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I. THE INSURGENCY

A. Summary

The steady increase in Communist Terrorist (CT) capabilities in several areas of the North, the seeming inability of the Royal Thai Government (RTG) to formulate useful steps to deal with the immediate threat there, and the longer term pressures of external factors becoming evident combined to illustrate that for the present the CT effort in the North is by far the most serious internal threat confronting the RTG. The CTs concentrated their efforts during the quarter on consolidation of their gains (in terms of territorial and population control) and on harassment of RTG forces to keep them on the defensive. The focus of these subversive and military efforts was Pua district of Nan province and Chiang Khong district, Chiang Rai. An expanded level of violence in Tak province revealed greater CT inroads among the Meo and Karen population there than heretofore suspected. Overt activity was relatively insignificant in the Tri-Province area during the quarter, but intelligence indicated that clandestine organizational activity among both the tribal and Thai

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populace in the Tri-Province area continued, with CT cadres--Thai, Sino-Thai, and tribal--ranging far from their customary operating area in the Phu Lom Lo mountains.

In the Northeast, RTG security forces displayed an increased confidence and aggressiveness during the quarter which resulted in a number of successful encounters, disrupted CT movement, and may have contributed to the CTs' inability to mount their much publicized offensive campaign. As a result of decisions taken at the annual CPT regional meeting in January, an upsurge in violence did occur in mid-February in Nakae district of Nakhon Phanom province which continued through March. Terrorism and harassment of security forces also plagued parts of Sakhon Nakhon Province; overt CT activity throughout the rest of the Northeast declined considerably from the last quarter, and was relatively light for the dry season.

In peninsular Thailand a new CI command structure began to crystallize during the quarter. CTs in the Mid-South conducted sporadic violence against RTG security forces; CT-initiated violence was most intensive in Phattalung province, where CTs appeared to ignore or to flout an ongoing police suppression operation. The occupation by the BPP of a CTO base camp in Sadao sparked several clashes between CTO and joint Thai/Malaysian Forces, but for the most part violence was minimal and the situation in the Far South continued to be characterized by the uneasy but mutually self-seeking co-existence of the RTG and the CTO.

B. North

Using a combination of military force, terror, coercion and propaganda, CTs in the Far North pushed ahead during the quarter with their efforts to gain control of terrain and population in remote mountain areas. CTs also worked to improve their capabilities in the region in terms of personnel, supplies, weapons, funds, and command and control. Persistent, aggressive harassment of RTG security forces in Nan and Chiang Rai provinces kept the RTG on the defensive and unwilling or unable to mount an effective response (see BANGKOK 3451, dtg 23 1955Z Mar 70,NOTAL, for recent Mission assessment of deteriorating situation in North).

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Communist efforts at consolidation of their control over population and territory took many forms. In areas of the Far North, CT bands (in some instances of 70-100 individuals) harassed isolated VDC and police outposts and caused them to be abandoned, thus lessening government presence in certain locations. There were reports in February that CTs had established schools for children in the Nan areas they control, possibly indicating longrange objectives to indoctrinate the population. Moreover, there have been CT efforts to collectivize the opium fields of villagers who have fled the CT-controlled areas, and to gain control of the opium harvent, which would provide the CTs with an additional source of funds. The CTs appear to have increasingly efficient command and control in the Far North, which may stem from the reported move of the CT headquarters for North Thailand (Hq 95) from Muong Sai, Laos, into Sayaboury province southwest of Pak Beng not far from the so-called "liberated" area in northern Nan. Refugees continue to flow out of CT-controlled areas, although in somewhat reduced numbers in March from the 1000 which fled in January. Other refugees have reportedly fled eastward in Laos to escape CT domination.

In Nan province, the situation is characterized by increasing CT attacks on RTG units, increasing infiltration of men and supplies from Laos, and continued subversion in villages. While CT activities have been reported during the quarter in all six districts of the province, the most serious situation continues to exist in Pua and Thung Chang districts. Villagers in over thirty village of Nan province have been subjected to intensive CT pressures to join the insurgent movement, support the CTs, or leave the area. Htin refugees report that groups of up to 100 CTs on some occasions propagandized villages, threatened the villagers with death if they did not join the CTs or flee the area, and took away the young men and women of the village. Reports from a number of different villages that the CTs were pressing their young people into service or training tend to be substantiated by the composition of the 1200 refugees in the vicinity of Pua town, who are mostly children and middle-aged and old men and women. In addition to this apparent augmentation of manpower and organization within Thailand, CTs in Pua are also reported to be receiving considerable, though undetermined, quantities of weapons, ammo, and personnel from Laos. CTs trained in Laos were reportedly reinfiltrated into Nan during the quarter--some armed with AK-47s. Porters

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and horses were reported bringing in loads of weapons, ammunition, and a new type of land mine into the CT-dominated areas of Nan (the presence in the North of conventionally manufactured anti-personnel mines was reported in ref B. These have been identified as Soviet-made Model PMN).

A similar security situation in Chiang Rai province affects the districts of Chiang Khong, Chiang Kham, Thoeng, and Pong--particularly Chiang Khong, where CT-initiated armed encounters increased during the quarter. In late February and March, CTs in Chiang Kham were reportedly supplied with large quantities of AK-47 ammunition and 67 CTs armed with AK-47s were reported to have returned from training in Laos. A number of hilltribe areas in Chiang Rai as well as those previously reported in Nan have now been denied to RTG authority and normal contacts for many months while CT organizational efforts continue in these areas. CTs are apparently changing their approach to hilltribe villagers in Chiang Rai--instead of telling villagers to support them or get out of the area, recently CTs are reported to be telling hilltribesmen they could stay in areas as long as they did not support the RTG. CTs possibly see a need not to reduce further the population base from which they must draw supplies and support.

Unless RTG forces react effectively, this continued, uncontested CT progress in the consolidation of their territorial and population gains in the remote mountainous areas adjacent to the principal towns and routes of communication in Nan and Chiang Rai will afford the CTs greater access to such places as Chiang Khong and Chiang Kham towns in Chiang Rai and Pua and Thung Chang district towns in Nan, as well as give them the ability to harass at will the road net connecting these places. In late February, for example, a VDC team headquarters building in a village only four kilometers from Chiang Khong town was attacked and burned.

The Chinese road down the Nam Beng Valley reached Muong Houn in February, and aside from some survey traces identified between Muong Houn and Pak Beng, the road has not been pushed ahead as it was during the first three months of the dry season. The heaviest anti-aircraft sites in northern Laos have reportedly been established by the Chinese along the completed portion of the road--including 37mm and 57mm anti-aircraft artillery and 12.7 mm 23 mm anti-aircraft machine guns. Moreover, Chinese presence

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(AA crews, Chinese security guards, mixed Chinese/NVM companies) between Muong Houn and Pak Beng has been increasing in the last two months. It appears now as if the road will terminate at Muong Houn this dry season.

Sporadic violence persisted in Tak province throughout January and February, although no overt activity was reported there in March. A clash occurred in Muang district, Kamphang Phet in February (see ref C para7), the first important instance of overt CT activity in that province. CT violence prevented the resumption of construction on the Mae Sot-Umphang road, which was abruptly halted in December, and on whose completion the government has placed a high priority. There were two significant aspects to this upsurge in violence in Tak. One was the CTs' capability to increase the violence along the road despite an influx of police reinforcements (2 SAFs) into the province and simultaneously extend armed activities into other areas (Na Bot Resettlement Center and Kamphaeng Phet). This geographic expansion of operating area adds weight to the conjecture by some observers that there has been an augmentation of CT cadres into this area. The second significant aspect is the possible involvement of Karen tribesmen with the CTs, whereas in the past the CT movement in the Tak area has been limited to the Meo tribes. The Karen involvement like the earlier Meo involvement appears to result from maltreatment they have received at the hands of the police. The number of Meos in the Tak area is relatively limited, but the Karens are a populous people, making up the majority of the population in some district of Tak and adjacent Mae Hong Son province. Movement of any number of the Karens into the CT camp would thus be significant in terms of their numbers and because they are the tribal group most assimilated with the ethnic Thai.

The Tri-Province area was relatively quiet during the quarter: the number of overt incidents reported was the same as last quarter (50); harassment of RTG operations bases in the Phu Lom Lo continued, but to a somewhat lesser extent; by March traffic had returned to normal on the Phits-Lomsak highway with no incidents occurring there since December. Overt activity continued in such widespread areas as the eastern side of the Phetchabun valley, near Ban Chang Talud, and Chon Daen district. Althought we have only sketchy information (primarily from defectors) on the clandestine organizational activity occurring, it is apparently

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moving apace. Senior cadres--most of whom have been identified only in alias--are continuing to function in the area. The CTs operating in the Chon Daen area (see ref B paral1) are reported to be using persuasion and friendly approaches to villagers rather than intimidation or a strictly anti-government pitch. There are also reports of additional Thai cadres being involved who can make such a pitch more palatable to the ethnic Thai populace of the area.

C. Northeast

The CT performance in the Northeast during the quarter in general was less than expected. The abortive January sapper attack against Ubon RTAFB (see ref B, para 26-27 and ref C, para 23) was probably carried out by a specially trained team of Vietnamese inserted into Thailand for this purpose. A modified version of the vaunted CT dry season offensive began in the latter part of February, following a decision at the annual CPT meeting in late January to step up violence in two areas of the Northeast. The decisions reportedly taken at this meeting and the scope of violence initiated thus far suggest that serious deficiencies still exist within the CT movement in the Northeast, as was speculated in the last quarterly airgram (ref A, p.6). Moreover, some aggressive RTG CI operations during the quarter undoubtedly affected CT plans and capabilities.

Reports on the meeting of the Northeastern CPT leadership held in January have provided a partial picture of insurgent policy in the Northeast for 1970. Meetings of this sort appear to be now an annual occurrence--the last previous one being held in December 1968. The decisions made at the latter meeting set the policy for 1969. This in essence was the adoption of a low posture in order to provide time and security to improve the quality of the jungle force and to strengthen the village support base. To a large extent such policies appear to have been ratified for an additional year at the January 1970 meeting at Phu Sung. Information indicates that emphasis is to be given to training and Maoist indoctrination, improvement of security and the strengthening of the village support base. One additional new aspect included in the decisions reached

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in January was, however, to increase military action against the government in areas of the Northeast where the insurgents felt themselves strongest--the Na Kae district in Nakhon Phanom province and in the region termed 01 by the insurgents which comprises the area where the provinces of Sakon Nakhon, Kalasin and Udorn join. The CTs in all other areas of the Sakhon Nakhon, Western, and Soviet CPT subregions are to support the efforts of those in the priority areas. Also at Phu Sung the decision was taken to de-emphasize political persuasion and to stress the use of coercion and intimidation in gaining recruits and village supporters. Apparently CT aggressiveness in the designated prime areas is to demonstrate to the rural populace that the CTs do constitute a strong anti-government force and that their military strength is to be feared and respected. Such a decision seems to corroborate the persistence of CT difficulties in establishing roots among the people and in expanding and strengthening their village support base.

In February and March Nakae district of Nakhon Phanom did witness an upsurge in CT-initiated violence--including harassment, ambushes and assassinations (see ref C, para 11). The RTG responded in kind with RTG-initiated clashes (see below II.C. SECURITY RELATED DEVELOPMENTS, NORTHEAST p.25). During the night of 28 February, about 80-90 CTs organized into a number of small bands burned eight bridges, blocked two roads, attacked a VPU, and set an ambush for elements of an RTA battalion stationed in Nakae (Bn 602) that had previously killed or wounded a number of CTs in the area (the ambush was never sprung). These coordinated actions were probably designed to isolate and to force the withdrawal of the battalion. They may also have had something to do with CT propaganda claims that a "liberated area" will be established in Na Kae in 1970. During March there were 16 CT-initiated acts of violence in Nakae, including harassments of RTA positions and attacks directed against village defense personnel and police, 6 clashes between CTs and RTG forces and three more instances of bridge burning. On 22 March CTs attempted unsuccessfully to ambush a RTA M-113 APC after prematurely detonating a handmade mine in the road. This was the first reported use of a mine by CT in the Northeast.

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Likewise, CT activity in Sakhon Nakhon during the quarter was high in comparison with the rest of the Northeast, but the majority of the incidents represented lowlevel organizational activities and instances of CT terrorism rather than armed encounters.

Developments elsewhere in the Northeast contained little of significance. Overt activity declined during the quarter in Ubon from last quarter following the December 23 killing from ambush of the CT leader for southern Ubon. Incidents of violence were relatively few (only 20% of the total 106) outside of Sakhon Nakhon and Nakhon Phanom provinces. In fact, almost three quarters (72%) of the total incidents reported in the Northeast during the quarter occurred in Sakhon Nakon and Nakon Phanom. Total incidents were about at the same level as last quarter of 1969 (319 vs. 314), but their composition was significantly different, with twice as many armed encounters occurring this quarter (106 vs. 55). This quarter saw a significant dropoff in foodgathering incidents with the completion of the harvest as well as a decline in reported instances of armed propaganda. The consensus of US observers is that the RTG, if it moved decisively and effectively in the next year, could in a few years eliminate the CTs as a credible armed threat in the Northeast. The longterm effort against subversion and problems on which insurgency feeds would of course take much longer. On the other hand, if the RTG does not move decisively in the near future, it could find itself faced with a "protracted war" situation in the Northeast.

D. Mid-South

Despite the suppression operations conducted by the police in Muang and Khuan Khanum districts of Phattalung province between October 69 and March 70, there was no discernible effect on the ability of the CTs to expand and intensify their operations. In February, seven of eight incidents reported throughout the entire region occurred in these two districts, including the ambush of a missionary couple (probably mistaken identity) on

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a main road and the high noon attack on a tambon police station along the same national highway. There were 10 more incidents reported here in March; these included an attack on a police station in which one policeman was killed and one wounded, the harassment of a VST post (one VST member was killed), the assassination of a villager, and the harassment of a police station just across the provincial boundary in Cha-uat district, Nakhon Sri Thammarat, which was probably related to the violence in Phattalung.

In addition to this CT aggressiveness in Phattalung, which seemed designed to discredit RTG CI efforts there and to demonstrate the capabilities of the CTs in the face of sizeable police deployments (5 SAFs, plus additional PP and BPP), violence occurred in March in Trang province (2 clashes), Ban Na San district of Suratthani (an assassination and the harassment of a VST), and Chawang district of Nakhon Sri Thammarat (VST harassment). If the Phattalung operations had been more successful, this widespread violence might have been seen as an attempt to divert the focus of RTG CI resources from Phattalung. In light of the demonstrated inefficacy of the Phattalung operations, this scattered violence is indicative of the growing capabilities and boldness of CT bands throughout the region.

E. Far South

During the quarter the CTO continued to sustain itself in south Thailand and generally to avoid firefights with RTG security forces. The occupation of a CTO base camp in Sadao by the BPP did lead to some CTO counterstrikes against joint RTG/Malaysian forces. There were numerous but unconfirmed reports of the CTO accelerating its efforts to gain support from Muslim separatists, and possibly bandits. Armed CTO incursions into northern Malaysia declined during the quarter from last quarter; at the same time, CTO propaganda which boasted of its intended return to Malaysia increased.

Last fall there were reports that the predominantly Chinese

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8th and 12th CTO regiments were being assigned Muslim soldiers from the 10th regiment in order to make the CTO's multiracial appeal more meaningful than in the past. Meanwhile, in the 10th regiment's operating area, which includes three districts of Narathiwat and two districts of Yala with a population that is perhaps 75 % Muslim, the CTO has added a separatist slant to its propaganda, saying "we are all Muslims and must join together so all can be free." The line between Muslim bandits and Muslim separatists is a vague one, and therefore, in recruiting and cooperating with separatists, the CTO has been forced to reconcile in its propaganda the presence of criminal elements in its ranks. Villagers have been told that such recruits were accepted only upon their solemn promise to work for the betterment of the life of the masses. Recent defectors from the CTO have reported discipline and morale problems among the Muslims in the Chinese-dominated CTO. The RTG has not found it any easier than the CTO to develop an approach to winning the allegiance of the Muslim community. Despite token efforts to gain the loyalties of the Thai Muslims, the RTG has not allocated sufficient resources to the task to make any real progress.

CTO incursions into northern Malaysia declined during the quarter. There continued to be sightings of small groups (ten or less) of armed CTs (both Malay and Chinese) propagandizing, foraging, and seeking information in Kelantan, Kedah and Perlis states. There were only two low level armed encounters during the quarter between security forces and CTO in northern Malaysia--one in which automatic weapon fire was directed at a PFF patrol in north Kelantan in early March and another in late January in which security forces fired on 3 CTs near Padang Besar, where a police station was harassed in December. Neither of these incidents rivalled the drama or publicity generated by the CTO highway and bridge sabotage attempts of last quarter. It is possible that the CTO has made sufficient reconnaissance of northern West Malaysia since the spring of 1969 to come to the conclusion that the CTO would not be able to insert units permanently into the area at the present time. While the CTO can send units of 20-30 across the border to attack soft targets such as roads, bridges, land development sites, or lightly defended government installations, the CTO has not been able to organize the support bases from which to operate larger units on an extended or permanent basis. Malays have immediately

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reported CTO presence to government authorities, and the Chinese community has also cooperated with security authorities, probably out of desire to avoid a return to conditions prevailing during the Emergency.

At the same time, reports of aggressive CTO intentions have increased. On 20 January, for example, a CTO leader told a masses' meeting in Sadao that the 8th CTO regiment would soon move permanently into Malaysia. A February 27 firefight in Waeng between the CTO and a joint patrol, with no casualties on either side, was magnified by the "Voice of the Malay Revolution" (and picked up and repeated by Radio Peking and "Voice of Thai People") as a brilliant victory for Liberation Forces in Kelantan in which five government forces were killed. Apparently the dearth of substantive CTO achievement in northern Malaysia required misrepresentation of both locale and circumstances, which is not normal practice for clandestine Communist stations. The various CTO propaganda efforts were probably designed to raise the morale of CTO and Malaysian Communist Youth League units in South Thailand as well as to convince the masses that the CTO has the strength to carry out attacks in force and to act with relative impunity in northern Malaysia.

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II. COUNTERINSURGENCY-RELATED ACTIVITIES

This sections is divided into three categories of CI-related activities - political development programs, socio-economic development programs, and security development programs. The Quarterly does not attempt to provide a comprehensive review of all on-going RTG and U. S. CI programs, but rather to discuss significant developments or program changes which occurred during the quarter.

A. Political Development Programs

1. People-Government Contacts

a. USIS Phase Down -- On April 19 the Ambassador addressed a letter to the Prime Minister expressing urgency in getting RTG action on the establishment of an information mechanism with which USIS could work to turn over informational functions. When no overt action had occurred by the end of March, the Ambassador arranged a meeting with the Prime Minister at which the subject was discussed. The Prime Minister indicated that the National Information and Psychological Operations mechanism (NIPSO), through its National Psychological Operations Center, would be designated as the official central RTG organization for this purpose. As the quarter closed, this meeting seems to have stimulated more action on the RTG side than has been evident in the past several months. A joint RTG-U.S. Mission meeting is hoped for in April to lay out more specific plans.

Along the same lines, USIS has worked out a plan for branch post closings and simultaneous phase over, where possible, to provincial governments. Nong Khai has already closed. Nakhon Si Thammarat in the South will close in mid-April. Sakon Nakhon and Nakhon Phanom will close in mid-June. Sakon Nakhon is the farthest advanced with respect to having an organized provincial RTG structural entity to take over. Two additional branch posts will close later in the calendar year, and a general phase down plan in other locations is already beginning.

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USIS has continued its training program designed to assist the transfer. In Sakon Nakhon it supported the CSOD Psyops officer in conducting a training seminar for the provincial psyops staff, which will eventually take over USIS operations, and a MAVU team attached to Second Army Forward. In Songkhla USIS participated in a training program for seven psyops teams from Region 9 of the BPP. This training program will eventually train a psyops team for each of the BPP companies in the region.

b. MIT Survey -- The RAC-conducted MIT Survey is well under way. About one-third of the village interviews were completed by early March. RDGT organized a "Mid-stream Technical Review" on March 17 and 18 to evaluate the program thus far. Several Branch PAO's attended. The conceptual framework of the program along with objectives and hypotheses were reviewed and found still to be appropriate. Progress of the village interview program was adjudged satisfactory. It is too early to have reached conclusions on the findings. Interviewing has been resumed as of the end of the quarter.

2. Orientation of the People

a. Hilltribe Station -- The Bangkok Relay Station of VOA has agreed to assist USIS in making an informal check on the audibility and signal strength of the Hilltribe Radio Station at various points in the North, particularly in Nan Province. (RTG authorities had requested U. S. assistance in establishing a new radio station in Nan alleging the Hilltribe Station to be insufficiently audible).

The 100 KW station is still using the PRD studio. However, the station's own studio building is under construction; and studio equipment, funded by USOM and procured through USIA, is now on hand stored at USIS awaiting installation. The next step is to obtain bids and designate a contractor for installation and check-out. It now appears questionable, however, whether the $4,000 allocated for this contract by USOM will be adequate. The target date for completion of the studio is mid-May. It appears doubtful the target date will be met. Meanwhile the station continues to experience difficulty in securing

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cooperation from RTG military and other elements in getting current high-level material for broadcast to insurgent-threatened hilltribe groups.

During the quarter the chief Meo announcer of the station died suddenly, although he was a young man who appeared to be in perfect health less than 48 hours before his death. Meos claim he was poisoned by the CT and asserted as proof that his fingernails and toenails turned black upon death. The Mission does not have confirmation that he was poisoned. Meos seem to accept it philosophically as a risk of the position and do not appear to blame the RTG. They have, in fact, recommended a replacement from among their numbers.

b. Psyops and Civic Action in North Thailand -- The 3rd Army's PsyOps/Civic Action (CA) program is marginal due to deficiencies in personnel staffing, command guidance and supervision, and inadequate coordination. The 3rd Army does operate at least 4 MAVU teams, the majority of which suffer from equipment shortages and breakdowns. However, one team is reported to be learning to do a creditable job in combining effective narrative presentations along with village movie showings. One of the films was shot locally by the RTG and is apparently a popular item because it contains scenes and faces familiar to its audience. On the minus side, even the best MAVU team is hampered by a personnel rotation policy that feeds in new team members every two months, with a consequent loss in team experience and/continuity. There are 1-kw radio stations in Chieng Klang and Lomsak, with restricted coverage and indifferent programming. The 3rd Army also conducts periodic loudspeaker flights and leaflets drops, the former being credited with bringing in several defectors. These projects, however, are mounted on an ad hoc basis. SOC 31 and SOC 32 teams, whose primary mission is intelligence collection, operate in conjunction with MAVU teams, and are considered effective. Medical CA teams are popular, but drug supply is erratic and inadequate.

The BPP conducts an active medical CA program that has produced increased "raw" intelligence, although this intelligence has not been systematically exploited. BPP and hilltribe personnel have received 5-week training recently in CA-related topics and have

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returned to their villages. BSVT teams also occasionally do CA work, though conflicting reports as to performance and effectiveness also make evaluation difficult. A Special Civic Action Team (SCAT) has been authorized by Bangkok, but is operating with USIS projectors and generators. It is not known when it will receive its own equipment. This 5-man team now works in Chiang Rai with hilltribe groups on a pilot basis. The BPP is reportedly considering re-activating 8 Development Platoons, with half of each platoon concentrating on psyops work.

The PP are being included in Medical Service Team training (also received by the BPP). The program apparently will extend medical care through the tambol station level. A Medical Instructor's Course began in February, and a Medical Aidman Course is scheduled for June. As yet no ramifications of this program have been felt in the tambols, however. All district PP commanders claim that they have assigned personnel to CA and "village contact" duties.

Various changwad-sponsored psyops programs are in being or getting off the ground in North Thailand, the best being in Chiang Rai and Nan, with incipient programs in Phitsanuloke and Petchabun. These programs are built around the classic MIT idea, with impetus and creative coordination from the changwad seat depending on the interest taken by the respective governors.

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B. Socio-Economic Development Programs

1. Accelerated Rural Development

a. Changwat Agreements Signed--The ARD Governors, or Palads representing them, signed the Changwat agreements subordinate to the FY 1969 Pro-Ag. Other signers were Prasong Sukham and Puang Suwanarat. The agreements, in Thai, include USOM commodity commitments, changwat production targets, fund commitments for ARD related to these targets, and special conditions from the Pro-Ag. Most important of the latter are the tying of equipment delivery to stipulated levels of performance, the separation of road maintenance and village project equipment from road construction equipment, and a requirement for villager contribution to village projects be conducted through the local Community Development officer.

b. ARD Well Drilling Program--There have been important developments in the ARD well drilling program. The first rig is now drilling a well in a schoolyard in Amphur Phon in Khon Kaen. The villagers are donating their labor and the changwat is providing materials. The other five rigs are drilling their first practice hole in the SED yard. At the meeting on January 19 between SED and ARD, agreement was reached on the following points:

i. The six rigs will be operated in pairs, two in each of three changwats for six months and then moved to three new changwats for the second six months.

ii. A committee of ARD, SED and USOM personnel was appointed to develop guidelines and criteria for planning well locations.

iii. It was agreed that the technical complexity of the well drilling equipment made it imperative that this equipment be operated under central direction and not be turned over to the changwats.

c. ARD Establishes Two New Committees to Improve Program Management --An ARD Fund Allocation Committee has been established under the chairmanship of Mrs. Somsri Kamtamala, Assistant Secretary General of ARD. Membership includes representatives of ARD Engineering, ARD Finance, BOB, Controller General's Office and USOM. The Committee will operate on two different levels. First it will monitor current fund requests to expedite the processing and the allocation of funds to the changwats. Second, for the longer run, it will also study the fund allocation process with a view to improving it. As an additional short-term job, the committee is currently reviewing cases where changwats have completed projects with funds specifically allocated for other purposes. It appears that there may be as much

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as ฿ 20 million involved. The Committee will review these project-by-project and attempt to reimburse the changwats where the projects are found to be within the scope of the ARD program and within the changwat's overall budget ceiling.

An ARD Committee on spare parts procurement has also been established, also under the chairmanship of Mrs. Somsri. It includes representatives of ARD Engineering, BOB, RID, DTEC, the Thai Management Advisory Committee and USOM. The Committee is charged with developing, for Cabinet approval, a system for open end spare parts procurement contracts with authorized dealers in Bangkok without going through the involved bidding process, which causes delay in the repair of deadlined equipment. The Committee is now concentrating on getting a recommended contract format and cost data on parts procurement from authorized dealers, non-authorized dealers, middlemen and other purchase sources. In addition, the Committee will hold informal negotiations with one selected dealer in order to provide more concrete evidence of the advantages. This proposal has already been discussed with three dealers and two regional representatives of US firms.

2. Agricultural Development

a. Extension Department Moves to Increase and Improve Field Staff-- A problem of some concern to both the RTG and USOM is the requirement for more trained personnel in the field. The ratio of extension workers in the field to farmers is about 1 to 5,000. This compares with a ratio of 1 to 500 in Taiwan and the US and 1 to 300 in Japan.

The Extension Department of the Ministry of Agriculture is presently taking steps to increase the number of trained personnel in the field. Two floors of the old Ministry of Agriculture building have been turned over to the Extension Department to develop a permanent training facility and a permanent instructor staff is in the process of being formed. This training facility will be concerned primarily with training field personnel for the security sensitive areas in the Northeast, North and South. Eventually, it is hoped that the training facility can provide pre-service and in-service training for all Ministry of Agriculture personnel on a Kingdomwide basis.

Thirty new-hire extension officers slated for assignment at amphoe level commenced training in January. After two weeks of formal training in Bangkok, they were assigned to on-the-job training with experienced officers in the field.

A pilot project to provide extension officers at the tambon level is just starting. Under this project, 25 extension officers will be assigned to work in one tambon in each of the 24 security sensitive

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provinces in the Northeast and North plus Prachuap Khiri Khan.

The Extension Department is recruiting for these positions and hopes to start pre-service training in May. The Director General of the Extension Department hopes to secure Bureau of the Budget approval for expansion of this project to meet the need for more agricultural technicians in the field. USOM is supporting this important effort with technical assistance and some audio-visual equipment and other training materials.

b. Hill Tribe Programs--The crop rotation program for hill tribe people in Amphur Hod, Changwat Chiang Mai is progressing well. The Ministry hopes to extend this program to other hill tribe areas next year.

The reforestation program for the hill tribe areas in the North is getting underway. Surveying of the sites for two nurseries was started during the quarter. The Royal Forestry Department plans to employ hill tribe people in setting up the two nurseries and in planting trees on mountainsides which have been denuded by forest fires and "slash and burn agriculture." It is hoped that the program will encourage hill tribes to develop farm woodlots for wood pulp and timber.

USOM is supporting these programs with technical advice and some commodity assistance.

3. Institutional Development--USOM is assisting several RTG agencies in the field of Institutional Development. A brief resume of these activities is provided below:

a. Civil Service Commission Position Classification--USOM is continuing work on a project with the Civil Service Commission which is seeking to change the present system of position classificatio from a ranking system which does not consider job characteristics or responsibilities, to a new position classification procedure which will take into account the technical requirements as well as responsibilitie attached to the relatively wide array of jobs. This project expects to present the new position classification system to the full Civil Service Commission in May and to introduce the system into the Civil Service organization as well as into the Labor Department and the Post and Telegraph office shortly thereafter. The project has encountered legal delays as well as a reluctance on the part of some Cabinet ministers to abandon a system which provides them with a convenient method for rewarding friends and for repayment of "faithful" services rendered.

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b. Labor Department Administration--The Labor Department Assistance project which is providing a general advisor to the Labor Department is currently emphasizing the development of an employment service, especially in the North and Northeast, and the improvement of existing employment service office in the Bangkok area to handle increased migration from the rural areas, seeking employment in the expanding service and industrial enterprises. The advisory activity has also aided the Department in a review of labor safety and health conditions and with the preparation of suggested regulations and legislation pertaining to employment security; and assistance has been provided for the formulation of legislation pertaining to the employment of aliens and to the formation of labor organizations.

c. Bureau of the Budget--Over the past 15 years contract advisory services have been made available by USOM to the Budget Bureau to assist it in the establishment of an Organization and Methods capability, in the review and revision of fiscal audit regulations and procedures as carried out by the audit council and in the review and revision of budget procedures. The O&M activity, over its history, produced recommended reorganizations of the Ministries of Agriculture and Education as well as extensive work in the revenue department of the Ministry of Finance, and the Thai Highway Department. Work in the field of budget procedures began in 1962 with the establishment of the Budget Bureau in the Office of the Prime Minister; and, lately, has sought to introduce modern program budgeting. At the present time, there is little activity in this area because of the difficulties which the then Director of the BoB encountered in his dealings with the National Assembly after the presentation of the budget for FY 2513.

d. Local Government In-Service Training--Assistance is being provided by USOM to the Department of Local Administration for in-service training, including the Nai Amphoe Academy and the VSDU training Center in Prachuab. With respect to the Nai Amphoe Academy, the 6th Group will graduate the last week of April and it is expected that all 47 will be assigned to Nai Amphoe positions by June of this year. The Palad Amphoe Academy, which began training in 1969, will graduate its 3rd group during the last week of April. Other training activities of DOLA include: The Developing Democracy Program which began its 1970 activities in February, training for the members of the Provincial Executive Committee who comprise the Governors' technical staff, and periodic in-service training to amphoe, changwat and central government officials.

Monthly seminars for Division Chiefs designed to update their administrative knowledge have also been presented within DOLA during the last two years. This format is now under consideration

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for expansion by the Ministry of Interior to include all Directors General and Deputy Directors General and an initial session was held March 14 and 15.

e. Community Development Department--Since the first of the year, USOM advisors have been occupied with assisting the new Director General, Prasong Isarabhakdi, to review his program, develop new objectives in areas directed toward women and youth activities (DCWay) and in the initiation of a departmentwide program for training of officers and personnel in the operation and maintenance of vehicles and audio visual equipment.

4. Public Health

a. Mobile Medical Team Activities (MMT)--Reports were compiled in January on the 32 MMTs currently in operation at the end of 1969. These teams operated in 18 ARD Provinces and rendered a combined total of 1,031,784 patient treatments last year. The number of teams remains at 32 as of this date.

Since the November 30, 1969 phase-out of the last team of the 606 Civic Action Center (USAF), operation of MMTs has been exclusively a Thai function with no marked decrease in effectiveness in field operations. Supply accounting, equipment maintenance, and record keeping are still areas in need of improvement.

b. Tambon Auxiliary Health Workers (TAHW)--A group of 99 students from northern Thailand completed a three month basic medical treatment course at Chiang Mai Medical School in December, 1969. They have now returned to their respective provinces for an additional three months on-the-job training as follows:

Province	No.
Chaiyaphum	14
Chiang Mai	20
Chiang Rai	10
Mae Hong Sorn	6
Nan	20
Petchabun	20
Uttaradit	9

Upon completion of training there will be a total of 580 TAHWs in the field.

Negotiations which began last year culminated in a budget allocation of ฿ 650,000 (US $32,500) to ARD. These monies are for the construction

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of a permanent TAHW Training Center to be built at Bang Phun, Pathumthani Province. The establishment of this permanent training facility is the product of Thai initiative. It will be Thai financed and operated with USOM support consisting essentially of commodities and advice.

5. Private Sector Development--During the quarter efforts continued to be devoted to institutional development, e.g., assistance and counsel to the Ministry of Industry, the Board of Investment, the Industrial Finance Corporation of Thailand, etc., with the objectives of improving their effectiveness and of achieving a climate conducive to productive investment by the private sector, with special incentives for investment in the North and Northeast. Action was also initiated to plan new area development programs, initially to be tested on a pilot basis if determined sound and acceptable, involving the focusing of government and private sector efforts on selected growth centers in the Northeast (e.g.,Khon Kaen or Ubon), presumably those having the greatest concentrations of natural resources and other economic assets. Historically, it is from such centers that development spreads most swiftly and with the greatest impact.

6. Rural Electrification--It appeared for a time that the RTG was reluctant to proceed with a long discussed project designed to accelerate the Provincial Electricity Authority's program of rural electrification. The Cabinet has now approved the project in principle and has appointed an interagency committee chaired by the head of the PEA to proceed with further survey work. To assist the committee in assembling and appraising needed data and in determining how best to proceed, the RTG has asked USOM to provide two technical advisors for a period of one year. This requirement is being further discussed with appropriate RTG officials.

7. Road Construction in North Thailand--In the last few years, the Thai Highway Department has embarked on an ambitious road building program which, when completed will have greatly improved land communications in the North and will have helped to break down the traditional isolation of this part of the country. A number of the projects currently underway involve the reconstruction and upgrading of previously existing roads and trails; others will require cutting totally new roads across previously unbroken ridge lines. All together approximately 1300 kilometers (over 800 miles) of roads are concerned. Among the projects are roads between Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai, Chiang Rai and Chiang Khong, and Chiang Rai and Ngao, Lampang.

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When these roads are finished, possibly as early as 1973, they will have tied the northernmost provinces of Thailand together in a way which the one truck railway and few, previously existing, low-grade roads were never able to achieve. One result of this construction should be the end of an economic situation in which it was often easier to trade with Bangkok and the rest of the world than it was with a neighbouring province. With the travel time between most Northern cities reduced from one or two days to only a few hours, important opportunities for regional planning will also become available to the Thai Government.

It should be noted that these roads are main routes being constructed by the Thai Highway Department. Individual provinces, many of which now have funds and equipment provided by the Accelerated Rural Development (ARD) program, are concurrently embarked on an extensive program of feeder-road building which is connecting vast stretches of previously isolated Northern territory to provincial and district capitals and bringing an ever-increasing portion of the population into easier reach of the Thai Government and its services.

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C. Security Development Programs

1. Counterinsurgency Operations

a. North RTG response to the increased threat in the North has been piecemeal and primarily reactive. Airstrikes have been used against suspected CT concentrations or to burn abandoned villages to deny supplies to the CTs (see ref B para 6); small units continue to defend isolated hilltop positions and to sustain casualties from sniping, booby traps, and ambushes; units have been moved to meet an individual circumstance, to defend a threatened village, or to destroy a suspected CT stronghold, but no evidence of a broad response to the threat has been forthcoming. CT-controlled areas of Nan and Chiang Rai can be reached only by airstrikes or by operations of relatively large RTG forces - e.g. companies. Even then RTG forces have suffered a high number of casualties in relation to these sustained by the CTs trying to operate in CT-dominated areas. In operations against CT areas in Nan during the quarter, the 10th Cavalry Squadron sustained approximately 10% casualties (36 casualties of 325 men deployed). Of these, 13 resulted from small arms fire, 21 from mines/booby traps, and 2 from M-79 grenade fire. Results of such operations have been indecisive: CTs disperse, avoid set battles, take few casualties while inflicting many, and regroup and resume control once RTG forces have pulled back. There have been no confirmed casualties sustained by the CTs during these operations.

Concerned about the deteriorating security situation in Nan and Chiang Rai as well as in Northwest Laos, the RTG has decided to shift Third Army Forward Headquarters from Lampang to Nan City. RTAF will also move elements to Nan to continue to support Third Army Forward. This move should facilitate Third Army control of internal security operations in Nan/Chiang Rai, and would presumably facilitate deployment of defensive forces along the Thai/Lao border if the external situation should make this more necessary.

Furthermore, RTA units dispersed in static village defense roles or in isolated outposts in the Tri-Provinces and Nan/Chiang Rai are reportedly going to be withdrawn gradually to be replaced in the villages by local

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paramilitary forces. RTA units will be retrained and operated in these areas in company and battalion strength against guerrilla threats beyond the capability of paramilitary and police to copee with. The RTA is also considering the organizing, training, equipping and dispatching of small hilltribe "hunter-killer" teams which will be used in conjunction with RTA support teams on long range patrol and other special missions. Two four-man Meo teams formed from Meo defectors and friendly hilltribes have already been deployed as a pilot project.

In the Tri-Province area, the RTA in mid-March withdrew from its three operations bases (platoon-sized) in Dan Sai district, Loei, at Ban Khi Tao, Pa Wai, and Phu Lom Lo in favor of a regroupment in a company-sized force at Hq 394. This unit will start CI training around 1 April, and is expected to be employed as a reaction/patrol force in the area. The RTA also plans to send "hunter-killer" teams to operate both north and south of the Phits-Lomsak highway.

With regard to the CSOD pilot project in Chiang Rai, most of the 22 VPTs deployed in September have now received their shotguns. Some have received radios while others still rely on kamnan tambon radios. The question of staffing and command at Hq 931 and the RTA reaction force is still unresolved (see ref A, p. 18). A police SAF continues to fill in as a reaction force in the absence of the originally planned RTA rifle company; however, lack of roads in the area precludes any serious thought of real time reaction overland and confused command and control arrangements make commitment of reaction forces by Governor difficult and slow.

Unanticipated refugee problems continue to plague the RTG in Nan and Chiang Rai. The initial increment of approximately 1,000 Htin refugees in Nan has been moved to Ban Pa Klang resettlement center (see ref B, para 5). CSOD has allotted a 30,000 baht fund for their food needs. The Htins have cleared about 500 rai of land and tractors are endeavoring to clear 1000-2000 rai more before the rains, which will be worked and the crops shared collectively this year. When enough land is cleared next year, each family will get a 10 rai allocation. Approximately 1000 additional hilltribespeople in Nan have requested permission to evacuate their villages and come to Pa Klang, but this request has been denied by CSOD and provincial authorities because of their inability to handle an additional influx of such magnitude. Also, some refugee centers located near the Lao border

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have been harassed and the Governor of Nan has requested approval from CSOD to move these refugees to camps in more secure areas.

b. Northeast - The tempo and scope of RTG CI operations in the Northeast increased during the quarter, highlighted by an increase in aggressive RTG small-unit operations, ambushes, and nigh operations (see ref C, para 13 for details). These tactics were aimed at specific CT bands or leaders, resulting in the death or capture of several prominent CT cadres and a number of rank and file CTs (confirmed CT casualties this quarter were 27 KIA, 5 WIA, 1 captured vs 4 KIA, 1 WIA, 5 captured last quarter) as well as the disruption of their operations and patterns of movement. The RTG also conducted airstrikes against suspected CT camps and cave complexes and a heliborne operation in the Phu Sung mountain area on 24-26 January (see ref B, para 19). While the airstrikes and heliborne operations were inconclusive, they did precipitate a number of clashes and CT withdrawal from the target areas. This intensification of the level of RTG operations in the Northeast (concentrated in the Sakhon Nakhon/Nakhon Phanom area) had a disrupting effect on CT operations and probably helped to forestall or to mitigate CT offensive action during January and February. Also significant were the initiation of long range reconnaissance and patrol (LRRP) and hunter-capture programs, the relief of most RTA units from fixed defensive roles, and programs to improve the image and behavior of the police (see below, section on Police, p. 29).

As reported in the January ISP (ref B, para 18), one officer and 43 enlisted volunteers began preliminary training in January designed to upgrade their individual capabilities prior to the start of formal LRRP training on April 10 in Lopburi. Training will be completed in early June. Six 7-man teams will probably be employed in the Nakon Phanom, Sakon Nakhon, Kalasin area primarily to uncover CT bases and groups for strike by reaction forces. RTA Bangkok gave formal approval in mid-March to Second Army's proposal to train fifty men for six hunter-capture teams. Fifty men have been selected and are awaiting initiation of a training program at Phitsanulok on 19 April.

In grappling with the basic security question of coping with the CT threat and at the same time preparing

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to defend against outside attack, the Thai have begun restructuring their security apparatus in the Northeast. The Thai concept of the RTA role is a mobile strike force available for deployment anywhere in the region. The VDC role -- as it is now being tested in Sakon Nakorn -- is one of an amphur and provincial level force commanded by the Governor as CSOC Provincial Director. Village defense in the Northeast will be in the hands of the villagers, who will be called to service by their Governor as CSOC Director and trained as VSDU.

Over 300 RTA troops have been pulled out of static defensive roles, their place taken by VDC/police, thereby freeing the RTA for use as part of their parent units/in mobile operations against CT bands or against a developing external threat. Another 350 are to be replaced in static roles as soon as VDC are available. These VDC and police are generally not native to the villages they occupy; the RTG has apparently recognized the disadvantages in this arrangement by undertaking to replace police/VDC eventually with VSDUs. In mid-March, the first group of VSDUs from Sakon Nakhon completed their training at the DOLA Prachuab center and returned to the province. VSDUs are being stationed in their native villages as defense and intelligence collection units in place of VDC. The VDC units in turn are assuming greater responsibility from Second Army Forward for suppression operations by being assigned as strike or reaction forces controlled by provincial officials to operate out of the provincial seat as well as the nine district seats. This consolidation of VDC personnel into larger units with an offensive mission is a reflection of the new RTG emphasis of shifting responsibility from the RTA to provincial forces, and an attempt to bring VDC units under tighter discipline and give them less opportunity to harass villagers in remote locations where VDC units are the only effective government power.

It was reported in the February ISP telegram (ref. C, para 14) that CTs in Na Kae had successfully prevented the start of work on an irrigation dam. In early March, Second Army Forward (CSOD Region II) called in the Na Kae police and civilian officials, development project officers, and RTA commanders from Bn 602 stationed in the district. The project officers and civilian officials were directed to resume work on the dam project, the local police were

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directed to provide security and to call for reinforcements from Bn 502 if required.

c. Mid-South - On 26 January regional and province commanders of Regions 8 and 9 met to review the results of the Phatthalung CI operation. The results of the operation at the time of the meeting were anything but encouraging: police casualties totaled nine KIA and twelve WIA; five radios and four weapons had been lost; confirmed terrori casualties were one KIA. The anomalous impact on CI operations in the province (see above, p 8-9) has already been reviewed.

The intent of the meeting was not only to review the weaknesses of the Phatthalung operations, but also to present a comprehensive two-year CI plan in the provinces of Nakhon Si Thammarat, Surat Thani, Trang, and Phatthalung. Forces will include PP, BPP, PARU, and RTA strike platoons. The Op Plan does not call for assaults on CT base areas but rather a heavy emphasis on civic action and public relations. At last report, budgetary problems required a much more modest operation tha the one planned.

During the quarter CSOD Regions 4 (mid-South) and 5 (Far South) were merged into Communist Suppression Operations Region 4 (CSOR 4) with two operational headquarters - CSOR 4/1 of Songkhla and CSOR 4/2 at Nakhon Sri Thammarat. A step toward integrated command in Phattalung is the reported transfer of Trang and Phattalung from BPP Area 8 to BPP Area 9 and from the operational control of CSOR 4/2 to CSOR 4/1 in Songkhla. If this transfer does occur, the PP (Region 9), BPP (Region 9) and CSOR command of these two provinces would all be located in Songkhla, whereas the present, ineffectual setup finds PP in the two provinces responsive to Region 9 Hq in Songkhla, while BPP and CSOR control emanates from Nakhon Sri Thammarat.

d. Far South - Communist Suppression Operations Region 4/1 (CSOR 4/1), which began functioning in January at Songkhla with RTA Major General Sant as Director, represents a move toward a rationalized CI command structure in South Thailand. Sant reports directly to CSOD Bangkok, but keeps General Cherm, CG, 5th Military Circle, and CSOD Director for all of peninsular Thailand, informed of his actions. All provinces now have functioning provincial suppression committees headed by the respective Governor, but the committees still have no budgets. Sant has been holding seminars and writing plans, and civilians, police, and the RTA are talking together, which is a step forward towards a coordinated CI effort. Sant sees the role of CSOR 4/1 as one of coordination and education, at least for the time being. CSOR 4/1 has asked Governors to develop comprehensive provincial CI plans (including security, development, and psyops) for CSOR 4/1 review and CSOR 4/1 expects to act as a catalyst and coordinator in the implementation of these plans.

The largest CI action of the quarter was the attack by 8 BPP platoons on a CTO base camp in Sadao (see ref C, paras. 18 and 19). The camp was capable of accommodating about 200 people. Its main facilities were meeting and dining hall, classroom, weapon repair shop,

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seven lookout towers, two tunnels, a 90 meter defensive trench, and basketball court. Operations RAMAKAMHAENG and WANG PHA continued during the quarter (for narrative, see ref A, p. 21 and ref C, para 21, respectively) with no significant results to report.

The RTG and the Government of Malaysia signed a revised border agreement in March (see BANGKOK 3288, DTG 20 1223 2 March 70 NOTAL) at the 10th General Border Committee meeting. Significant revisions include extension of the right of "hot pursuit" to military as well as police forces of one country into the other's territory, hot pursuit for 72 hours, with extension by the host possible, authorization of cross-border airstrikes, provisions for combined headquarters to be set up in both countries during military operations along the border, and formal recognition of the transfer of CI command responsibility in South Thailand from the NSC to CSOD (ref A, p. 20). Despite these legal steps towards expanded cooperative security efforts, effective operations against the CTO rest on RTG attitudes and willingness to commit additional resources to the CI effort in the South. The RTG does not appear to have reordered its priorities to include a significantly increased CI effort against the CTO. However, as the new CI structure in the South crystallizes and hopefully begins to function effectively, this new command structure, in conjunction with some of the features of the revised agreement may form the basis for increased pressure against the CTO sanctuaries in South Thailand and for impeding their cross-border movement.

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2. Police

a. PP and BPP Deployment

Region	Provincial Police	Border Patrol Police	Total
1	3,987	---	3,987
2	3,028	639	3,667
3	5,639	1,152	6,791
4	7,319	1,122	8,441
5	4,509	1,291	5,800
6	4,686	563	5,249
7	3,915	520	4,435
8	3,817	489	4,306
9	4,469	1,159	5,628
	41,549	6,935	48,484

The above represents assigned strength. No information is available to the Mission concerning "present-for-duty" strength as compared with assigned strength.

b. TNPD Civic Action - The TNPD has a rapidly growing interest in the area of psyops and civic action, including village development projects. Significant civic action activity is being undertaken by the PP in Regions 3 and 4 and on a lesser scale in Region 6. Both the PP and BPP are forming psyops teams and requesting assistance in this area. The BPP has long spearheaded this type of activity and more and more reports are being received of increased PP participation in civic action.

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c. Muban Police - A preliminary evaluation of the TNPD Village Police Program (ref A, p. 21) has been made in Udorn, Sakon Nakhon and Kalasin provinces by American Institutes for Research and Provincial Police Headquarters personnel. The findings may be summarized as follows:

The mistakes most frequently made by the village policemen are in the area of basic police discipline rather than technical skill.

All aspects of financial and logistic support--allowances, uniforms, supplies, and equipment--are below minimum acceptable levels.

Team leaders estimate that about half of the group will be qualified for career police positions after their two-year tour and most of these individuals indicated that they are eager to obtain such positions.

In the security-sensitive villages to which police teams have been assigned, increased amounts of intelligence information are being collected.

The rapidity of team response to live tactical intelligence has been high.

The incidence of both major and petty crimes has dropped sharply since the village teams have been deployed.

The record of the village police in investigating such crimes as did occur have been good.

The village police have played an active role also in settling local disputes, apparently to the satisfaction of all parties concerned.

Personal interactions among the police and the villagers appear to have been positive and friendly, in part because of the efforts the individual policemen have made to be helpful.

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3. CI Training

a. TNPD CI Training (see ref A, p. 22) - Currently, 101 assistant instructors are being trained as instructors. Following graduation in June, 30 to 40 will be retained at Hua Hin and the remainder will be assigned to the four area training centers. All area centers are to have training facilities prepared by July 1970. CI training will commence for 120 police personnel (60 BPP and 60PP) at each site in July. The present status of TNPD CI training is as follows:

	USSF Cadre	Thai Cadre	Assistant Instructors Trained	Completed CI Training FY 70	Projected CI Training FY 70
Hua Hin	13	23	30	65	251
Chiang Mai	5	16	85	186	120
Udon	4	6	35	---	120
Ubon	4	6	52	---	120
Songkhla	5	6	35	---	120
Bangkok*	7	4*	33**	---	100
	38	61	270	251	831

* Four TNPD Doctors
** Medical Corpsmen in Training

b. RTA CI Training - The current status of RTA CI training is reviewed below. Problem areas include personnel shortages (RTA cadres), budgetary shortages, and difficulty in obtaining training ammunition and POL on a timely basis.

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Camp	Army Area	Cadre US	Asgd RTG	Number students graduating FY 70 or in training	Number students programmed for Thai FY 70
Khao Yoi*	1st	0	Unknown	Approximately 320	Approximately 640
Nam Pung Dam	2nd	9	91	445	Unknown. Classes to begin 15 Feb 70; 29 Mar and 2 August 70.
Nong Takoo (Pak Chuang)	2nd	9	51	876	Unknown. Classes to begin 12 April 70 and 24 May 70.
Lampang	3rd	10	76	366	Classes to begin 16 Feb 70, 24 April 70, 4 July and 12 August 1970; approximately 570 students
Trang	5th Mil Cir	0	54	60 VDC	2 companies: classes to begin early March, 18 April 70.

* Future training will be conducted at Nong Takoo.

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4. VILLAGE DEFENSE

a. Village Security and Development Units (VSDU): The second class of 400 VSDU trainees was graduated on 20 March and returned to their home provinces of Kalasin, Sakhon Nakhon, Nong Khai, and Nakhon Phanom (see Ref A, p. 23). They are being deployed in ten-man teams to their home villages and armed with shotguns. Each village that has a VSDU team will receive a 3000 baht development grant. On March 23 a third group of 400 trainees from the same four provinces plus Udorn started training at the DOLA Prachuab Training Center. The permanent training facility is progressing on schedule and will be completed in May. A budget of 19.5 million baht for the program has been approved, which will be used to train a total of 3,500 men in calendar 1970. DOLA tentatively plans to train an additional 5,000 in calendar year 1971. Many of the trainees are being drawn from the present Village Protection Teams (VDC manpower base) and the overall plan is eventually to use the VSDUs to replace the present melange of VPT, JST, etc., now deployed in the Northeast around target areas.

b. VSDU Training in the South: Lack of per diem funds, weapons, and logistical and administrative support has forced the postponement of the VSDU training for village headmen in South Thailand (see ref A., p.23). Training is now expected to commence in late May.

5. INTELLIGENCE

In the military intelligence field, US support during the report period was directed at advising Thai military counterparts at the directorate level on means to speed the flow and retrieval of intelligence information, provide training and working materials, and offering assistance in intelligence collations and analysis methods. In February, 7 officers from the Armed Forces Security Center (AFSC) made an intelligence orientation trip to the Republic of Vietnam to study the "Open Arms" and "Phoenix" programs and the Combined Document and Captured Materials Exploitation Centers. It is hoped that this exposure to successful programs will stimulate the Thai to remedy their own shortcomings and to develop similar programs.

Also during the quarter, intial steps were taken to provide advice and assistance in expanding the Order of Battle (OB) capability of the Directorate of Intelligence, RTA. Technical advice and assistance was also provided to the Directorate of Intelligence, RTA in their preparation of a feasibility

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study on the development of aerial reconnaissance support capability for the RTA.

The Directorate of Intelligence, RTAF, received intelligence advice and assistance in target development. Project x instructional materials and lesson plans were provided to facilitate the development of a photo interpretation course. Trained photo interpreters are insufficient to conduct a realistic aerial reconnaissance program in support of CI operations.

6. Royal Thai Armed Forces

a. Mekong River Patrol - The Royal Thai Navy (RTN) has been assigned responsibility for CI patrols and operations on Thailand's rivers by the Prime Minister. First priority was assigned to patrol operations on the Mekong. To accomplish this, the Royal Thai Navy has established a river element of the RTN under the command of RADM Supa Gajaseni. His deputy will be Navy Captain Damrong Sekanand. This river patrol force plans initially to take over responsibility from the Marine Police for a hundred km stretch of the river in the vicinity of Nakhon Phanom. A headquarters will be established in Nakhon Phanom under Captain Damrong, who will take over assets currently in place which are now under the Governor's control. Increased RTN operations on the Mekong will be contingent upon the acquiring of additional patrol craft. The Mekong River unit will be immediately subordinate to the commander of CSOR 2.

b. Royal Thai Air Force - RTAF has deployed its aircraft assets throughout Thailand in support of the RTG CI effort. There have been an average of twenty-five H-34 and UH-1 helicopters deployed, which represents over 1/3 of the total RTAF helicopter assets. RTAF has permanently deployed two of its four AC-47 gunships, one each to Chiang Mai and NKP on 15-minute alert. During the quarter, the AC-47s flew six air strike and twenty-seven combat air patrol sorties.

The RTAF continues to deploy T-6s to Lom Sak and Songkhla - five to each location. Since the T-6s started escorting helicopters in the Tri-Province area, battle damage to helicopters from CT ground fire has decreased considerably. During the period, the Lom Sak based T-6s flew 187 helicopter escort sorties. On 27 February, the T-6s at Songkhla participated in a joint operation against a CT base camp near the Malaysian border, the first RTAF air strike in South Thailand in support of the RTG CI effort. RTAF T-28s from Chiang Mai, Udorn, and Ubon flew the bulk of the CI air strike missions during the period. Forty-three air strike sorties were flown in response to requests from the RTA. All missions were controlled by RTAF 0-1 FAC aircraft.

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III. OTHER ACTIVITIES

A. Base Defense

1. Ubon Attack

No significant information has been developed concerning the 13 January sapper attack on Ubon RTAFB which has not been previously reported (see ref B, para 26, 27; ref C, para 23; COMUSMACTHAI 150800 Jan 70).

2. BDSC Communications Package

An important step towards improving base defense capabilities at US-tenanted Thai airbases was taken in March when CSAF approved PACAF funding of the entire Base Defense Security Center (BDSC) communication package (see ref A, p. 24). The package will provide a vitally needed command communications net at US-tenanted RTAFBs. Funds were approved for the proposed 14 base stations and 52 portable stations. PACAF has directed 7/13 AF to provide this equipment from Southeast Asia assets on a leased basis.

3. RTAF Security Police Reorganization

RTAF has appointed Col. Boonprip as Director of Security. He will be assigned to RTAF Forward Directorate of Operations. This is the most important re-organizational change in RTAF Security Force organization (see ref A, p. 25) and it provides, for the first time, central administrative control over all RTAF Security Forces. RTAF approved the consolidation of the CI Course and the Security Police Course into one security police course which emphasizes air base defense. In conjunction with the CI Course, 200 students were airlifted from Don Muang to a training area 12 miles from the base. They practiced helicopter assault, simulating an air base defense situation where RTAF Security Forces are deployed off-base to block an approaching attacking force.

4. Equipping RTAF Security Police

Funds for communications equipment for RTAF Security Police for all joint-use bases have been approved and the equipment is on order. Delivery is expected by 30 June 1970. Communications equipment for the remaining Thai air bases and 3 AC&W sites is programmed within the country ceiling of the FY 71 MASF Thailand Program. Training ammunition, M60 Machine Guns, and M-79 Grenade Launchers are also funded for FY 71. WRM and ammunition for the remaining weapons are in the shortfall (unfunded) portion of the program. M-1 Carbines, one per security force member, have already been delivered to the RTAF.

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5. USAF Security Police Augmentation

Approval was granted in March for the assignment under the current manpower ceiling of 220 additional USAF Air Police to Thailand for duty at Udorn, Ubon, and Nakhon Phanom RTAFBs. When interspersed with Thai Security Guard personnel the additional air police will enhance base defense at these three bases.

B. Vietnamese Refugees in Thailand

Of the approximately 40,000 Vietnamese refugees in Thailand, it is estimated that a substantial majority are controlled by the Lao Dong party of North Vietnam or are sympathetic to Hanoi. The Vietnamese community is apparently well-disciplined and highly organized. The youth receive Communist political indoctrination; households are regularly tasked to contribute money to the Communist causes. The Lao Dong Party has been careful to circumscribe refugee actions which might give the RTG cause or excuse to suppress or deal more harshly with them.

Circumstantial evidence points to the involvement of out-of-country Vietnamese as well as the local Vietnamese community in the abortive sapper attack on Ubon RTAFB on 13 January 1970. The sapper team itself was without doubt a specially trained and equipped team inserted into Thailand (probably coming up the Mun River) for the specific mission of attacking the airbase, with the approval and abetment of the Communist Party of Thailand. One or more of the sapper team's members may have been from the local Vietnamese community.

The RTG is convinced of local Vietnamese involvement in the Ubon attack, which has generated new thinking on the Thai's part as to how to deal with the problem of this minority controlled by a hostile external power. Governor Phat of Ubon in January submitted a plan to Minister of Interior Praphas calling for the removal of the leaders and their families (about 200) from the pro-Hanoi communities, and their resettlement in controlled areas away from the rank and file Vietnamese. The RTG now apparently feels that Hanoi can no longer use the excuse of U. S. bombing to delay repatriation, and has established contacts with the DRV Red Cross through the International Red Cross pointing towards future discussion of the resumption of repatriation. Despite publicity to the contrary, no agreements have yet been reached between the RTG and the DRV regarding repatriation and no refugees have been resettled away from US-tenanted Thai bases.

During an official visit to South Vietnam in February, Lt. General Saiyud, Director of Operations and Coordination, CSOD, raised the question with the GVN of accepting 200-300 Vietnamese cadres if they were arrested and deported by the RTG (in an arrangement similar to that under which the RTG deported 99 refugee

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leaders to GVN in September '68). Saiyud also spoke with North Vietnamese defectors living in South Vietnam. Among the ideas generated by his trip were to send selected Vietnamese refugee leaders to SVN to see conditions there for themselves, and to bring North Vietnamese defectors to Thailand to describe actual conditions in the two Vietnams. A major problem is one of intelligence -- identifying thekey leaders of the Vietnamese refugee community.

All of these plans are in the deliberative stage, and as far as the Mission knows, there has been no move to date to initiate any of them. Whatever the final outcome of these deliberations, the Ubon attack seems to have galvanized RTG concern, and the RTG is now addressing the problem more seriously than it has in the recent past.

Information Addressees:

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