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TO : Amembassy BANGKOK

INFO : Department of State, Amconsul CHIANGMAI, Amconsul SONGKHLA, Amembassy VIENTIANE, Amembassy PHNOM PENH, Amembassy SAIGON, Amembassy Kuala Lumpur

FROM : Amconsulate UDORN

DATE: May 18, 1972

SUBJECT : The Insurgency in Northeast Thailand During 1971

REF : A. Udorn A-6, March 5, 1971
B. [redacted]

Action 6/13

Info Office Symbol US Ed

Info Agency

SUMMARY

The number of full-time armed jungle insurgents increased from 1500 in 1970 to 1770 in 1971, approximately.

Violent and insurgent initiated incidents rose substantially over the same period of time. Incidents however, were largely concentrated in about 20 of the Northeast's 177 districts and subdistricts. Evidence mounted during 1971 that thousands of villagers were being organized into local or village militia units and were being provided military and political training. Insurgents set up village, tambon, district, provincial and regional committees, at least on paper, in parts of Nakhon Phanom, Kalasin and Sakon Nakhon Provinces. Insurgents used the same tactics in 1971 as in 1970 and added new ones: they organized demonstrations and burned ARD equipment. Outside support from Laos, North Vietnam and China in the form of weapons, advisors, training and supplies continued although except for the imported Maoist ideology, the insurgency in the Northeast continued to be largely a Thai effort. RTG counterinsurgent plans and efforts improved during 1971 but obviously fell far short of what was needed to halt insurgent gains even though the insurgency is very limited geographically and susceptible to sustained, coordinated civilian, police and military initiatives against its organization and

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FORM DS-323 4-62

Drafted by: Michael [redacted] Cook May 17, 1972

Contents and Classification Approved by: Philip R. Mayhew

Clearances:

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armed strength. The prognosis for 1972 is that the insurgency will continue to gather strength, perhaps at a more rapid rate. It could become a major armed threat and a viable alternative government to the RTG in substantial areas of the Northeast within five years unless counterinsurgent efforts are quickly and dramatically improved.

Insurgent Military Strength

[redacted] the number of full-time armed jungle insurgents increased from 1500 in 1970 to 1770 in 1971 in the five Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) operational areas entirely or almost entirely within the Northeast. The Ministry of Interior estimates the Northeastern population for 1971 at 12,380,301, an average therefore of 7000 people for each armed insurgent. This compares with 8015 people per insurgent reported for 1970. [redacted] another 450-600 main force insurgents work in the CPT tri-province operating area, which is largely in Petchabun and Phitsanulok Provinces of Northern Thailand, but also includes western Loei Province of the Northeast. Enclosure 1 on page 11 lists armed insurgent strength by CPT operating area for 1970 and 1971. A map of the CPT operating areas can be found in Enclosure 2 on page 12.

Full-time armed jungle insurgents, however, represent only a fraction of the military strength of the insurgents in the Northeast. Under CPT leadership thousands of villagers have been organized into local militia and village militia or village military units (VMUs) as well, and been trained in military skills and the thoughts of Mao Tse Tung*. Intelligence sources have the names of 3157 VMU members from 124 villages in Nakae District of Nakhon Phanom alone. Of these, 244 members are reportedly organized on paper into two companies although there is as yet no indication they have been trained in company-sized formation. Village militia are also being organized elsewhere in southern Nakhon Phanom and in Sakon Nakhon, western Udorn and northeastern Kalasin.

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*The local militia are at a lower level in the insurgent's organizational hierarchy than the armed jungle insurgents (also known as Party Soldiers and Thai Peoples Liberation Armed Forces). The local militia are normally not as well armed as the Party Soldiers and their operations are restricted to one geographical area whereas Party soldiers may be sent on a mission anywhere in Thailand. In contrast, village militia are organized and carry out assignments in their own village. Most of them as yet apparently do not carry arms although they receive military training and some have access to weapons. Village Military Units are a type of village militia which have not been established in all CPT operating areas. They are the primary insurgent village political-military unit in the villages where they have been organized.

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Arms are being stockpiled for their use. The insurgents are thus organizing and training in the villages a large contingent military force on which they will be able to draw as they see fit for military actions and from which they can easily obtain recruits to expand or replace battle losses of the jungle forces.

Organization

The national CPT leadership strictly controls the six CPT operational areas partly or entirely within the Northeast. The leadership is, for example, intimately involved in writing work plans and choosing personnel to lead the CPT areas and made the decision to "discipline" and replace the head of one and perhaps two CPT areas during late 1970 or 1971. The operational areas reportedly help each other out from time to time. Nakae, for instance, has produced cadre and armed jungle insurgents to help other areas, at least temporarily. Mutual aid is limited, however, and the six CPT areas must depend largely on their own efforts guided by the national CPT leadership.

CPT Nakhon Phanom Operational Area. This area covers at least 17 districts in three (and possibly four) provinces, includes almost half the armed jungle insurgents in the Northeast, and suffered half the violent incidents occurring in the Northeast during 1971. Organization in this CPT area is the most sophisticated in Thailand. It is based on the burgeoning Village Military Units which are primarily an auxiliary military force and secondarily a medium for extending and exercising political control over villagers. Insurgents have also established numerous front groups at the local level such as the Revolutionary Farmers' Association. Captured documents also indicate at least 610 party members operate in the CPT Nakhon Phanom area and eastern Sakon Nakhon Province, many of whom live in the villages. CPT leaders decided to consolidate their strength at the village level during 1971 and ordered formation of village committees where a covert cell structure existed and tambon, district, provincial and regional committees. Much of this organization exists only on paper at this time and nowhere have these committees taken over from the RTG administration, but the embryo of a revolutionary government has been formed.

CPT Sakon Nakhon Operational Area. This CPT area is second only to the CPT Nakhon Phanom area in seriousness. There were 171 violent incidents during 1971 - a 46 percent increase over 1970 - in 18 districts. Insurgents made many of the same organizational innovations in parts of Sakon Nakhon as they did in the CPT Nakhon Phanom area, but their gains were not as spectacular. Aggressive RTG patrolling in northwestern Sakon Nakhon caused shortages of food, money, ammunition and other supplies for some insurgent groups and to some extent hampered their

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activities. Uneven insurgent gains are also explained by the lack of dynamic leadership in this CPT area and the reassignment of some experienced cadre to initiate organizational work in Tha Khan Tho district of Kalasin.

CPT Nong Bua Lamphu Area. A new leader arrived in late 1970 or early 1971 and began to revitalize insurgent operations in this CPT area. During 1971 insurgents set up low-level cadre training schools and expanded organizational work into many new and previously untroubled villages. Front organizations have been established and village militia organized. [redacted] 2,000 villagers in this area support at least 220 armed jungle insurgents and 300 village militia, many of whom have access to arms. Violent incidents in 1971 were two and one-half times the 1970 level.

CPT Southern Ubon Operational Area. This area also reportedly acquired a new leader in 1971, perhaps because the CPT was dissatisfied with the slow pace of progress. Both violent and insurgent initiated incidents in 1971 were double the 1970 totals. Incidents were very low in absolute figures, however, and this CPT area covered only six RTG districts. Moreover, the party apparently has been having difficulty overcoming the organizational doldrums.

CPT Khorat-Buriram-Prachinburi Operational Area. The estimate for jungle insurgents in the KBP area increased from 80-100 men in 1970 to 150-175 men, not all armed, in 1971. This revised estimate, however, reflects better intelligence as much as insurgent gains. Incidents dropped two-thirds from 1970 to 1971. Insurgents reportedly decided to avoid clashes with government forces during 1971 and concentrate on organization, growing needed foodstuffs, establishing a secure base area, setting up a communications link with southern Ubon, and improving urban support. By the end of the year they had apparently had only slight success with all of these endeavors except avoiding contact with RTG forces at which they succeeded very well.

Insurgent Initiated and Violent Incidents

Insurgent initiated incidents throughout Thailand rose dramatically from 2188 incidents in 1970 to 2989 incidents in 1971. The Northeast's share increased from 1393 to 1673 incidents. Measured as a percentage of the nationwide total, incidents in the Northeast declined from 64 percent in 1970 to 56 percent in 1971 because the North suffered a large increase from 579 incidents (or 26 percent of the nationwide total) in 1970 to 1095 incidents (or 37 percent) in 1971. The Northeast

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continued, however, to have by far the highest percentage of incidents of Thailand's four regions. In considering this figure it should be remembered that the Northeast accounts for one-third of Thailand's total population. See Enclosure 3 on page 13 for a breakdown of incidents in the Northeast by CPT operating area and RTG district and subdistrict during 1970 and 1971.

Violent incidents in the Northeast (excluding western Loei) increased from 450 in 1970 to 552 in 1971. Including western Loei, the Northeast had 592 violent incidents during 1971 or only one incident per 20,983 people. The rate for Nakhon Phanom Province, however, is one incident to 2,643 residents. The rate for Sakon Nakhon is one to 6,043 people and for Kalasin, one to 6,600 people (see Enclosure 4 on page 18). The increased violence caused a deterioration in road security during 1971 and as a consequence by the end of the year the Embassy had increased restrictions on American travel to seven Northeastern roads totaling roughly 270 kilometers. This is, of course, only a tiny fraction of the burgeoning web of roads crisscrossing the Northeast. Moreover, we have no indications insurgents would knowingly attack Americans even in the least secure areas. The danger is that an American would be caught by mistake in an ambush intended for RTARF or civilian RTG officials or that insurgents would change their policy towards Americans before we became aware of it.

Violent incidents and/or several insurgent initiated non-violent incidents (such as armed propaganda) occurred in 35 percent or 61 of the Northeast's 177 districts and subdistricts. The insurgents are at this time only a potential problem elsewhere. The insurgency is troublesome but not serious in about 40 of these 61 districts. Insurgent activity was concentrated in the remaining 20 or so districts, primarily in southern Nakhon Phanom and Sakon Nakhon provinces, the northern reaches of Kalasin province and far western portion of Loei and Udorn provinces.

Tactics

Insurgents continued during 1971 their policy of training cadre and consolidating control of base areas. They also moved vigorously and with substantial success to organize and indoctrinate residents of rural villages around their base areas in a large part of the CPT Nakhon Phanom operational area and parts of the CPT Sakon Nakhon and Nong Bua Lamphu operational areas as noted above. They used the same combination of persuasion, education, propaganda, threats and violence as in 1970 (see refair). They also ambushed RTG officials on roads in four districts. These techniques were supplemented by new ones. In Nakae District of Nakhon Phanom and Khao Wong subdistrict of Kalasin, the VMUs for the first time organized villagers for major

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demonstrations against RTG activities. The demonstrators succeeded in stopping dam construction in Nakae, but in Khao Wong they did little more than call to everyone's attention the control insurgents exercise over local villagers there. Insurgents also halted road construction in Nakae and Dan Sai districts of Loei by burning construction equipment and threatening workers. The equipment destroyed in Nakae belonged to the ARD program.

Insurgents supplemented their "hard sell" with more subtle means. They provided literacy training (using Mao's little red book as a text), worked side by side with farmers in their rice paddies, and treated villagers with injections, acupuncture and other techniques of Western and Eastern medicine. Female insurgents also used their charms to good effect. One returnee told us he entered the jungle simply to follow his girl friend. The prospect for 1972 is more intensive and widespread use of all of these techniques as insurgent strength increases.

Weapons

AK-47s and other bloc weapons continued to trickle into the Northeast and insurgents used them during 1971 in all the CPT operational areas except the Korat-Buriram-Prachinburi (KBP) area. In early 1972 insurgents in the KBP area used AK-47s to help overrun a VDC outpost, demonstrating they too obtained bloc weapons during 1971. Intelligence sources confirm that insurgents in southern Nakhon Phanom have 60 millimeter mortars and M-79 grenade launchers, although these weapons have yet to be used there. Insurgents in Dan Sai District of Loei used B-40 rockets twice during 1971, once to ambush an RTG convoy and once to overrun an outpost manned by police Special Action Forces.

Communist and American-made weapons of many types are sold on the black market in Thailand to anyone with the money to buy, and insurgents have made some local purchases. Most insurgents, however, have obtained their weapons from the Pathet Lao/NVA or captured them from RTG forces. [redacted] insurgents are building a large stockpile of weapons from these sources. The prospect for 1972 is that the insurgents' stockpile of weapons will be enlarged substantially and that the Pathet Lao/NVA will provide more sophisticated weapons as insurgent skill and experience increases.

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Outside Assistance

The Northeastern insurgency is based squarely on a foundation of imported Maoist ideology disseminated by hundreds of Thai cadre trained in China, North Vietnam and Laos during the 1960s and the early 1970s. Thai continued to leave the Northeast during 1971 for specialized training in North Vietnam. The insurgents, however, set up schools during 1970-71 to provide political, military and medical training to subordinate cadres in the mountains of Nakhon Phanom, Sakon Nakhon and Udorn. The CPT therefore no longer has to depend on schools in southern Laos to train low-level cadre in the Northeast. More villagers can thus be trained nearer to their homes with less effort and sacrifice.

Reports continued in 1971 that North Vietnamese, Pathet Lao and even Chinese advisors were working with the insurgents in the Northeast. None have been confirmed. CPT liaison teams are assigned to work in Laos with Pathet Lao and NVA units. The headquarters for the Southern Ubon operational area may also be across the border in Laos, although the headquarters for the other five CPT operational areas partly or entirely in the Northeast are all in Thailand. Other outside assistance includes such items as weapons (mentioned above), ammunition, Thai currency, Chinese propaganda materials printed in Thai and Mao badges, though the level of this support is not believed to be very high.

The CPT organization in the Northeast could get by with less support from the outside after its successes during the last few years. The prospect is, however, that outside assistance will increase as the situation in Indochina deteriorates and the CPT organization increases in size and sophistication and is able to absorb more outside assistance.

RTG Counterinsurgency Efforts

Efforts at counterinsurgency by civilian, police and military elements improved somewhat during 1971, though they fell far short of what was needed to slow insurgent gains.

Volunteer
VDC. The Defense Corps (VDC) units continued to operate primarily in the 30 target areas organized in the Northeast under CSOC Plan 0910. They fought with the insurgents frequently and often came off second best. VDC continued to suffer from inferior weapons, inadequate training, poor leadership, weak discipline and half-hearted logistical support. Although the RTG undertook programs

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to correct most of these shortcomings during 1971, results were uneven. The prospect for 1972 is for continued but limited efforts along the same lines to improve the VDC.

VSDU. The RTG has thus far trained 3,332 villagers under the Village Security and Development Program of whom 3,136, or 94 percent, are from six Northeastern provinces. The RTG has scrapped the original concept outlined in CSOC Plan 110 of arming the VSDU and paying them per diem as a village security force. The new concept for the VSDU is apparently to indoctrinate and orient selected villagers and return them to their villages as unarmed or self-armed agents of developmental change and village level support rather than as a security force. These apparent intentions were not, however, clear during 1971 to local officials, who were unsure what to do with the unarmed and unpaid VSDU. As a consequence some VSDU were being used as fillers on VDC teams, some were assigned as assistant village chiefs, but most returned to their villages without any clear idea of what they should be doing. We expect continued efforts by some local officials during 1972 to try to salvage some benefits from the VSDUs' training, perhaps in ways not wholly acceptable to the central government.

Police. The police became more deeply involved in counterinsurgency during 1971. Transfer of VDC leadership from civilians, such as school teachers, to police sergeants was largely completed. The BPP had many firefights with insurgents although they were spread too thin to have a major impact on the insurgency in their large area of operations. Thirteen of the Northeast's fifteen provinces had police Special Action Forces (SAF) platoons of 50-men each. One of the SAF's missions is counterinsurgency, but they were on the whole underutilized. Police also served at a very large number of tambon police stations in insecure areas though normally they were understrength and many other tambon stations did not have any police assigned at all. Intelligence collection and utilization, partly the responsibility of the police, continued to be a major weakness in the counterinsurgency program.

The BPP and SAFs are being reorganized in 1972 and will be involved more deeply in counterinsurgency. An increase in police strength is also in the cards, although total police strength committed to counterinsurgency is unlikely to reach the proportions considered by many theorists necessary to deal with Thailand's growing insurgency.

RTA. Second Army undertook a large variety of operations against the insurgents during 1971. The wet season offensive and following dry season offensive (which finally got underway in December) emphasized small unit patrols, psyops and training of paramilitary forces. Army

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training tests held the first and last parts of the year in insecure areas supplemented regular counterinsurgent operations. Second Army normally asked police and civilian forces to join in their operations.

The number of Second Army positions authorized per diem for counter-insurgency during 1971 was reduced in October from 2,914 to 2,704 slots. The troops were so poorly utilized throughout the year, however, that this reduction had little impact on RTA operations. Second Army rarely put more than 300 men in the field on offensive patrols at one time. Operations at best had limited impact of short duration on the insurgents except in northwestern Sakon Nakhon where they hampered insurgent activities for several months.

Planning for Counterinsurgency

The RTG completed two important counterinsurgency plans during 1971, "The RTA Communist Suppression Plan for 1972" and CSOC Plan 14/15 for Nakae. The RTA plan gives a good general description of policy to be implemented and how RTA units are to be utilized, but is especially vague about the nature, amount and deployment of police and civilian resources involved in the effort. An overall civilian-police-military (CPM) plan is needed with more specifics. Nakae Plan 14/15 is a prototype for such a plan on a small scale. The RTG released the main body of 14/15 in August 1971 and the RTA began to implement some of its responsibilities under the plan late in the year. Unfortunately, at this writing the plan has just been formally approved and individual annexes for the police and ARD programs have yet to appear. This slow pace augurs ill for counterinsurgency planning which encompasses much larger areas.

Conclusion

The insurgency is still not a major threat to the RTG in the Northeast. In comparison to the population, there are a relatively small number of insurgents. They also operate in a small geographic area. The insurgents have, however, made steady and impressive gains over the last few years, particularly in the CPT Nakhon Phanom area. They have organized and provided military and political training to thousands of villagers and established the embryo of a revolutionary government.

Insurgents have made this progress with little effective RTG resistance. RTG suppression efforts have suffered from several critical problems. They include the need to improve day-to-day tactical military intelligence and intelligence about the insurgent organization; to use

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available CPM resources better and more vigorously against the insurgent village organization; to increase resources available, particularly the police; and to write an overall detailed CPM plan. Progress in all these areas is expected during 1972. It will, however, be slow at best.

Our prognosis is that the insurgents will continue to consolidate earlier advances and enlarge their organization in the Northeast during 1972 at a more rapid rate. The insurgents could become a major armed threat and viable alternative government to the RTG in substantial areas of the Northeast in five years if they are able to sustain the pace of their organizational and political gains. The quality and intensity of counterinsurgent efforts will have to be rapidly and dramatically improved to halt these gains.

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Enclosures:

1. Armed Jungle Insurgent Strength in Northeast by Insurgent Operating Areas, 1970-71, page 11.
2. Map of Insurgent Operating Areas in Northeast Thailand, page 12.
3. Incidents by CPT Operational Area and RTG District or Subdistrict, 1970-71, pages 13 to 17.
4. Ratio of Violent Incidents to Population in Northeast by Province, 1971, page 18.

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ARMED JUNGLE INSURGENT STRENGTH IN NORTHEAST BY INSURGENT OPERATING AREAS, 1970-71*
(See Map, Enclosure 2)


Operating Area	1970 Strength	1971 Strength
Sakon Nakhon** Scope: Sakon Nakhon, Northern Kalasin (except Khao Wong and Kuchinarai), Eastern Udorn	275-325	405
Nakhon Phanom** Scope: Nakhon Phanom, Kuchinarai and Khao Wong of Kalasin; Northern Ubon; Phon Thong and Nong Phok of Roi-et	725-825	835
Nong Bua Lamphu Scope: Western Udorn, Eastern Loei, Western Nongkhai	170-190	220
Southern Ubon Scope: Buntharik, Det Udom, Nam Yuen of Ubon; Kantharalak of Sisaket	150-175	135-180
Korat/Buriram/Prachinburi (KBP) Scope: Khon Buri of Korat; Lahansai, Nang Rong, Muang of Buriram; Watthana Nakhon of Prachinburi	80-100	150-175 (not all armed)
TOTAL	1490-1615	1745-1815

* Not including insurgents operating in Western Loei, part of CPT tri-province operational area.

**Exact division between Sakon Nakhon and Nakhon Phanom operating areas is not certain. There are three CPT provincial committees in Nakhon Phanom operating area.

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MAP OF INSURGENT OPERATING AREAS IN NORTHEAST THAILAND



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INCIDENTS BY CPT OPERATIONAL AREA
AND RTG DISTRICT OR SUBDISTRICT, 1970-71*

lakhon Phanom Operational Area

rict or istrict	CT Initiated Incidents (Violent and Non-Violent)		VIOLENT INCIDENTS							
			Assassinations		CT Attacks		RTG Initiated Clashes		Total Violent Incidents	
	1970	1971	1970	1971	1970	1971	1970	1971	1970	1971
e (8)	156	168	45	46	50	32	48	34	143	112
Wong (3)	47	75	9	14	11	18	6	13	26	45
Phanom (8)	27	28	13	14	4	6	14	19	31	39
cha-i (8)	21	33	5	10	3	9	5	9	13	28
Pak (8)	14	17	8	8	1	0	7	7	16	15
ahan (8)	18	23	3	6	1	3	9	4	13	13
hinarai (3)	15	21	1	3	1	4	1	2	3	9
Tan (8)	16	16	5	6	2	1	8	1	15	8
ng Nakhon hanom (8)	6	6	4	2	0	1	1	4	5	7
at Charoen (14)	7	1	1	0	0	0	0	5	1	5
Phaeng (8)	5	9	1	3	0	0	0	0	1	3
u (8)	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	3
numan (14)	5	14	0	0	0	1	2	1	2	2
Uthen (8)	4	2	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1

e Enclosure 2 to identify province by code number. Districts with no violent cidents in 1970 or 1971 and three or less non-violent insurgent initiated incidents e omitted for the sake of brevity.

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CPT Nakhon Phanom Operational Area (Contd)

District or Subdistrict	CT Initiated Incidents (Violent and Non-Violent)		VIOLENT INCIDENTS							
			Assassinations		CT Attacks		RTG Initiated Clashes		Total Violent Incidents	
	1970	1971	1970	1971	1970	1971	1970	1971	1970	1971
Kutchum (14)	3	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1
Nong Phok (10)	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Loeng Nok Tha (14)	3	3	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	0
TOTAL	347	419	95	115	77	76	101	101	273	292

CPT Sakon Nakhon Operational Area

Sawang Daen Din (11)	173	110	11	6	9	12	15	22	35	40
Sahatsakhan* (3)	24	47	5	13	4	4	1	7	10	24
Muang Sakon Nakhon (11)	184	203	2	3	3	4	7	8	12	15
Waritchaphum** (11)	21	37	2	2	0	10	2	2	4	14
Bungkan (9)	16	29	4	11	0	2	3	1	7	14
Somdet (3)	6	34	2	7	0	3	0	4	2	14
Kut Bak (11)	125	107	6	4	3	3	3	4	12	11
Ban Muang (11)	2	14	0	3	1	0	3	8	4	11

* Includes Huai Mek Subdistrict
**Includes Phangkhon District

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CPT Sakon Nakhon Operational Area (Contd)

District or Subdistrict	CT Initiated Incidents (Violent and Non-Violent)		VIOLENT INCIDENTS							
			Assassinations		CT Attacks		RTG Initiated Clashes		Total Violent Incidents	
	1970	1971	1970	1971	1970	1971	1970	1971	1970	1971
Wannoniwat (11)	30	25	0	3	5	3	4	2	9	8
Ban Dung (15)	6	18	1	3	1	3	2	0	4	6
Nong Han (15)	4	13	0	3	1	0	2	1	3	4
Seka (9)	3	9	0	2	1	1	0	0	1	3
Si That (15)	11	8	1	0	2	2	5	1	8	3
Phannanikhom (11)	34	29	1	0	0	0	2	1	3	1
Akat Amnuai (11)	1	0	0	0	2	0	1	1	3	1
Phon Phisai (9)	2	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Phen (15)	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Tha Khantho (3)	1	11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	644	698	35	62	32	47	50	62	117	171
CPT Nong Bua Lamphu Operational Area										
Nam Som (15)	34	58	3	6	2	6	2	11	7	23
Nong Bua Lamphu (15)	26	34	0	5	1	1	0	3	1	9
Muang Udorn* (15)	24	20	2	2	2	1	0	5	4	8
Kumphawapi (15)	4	21	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	4
Naklang (15)	16	23	0	2	0	0	2	1	2	3
Chiengkhan (6)	4	3	0	1	0	0	2	1	2	2

*Includes Nong Wua Saw and Kut Chap Subdistricts

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CPT Nong Bua Lamphu Operational Area (Contd)

District or Subdistrict	CT Initiated Incidents (Violent and Non-Violent)		VIOLENT INCIDENTS							
			Assassinations		CT Attacks		RTG Initiated Clashes		Total Violent Incidents	
	1970	1971	1970	1971	1970	1971	1970	1971	1970	1971
Ban Phu (15)	15	4	2	0	0	1	0	0	2	1
Si Bun Ruang (15)	12	9	1	0	0	0	2	0	3	0
Mon Sang (15)	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Sangkhom (9)	4	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Muang Loei (6)	8	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Wangsaphung (6)	4	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	152	187	9	20	5	9	8	21	22	50
CPT Southern Ubon Operational Area										
Buntharik (14)	63	113	1	5	3	6	3	3	7	14
Det Udom (14)	3	67	0	1	0	7	0	3	0	11
Nam Yuen (14)	68	98	1	3	1	0	6	0	8	3
Kantharalak (12)	2	4	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	3
Phibun Mangsahan (14)	14	18	0	0	1	1	1	1	2	2
Muang Ubon (14)	3	3	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1
TOTAL	153	303	2	9	6	18	10	7	18	34
CPT Korat-Buriram-Prachinburi Operational Area (Korat and Buriram only)										
Khonburi (5)	10	6	1	1	0	0	3	2	4	3
Lahansai (1)	26	11	2	0	3	1	4	2	9	3
Muang Buriram (1)	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Nang Rong (1)	33	5	3	0	1	0	3	0	7	0
TOTAL	69	24	6	1	4	1	10	5	20	7

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CPT Loei-Phitsanulok-Petchabun (Tri-Province) Operational Area (Northeast Districts Only)*

District or Subdistrict	CT Initiated Incidents (Violent and Non-Violent)		VIOLENT INCIDENTS							
			Assassinations		CT Attacks		RTG Initiated Clashes		Total Violent Incidents	
	1970	1971	1970	1971	1970	1971	1970	1971	1970	1971
Dan Sai (6)	Unk	44	Unk	6	Unk	12	Unk	14	Unk	32
Tha Li (6)	Unk	4	Unk	2	Unk	0	Unk	2	Unk	4
Na Haeo (6)	Unk	12	Unk	0	Unk	2	Unk	0	Unk	2
Khon San (2)	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
TOTAL	Unk	60	Unk	8	Unk	14	Unk	16	Unk	38

*Figures for Loei districts during 1971 are only estimates determined by doubling statistics for last six months of 1971. Consulate did not keep records on Loei during 1970 or first six months of 1971.

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RATIO OF VIOLENT INCIDENTS TO POPULATION IN NORTHEAST BY PROVINCE, 1971

	Population*	Violent Incidents	Population per Violent Incident
Nakhon Phanom	605,302	229	2,643
Sakon Nakhon	610,355	101	6,043
Kalasin	606,766	92	6,600
Loei	344,790	40	8,620
Udorn	1,022,462	62	16,490
Nongkhai	424,869	18	23,550
Ubon	1,555,294	39	39,879
Buriram	802,610	4	----
Nakhon Ratchasima (Korat)	1,468,144	3	----
Sisaket	833,726	3	----
Roi-et	878,059	1	----
Mahasarakham	647,010	0	----
Chaiyaphum	719,749	0	----
Khonkaen	1,087,764	0	----
Surin	773,401	0	----
TOTAL	12,380,301	592	20,983

*Population published in Government Gazette, MOI, March 21, 1972, based on statistics compiled December 31, 1971