REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND969000

Pol, Thai - US

Department of State TELEGRAM

SANITIZED COPY
SENSITIVE INFORMATION DELETED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 094

PAGE 01 BANGKO 07862 01 OF 02 260922Z

4 S
ACTION EA 15

INFO GPM 03, SC 01, RSC 01, USIA 12, H 02, NSC 10, L 03, INR 07, P 04, CIA 04, DOD 01, SP 02, SS 20, NSAE 00, IGA 02, AID 28, MMS 01, RSR 01 [illegible]

STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW
☐ Retain class'n ☐ Change/classify to
☑ Declassify ☑ with concurrence of [redacted]
☐ after
EO 12958, 28X
FPC/HOR by [illegible] Date: 4/16/96
Withdrawal No. 2169-49

R 260808Z DEC 67
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3600

67-69 Pol

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 BANGKOK 7862

SUBJECT: IRG/EA THAI COUNTRY REVIEW

REF: STATE 87741

1. GENERAL THONGCHERM IS ADVISED ON MILITARY MATTERS BY LT COLONEL MITTLESTADT OF THE ARMY ADVISORY GROUP, AN ABLE OFFICER WHO HAS THONGCHERM'S CONFIDENCE FROM THEIR PRECEDENT ASSOCIATION IN THE SAME RELATIONSHIP AT KORAT (HEADQUARTERS SECOND ARMY, OF WHICH THONGCHERM REMAINS COMMANDER). MITTLESTADT CONSULTS WITH MISSION STAFF, ESPECIALLY SA/CI, ON US POLICY AS IT AFFECTS THONGCHERM'S RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE NORTHEAST. MISSION REGARDS MITTLESTADT AS CAPABLE AND RELIABLE INTERPRETER OF THESE VIEWS. IN ADDITION, LT COLONEL ELLIS, MACT REPRESENTA-

PAGE 2 RUMTBK 7862K/1 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
TIVE AT SAKON NAKHON, HAS ACCESS TO THONGCHERM AND STAFF AS DOES PART-TIME AIR FORCE ADVISORY GROUP MEMBERS. DIRECT SECURE VOICE LINK BETWEEN ELLIS' OFFICE AND MACT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED WITH MY APPROVAL.

2. [redacted]

FOIA(b)1 State

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SANITIZED COPY
SENSITIVE INFORMATION DELETED

Declassified
Authority: 28143
By: Alan Lipton Date: 09-11-2008

Authority
DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 987466

Department of State TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 BANGKO 07868 01 OF 02 260962Z

[redacted] NORMAN SHANK, USOM AREA DEVELOPMENT ADVISOR, IS STATIONED AT SAKON NAKHON AND MEETS FREQUENTLY WITH THONGCHERN AND HIS STAFF ON INTER-RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MILITARY AND AID SUPPORTED PROGRAMS, OFTEN AT LATTER'S INITIATIVE.

3. CONSUL FRANCIS AND VICE-CONSUL FROM CONSULATE UDORN - WHOSE INTIMATE KNOWLEDGE OF THE NORTHEASTERN SCENE AND LANGUAGE IS FAMILIAR TO THE DEPARTMENT - ARE FREQUENTLY IN TOUCH WITH GENERAL THONGCHERN PERSONALLY AS WELL AS MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF AND CIVIL AUTHORITIES IN WHOSE AREA OF JURISDICTION SECOND ARMY OPERATES.

FOIA(b)1 State

PAGE 3 RUMTBK 7862K/1 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4. MORE IMPORTANTLY FOR PURPOSES OF SUCH POLICY QUESTIONS AS BALANCE BETWEEN MILITARY AND CIVIL COUNTER-INSURGENCY MEASURES, I AND PRINCIPAL MEMBERS MY STAFF [redacted] HAVE HAD FREQUENT CONTACT WITH GENERAL THONGCHERN IN BANGKOK, KORAT AND AT SAKON NAKHON, UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH HAVE PROVIDED EXCELLENT SETTING FOR DETAILED EXAMINATION OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN US-SUPPORTED CIVIL/POLICE PROGRAMS - NOTABLY AID PROJECTS - AND COMMUNIST SUPPRESSION RESPONSIBILITIES. HIS REPLIES HAVE BEEN CONSTRUCTIVE AND REASSURING, AS HAVE HIS ACTIONS THUS FAR. MISSION HAS BEEN UNABLE TO DISCOVER ANY CONCRETE ACTION TAKEN BY SECOND ARMY FORWARD THUS FAR WHICH HAS AN ADVERSE IMPACT ON AID OR OTHER CIVIL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS. WE REMAIN OF COURSE ON THE ALERT FOR ANY ADVERSE DEVELOPMENT AND HAVE GIVEN GUIDANCE TO ALL US FIELD REPRESENTATIVES IN THIS REGARD.

5. WE ARE OF COURSE WELL AWARE OF THE HAZARDS INVOLVED IN THE NEW SECOND ARMY ROLE AS WE HAVE REFLECTED IN OUR REPORTING. ENERGETIC, HIGH-LEVEL US EFFORTS BY THE TAYLOR-CLIFFORD MISSION

PAGE 4 RUMTBK 7862K/1 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
THE CHARGE BEFORE MY ARRIVAL AND BY OWN INTERVENTIONS BEGINNING

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Authority
DECLASSIFIED

NATIONAL ARCHIVES

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000

Department of State TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOIA(b)1 State

PAGE 03 BANGKO 07862 01 OF 02 260922Z

BEFORE PRESENTATION OF CREDENTIALS, WHILE THEY DID NOT AVERT MODIFICATION OF PREVIOUS ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, APPEAR TO HAVE PRESERVED THE ESSENTIAL SUBSTANCE IF NOT ALL THE FORM OF OUR COOPERATION IN THE COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD.

6. WE HAVE BEEN REPEATEDLY ASSURED FROM THE PRIME MINISTER ON DOWN THAT THERE WILL BE ABSOLUTELY NO UNWARRANTED INTRUSION INTO THE CIVILSECTOR. EXCEPT FOR A PROBABLY INADVERTENT INCURSION IN AN ARD PROJECT IN SAKON NAKHON BY A 2ND ARMY MAJOR AT THE OUTSET OF THIS NEW ARRANGEMENT, QUICKLY WITHDRAWN, THERE HAVE BEEN NO INSTANCES OF INTRUSIONS OR EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY OR CONTROL OVER CIVIL PROGRAMS WHETHER OR NOT THEY HAVE BEEN AID SUPPORTED. WE HAVE HEARD THIS DETERMINATION THAT 2ND ARMY WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH CIVIL AFFAIRS OFTEN ENOUGH AND FROM ENOUGH SENIOR THAI OFFICIALDOM, THAT WE BELIEVE SUCH WILL NOT OCCUR. AS RECENTLY AS DECEMBER 22, GEN. SURAKIJ, CHIEF OF STAFF, RTA, TOLD [redacted] THAT THE RTA WAS EAGER FOR THE CIVIL SIDE TO CARRY OUT ITS PROGRAMS EFFECTIVELY, CITING THE VSF PROGRAM IN PARTICULAR, AND STOOD READY TO GIVE ANY ASSISTANCE

PAGE 5 RUMTBK 7862K/1 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

REQUESTED, BUT THAT THE RTA WOULD NOT TAKE INITIATIVES IN THIS REGARD FOR FEAR OF BEING ACCUSED OF INTERFERING WHICH, HE SAID, GEN. PRAPHAT HAD ISSUED STRICT ORDERS AGAINST.

7. TO DEFINE THE SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE WHICH HAS TAKEN PLACE, WE MUST NOW DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN THE CSOC WE COMMONLY IDENTIFIED WITH GEN. SAIYUD, WHO AS DIRECTOR OF THE OPERATIONS AND COORDINATION STAFF DURING THE CPM-1 ERA, REPRESENTED THE OPERATIONAL CUTTING EDGE OF CSOC, AND BETWEEN THE COMMANDER AND CHIEF OF STAFF OF CSOC, RESPECTIVELY PRAPHAT AND SURAKIJ, WHOSE PRESENT OPERATIONAL ARM IS 2ND ARMY, WHICH HAS REPLACED CPM-1. TO AN INCREASING DEGREE SAIYUD IS BEING EASED OUT OF THE MILITARY SUPPRESSION ROLE, WITH THAT ROLE NOW FIRMLY IN THE HANDS OF THE RTA IN THE PERSON OF 2 ND ARMY FORWARD. ON THE OTHER HAND, GEN. SAIYUD CONTINUES AS AN ACTIVE MEMBER OF THE VILLAGE SECURITY FORCE COMMITTEE AND WE ARE ENSURING THAT HIS CONSIDERABLE TALENTS FIND PLAY IN THIS VERY IMPORTANT SECTOR. AND ARE NOT WASTED IN A HEAD-BUTTING CONTEST WITH THE RTA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority _____

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND969000

L ARCHIVES

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 04 BANGKO 07862 01 OF 02 260922Z

LEADERSHIP, A CONTEST WHICH HE HAS ALREADY IN FACT LOST. WITH REGARD TO DR. CHUMNAN, IT IS COMMONLY KNOWN THAT HE IS UP TO

PAGE 6 RUMTBK 7862K/1 C O N F I D E N T I A L
HIS EARS IN POLITICAL WORK FOR PRAPHAT IN CONNECTION WITH THE RECENT MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS, THE COMING PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS AND IN PLANNING WORK CONCERNING A FUTURE POLITICAL PARTY. HE HAS BEEN LESS AND LESS PERSONALLY INVOLVED IN CSOC AFFAIRS, OF EITHER SORT, BUT REMAINS EASILY AVAILABLE WHEN ASSISTANCE OR ENDORSEMENT IS NEEDED FOR ADVANCEMENT OF VSF MATTERS WHICH LIE LARGELY IN THE AREA OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR.

8. WHILE NOT ENDORSING THE NEW SECOND ARMY ROLE, TOWARD WHICH I MAINTAIN AN ATTITUDE OF CRITICAL EVALUATION OF DEEDS RATHER THAN WORDS, WE MUST ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THERE EXIST POSITIVE ASPECTS OF THIS CHANGE. UNDER PREVIOUS ARRANGEMENTS MILITARY SUPPORT TO CPM-1 WAS UNEVEN, AND RTA SUPPORT IN PARTICULAR WAS VISIBLY RESTRAINED AS UNITS PUT UNDER CPM-1 CONTROL OFTEN ARRIVED WITHOUT ADEQUATE EQUIPMENT FOR OPERATIONS. AS A CONSEQUENCE, MILITARY COMPONENT OF CPM-1 FAILED TO PURSUE AND ATTACK MAIN ARMED CT BANDS WITH SUFFICIENT VIGOR TO ESTABLISH CLEAR RTG INITIATIVE. (CSOC DIRECTOR OPERATIONS SAIYUD ADMITTED AS MUCH TO SPEAR AND STOKES, AS REPORTED A-420, ATTRIBUTING THIS SHORT-COMING TO RTA DELAYS IN PROVIDING REQUIRED LOGISTIC SUPPORT.
UNGER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority _____

DECLASSIFIED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000

Department of State TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 098

PAGE 01 BANGKO 07862 02 OF 02 260945Z

S
ACTION EA 15

INFO GPM 03,SC 01,RSC 01,USIA 12,H 02,NSC 10,L 03,INR 07,P 04,CIA 04,
DOD 01,SP 02,SS 20,IGA 02,AID 28,MM 01,NSAE 00,RSR 01/117 W

R 260808Z DEC 67
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3601

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 BANGKOK 7862

RTA VERSION IS THAT COMPLEX COMMAND CHANNELS AND LACK OF CLEAR OVERALL AUTHORITY FOR SUPPRESSION OPERATIONS WAS PRODUCTIVE OF SLUGGISHNESS AND DELAY). WHATEVER THE EXPLANATION, DURING PAST TWO MONTHS AGGRESSIVE SECOND ARMY SUPPRESSION ACTIVITY IN NORTHWEST SAKON NAKHON PROVINCE, UNDER THONGCHERM'S DIRECTION, IN SAWANG DAEN DIN AND WANONIWAT DISTRICTS, HAS BEGUN TO CREATE ATMOSPHERE OF SECURITY IN WHAT HAD BEEN MOST INSECURE AREA IN THE NORTHEAST, OPENING OPPORTUNITY FOR CIVIL DEVELOPMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIVITY TO COUNTERACT EFFECTS OF CT ARMED PROPAGANDA MEETINGS WHICH HAD BEEN CONCENTRATED IN THIS AREA. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THERE EXIST VALID MILITARY ROLES IN THE COUNTER-INSURGENCY PICTURE IN THE NORTHEAST AND THAT THONGCHERM IS BEGINNING TO FILL THEM CAPABLY. IN FACT, WE HAVE TAKEN

PAGE 2 RUMTBK 7862K/2 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
DISCREET SOUNDINGS AMONG GOVERNORS IN THE NORTHEAST AND FIND GENERAL AGREEMENT - INCLUDING SUCH CIVIL STALWARTS AS UBON GOVERNOR PHAT - THAT MORE EFFECTIVE AND DETERMINED RTA OPERATIONS AGAINST CT BANDS WERE NEEDED THAN HAD BEEN ACHIEVED UNDER CSOC/CPM-1 ARRANGEMENT, AND THAT NEW SECOND ARMY ROLE WOULD BE WELCOME IF IT DID NOT IMPINGE ON GOVERNOR'S RULE. WHILE THERE HAVE BEEN A FEW SIGNS OF UNCERTAINTY AND APPREHENSION ON PART

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND969000

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 BANGKO 07862 02 OF 02 260945Z

OF INDIVIDUAL CIVILIAN FUNCTIONARIES IN PROVINCES, OUR SOUNDINGS TAVE REVEALED NO DEMORALIZATION IN PROVINCIAL STAFFS.

9. WE SHOULD STILL HAVE BEEN MORE CONCERNED ABOUT NEW SECOND ARMY ROLE IF IT HAD DISPLACED A VIGOROUS, INVOLVED CIVIL CPM-1 ELEMENT IN THE FIELD THAT WAS ACTING DECISIVELY TO COORDINATE ASSETS OF NORTHEAST DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS WITH SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE BREAKTHROUGHS ON INSURGENTS AND WITH SECURITY OPERATIONS. AS WASHINGTON AGENCIES AWARE, HOWEVER, CPM-1 CIVILIAN ELEMENT WAS WEAK. PROMISE OF EARLY CSOC DAYS - WHEN DR. CHAMNAN ACTUALLY SAID HE INTENDED TO SPEND A GOOD DEAL OF TIME IN SAKON NAKHON HIMSELF - WAS NOT CONSUMMATED. CSOC HEADQUARTERS HAS MADE LONG STRIDES IN COORDINATING CIVIL RTG

PAGE 3 RUMTBK 7862K/2 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
EFFORTS AT TOP, AND IN SOME AREAS - PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BEING A MAJOR ONE - CSOC HAS COMBINED MILITARY AND CIVILIAN ASSETS TO GET RTG MOVING IN AREA THAT HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN VIRTUAL VACUUM.

10. ON THE WHOLE, HOWEVER, WE HAVE TO CONCEDE THAT CIVIL-POLICE-MILITARY CONCEPT WAS NOT CARRIED FAR BY THE RTG IN ITS ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS. IT REMAINS A VALUABLE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, AND IN THIS FORM IT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN CARRIED OVER TO SECOND ARMY FORWARD AND TO BE STILL CONSIDERED VALID BY THE THAI. WITH CSOC REMAINING AS THE NATIONAL ORGANIZATION RESPONSIBLE FOR VARIETY OF COUNTERINSURGENCY PLANNING FUNCTIONS, AND WITH CSOC PERSONNEL DEEPLY INVOLVED IN VITAL COUNTERINSURGENCY PROGRAMS SUCH AS VSF, I BELIEVE THERE IS GOOD CHANCE THAT CIVIL CONCEPTS WE HAVE HELPED PLANT AND NURTURE THROUGH CSOC WILL CONTINUE TO GROW.

11. ON NEGATIVE SIDE, WE CAN ASCERTAIN DEFINITE FEELING ON PART OF POLICE THAT THEIR PRESTIGE AND COMMAND ROLE IN NORTHEAST HAS BEEN DIMINISHED. POLICE DEPUTY AT CPM-1 HAS BEEN REPLACED

PAGE 4 RUMTBK 7862K/2 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Authority

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000

Department of State TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 03 BANGKO 07862 02 OF 02 260945Z

Y POLICE "ADVISOR". DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER PRAPHAT HAS, ACCORDING TO TNPD COMMANDER GENERAL PRASERT, BEEN SLOW IN APPROVING PERMANENT ASSIGNMENTS OF POLICE OFFICERS TO TAMBON STATIONS IN NORTHEAST. WE ALSO HEAR CONFLICTING VERSION: THAT TNPD ITSELF IS RESPONSIBLE FOR DELAYS. (IN EITHER EVENT, FULLY QUALIFIED LEADERSHIP FOR TAMBON NETWORK IS HARD TO COME BY, AS WITNESS NEED TO DRAW UPON BPP CADRES FOR INITIAL STAFFING.) TNPD ALSO HAS RESERVATIONS ABOUT ARMING NEW VILLAGE SECURITY FORCE, WHICH WE WILL HAVE TO WORK OUT ON THE GROUND AS THE PROGRAM DEVELOPS. WE ARE WORKING TO ESTABLISH EFFECTIVE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TAMBON POLICE STATIONS AND THE VSF.

12. WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT TO DISTINGUISH SYMPTOM OF SECOND ARMY ROLE IN NORTHEAST FROM DEEPER POLITICAL CURRENTS INVOLVED IN POLICE ATTITUDES. TNPD SHOWED NO INTEREST IN PUTTING ANY WEIGHT BEHIND RETENTION OF CPM-1/CSOC ARRANGEMENTS IN THE NORTTEAST, ACCORDING TO SAIYUD (A-420). TNPD DOUBTLESS REALIZED THAT CSOC QUESTION WAS PERIPHERAL MATTER IN TRADITIONAL STRUGGLE BETWEEN ARMY AND POLICE FOR INVLUENCE, POWER AND PROGRAM FUNDS.

13. THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT CSOC OPERATION HAS BEEN

PAGE 5 RUMTBK 7862K/2 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

SUCCESSFUL MECHANISM BY ANY OBJECTIVE STANDARD IN MODIFYING THE HISTORICALLY AUTHORITARIAN AND ALOOF THAI APPROACH TO RURAL ADMINISTRATION. SEEN PURELY IN CI TERMS, AS SAIYUD UNDERSTANDABLY DOES, IT WOULD PERHAPS BE BETTER NOT TO HAVE MADE ANY CHANGES IN THE CSOC APPARATUS. HOWEVER, CI OPERATIONS OF RTG BY THEIR VERY PROGRESS HAVE BECOME A MAJOR FACTOR IN THE BALANCE OF POLITICO-MILITARY FORCES ON WHICH THE THANOM-PRAPHAT REGIME RESS. ARMY LEADERS WILL SEEK TO ENSURE THAT PROSPECTIVE PROMULGATION OF A CONSTITUTION AND NEW ELECTIONS DO NOT CUT TOO DEEPLY INTO THE DOMINANT POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF THE ARMY. ARMY OFFICERS, PARTICULARLY THOSE AT INTERMEDIATE LEVELS THAT HAVE NOT BEEN MELLOWED AND BROADENED BY PARTICIPATION IN BROAD AFFAIRS OF GOVERNMENT, SEE THEIR FUTURE SUBJECT TO LIMITATION AND MAY WELL HAVE MADE THEIR CONCERNS KNOWN THROUGH SURASKIT TO PRAPHAT.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Authority
DECLASSIFIED

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969000

Department of State TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 04 BANGKO 07862 02 OF 02 260945Z

14. MUCH AS WE OPPOSE ANY RISK AT ALL OF ROCKING THE BOAT IN CI ACTIVITY, WE MUST ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT THAILAND'S EXEMPLARY RECORD OF COOPERATION WITH US MILITARY AND COVERT ACTIVITY AND POLITICAL OBJECTIVES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA IS RELATED TO THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EXTANT POLITICAL SYSTEM HERE. MODIFIED AND BROADENED THOUGH THE GOVERNMENT'S POLITICAL BASE HAS BEEN

PAGE 6 RUMTBK 7862K/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L
BY PROGRESSIVE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, WITH MORE LIBERALIZATION IN PROSPECT, IT IS VITAL TTAT THE INSTITUTIONAL ARMY BE KEPT IN STEP WITH THESE CHANGES, AND THAT THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT BE EVOLUTIONARY AND ORDERLY. WHILE WE CONTINUE TO URGE OUR VIEWS OF THE APPROPRIATE CIVIL-MILITARY BALANCE OF EFFORT ON ALL RTG ELEMENTS INVOLVED, WE MUST AT EACH STAGE TAKE FULL ACCOUNT OF THE DECISIONS OF THE EXISTING LEADERSHIP. IF WE DO NOT WE RISK LOSING OVER TIME THE CLOSE COOPERATION WE NOW ENJOY ON MANY MATTERS RELATED AND UNRELATED TO CI. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, WE SUCCEED IN WINNING THE ARMY OVER TO A BALANCED APPROACH TO COUNTER-INSURGENCY, EVEN THOUGH IT TAKES A LARGER SHARE OF THE CREDIT THAN HERETOFORE, WE WILL HAVE PLACED THE CI PROGRAM ON A MUCH SOUNDER LONG-TERM FOOTING, AS HARMONIZED WITH AND ACCEPTABLE TO THE MOST CRITICAL POLITICAL FORCE IN THE COUNTRY. AS WE READ OUR BRIEF EXPERIENCE WITH THONG-CHERM, WE HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE WE CAN SUCCEED.

15. DEPARTEMTN IS AWARE THAT WE HAVE MADE MOST OF THESE POINTS IN OUR EXTENSIVE REPORTING ON DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS, BUT I ASSUME REFTEL REQUEST WAS FOR THE KIND OF GENERAL SUMMARY AND PERSPECTIVE GIVEN ABOVE. WHEN MINUTES OF IRG/FE MEETING ARE RECEIVED, WE WILL EXAMINE THEM TO SEE IF ANYTHING FURTHER IS REQUIRED. GP-4 UNGER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Authority _____