacking United States forces.

C.I.G.S. warned Mr. Menzies that the United States would think of their strategic bombing as removing all Chinese air forces from the whole South East Asian area; they might therefore, say that you don't need tactical air forces. That should be borne in mind in Mr. Menzies approach to the United States.

Mr. MacMillan pointed out that such an argument would at the best be only valid for hot war.

Mr. Menzies said the United States were over-attached to strategic air power. He must raise Operation Warrior; it could not be left 'til events required us to go in. It was a political problem to invade and he recalled Mr. Holland's opposition to such a course.

28

C.I.G.S. reminded the meeting that Warrior must, above all, be launched with surprise. Mr. Menzies agreed; he had been prepared to ignore the political complications of invading Thailand but you could not do so; he must speak to a restricted circle in the United States about this. When the time came to move, one Government might be against it and that would end the Operation. The political aspect required full and real thought.

(At this point, Mr. Menzies broadly threw out the suggestions contained in attachment "A" to this letter, namely

1. Possibility of extending Malayan Police Agreement.
2. A token force in Bangkok whose object was to withdraw).

Immediately C.I.G.S. voiced his objections to the token force. He said his objections were purely military and the question was really a political one. But you would lose your token force in the event of a Communist uprising. There were two million Chinese in Bangkok and if only 60,000 were Fifth Columnists, they could swamp a brigade group.

C.A.S. said that the two battalions in Berlin were ~~worry enough~~. a parallel

C.I.G.S. said you would get more boost to Thai morale from General Donovan's idea of building airfields in Thailand, one of which would be at Songkhla. The presence of an air group would assure the Thai army of air support and would boost morale much more than a brigade group. Mr. Menzies said that it appeared the two major matters to put to the United States were naval and air support and how to get to the Kra position.

27

C.I.G.S. said that the time factor was important; Warrior must be accomplished the moment Thailand looked like going; similarly if Laos and Cambodia went and there was evidence of a Communist build up in those two countries.

Mr. Menzies then threw out the idea of a broad multilateral pact under SEATO.

Mr. MacMillan said he liked that idea as it did not point the bone. He also liked Donovan's idea.

C.I.G.S. said Donovan's airfield scheme got an initial favourable reception but was finally turned down by the United States Chiefs-of-Staff; we might have to revive it.

Mr. Menzies then read and delivered to Mr. MacMillan the memo attached hereto marked "B" which had been prepared by Mr. Tange. He said he wanted all possibilities examined and particularly a SEATO multilateral pact which, at first sight, he preferred.

C.I.G.S. said that there was such a pact in NATO but it took some years to achieve.

C.A.S. said such a pact might have the effect of frightening other Asian countries from joining.

Mr. MacMillan said he would discuss the problem with the Chiefs-of-Staff and the Foreign Secretary.

A somewhat general discussion followed and it was finally agreed that, whatever developments of new weapons occurred, in and near Malaya we would always have to reckon with conventional forces and infiltration.

Mr. Menzies then circulated a paper prepared for him by Sir Frederick Shedden and a copy is enclosed.

Page 3 of this paper provoked some discussion. Mr. Menzies said that he must talk in Washington with the list of deficiencies in his hand. Goods in kind were going out of the United States to countries which would not be very biligerent when the time came.

C.I.G.S. said that it was necessary to know United States air plans in order to know our own forces' requirements. We would never get their detailed plans. But if we told them the targets which were support bases for forces attacking Malaya, he felt sure they would say that they would include those targets in their plans. He thought Mr. Menzies must get agreement at the highest political level in Washington for such tintack military talks.

Mr. MacMillan said our aim would then be to get the United States to make up the specific deficiencies e.g. bombs, guns, etc. either by off-shore purchases or direct grant aid of goods.

C.I.G.S. said the United States were not ignorant of the position in view of the 5 power planning talks last year.

C.A.S. said that the important thing was to get United States agreement to extend the NATO infrastructure principle to SEATO. They, in fact, extended that principle to other SEATO countries except the ANZAM countries. As in NATO we would, of course, have to accept obligations such as telling the United States of our proposed force contributions.

C.I.G.S. said the United Kingdom must make firm decisions as to its own Army contribution. In cold war they could provide one division but that depended on (a) their physical movement and (b) the stock pile of equipment. He thought Mr. Menzies should speak quite frankly about obtaining one United States marine division from Pearl Harbour.

Mr. Menzies said that equipment was all important. He must be sure of supplies if he were to seek a radical change in Australian defence policy.

C.I.G.S. said that there should be a fundamental study of the size and shape of forces for Malaya. We had been talking in terms of last war divisions but he felt sure Malayan divisions could be more lightly equipped, if not

smaller.

Mr. MacMillan concluded by saying that he thought a paper should be prepared for the Foreign Secretary on what he should open up with Dulles in Bangkok.

There was then some discussion on Maralinga but I am writing separately about that.

Developments since the meeting

We have given some thought to what might emerge as a result of the meeting and we felt some concern as to the shape which the paper to the Foreign Secretary might take. It now appears that there will be no paper but that he may be given a copy of the Minutes as his brief for his talks with Dulles (with which talks it is contemplated that the Foreign Ministers of Australia and New Zealand would be associated).

As I said earlier, Sir Frederick received a draft of the Minutes and found them unsatisfactory and suggested extensive amendments. So far as we know, there is no firm set of Minutes.

We think it important in relation to the matters which it has been suggested Sir Anthony Eden should raise in Bangkok to make the following points:

1. Withdrawal of Commonwealth Forces from Korea.

   We regard this as a proper subject to be opened up and discussed fairly fully in Bangkok.

2. Proposal for 4 Party military planning.

   The idea that Sir Anthony Eden should mention this to Dulles in Bangkok came in the ANZAM meeting from Mr. Menzies and the actual words he used were "Anthony could whistle in Dulles' direction on the need for it."

   We therefore, intend to press upon C.R.O. this morning that the question of military planning should only be opened up in the broadest way with Dulles. I am, personally, fearful of Dulles receiving it as a firm and definite proposal which will be put into the

State Department machine immediately encountering latent opposition from the Pentagon. The chances of our achieving our objective are enhanced if Mr. Menzies sells the idea in principle to President Eisenhower and Admiral Radford.

3. Deficiencies of equipment.

Again I feel this should only be opened up with Dulles in the broadest terms and again the better presentation of it would be made by Mr. Menzies.

4. The infrastructure principle in SEATO.

As you will see from the earlier part of this letter, this was the particular thinking of the Chief of the Air Staff. I do not think that in opening up the subject of equipment deficiencies with Dulles, Eden should use NATO terms (the exact connotation of which we, in Australia, do not know) but which would be received by Dulles in their strict NATO technical sense. It might be possible that the obligations which a receiving country has to accept under NATO would be difficult for an Australian Government to accept. Alternatively, it might be possible for an ANZAM arrangement on equipment to be made which is better than the NATO pattern. At least the possibility should be kept open until Mr. Menzies gets to Washington.

Yours sincerely, and in haste

Alan McKnight

Allen S. Brown, Esq., C.B.E.,
Secretary,
Prime Minister's Department,
Canberra, A.C.T.

P.S. Can you let Jim Plimsoll see.

Top Secret

Memorandum by Australian Prime Minister.

DEFENCE OF MALAYA

1. The Australian Government has accepted the principle that the main aim of Australia should be to assure the safety of South-East Asia in a general war.

2. Estimates made by the ANZAM planners of the force requirements for the defence of Malaya have assumed that Operation Warrior will be put into operation if Thailand "goes Communist".

3. The Australian Defence Committee concluded that "if Siam turns Communist, it is . . . . militarily essential that the . . . . position should be seized immediately to prevent its occupation by the Communist forces. The most important result of this action would be that, in the event of war, the ANZAM powers would have in their possession the final position from which Malaya could be defended . . . . . Failure by the ANZAM powers and the United States to approve of such an operation being carried out, should the need for it arise, would mean that Malaya could not be defended if attacked in strength and the forces deployed in the area would almost certainly be lost".

4. It is in my opinion desirable that, before further steps are taken to commit Australian forces to Malaya, the three ANZAM Governments - and subsequently the United States - should agree that Operation Warrior will be carried through, if Thailand turns Communist in the cold war, in order to prevent the Isthmus falling under Communist control.

5. As a better alternative, the four Governments should agree upon how best to secure the position by some means other than by forcible seizure, which clearly involves serious political problems. One possible method would be prior agreement with a non-Communist Siamese Government under the Manila Treaty. The content of such an agreement could take various forms.

6. For the reasons given in paragraph 3, I should welcome full explanation of this problem, and of possible solutions to it, with a view to reaching early agreement.

9th February, 1955.

TOP SECRET

A. 22

SONGKHLA.

At the present time the disposition is to let the question be settled when the time comes. Mr. Menzies has expressed himself as quite willing to face up to moving troops into Thailand should that be militarily necessary.

On the other hand, Mr. Holland has expressed himself as against such a step. And the U.K. have expressed no opinion but the Foreign Office is uneasy.

The probabilities are that there will be no sudden and decisive military invasion which marks a point at which Communism has adopted military means to occupy Thailand. The position will gradually worsen and in such circumstances the strong probability is that one or more Governments will shrink from the political decision to authorise the entry of Anzam Forces into Thailand.

But to assure ourselves some good argument as to the legality of moving in, we should investigate now the various possibilities of obtaining from the Thailand Government some agreement which could be said in the future to justify the movement of our troops into Songkhla.

Such an agreement can be either abstract or related to some present movement of forces.

In either case it must be so worded as to cover the future contingencies which we have in mind.

An abstract agreement can be either bilateral or multilateral.

I think a bilateral agreement in the abstract is the least desirable form of agreement.

One possibility is that there could be a multilateral agreement in the abstract among all the SEATO powers whereby each gives in advance its consent to the stationing within its territories of the armed forces of any other party to the treaty for the purpose of combatting Communist expansion(or aggression or infiltration).

I am trying to discover whether there is any comparable agreement under NATO.

The remaining possibility is a bilateral agreement with the Thailand related to some present movement of forces.

There are two possibilities

(a) an agreement between the U.K. and Thailand giving the armed forces of the Anzam powers, which are in Malaya for the purpose of combatting Communist terrorism, the right to enter the southern provinces of Thailand for the purpose of rounding up terrorists whom they reasonably believe to be in those provinces.

There is already an agreement for Malayan Police Forces to enter and all that is needed is an extension of this agreement (1) to military forces and (2) to additional areas.

In view of the terms of Article II of the Manila Treaty I do not think it is an unreasonable agreement to seek from the Thais.

(b) The other alternative for a Thai military agreement requires a prior decision as to the stationing of a Token force in and around Bangkok. The arguments for stationing such a force are

1. It would bolster Thai morale, particularly if associated with an American air group.
2. It is not a great military risk because such a force could be evacuated to Songkhla.

3. In withdrawing from Bangkok to Songkhla the force could take with it the Thai King and the Government.
4. It is consistent with certain indications given by the U.K. Chiefs-of-Staff, that they are thinking ahead to the time when they can seriously think of attempting to hold Thailand by military means.
5. It gives us cover for Songkhla.

The arguments against the stationing of such a force are

1. They would be hostages to fortune.
2. Military advisors are against the proposal.
3. It would expose the Thais to violent Communist propaganda.
4. It might provoke the Communists to greater activity against Thailand.

On this I can only say that I think the opposition of the U.K. Chiefs-of-Staff is purely instinctive and they admit that they have not looked at the possibilities of evacuation and they also admit the powerful nature of the political arguments in favour of the proposal.

On the question of the effect of the withdrawal of the brigade on Thai morale I do not think that this could be appreciably different from the effect on Thai morale of putting no troops in in the event of Communist attack against Thailand.

In short, should not Governments agree that an examination should be made of the proposal.

Anick

TOP SECRET

C.

19

TOP SECRET

Copy No. 7

ANZAM PLANNING FOR THE DEFENCE OF MALAYA

THE PRIME MINISTER

1. The attached notes for use at the meeting on Thursday, 10th February, are based on the Defence paper on ANZAM Planning for the defence of Malaya, which was submitted to you on 27th January, and subsequent Conference discussions.

2. Also attached is a note on Deficiencies in Mobilization Equipment, which are related to the requirements of the Forces to be deployed overseas, as mentioned in the notes in paragraph 1.

3. I have been informed by the Ministry of Defence that the only subject that they wish to raise is the Atomic Testing Range. A note on this is also attached. They are happy with the view that they should arrange for an English contractor to do the work, but look to us for assistance in the firing tests, of about 150 Service personnel.

Secretary
Department of Defence

9th February, 1955.

TOP SECRET

Copy for Mr. Knight

TOP SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy No. 7

ANZAM DEFENCE MACHINERY

THE PRIME MINISTER

1. In the notes prepared for your use at the meeting on 10th February, with the United Kingdom Minister of Defence, reference is made in several places to further action that is necessary by the ANZAM Defence Machinery, in regard to planning for the defence of Malaya.

2. I attach for your information a diagram showing the composition of this machinery, through which ANZAM planning has been developed to date.

3. Briefly, it comprises, under the three Governments, the ANZAM Defence Committee, consisting of the Australian Defence Committee and the United Kingdom and New Zealand Chiefs of Staff. The Heads of the United Kingdom and New Zealand Liaison Staffs normally represent their Chiefs of Staff, though the latter attend on special occasions when in Melbourne. ANZAM Joint Planning, Joint Administrative Planning and Joint Intelligence Staffs function under the ANZAM Defence Committee, as shown in the diagram.

4. Under the arrangement agreed between the three Governments, planning in peace for the defence of the ANZAM Region is assigned to the ANZAM Defence Committee. Home defence plans within the Region are the responsibility of the respective National Authorities, and are co-ordinated as necessary by the ANZAM Machinery.

Secretary
Department of Defence

9th February, 1955.

ANZAM DEFENCE MACHINERY

CONFIDENTIAL

ANZAM GOVERNMENTS

AUSTRALIA | UNITED KINGDOM | NEW ZEALAND

ANZAM DEFENCE COMMITTEE

AUSTRALIA	DEFENCE COMMITTEE
UNITED KINGDOM	U.K. CHIEFS OF STAFF represented by Head of U.K. Service Liaison Staff.
NEW ZEALAND	N.Z CHIEFS OF STAFF represented by Head of N.Z. Joint Service Liaison Staff

	ANZAM JOINT PLANNING STAFFS	ANZAM JOINT ADMINISTRATIVE PLANNING STAFFS	ANZAM JOINT INTELLIGENCE STAFFS
NEW ZEALAND	Planning representatives from N.Z. Joint Service Liaison Staff, N.Z. Joint Planning Committee, as appropriate.	Administrative planning representatives from N.Z. Joint Service Liaison Staff, N.Z. Joint Administrative Planning Committee, as appropriate.	Intelligence representatives from N.Z. Joint Service Liaison Staff, N.Z. Joint Intelligence Committee, as appropriate.
UNITED KINGDOM	Planning representatives from U.K. Service Liaison Staff, B.D.C.C. (F E), U.K. Joint Planning Committee, as appropriate.	Administrative planning representatives from U.K. Service Liaison Staff, B.D.C.C. (F E), U.K. Joint Administrative Planning Committee, as appropriate.	Intelligence representatives from U.K. Service Liaison Staff, J.I.C. (F E), J.I.C. (London), as appropriate.
AUSTRALIA	Joint Planning Committee	Joint Administrative Planning Committee	Joint Intelligence Committee.

MEETING WITH UNITED KINGDOM MINISTER OF DEFENCE

Thursday, 10th February, 1955

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY PRIME MINISTER

As I said at last Friday's meeting, Australia can fairly claim that she has never yet grudged her share of responsibility in times of crisis.

The proportion of our Defence Vote devoted to joint projects of a British Commonwealth nature is also evidence of the commitments that we have readily accepted in peace. Australia spent £42 million to 30th June, 1954, on particular projects of British Commonwealth Co-operation, such as the Long Range Weapons Establishment, Atomic tests, and Joint Intelligence, and the current annual expenditure of £11 million will rise higher with existing commitments.

We have now agreed to participate in a strategic reserve in Malaya and, subject to the clarification of certain conditions, to reinforce the area in the event of war.

I would now outline some suggestions which, if agreed to, will lay down the course of action on the next steps. Many of them rest, in the preparatory stage, with the effective and expeditious operation of the ANZAM Planning Machinery.

Copy for Mr. McKnight

Copy No. 7

ANZAM PLANNING FOR THE DEFENCE OF MALAYA

OUTSTANDING MATTERS FOR CONSIDERATION AND DECISION BETWEEN THE ANZAM GOVERNMENTS

I - THE COMMONWEALTH STRATEGIC RESERVE

1. THE SHARING OF CAPITAL COSTS.

The capital expenditure for the whole Reserve has been estimated at £7 million. The apportionment between Governments is a matter for determination.

Maintenance costs of component parts of the Reserve, and related domestic administrative matters, such as conditions of service, are the responsibility of the respective Governments.

Brought to be under the mark

SUGGESTED ACTION

The programme of capital expenditure, and the sharing of it, should be examined by the ANZAM Defence Machinery in conjunction with the respective Treasury representatives. Proposals should then be submitted to the three Governments for consideration.

2. THE FUNCTIONS OF THE RESERVE.

The functions of the Reserve in relation to -

(i) anti-bandit operations;

(ii) the defence of Malaya;

are matters for consideration by Governments.

The Melbourne Defence Report stated -

"28. The employment of the Reserve would be a matter for decision by the respective Governments, but the United Kingdom hoped that it would be available for use in current anti-bandit operations."

SUGGESTED ACTION

The ANZAM Defence Committee should submit to the Governments concerned a draft directive regarding the employment of the Reserve.

II - THE PROPOSED SONGKHLA OPERATION

3. SECURING THE SONGKHLA POSITION.

The following is a summary of Australian Defence views:-

"If Siam turned Communist, the Communists would have in their hands the Songkhla position, which is the final position from which Malaya could be defended against a major land attack. Also the internal security situation in Malaya would gravely deteriorate.

Accordingly, the military advice is that, if Siam turns Communist, it is essential to secure immediately the Songkhla position.

The launching of the operation might have grave political implications. It would therefore be essential for the ANZAM Governments to reach agreement on this matter and obtain United States concurrence in the proposed course of action, as their support would be essential politically in the United Nations, and militarily, in the event of war with China developing.

Although forcible seizure of the Songkhla position may well prove to be the only feasible method of securing it, every effort should be made to find alternative means, for example, by prior agreement with a non-Communist Siamese Government under the SEAC Defence Treaty."

The United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff have pointed out that the military need for executing the plan for occupation of this position may become progressively less as the SEAC Defence Treaty organisation gains in strength.

The proposed operation was discussed by the United Kingdom, Australian and New Zealand Prime Ministers on 4th February, and the following views were expressed:-

United Kingdom - Agreed to planning without commitment.

Australia - "If such a move should become necessary in the cold war and before open aggression had occurred, I said I would myself be willing to support and justify the step. But in view of its political implications it was essential to secure the concurrence of the United States Government in the necessity for such a plan and their political support if the occasion for its execution arose."

New Zealand - Was chary about the operation.

SUGGESTED ACTION

As indicated above, this matter should be further discussed between the ANZAM Governments, and with the United States of America.

1. Clear with US.

2. Explore our ways & means.

4. FORCE REQUIREMENTS AND DEFICIENCIES FOR THE SONGKHLA OPERATION.

(i) SUMMARY OF REQUIREMENTS AND DEFICIENCIES.

The following is a summary of the total forces required, in addition to the security forces in Malaya, as assessed by the ANZAM Planners:-

ARMY - One division and one brigade group are required by D plus 35 days, in the initial stages of the operation, and the remainder of the second division, as a reserve and deterrent, by D plus 42 days.

Of this total of two divisions, it has been assumed that the United Kingdom may be able to provide one division from internal security forces in Malaya, and to replace it, if a reduction in internal security is not acceptable. This would leave a deficiency of one division. However, the availability of the division from the United Kingdom is stated to depend on the situation in other theatres.

AIR FORCE - 248 aircraft are required but there will be a deficiency of 48.

NAVY - 65 vessels are required, but there will be a deficiency of 12.

(ii) POSSIBLE AUSTRALIAN CONTRIBUTIONS TOWARDS MEETING DEFICIENCIES.

ARMY - The Australian Defence Advisers have considered the possibility of providing a brigade group by D plus 35 days, in addition to the Australian component of the Strategic Reserve (one battalion with certain support arms). This would involve increasing the strength of the Permanent Forces, which are already below establishment, or altering the system of national service, which is a legislative matter.

AIR FORCE - To contribute 20 aircraft towards the deficiency of 48 would entail an increase of 3,000 in the strength of the Royal Australian Air Force, which is at present 2,000 under establishment. The same considerations of policy apply, as in the case of the Army.

NAVY - To bring the Royal Australian Navy carrier up to operational status, and to man four ocean mine-sweepers, would require an increase of 700 in the strength of the Royal Australian Navy. The same considerations of policy apply, as in the case of the Army.

(iii) VIEWS OF UNITED KINGDOM CHIEFS OF STAFF (COS (55) 19), AND COMMENTS THEREON.

The United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff have stated in their report on the ANZAM Planners' Studies -

"We agree that the force must be strong enough to deter possible Communist intervention from Viet Minh or China if we have to seize the Songkhla position in peace. If plans could be properly co-ordinated with the United States it is probable that the deterrent forces required could be reduced." (Paragraph 19.)

"We consider it reasonable for one division of the United Kingdom Strategic Reserve to be earmarked to reinforce Malaya if it should be necessary to mount the operation to seize the Songkhla position in cold war. The availability of this division, however, would depend on the situation in other theatres at that time, and no firm guarantee could be given that it would in fact be available. We consider that if we could count on United States support and had plans properly co-ordinated with them, the deterrent elements could be substantially reduced to units which could more easily be provided by the ANZAM powers." (Paragraph 21.)

In the case of land forces, the deterrent element of the total of two divisions (in addition to the forces now in Malaya), is two brigades, leaving one division and one brigade to be provided.

With an Australian contribution of one brigade, and no certainty of a United Kingdom division, the minimum force requirements, apart from the deterrent element, may not be forthcoming. The co-operation and support of the United States are therefore of paramount importance, as stated by me at the meeting on 4th February.

SUGGESTED ACTION

(a) It is essential to be quite clear about the intentions for meeting the force requirements and deficiencies for the Songkhla operation, should it be approved for planning purposes, and for any modification of Australia's legislation to provide its contribution.

(b) Following this clarification, an explanation of the Songkhla operation, or any alternative course of action, will be outlined by me in Washington to the United States Government, together with a statement of force requirements and deficiencies.

5. ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF SONGKHLA OPERATION.

There are also important administrative implications of the Songkhla operation to be considered. These relate to the movement problem and administrative units. There is also a large works programme, including airfield construction, which has to be completed in peace, before occupation of the Songkhla position. Reserves of equipment and material must be stockpiled in peace.

SUGGESTED ACTION

Any decision relating to a commitment for forces would entail a contribution to these requirements. It is necessary to establish a basis for inter-Governmental agreement on the division of responsibility in respect of personnel, material and finance.

The Joint ANZAM Administrative Planning Staffs should be instructed to make a detailed investigation of the requirements, for submission through the ANZAM Defence Committee to the respective Governments for consideration and decision, as a guide to planning and providing for these needs, if ultimately approved.

III - THE DEFENCE OF MALAYA IN WAR

6. FORCE REQUIREMENTS AND DEFICIENCIES.

Examination of the ANZAM Planners' Studies shows that the land forces required (5 divisions by D plus 6½ months) cannot be provided in time, and that there are large deficiencies in naval and air forces (138 vessels and 508 aircraft respectively).

7. ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLICATIONS.

Serious administrative deficiencies will exist, even if the ANZAM countries provide all the administrative support that is thought to be possible. There is the provision of administrative units. There are large deficiencies in the equipment of all forces, some of which should be stockpiled in Malaya, and considerable construction work, including airfields, must be completed in peace.

I stated at the meeting on 4th February that Australia was confronted with very serious difficulties in equipping her forces, for which there was no simple practical or financial solution. Equipment for all three divisions, which it is planned to deploy in war, is not available in Australia. If high priorities could be obtained from the United Kingdom and the United States for the equipment for one division to be stockpiled in Malaya, then from our present resources within Australia we could very largely equip the second division and partially equip the third division of the corps. This equipment would be mainly stocks from the 1939-45 War. Our present mobilization equipment programme is based upon a long haul of fifteen years with an average annual expenditure of £11 million.

SUGGESTED ACTION

It was agreed at the meeting on 4th February that the Bangkok conference would afford a convenient opportunity for the United States to be informed of the serious deficiencies which existed in the forces and equipment available for the defence of South East Asia, and of the need for American assistance in remedying this. For this purpose, the United States Government might be prevailed on to facilitate the supply of equipment to Commonwealth members of the SEAC Defence Treaty by arrangements comparable with those which exist for members of NATO.

I also propose to discuss these matters in Washington.

In order to determine more precisely what are the requirements, the probable source of supply after my Washington talks, and the production and financial implications, the ANZAM Joint Administrative Planning Staffs, with representatives of the Joint War Production Committees, might then examine the matter and report through the ANZAM Defence Committee to the respective Governments. Standardization according to source of supply should also be considered.

8. RELATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO SCALE OF ATTACK.

If the United States were to carry out intensive air attacks on China with nuclear weapons, the probable scale of attack on Malaya might be so reduced, as to bring the defence of Malaya within the capabilities of the ANZAM countries.

The United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff have stated:-

"The (ANZAM Planners') study clearly indicates the need for us to co-ordinate with the United States plans for war with China." . . . . . .

"Any overt aggression by Chinese or Viet Minh forces would constitute an attack against the SEAC Defence Treaty Powers. The United States would thus be involved and future plans should assume that under these conditions she would use nuclear weapons."

SUGGESTED ACTION

It is essential that an understanding of United States' intentions in the use of nuclear weapons should be obtained, following which a reassessment of the measures necessary to meet the revised scale of attack on Malaya should be made by the Joint ANZAM Intelligence, Operational and Administrative Planning Staffs, for consideration by the ANZAM Defence Committee. This question will be raised by me in Washington.

9. INTELLIGENCE APPRECIATION PROPOSED BY UNITED KINGDOM CHIEFS OF STAFF.

The United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff consider that certain measures should be taken now to prepare the Intelligence background for further planning covering the period from the end of 1957 to the end of 1959. They have proposed that the Intelligence appreciation should be made by the Joint Intelligence Committee, London, and considered later by the combined Joint Intelligence Committees of Australia, New Zealand and the Far East.

SUGGESTED ACTION

(a) As I am to raise in Washington the questions of United States co-operation and support, and as the Americans have suggested an inner group of the United States, United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand for SEAC Defence Treaty planning, it would appear, in view of their predominant position, that, if possible, the United States should ultimately be associated with this appreciation. The views of the United Kingdom Government on this are desired.

(b) No reference is made in the proposed appreciation to the possible effects of Indonesia going Communist. This aspect should be included.

9th February, 1955.

Copy No. 7

DEFICIENCIES IN MOBILIZATION EQUIPMENT OF THE AUSTRALIAN SERVICES

1. SUMMARY OF TOTAL DEFICIENCIES.

The most recent survey conducted by the Australian Services of their equipment requirements for mobilization disclosed the following total deficiencies:-

	Navy £M	Army £M	Air Force £M	Total £M
Items Commonly Produced in Australia	15.777	54.055	63.228	133.060
Items to be Sought Overseas	27.960	121.772	117.834	267.566
TOTAL	£43.737M.	£175.827M.	£181.062M.	£400.626M.

Actual expenditure during 1953/54 and planned expenditure during the current Three Years' Defence Programme against the above deficiencies are as follows:-

	Year	
Actual Expenditure	1953/54	£26.772M.
Planned "	1954/55	£37.136M.
	1955/56	£47.423M.
	1956/57	£31.061M.
		£142.392M.

Note: Of this total, £85.921M. is for items commonly produced in Australia and £56.471M. is for items to be sought overseas.

2. SUGGESTED ACTION.

These deficiencies relate to the requirements of forces on mobilization for Home Defence and for deployment overseas. The study suggested in the separate note in respect of the latter should embrace a survey of these requirements also.

9th February, 1955.

Copy No. 7

ATOMIC TESTING FACILITIES IN AUSTRALIA

NOTE FOR PRIME MINISTER

1. DISCUSSION WITH UNITED KINGDOM MINISTER OF DEFENCE, 10TH FEBRUARY.

The United Kingdom Minister of Defence wishes to discuss this subject at the meeting on 10th February.

It is understood that the United Kingdom are happy with the view that they should arrange for an English contractor to do the construction work at Maralinga, but that they look to Australia for assistance in the firing tests of about 150 Service personnel. This could be arranged, and the United Kingdom Minister of Defence might be informed.

As you are aware, the Royal Australian Air Force Airfield Construction Squadron is ear-marked for work in Malaya for the Strategic Reserve, and the Forces are under strength. Accordingly, the Defence Committee reported as follows in September, 1954, on the ability of the Australian Service Departments to provide Servicemen for construction and other purposes associated with the tests:-

> "The resources of the Services for carrying out projects of the nature proposed are limited, as compared with the resources of the civilian sector of the economy. The Rum Jungle uranium project has been undertaken by private enterprise, and it is suggested that a Governmental approach to industry on the national importance of the Atom Range project should meet with a similar satisfactory response."

2. REPLY PREVIOUSLY FURNISHED TO THE UNITED KINGDOM.

The United Kingdom High Commissioner was advised on 25th October that the Australian Government was prepared to co-operate with the United Kingdom Government in the further series of trials beginning in April or May, 1956, and, to this end, agreed to make the Maralinga site available for a permanent testing ground.

The letter of 25th October also stated:-

> "I am afraid that pressure on our local resources, both service and civil, is such that it is unlikely that little more than token contribution can be made by us towards the construction and preparation of the proving ground."

Following discussions with the United Kingdom official mission which visited Australia in December, the United Kingdom High Commissioner was informed on 18th January that the Australian Government would wish the United Kingdom to agree, if it decided to go ahead with the establishment of the proving ground, upon a memorandum of arrangements covering the various matters of general principle which were outlined.

It was added that -

> "Our discussions have been based on the assumption that the United Kingdom will be the constructing authority and that the bulk of the labour force and materials will be found from United Kingdom sources."

9th February, 1955.

TOP SECRET

INTRODUCTION.

The ANZAM Defence authorities have appreciated that S. is the final position from which Malaya could be defended. If Thailand falls into Communist hands during the cold war period, it would be essential for Commonwealth forces, stationed in Malaya, to seize S. The most important result of this action would be that, in the event of war, the ANZAM Powers would have it in their possession. Furthermore, by the shortening of the boundary with Communist Thailand from the existing frontier of 270 miles to one of 50 miles, it would reduce the Communist ability to reinforce the Malayan Communist Party.

2. The Prime Minister and party discussed the implications of gaining possession of S. during the cold war period both in London and Washington.

DISCUSSIONS IN LONDON.

3. At a meeting at the Ministry of Defence on 10th February, 1955, the Prime Minister submitted a memorandum to the United Kingdom Minister for Defence which stated inter alia:-

> "It is in my opinion desirable that, before further steps are taken to commit Australian forces to Malaya, the three ANZAM Governments - and subsequently the United States should agree that operation Warrior will be carried through, if Thailand turns Communist in the cold war, in order to prevent the Isthmus ~~policy~~ falling under Communist control.
>
> As a better alternative the four Governments should agree upon how best to secure the position by some means other than possible seizure, which clearly involves serious political problems. One possible method would be prior agreement with a non-Communist Siamese Government under the Manila Treaty ....

4. In the course of discussion various possibilities were mentioned, including:-

(a) the establishment of a token force in Bangkok in peace-time which, in the event of trouble, could withdraw on to the S. position;

TOP SECRET

(b) the building of airfields in Southern Thailand in peacetime as part of the South-East Asia Defence Organization "Infrastructure". If one could be sited at S. it would give an excuse for going to the defence of that position if necessary.

From the minutes of the meetings in London it would seem that only Sir Winston Churchill expressed any view (4th February, 1955). He pointed out this grave step (seizing of S. before aggression had occurred) would not be contemplated unless aggression was imminent in the area; and that plans for such an operation would be made on the assumption that Thailand was a friendly ally. However, it was only prudent that the military staffs should prepare plans against this as well as other contingencies. Such plans in no way committed the ANZAM Governments to carrying them out.

5. In your report to our Minister you stated that the United Kingdom authorities maintained that they could not make a firm governmental decision "ahead of the circumstances of the time, that the operation will in fact be carried out". You also found that the Foreign Office held not only this view but also the view that the operation would in fact be most difficult to carry out, if there were merely a change in the political colour of the Thai Government during the cold war stage. Not merely did Eden take the view that a governmental decision by the United Kingdom should not be made now but he also urged the Prime Minister not to seek a decision from the United States that they would give political support to this operation.

DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON.

6. At a meeting on 15th March, 1955, the Prime Minister expressed to the Secretary of State the necessity to find some solution which would ensure that ANZAM Powers had the S. position if it became necessary to defend Malaya against overt aggression. He said that the three Commonwealth Governments would need the political support of the United States Government, if they were obliged to seize the S. position forcibly in order to deny it to a Communist regime in Thailand, which had assumed power during the cold war stage. The

TOP SECRET

Secretary of State recognized the importance of the problem and said that the United States military opinion confirmed the ANZAM view of the essentiality of the S. position. As a first reaction he made the suggestion that a solution might be found in the precedent of the Caracas resolution of February 1954 in the organization of American States.

7. In a discussion with Mr. Merchant you submitted the following alternatives:-

(a) The most desirable arrangement would be an agreement by the present Thai Government (perhaps within the Manila Pact framework) legally binding its successor to give the ANZAM Powers the right to occupy the position. The agreement would need to be such as to give ANZAM Powers a good case in international law.

(b) Some multilateral agreement among all Manila Pact Powers welcoming the entry of ~~unlimited~~ member forces into the territory of another member in the event of a threat to the security of the latter.

(c) The establishment of some prepared position (e.g. an airfield) with the right to defend it in the eventuality in question.

8. Mr. Merchant replied that the action in question would constitute little difficulty in time of war but would be an extremely difficult problem in time of peace. He expressed the view that an agreement at Government level of the type suggested would give rise to serious difficulties.

(a) It might produce defeatism throughout a large part of the Manila Pact Area.

(b) It would provide the Communists with a magnificent opportunity for a propaganda barrage against the Thai Government.

(c) A generalized authority under the Manila Pact would be construed by Communist propaganda as confirming that the Manila Pact is a vehicle for enabling the colonial powers to re-establish themselves on the Asian mainland.

TOP SECRET

(d) Such a generalized authority might also be construed as directed at Laos, Cambodia and Viet Nam and thus violating the Geneva Agreement.

9. Mr. Merchant threw out the idea that the desired results might be achieved through understandings at the military level on such subjects as protection of the lines of communication, development of joint Malay-Thai police measures, etc. He also suggested that if it were decided to negotiate with the Thai Government, it would be best to make an approach in terms of "contingency planning" for the whole area of the Pact. If one were only discussing the defence of the Kra Isthmus with them, it might give them the impression the rest of Thailand would not be defended.

10. The Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Radford, did not apparently express an opinion on the S. position as such. He, however, stated the principal danger to Malaya lay in internal subversion there and in Thailand. In the case of Thailand there should be military intervention to prevent its fall to Communism by a coup or other subversive means.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS.

11. On 31st our Ambassador in Washington had a further discussion with Mr. Merchant, who said that we should take it as definite that the United States supported the general proposition to move to the S. position if an emergency arose which rendered such a move necessary. Such a move would in such circumstances be justified whether or not there was any "colour of right". Merchant thought that some solution might be found along the lines of an agreement for joint police border operations. The Ambassador suggested the following:-

(a) The ANZAM Powers and the United States to work out a formula so general in character as to conceal the real intent but sufficient to give some "colour of right" in the event that an emergency did arise.

(b) This general formula to be casually inserted when the occasion arose in some wider and more general statement or draft resolution on which meeting of SEATO subversion experts and/or military advisers might be working.

TOP SECRET

PRESENT SITUATION.

12. The present situation, as we see it, is as follows:-

(a) The Australian Government is anxious to find some solution to the problem of seizing the S. position during the cold war period, should Thailand turn Communist. The present estimates of force requirements are based on the assumption that the ANZAM forces will meet Chinese aggression on the Kra Isthmus rather than on the Malayan border.

(b) The United States would not oppose the seizure of S. position in an emergency.

(c) The United Kingdom Government have serious reservations about the desirability of moving on to the position in times of peace and state they are not in a position to make a governmental decision in advance.

(d) The Prime Minister has informed the United Kingdom and New Zealand Governments through their respective High Commissioners that the Australian Government are studying the problem further with the intention of consulting further with the two Governments concerned.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS.

13. We feel that we must attempt to find a solution which ~~closely~~ clearly establishes a precedent for the presence of ANZAM forces on or near the S. position during the cold war period but which -

(a) does not give the Thais the impression that other parts of Thailand will NOT be defended;

(b) could not be construed as an attempt to reimpose colonialism on the mainland of South-East Asia;

(c) could not be construed as directed against Laos, Cambodia and Viet Nam.

14. Of the solutions put forward (summarized at Appendix A) we are in favour of one combining -

(a) an extension of the present U.K./Thai police agreement to include the use of ANZAM forces within the Thai frontier;

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

2

(b) A U.K./Thai agreement for the establishment of some prepared position on or near S. (e.g. an airfield) with the right to defend it with ANZAM forces (possibly brought in under (a) above) against possible attacks from terrorists operating in Thailand.

To allay Thai fears about the defence of other parts of Thailand it might conceivably be possible to represent the construction of the airfield in (b) above as a part of a common SEATO infrastructure programme, extending into Northern Thailand. We feel at any rate that the solution we envisage, would provide the Communists with the least amount of ammunition to fire at the Thai Government in any propaganda campaign they may choose to launch.

15. Of the other solutions we feel that the Caracas solution might not be understood in Australia and would certainly not be accepted in countries such as India. We agree with Mr. Merchant's that multilateral agreements would be open to misinterpretation in Asia.

TOP SECRET

ANNEXURE "A"

SOLUTIONS PUT FORWARD.

1. The establishment of a token force in Bangkok in peacetime which, in the event of trouble, could withdraw on to the S. position.

2. An agreement by the present Thai Government (perhaps within the Manila Pact framework) legally binding its successor to give the ANZAM Powers the right to occupy the position. The agreement would need to be such as to give ANZAM Powers a good case in international law.

3. Some multilateral agreement among all the Manila Pact Powers welcoming the entry of member forces into the territory of another member in the event of a threat to the security of the latter.

4. The establishment of some prepared position near S. (e.g. an airfield) with the right to defend it in the eventuality in question.

5. An extension of the U.K./Thai police agreement to include the use of ANZAM forces within the Thai frontier.

6. The ANZAM Powers and the United States to work out a formula so general in character as to conceal the real intent but sufficient to give some "colour of right" in the event of an emergency. This general formula to be casually inserted when the occasion arose in some wider and more general statement or draft resolution on which meeting of SEATO subversion experts and/or military advisers might be working.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF AUSTRALIA
A1838 A1838/269
TS687/7/3
446 11 741 2 2 2 - 2 (B1132286)
ITLJ: 2020/00171828
Search room PIN 222380
Indicators: 26,69
Date Printed: 7/5/2020
842193

OPEN

FILE No.:

687/7/3