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ORIGIN/ACTION
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	EUR	FE
	CU 3	INR 6
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	COM	FRB
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	XMB	AIT 5
	CIA 16	NAVY 5
	USIA	NSA 3
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AIRGRAM

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DATE: January 25, 1971

FROM : Amembassy BANGKOK

SUBJECT : Quarterly Airgram on the Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Programs in Thailand, October-December 1970.

REF : A. Bangkok A-584 (Quarterly Report for July-September 1970)
B. Bangkok A-629 (October 1970 Report)
C. Bangkok A-676 (November 1970 Report)

POL 23-2 Thai

BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
JAN 28 1971
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A. SUMMARY

Communist insurgents in Northeast Thailand continued to give primary emphasis to consolidating their village-level support base in traditional areas of activity. Armed CT bands generally avoided contact with government forces, and military activity in the northeast was lower than at the comparable time last year.

In the north, insurgents reacted defensively to RTG forays in small units into CT operational and base camp areas, but there was no diminution of insurgent capabilities. In fact, they probably accomplished many of their organizational objectives through increased propaganda and recruiting among remote hill-tribe villages. Recent operations and new intelligence have revealed a higher degree of organization and a higher level of insurgent command and materiel resources in both the North and Northeast than we had previously deduced from available evidence.

GROUP 3 - Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
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RTG counterinsurgency efforts in North Thailand showed substantial improvements over past performance. A new regional Army Commander in the northeast increased the tempo of operations slightly, but there was no effective government challenge to Communist expansion at the village level. In the Mid-South RTG command arrangements were strengthened but to date no decisive actions have been taken to blunt CT violence against police and paramilitary forces, or make significant inroads into the CT organization in the region which has been developing virtually unchallenged over the past four years. The security situation in the Far South was essentially unchanged from last quarter. END SUMMARY

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B. North

CT performance during the quarter, new intelligence, and the discovery of a significant cache during Chinese irregular operations in eastern Chiang Rai province all revealed new dimensions in the Communist insurgency in Nan and Chiang Rai provinces. Sabotage attempts along the Thoeng/Chiang Khong highway in October (ref B), although unsuccessful, suggested a more sophisticated CT capability to interdict roads, a serious portent in a region where it would not be difficult to isolate key places. In October through December on 12 occasions, large groups of insurgents (50-130) conducted forced propaganda and recruiting sessions in both hilltribe and ethnic Thai villages of Pong, Chiang Muan (recently carved out of southern Pong), and Chiang Kham districts of Chiang Rai province. In some instances these large groups clashed with RTG forces reacting to reports of their presence. On October 17, a CT force of 30-50 armed insurgents sealed off a complex of about ten Thai villages in sub-district Chiang Muan, conducted propaganda sessions in some villages (including the sub-district seat), purchased food, and remained overnight. Despite prior warning--relief forces arrived too late to engage the CT. A number of young Thai native to the Chiang Muan area were seen among the CT force, indicating some CT success in bridging the gap between outside cadre and local Northern Thai. Such incidents confirm previously reported clandestine activity and represent the first major overt efforts by the CTs to recruit among ethnic Thai in Chiang Rai province.

Recent intelligence has identified two Thai Peoples' Liberation Armed Forces (TPLAF) battalion organizations in northern Nan (ref C), and two battalion headquarters in CPT area 24 (which encompasses Chiang Rai province and westward). Even if these headquarters were rudimentary they would indicate TPLAF organizational progress and suggest ambitious goals. CT in Chiang Rai reportedly undertook a medical civil action program for remote villages appealing to the same aspirations and grievances that analogous RTG programs address. Clandestine, lowlevel CT organizing continued to be reported in expansion areas along the Chiang Rai/Lampang border and the Nan/Phrae border. VOPT laid the groundwork for these efforts by timely propaganda broadcasts to these areas on local grievances.

The full impact of the current military operation by Chinese irregulars against insurgent strongholds in Chiang Khong District of Chiang Rai (see II.A.1.a. below) remains unclear, but capture of base camps, supply caches, support facilities and documents near Doi Pha Mon indicates that Communist insurgent resources and organization in this portion of the North are considerably more extensive than previously believed. A CT base camp discovered in the vicinity of Doi Din Khao

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(PB 4198) on 14 December reportedly contained a weapons repair facility, an area headquarters with mimeograph printing equipment and numerous documents and photographs. Co-located with the camp was a large supply cache containing $15,000 worth of medical supplies, 400 uniforms, eight commercial radio receivers (seven of Japanese origin and one of CHICOM origin), and a large quantity of explosives and demolition equipment. Chinese irregular operations during the period also captured a reported 82 tons of unmilled rice. In reaction to the Chinese irregular operation in Doi Luang (vic PC 4040) the CT reportedly evacuated their base camps and moved into Laos. In the Doi Yao/Doi Pha Mon area, local CT are reportedly moving into the Doi Pha Mon/Laos border area to regroup and prepare to counter the Chinese irregulars. Additional low level reports indicate that a large number of CT have infiltrated into the Doi Pha Mon area of Chiang Rai Province from Laos with the mission to reinforce the local CT and attack the Chinese irregulars in the Doi Yao area (PC 4202) during January 1971.

Insurgent military activity in Nan and Chiang Rai provinces was primarily in response to RTG patrols and operations against CT base camps. CTs harassed RTG operational bases and fired on aircraft supporting ground troops. In ten incidents RTG aircraft sustained hits but no aircraft were destroyed. Some planned CT organizational and military activity was evidently disrupted by aggressive small unit operations of RTG forces, and CT focus on recruiting,

In Tak province only two incidents were reported during the quarter, reflecting lack of RTG presence in affected areas of the province rather than a decrease in the insurgent threat. Most previous CT military activity has been in response to RTG roadbuilding efforts and Police operations, neither of which occurred during the quarter. (Four SAFs totalling 200 men and 200 new BPP have moved into the Mae Sot area and are planning to initiate operations shortly). Insurgents continued to recruit and train Karen and Meo villagers and reportedly prepared their forces to attack road construction crews on the Mae Sot-Umphang road whenever work was resumed. Available evidence indicates that armed insurgent strength in the province may have increased by as much as 50% in the last six months.

RTG pressure circumscribed CT armed activity somewhat in the Tri-Province area, and the government appeared to have the military initiative. Insurgents fired on traffic several times along the Phitsanulok/Lomsak highway, but did not disrupt communications seriously. In mid-November and December overt CT organizational activity appeared in Chon Daen district, Phetchabun, and Nakhon Thai district, Phitsanulok, where persistent covert activity had been suspected. Initial subversive contacts similar to those reported from Chon Daen (where 50-60 armed guerrillas now operate) a year ago were reported in eastern Phetchabun border areas contiguous to Khon Kaen, Chaiyaphum, and Loei. Coupled

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with reports of westward expansion by CT groups in Loei and Udorn provinces in the Northeast, this indicates the probability of the eventual tactical linkup of the two regional insurgencies in the next few years.

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B. Northeast

The past three months have given us new insights into the scope and substance of insurgent organization, objectives, and techniques in Northeast Thailand. Better intelligence on CT rainy season activity [redacted] revealed the existence of a strong insurgent base area in tambon Dong Luang, a narrow east-west valley in the Phu Phan hills in Nakae district of Nakhon Phanom province. While it has not been declared a "liberated area", and could be entered at will by available RTA forces, Dong Luang is sufficiently under the control of CT units for them to establish a permanent provincial headquarters and a school complex there. The latter provides political, military and medical training. Nine groups of villagers reportedly received political training there during the rainy season and 14 groups, military training. Such in-country facilities provide a basis for more rapid expansion of insurgent ranks.

Storage areas have been constructed and a small weapons repair facility and armory are functioning in Dong Luang, making it possible for CT to accumulate weapons and supplies for future operations. (The flow of weapons and materiel infiltrated from Laos has, in fact, increased, and two new infiltration routes, one through Mukdahan district of NKP, and one through northern Ubon into the Dong Luang area, were recently uncovered.) Although exact numbers are not known, as many as 200 AK-47s, quantities of Tokarev pistols, SKS carbines, a number of light machine guns, and other weapons may have reached the Northeast in various shipments over the past few months.

To expand and strengthen their village support base and to develop their military structure the CTs in Dong Luang used new organizing techniques which appear to have been relatively successful (see ref A), and are being applied elsewhere in the Northeast. Insurgent forces consist of regular jungle forces(now called TPLAF elements), local military units, and village military units (VMUs). In line with proven ChiCom tactics and as a part of consolidating the Liberation Army, it appears that only the most highly motivated individuals were encouraged to join the regular jungle forces. The less experienced and less well trained are formed into local military units, who assist the political cadre in target villages to select and train members of village military units, the lowest level of the

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Thai People's Liberation Armed Forces. VMUs provide a means of expanding insurgent control of villages, and free local military forces and regular jungle forces to concentrate on operations over a wider geographic area. They represent a useful organizing technique which enmeshes even the lowest and newest supporter in a formalistic, military-type structure that makes it more difficult to leave, once recruited.

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Forty-two VSUs have reportedly been created in 25 Nakae villages and 58 more VMUs are being developed. Also as a part of the TPLAF consolidation during 1970, CTs in Nakae created the "Phu Phan Battalion" (ref B). Although not of standard battalion size or composition, the existence of a battalion headquarters represents a psychological step forward.

Similar organizing efforts are also underway in two areas of Sakon Nakhon province -- where the provinces of Sakon Nakhon, Kalasin, and Udorn come together ("Phusung" area) and further north in Sawang Daen Din district ("Dong Phra Chao"). In the latter, insurgent leaders, reinforced by experienced cadre from Nakae, have reportedly been established VMU's in at least ten villages and are working in others. The relative isolation and lack of RTG presence of the Phu Sung tri-border area, coupled with this concentration of insurgent presence and efforts, suggest that a CT base area along the lines of Dong Luang may be developing. There are also permanent training sites in this area of Sakon Nakhon, and unconfirmed reports have mentioned the formation of a battalion organization there as well.

An infusion of experienced senior cadre from NKP during the rainy season gave a boost to insurgent efforts in the Korat/Buriram border area too. New plans were laid and an increase in both military and propaganda activities occurred in this CT command area during the quarter (see refs B and C). Plans reportedly call for westward expansion into central Thailand.

Among other expansion areas is southern Ubon, where Thai insurgents operating from bases in Laos and supported by PL/NVN elements seek to expand in Thai territory adjacent to the Lao and Cambodian borders. Small groups from Sakon Nakhon are reportedly developing support bases in northwestern and central Kalasin, and also moving into northeastern Khon Kaen to commence organizing in an area that would improve the link between the Nong Bua Lamphu insurgents and those in various parts of the Phu Phan chain. Insurgents in western Udorn were increasingly active during the quarter in Na Klang and Ban Phu districts and intelligence indicates they have been ordered to expand westward toward the Tri-Province operational area. It should be emphasized that in all these expansion areas CT efforts are relatively small in scale, lowlevel, diffuse, and do not in any way reflect the intensity of organizational efforts ongoing in parts of Nakhon Phanom and Sakon Nakhon. Areas

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of the latter two provinces have been the focal point of CPT subversive activities for more than a decade; similar insurgent progress should not be anticipated in the expansion areas over the short term.

Intelligence developed during the quarter gave us the CPT 1970 Work Plan comprising six specific policies, which were articulated at regional and province level CPT meetings in November 69 and which formed the basis for all CT efforts during 1970. The six policies, which reaffirmed the Maoist underpinnings of the Thai insurgency, were:

1) Study and integrate Mao Tse Tung's thought with practice;

2) Consolidate Party leadership;

3) Expand Mass work;

4) Consolidate the Liberation Army;

5) Self-reliance and arduous struggle;

6) Grasp advanced thinking: criticize Capitalist and Non-Proletarian ideas.

In accordance with these plans, political study devoted exclusively to reading, memorizing, reciting, and discussing Mao's thought was a mandatory part of the daily routine of every jungle group, regardless of size. Leaders often allocated more time to such study than to military training. In implementing the policy to expand mass work, CTs helped villagers with their crops, with building houses, clearing land, providing basic medical care, and regularly offering political and military training. We have seen the initial steps taken to "(4) consolidate the Liberation Army". In response to the final policy, CT recruiters at the village level shifted the thrust of their appeal from promises of tractors, high salaries, good jobs, and other material benefits, which were standard recruitment themes of previous years, to an emphasis on motivating the people ideologically. This effort was also related to the first policy of learning Mao's thought and attempting to apply it to their daily revolutionary tasks. The adapted Maoist orthodoxy which pervades the plans and actions of the insurgency is aimed at the long term growth of a Maoist revolution based on "steadfast" prosecution of an armed struggle which has its roots in the peasantry and which aims at the creation of rural bases from which to expand,

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"surround the cities", and "seize state power completely (quotes from 30 Nov. VOPT statement of CPT objectives on the occasion of the 28th anniversary of the CPT)." It is by no means clear that the substitution of pure ideology for local appeals will be effective with unsophisticated and traditionally apolitical Thai-Lao in the NE.

D. West Central

There was little change in the level of activity in this region, with seven incidents being reported (8 last quarter). Of note were a high proportion of violent incidents, including 2 assassinations, three clashes, and one ambush. Most of the incidents were concentrated in Phetchaburi province. The insurgency in this region continues to be lowlevel and CPT organizers have not made much progress.

E. Mid-South

Communist insurgents continued to pose a serious challenge to RTG authority and control in active CT areas of three provinces. In these areas CTs worked to organize support among the rural populace and continued their violent and comparatively successful campaign against police and paramilitary forces. CT "masses work" was characterized by assassinations (11), large-scale armed propaganda meetings (5), and an effort to develop a favorable image by providing medications and helping with harvests. The armed propaganda sessions, on occasion involving 30-50 CTs, in particular represented a more determined effort to extend their control among the rural population.

CT military action showed some new facets during the quarter. In October and November, CTs resisted and retaliated against RTG incursions into CT base areas in Nakhon Si Thammarat (NST) province rather than evading suppression forces as they have in the past. An RTG security post in Surat Thani, NST, and Phatthalung province each experienced attacks by 30-50 man groups of CTs, marking an increase in the operating size of CT bands. Among the most successful CT actions were the October attack on a MDU sub-unit, the burning of a village security post in Surat Thani, an attack on a tambon station in Chawang District (NST province) in which 4 PP were WIA, an attack on a tambon station in western Surat Thani (see below), and the late December attack by 30-50 CTs on a village

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protection team in Cha-uat district (NST province). In the latter attack, ten of 22 team members were wounded and the whole team was captured by the CTs. They were later released after surrendering their weapons and submitting to an hour-long propaganda session. The CT assassination of a policeman on a train and the blocking of the main railroad line by armed men (believed to be CT) added a new CT tactic.

The attack by twenty armed, uniformed insurgents on a tambon station in western Phra Seng district, Surat Thani province, was the first CT military action in this area and may be an indication of further CT expansion. Armed CTs were also reported to be conducting reconnaissance into new areas even closer to the Krabi/Surat Thani border, and, further south, surveying unaffected areas of western NST province. RTG operations in October in southern NST province provided additional information (see ref B) on the establishment of CT bases and support structure in Ron Phibun, Thung Song, and Cha-uat districts which are intended to provide a coordinating link between the Phattalung insurgent organization to the south and the insurgents based to the north in Chawang district of NST and Ban Na San district of Surat Thani.

F. Far South

The frequency of reported CTO incursions into Malaysia decreased somewhat, but there is nothing to indicate that this represents a shift in the primary CTO shortterm goal of re-establishing a viable guerrilla presence in northern Malaysia. (As occurred last year at this time, reports of CTO sightings in northern Malaysia may be delayed by monsoon rains, which curtail travel.)

Inside Thailand, the CTO increased tax and food collections, laid stress on organizational security measures (assassination of informers and continued to expand recruitment efforts. These vigorous efforts towards organizational strengthening and expansion, also observed last quarter, are probably related to the level of support the CTO believes is required to carry out its "return to Malaysia" goal.

CPT elements in Hat Yai district of Songkhla province expanded into new operational areas and may have increased their armed strength to as many as 70 men (see ref B). Their efforts were directed for the most part at masses work, but they did initiate some violent incidents, including the ambush of a BPP patrol which resulted in four RTG casualties.

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New intelligence indicates that some of the previously fragmented bandit groups operating in Pattani, Narathiwat, and Yala have reportedly linked together under the leadership of Poh Yeh. The bandit groups are also more frequently associated in reports with the Muslim separatist movement. In August, 97 bandits from several groups met and agreed on unified command and on principles and regulations to govern their activities in pursuit of the separatist cause, although long-term objectives were vague. AmConsul Songkhla reports that Poh Yeh is beginning to catch the imagination of Muslim villagers and to acquire a charismatic aura, which will make him an increasingly serious problem for the RTG.

II. COUNTERINSURGENCY RELATED ACTIVITIES

The Quarterly does not attempt to provide a comprehensive review of all ongoing RTG programs and U.S. CI Support programs, but rather to discuss significant developments or program changes which occurred during the quarter.

A. Security Development Programs

1. Counter-insurgency Operations

a. North - CSOR III followed up last quarter's reorganizational planning and the initiation of aggressive CI operations with concrete accomplishments in both areas during the quarter. The implementation of CSOR III command and control reorganization plans (ref A) proceeded on schedule. Local regimental commanders assumed responsibility for their respective tactical areas on 1 December, and the Tactical Operations Center at Phitsanulok became operational on 29 December. Adequate staffing of the TOC remains a problem, particularly staffing by police and civilians. Samran also took steps to improve RTA training in the Third Army Area (ref C).

The RTG employed small units to a greater extent than ever before against insurgent base camp areas in both the Tri-Province area and the Far North. In the former, operating out of two company-sized base camps established in October in the eastern foothills of Phu Lom Lo mountains, RTG forces have focussed on the CTs who are active in the mountains south of the Phitsanulok/ Lomsak highway in Lomsak and Muang districts, Phetchabun province. Active patrolling has resulted in a number of contacts and successful encounters with insurgent bands(enumerated refs B and C), and half dozen CT camps destroyed as well as several sizeable rice caches. Both here and in the Far North, tactical psyops were more frequently employed because of the availability of U-10 aircraft for budspeaker and leaflet operations.

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During the quarter, RTG operations ranging in size from small-unit to company were launched against CT base areas in northern Nan and in Thoeng and Chiang Khong districts of eastern Chiang Rai province (refs B and C). These operations were significant for their frequency and duration; they demonstrated improved planning and coordination, greater aggressiveness on the part of small units, and improved use of support elements - tacair, artillery (observed), helicopter. RTG operations during the quarter may have disrupted CT dry season plans to a greater degree than anticipated by the CT. Despite these promising initiatives and conceptual developments, the substantial CT capabilities in the North, nurtured and consolidated over three to four years of virtually unopposed effort in some areas of the North, should not be underestimated. The RTG has a long way to go to make significant inroads into insurgent strength and support.

Recently, Supreme Command Headquarters (Forward) assigned the Chinese Irregular Forces (CIF) two areas adjacent to the Laos border; about 20 square kilometers in the Doi Luang area and 40 square kilometers in the Doi Pha Mon area. The 250 man CIF which moved into the Doi Luang area on 9 December encountered stiff enemy resistance and suffered 14 KIA and 17 WIA in their first encounter. Enemy defenses in this area consisted of bunkers and sand-bagged positions. With RTAF air support, the CIF overran a number of CT camps securing a large portion of their objective. On 10 December, the 500 man CIF began their operation in the Doi Yao area. Most Chinese Irregular casualties in the Doi Yao area were caused by CT mines and booby traps. The Irregular Force in this area overran and captured a number of CT camps including a major CT headquarters, supply, storage and maintenance facility. Helicopter support was provided by Police, RTA and RTAF assets in the area. At present, CIF forces are consolidating, establishing operational bases, resupplying their forces and conducting security patrol activities. They are restricted because of limitations on supplies and support. Enemy harassment has been steady and there are unconfirmed reports of CT reinforcements being assembled in nearby Laos to contest Chinese Irregular presence in the border areas long dominated by the CT. The extent to which the Chinese Irregulars will be able to clear their areas of operation for re-settlement of their families and the degree of support the RTG is willing to provide them to carry out that task remains unclear, as does the long range impact their presence will have on the stability of the area and extent of RTG control. Operational control of the CIF operations is exercised by Headquarters 04, SCHQ(Fwd) located at Chiang Khong. An additional 300 man CIF battalion is currently undergoing training prior to its deployment to the Doi Luang area. After this new battalion is deployed, the 250 men now in Doi Luang will be redeployed to the Doi Yao area to join CIF personnel in preparation for an assault on the Doi Pha Mon area. The source of many of the problems faced by the CIF stems from the unwieldy command relationship with Supreme Command Headquarters (Forward) controlling an operation within the 3rd RTA area of operations.

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b. Northeast - The tempo of CSOR II/Second Army operations increased in the second half of the quarter for the first time since June 1970, when external concerns increasingly pre-empted command and staff attention. Among the factors affecting the CI effort during the quarter were:

1) Some decline in the pressure of external concerns on CSOR II as evidenced by the close out of HQ 36 in Surin in September;

2) Some increase in the strength of CI-deployed forces, to include an artillery battery;

3) The end of the rainy season;

4) The assumption of command by Maj Gen Phayom in late October;

5) Expressions of concern about the situation by General Praphas.

CI activity in October consisted primarily of patrolling by village security personnel led by policemen, which resulted in 15 clashes with insurgent bands. Most of these clashes occurred in Nakhon Phanom , where a new governor, an RTA Major General (ref A), has been trying to use provincial CI assets more effectively. Three CSOR operations by composite RTA/VDC forces were initiated in November at the request of provincial governors. A company-sized RTA operation in support of VDC in Buriram resulted in the destruction of three temporary CT camps and the surrender of 3 CTs. The other two operations made no contacts. Four operations were conducted during December in Udorn, Sakon Nakhon, and Nakhon Phanom. One of these operations, in the Phu Phan mountains on the Sakon Nakhon/Nakhon Phanom border, produced significant results; nine CTs with weapons were captured. It now appears that RTA operations under CSOR II will include reconnaissance to develop intelligence, attacks on targets identified by intelligence, and military actions in response to provincial requests. Current plans envisage the launching of six operations for Jan 1971 and at least two 2nd RTA initiated operations each month thereafter. Advisors report that General Phayom's presence has stimulated a greater sense of urgency and dispatch within Second Army.

In partial answer to the questions posed in the last Quarterly (ref A, p. 13), it is evident from recent developments that the RTA is not "opting out of CI in the Northeast", but is adhering to the concept of turning over static, local security roles to police and paramilitary forces, with the RTA performing a mobile strike role against identified targets, CT sanctuaries and CT bands. There is, however, as yet no indication that the police are willing to assume a greater CI role. The BPP has border responsibilities in addition to CI tasks, and the PP seem to feel that the CI mission belongs to Second Army as long as martial law is in effect. The village security program in the field continues to reflect the bureaucratic disarray and disagreement in Bangkok. The CTs have been maintaining a low profile, eschewing military action in favor of continued organizational progress. If the CT adopt a more aggressive posture in the

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months ahead, police and paramilitary forces, in their present state, may be hardpressed to deal with the situation in several of the seriously affected provinces. If the CTs continue to pursue organizational and operational objectives, police and paramilitary forces appear to be unable to prevent further CT gains in capabilities, in the consolidation of base areas, and in the expansion of organizational activities.

c. Mid-South

In mid-November, Maj Gen Sant Chitpatima assumed command of CSOR 4 and the 5th Military Circle. Sant is expected to make better use of his resources and apply more pressure on the Mid-South CTs. Sant considers Phattalung his first priority, and following the CT attack on an MDU sub-unit there in late October he set up a forward headquarters in Phattalung to direct operations by 7 BPP platoons and 3 RTA platoons deployed to the province. These units constitute the first government presence in many rural areas of the province in more than a year. Predictably, villagers have not cooperated in providing information to RTG forces. The CTs appear to be well informed on the movements of RTG security forces, and there have been no contacts with insurgent bands by the patrolling forces. Three small camps have been located and some CT suspects arrested, and the active patrolling has resulted in a decrease in overt CT activities in the province. The operation is continuing, and its most important result may turn out to be the reintroduction of RTG presence and authority into rural areas where CT writ has too long been allowed to hold unchallenged sway. On the other hand, the effects of several years of RTG inaction are not eradicated by six weeks of activity; a recent visitor to the provincial capital of Phattalung reported fear of the CTs continued to be so pervasive that many police and officials did not go about the street in uniform.

BPP operations in NST province achieved more tangible results than the Phattalung operations. In October two CT camps in the Ron Phibun/Thung Song area were attacked and captured, and subsequent retaliatory attacks by the CTs beaten back (ref B). Following a clash in Chawang district of NST in which a CT camp was captured, a 114 man combined BPP/RTA operation was launched against other identified CT targets in the area. The recent increase in participation in CI by the RTA strike platoons assigned to provincial CSODs appears to corroborate General Sant's stated intention to bring the RTA into a more active CI role in the Mid-South, which would be a welcome reinforcement, however small, to the police and paramilitary forces that have borne the brunt of CT violence in the region. Sant has also programmed two CI training operations in sensitive areas in the Mid-South during the next quarter in lieu of Company training tests. These will be conducted by reinforced rifle companies in Ban Na San district, Surat Thani and Ronphibun district, Nakhon Si Thammarat during the latter part of January.

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d. Far South

A large-scale anti-bandit campaign dominated RTG efforts in this region (ref C). RTG forces consisted of several hundred Provincial Police and a reinforced RTA company sized unit, which was deployed in the usual role of providing security in urban areas of Ruso district, Narathiwat in order to release additional police for counter-bandit operations in the rural areas of Pattani and Narathiwat. In some instances RTA APCs and infantry were used as blocking forces during PP operations against bandit concentrations. Some bandit camps were located and destroyed, approximately 500 suspects were arrested (of 450 alleged bandits arrested in a similar campaign last year, there was sufficient evidence to convict only one and the rest were subsequently released), and some engagements with bandit gangs resulted in the deaths of 40 alleged bandits. None of the major bandit/separatist gangs associated with Poh Yeh (see above) have been engaged.

The reinforced rifle company (four platoons reinforced with APC's and artillery) was deployed in Ruso district in lieu of an Army Training Test. Acting on police intelligence, this force uncovered and destroyed four CT camps which had a total of two buildings, and three underground bunkers, and contained large supplies of food. The operations also resulted in the capture of 29 suspected CTs. RTA authorities in the South indicate that future Army Training Tests will be conducted in a similar manner.

A high-ranking official of the Ministry of Interior, who reportedly has the authority to command the governors of Songkhla, Yala, Narathiwat, Pattani, Trang, and Phatthalung on bandit and terrorist suppression matters, has established a headquarters in Songkhla (ref C). He will handle whatever funds become available to the region under the MOI internal security campaign (ref B, p. 1).

There were no significant joint Thai/Malaysian operations against the CTO. In the only aggressive action against the CTO during the quarter, a BPP force on December 16 made a unilateral attack on 30-50 CTO engaged in a propaganda meeting in Betong district of Yala. One BPP was KIA and 5 CTO were reportedly KIA.

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2. Police

a. TNPD Village Police - In mid-1969 the TNPD introduced a new concept for providing increased security in the villages of rural Thailand. Villagers of draft age were recruited to serve a two-year tour of duty with the police in lieu of their normal military obligation and after training were posted in or near their home villages under the immediate supervision of the tambol police. Ninety teams were deployed in late 1969 and on the basis of a field follow-up the central concept of the village police program was judged to be sound. The 540 man force is nearing its second anniversary and the TNPD has instituted a recruitment campaign in order to complete training of new personnel to replace those ending their two year tour of duty.

b. Police Aviation Division (PAD) - Total flying time rose to 1,499 hours during November -- a new record. Seven utility and two light observation helicopters and one small STOL aircraft were deployed in the South -- four of the utility helicopters in direct support of flood relief, including aerial rescue. Four utility and two light helicopters were deployed in support of operations in the North, and three utility and two light helicopters in the Northeast. Three utility and three light helicopters, and a small STOL aircraft were available in the Central area. All air support requirements for counter-insurgency training were met during November. Large STOLs (Caribous) flew 16 sorties and the small STOLs flew 9. Forty-one days of helicopter flying time were provided.

During November, at the request of the Police Aviation Division, the Royal Thai Air Force conducted day and night Infra Red (IR) photo reconnaissance missions in Region 6. This is the first and marks significant progress in Thai interservice cooperation.

c. Vehicle Maintenance - The first three Mobile Maintenance Teams have been dispatched to Region 3 -- one each to Korat, Buri Ram, and Ubon. The remaining thirteen are expected to go into operation on/about 1 January 1971.

d. TNPD Ammunition Requirements - USOM/Public Safety has proposed to the TNPD that it will fully support all ammunition actually fired by the TNPD during the next two fiscal years (of types being funded) if the TNPD utilizes regular funds to establish required stock objectives within the same time interval, then assumes total responsiibility for procurement of ammunition.

e. Commissioned Officers In-Service Training - On 25 September the first 60-man group of TNPD commissioned officers completed a six-month, in-service training course and a second class of 60 officers entered training on 19 October. Participants are comprised of district commanders or officers who will soon be eligible for the position of district commander. The course is based upon the International Police Academy General Course.

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f. Village Radio Project - As of 1 October, the RTG Department of Local Administration assumed full responsibility for operations and maintenance of the Village Radio System.

g. Remote Area Security - TNPD instructor cadre have been trained for intelligence, PsyOps and Security Development courses. At this point the TNPD counterpart funds and regular budget are totally funding the Remote Area Security Program. The first six months of 1971 will be utilized to further develop training capacity in security development and lay the groundwork for expanding the program to the Provincial Police Tambol police stations.

h. TNPD Recruiting - A total of 1,980 recruits completed a six-month basic training course during October and 2,573 new men entered training at the five Provincial Police Schools on 1 November.

3. Counterinsurgency Training

There were no significant developments during the quarter.

4. Village Defense and Local Security

Slow parliamentary action on the budget, and a natural calamity, further delayed the extension of village self-defense efforts in the Northeast. During the quarter the Department of Local Administration (DOLA) decided--at Mission urging--to issue existing stocks of Springfield rifles to the NE villagers who have already graduated from the Prachuab VSDU center. (The order was issued to the provinces, but the status of its execution is not clear.) When the FY 1971 Budget is released, hopefully in January 1971, CSOC and DOLA funds will be available to permit activating the Prachuab graduates as Village VDC, freeing regular VDC members from static defense duties. The latter, according to CSOC and DOLA planning, will be grouped at District and Tambon level to react to CT attacks and perform mobile patrolling to keep CT units off balance, and thus unable to concentrate on the Village VDC. Two special VDC teams, led by BPP noncoms, are performing this mobile role now in one district each of Nakhon Phanom and Kalasin provinces. Other NE districts are using VDC members, even without special training, to fill the reaction role.

The Prachuab training center was damaged by Typhoon Ruth in early December. Repairs, according to DOLA, will be completed in time to permit the center to reopen in February with the Sixth VSDU class--a two-month delay from the latest schedule.

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In the North, regular VDC mobilized for active duty in Village Protection Teams continued to suffer poor morale and lack of motivation to fight. A specially-selected and trained unit in Chon Daen district, Petchabun, demonstrated that good training, leadership, and administrative follow-up can make an effective force of the VDC when it successfully engaged a group of CTs on November 15 (see ref C).

5. CI Research

a. Border Control System (BCS) Study - Briefing on results of the Stanford Research Institute BCS Project was presented on 18 December to RTG officials including the Assistant Governor of Nong Khai Province, the Military Advisor to the Governor, area Police and Military Commanders, members of National Security Council, J-2, J-3 of Supreme Command Headquarters, and the Operations Director of CSOC. The presentation provided valuable exposure of ARPA RDC-T/MRDC work to operating agencies of the RTG. MRDC is following up the presentation with a request for comments from the participating agencies.

b. Village Alarm System Development - The favorable results of 1970 field tests of the Village Alarm System have been incorporated in a report requested by PM Thanom. The report will be sent to Supreme Command Headquarters (SCHQ) in January 1971. SCHQ intends to provide reproduction operational quantities of the Village Alarm device to CSOC and select police organizations during 1971.

6. Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF)

a. Mekong River Patrol - On 20 November 1970, the Mekong River Operations Unit (MROU) was formally established with headquarters at Nakhon Phanom. This unit is administratively a part of the Royal Thai Navy, but operational control is exercised by CSOR II. The MROU has three naval craft and also has under its operational control approximately forty boats and associated personnel of the Royal Thai Navy and Marine Police based at Nakhon Phanom, Nong Khai, Loei and Mukdahan. Operations to date have not resulted in capture of communist infiltrators across the Mekong River, but some smugglers have been apprehended.

7. Base Defense

a. BDSCs - All major U.S.-~~tenanted~~ Thai airbases/now have functioning Base Defense Security Centers.

b. Threat to NKP RTAFB - The insurgent threat to Nakhon Phanom RTAFB has not increased during the past quarter. Low level reports of "armed strangers", CT movements, and propaganda boasts of an impending attack against the base persisted, but no hard intelligence was produced which indicated an attack was planned or imminent. CT activity in Pla Pak district, NKP Province, and reports of CT elements moving within 15 kilometers of the base were probably due to preplanned organizational and expansion activities from the traditional CT operating areas in

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Na Kae and That Phanom Districts. The increase in reporting from peripheral areas of low level CT recruiting and proselytizing probably reflects the refinement and expansion of the RTAF OSI Area Source Program (ASP) in the villages around the base.

The major threat to NKP RTAFB remains NVA or Pathet Lao forces in Laos, who could infiltrate into Thailand for the express purpose of harassing or attacking U.S.-tenanted installations. Such hostile elements could employ stand-off weapons or stage sapper raids as they probably did in 3 ~~KKX/MXM~~ previous actions against Udorn and Ubon RTAFB's. PL/NVN units targetted against U.S. installations in Thailand reportedly exist in Laos. With time, and the steadily increasing sophistication of weaponry, training and personnel, the threat from Thai indigenous insurgent elements will increase.

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B. Political Development Programs

1. Status of USIS Turn-over Activities

A major problem regarding USIS assistance to NIPSO remains, namely the failure of NIPSO to transfer the equipment donated to them by USIS on September 29 to the field. The jeeps are still at CSOD-NIPSO headquarters in Bangkok and have not been dispersed to the 18 changwads designated by NIPSO to receive the equipment.* USIS will not donate the second group of 18 vehicles until a joint USIS-NIPSO committee has evaluated the work of the first group. In the meantime, however, NIPSO has gone ahead and brought the second group of trainees to Bangkok for training. These officials will operate the planned second increment of equipment. There will be pressure from NIPSO to grant the second increment when the training is completed in early February. However, present USIS plans call for an assessment to be made approximately one month after the first increment of equipment has been in the field before we proceed.

2. NIPSO Film Library

In other more positive developments, NIPSO has received 80 films from USIS on subjects of national development and counter-insurgency. They have set up a film library in the NIPSO offices. Over half are already out on loan, an indication that a system is working. USIS plans to go ahead and donate an additional group of films when the branch posts return prints in their libraries. The recall of USIS films related to CI and development is now underway.

3. NIPSO Publications

The first issue of Muan Thai, the publication attributed to NIPSO replacing the USIS Patanakarn will come in January. Although the layout and art work was done by NIPSO personnel with the assistance of USIS publications section personnel, the publication will be printed through 7th Psyop Funds in Okinawa. The publication is anti-communist in content and is designed for lower-level RTG officials. The assistance from Okinawa is scheduled to run for one year.

4. Training of Nai Amphur Academy Class

USIS personnel are presently conducting a field training exercise with the current class from the Nai Amphur Academy in three Northeastern provinces. The academy students are learning the fundamentals of village information work including techniques of

* NIPSO advises that the various administrative problems, including licensing of the vehicles, have been solved and that the equipment will move in late January.

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face-to-face communication with villagers and use of films and publications with the assistance of USIS information assistants. This will probably be the last year that USIS will provide this assistance to the Academy and plans will be made for NIPSO to pick up the project in 1972.

5. Hilltribe Station

Radio broadcast equipment totalling $25,000, purchased with USOM funds and procured by USIA has been installed in the PRD Lamphun hilltribe station. In addition, five new CJ-6 vehicles for use by the station has been received by USIS. PRD has been informed that the jeeps are on hand for turn-over.

6. Police PsyOps Training

assisted by ARPA

USIS and 93rd PsyOps/in November ~~jointly~~ conducted a 4-week psychological operations training course for BPP instructors at the TNPD CI training center in Hua Hin. The course, though marred by some administrative difficulties and an initial lack of understanding on the part of the Thais concerning precisely what the exercise was about, generally accomplished its objectives. A POI for a one-week psyops course for use at all four police CI training centers, was established. The training of five instructors from each center in the basic principles of the course, was not completed. Only eight full-time instructors were trained. The course was designed to teach psyops techniques (basically, face-to-face communication with villagers) which should be ~~xxxx

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C. Socio-Economic Development Programs

1. Accelerated Rural Development

a. ARD Accomplishments - During the past Thai Fiscal Year (2513), which ended on October 31, ARD changwat production increased over the previous year as indicated below:

	FY 2512	FY 2513	% Increase
All weather road construction (KM.)	723	888	24%
Road plans processed at NEARDC (KM.)	1216 1/	1762	46%
All-weather road construction per $100,000 of available equipment (KM.)	6.5	7.5	16%
Road maintenance undertaken (KM.)	750	893	19%

b. FY 68 Equipment Arrivals and Delivery - During the past quarter the majority of the FY 1968 construction equipment (total value $5,212,000) arrived in Thailand, was serviced, and delivered to the ARD changwats. However, in spite of the production increase noted above, eight of the ARD changwats failed to meet the previously agreed criteria on production and utilization standards (see ref A, p. 27) and will not be receiving equipment at this time. Equipment previously destined for these changwats will be utilized in early mobilization of the FY 1969 changwats (Tak and Lampang) and Changwat Korat. Action to divert this equipment was approved by the CCARD.

c. Open-End Spare Parts Contract - During October the Cabinet approved an open-end contract system of spare parts purchase for ARD equipment on a one year trial basis, which may facilitate management of ARD equipment and improve deadline rates. (This will be the first time such a system is tried by a Thai government agency.) A Procurement and Expediting Office is now being organized, and ARD has designated seven individuals to man it.

d. Well Drilling - The first ten ARD wells have been completed in each of three changwats, Ubon, Sakon Nakhon and Nakhon Phanom; and the six drilling rigs have been moved to the next three changwats, Loei, Udorn and Nong Khai.

d. ARD Budget - In early November, the Cabinet approved a recommendation by the CCARD Committee to appeal part of the Parliamentary Budget Scrutiny Committee's trimming of ฿52 million from an original ARD budget request of ฿316.5mil. Reportedly

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1/ Detailed figures for October-November, 1968 are unavailable. We suspect the totals for these two months to be overstated by approximately 66 KM.

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some ฿32 million will be restored. In spite of late enactment of the FY 2514 budget, ARD budget allocations are running well ahead of last year. During the first two months of this fiscal year, ฿22 million had been allocated to the changwats; this compares to only ฿5 million for the same period in FY 2513.

2. Agricultural Programs

a. Soil and Water Development - Four engineers and two engineering technicians are completing 4-1/2 months training at Surin under the ARD Surface Water Resources Training Contract. Work is in progress on a masonry dam at Hot, Chiang Mai Province, a part of the Mae Long Watershed Project. Two engineering participants recently departed for the U. S. for Master's Degree training. One engineer returned in December at the conclusion of his Master's Degree training. RTG Budget support was increased by about ฿8,000,000 to ฿10,935,000 for FY 1971, indicating an increasing recognition of the importance of soil and water conservation practices. The Department of Land Development continues to lay stress on activities in the Northeast and North. Thai officials are in daily contact with farmers and are providing technical assistance in adapting soil and water conservation measures.

b. Department of Agricultural Extension - The in-service training school recently established by the Extension Department for training Extension Officers is assisted by a USOM advisor in curriculum planning and administrative practices. The Director General of the Extension Department plans to increase the number of personnel in the field by transferring 200 agents from Bangkok to field locations as soon as they are trained.

c. Agricultural Research - The Northeast Agricultural Center has continued to progress - in furthering its physical plant and in evolving a meaningful agricultural research and extension program for the Northeast. The Center staff, assisted by the UKy Team, has recently submitted to the Ministry of Agriculture a comprehensive plan for operation and management of the Center over the next five years. This plan reflects an increased capability on the part of the Thais to look at their requirements and plan ahead to see that they are met.

3. Health Activities

a. Mobile Medical Teams - In the period October - December, the number of Mobile Medical Teams (MMT) was reduced from 31 to 29. This was due to the withdrawal of two teams fielded by Chiang Mai Medical School in Nan and Uttaradit. These teams will be refielded in Chiang Mai Province in January 1971 making the total 31 again. Plans are still on the drawing board to launch new teams in Tak, Phitsanulok, Lampang and Prachin Buri pending release of the 2514 budget.

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A major breakthrough is deserving of special mention. RTG support of the MMT project will increase upon termination of USOM support next year. The trend has been this way since FY 67, when ARD expenditures exceeded those of USOM. The political implications of the project are well understood and continued support is assured for as long as insurgency remains a major problem.

b. Tambon Auxiliary Health Workers - The most recent class of Tambon Auxiliary Health Workers (TAHWs) graduated from Chiang Mai Medical School in November, bringing the number trained to 680, ARD is presently contracting with Chiang Mai Medical School to train another group of 70 starting in February or March 1971. RTG capability to support the project was firmly established within the past year. ARD has as of this time borne 76.4% of the total project costs over a five-year period.

The permanent TAHW training school begun in September is progressing and may be finished by the contract date of February 1971. Construction and general equipment for this school are being paid in total by ARD ($61,090). Vehicles and audio-visual equipment were supplied by USOM.

4. Education Activities

a. Mobile Trade Training Units - MTTU #28 has been established at Sri Chiang Mai in Changwat Nong Khai. All 9 of the MTTU's for FY 70 are now in operation.

b. MOE Elementary and Adult Education Department - The Ministry of Education (MOE) Elementary and Adult Education Department has announced plans to enroll as many illiterate citizens as possible in adult education programs during the next five years. It is hoped that the stepped-up program, which begins in 1971, will enroll 8,000 annually. Adult education is seen by the Department as an important factor in social and economic development and in helping reduce potential susceptibility to communist propaganda.

c. Secondary Education Department - The MOE Secondary Education Department is launching a program of double sessions for secondary schools. First reports indicated a limited number of schools in Bangkok would be double sessioned on a trial basis. Since these early reports, indications are now that double sessioned high schools may become a general trend starting at the beginning of next school year. The possible benefits from this educational change are:

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1. Increased student enrollment.
2. Increased teacher income from over-time salaries.
3. Improved building utilization.
4. Decreased capital costs.

d. Thai UNESCO Fundamental Education Center - A ₩14 million building program is underway to expand the capacity of the "Thai UNESCO Fundamental Education Center" (TUFEC), Ubon, and increase the utilization of the staff in an intensive, in-service training program for under qualified teachers in the Northeast. The MOI is providing the budget for buildings while the MOE is providing land and will maintain the structures. The facility is being planned to accommodate approximately 1,000 teachers. Classes, which will last for approximately three months, are expected to begin in April 1971.

5. Institutional Development

a. Public Administration Service Contract - The Public Administration Service Contract which supported the Management Improvement Project of the Budget Bureau terminated December 31, 1970. USOM no longer has project relation with the Budget Bureau.

b. Skill Development Institute - The Labor Department is now negotiating for a World Bank Loan of 80 million baht to expand the Skill Development Institute into 8 branch Institutes which are to be located adjacent to industrial activities in order to provide skills training to meet industrial demand. The Department is also working on changes in a Draft Labor Protection Act by which Workmen's Compensation will be paid by the Government and an appropriate fund of approximately 100 million baht will be established. USOM advisors are working with the Department on the Draft Act and especially on controls for the protection of the large amount of funds involved.

c. Provincial Plan Formulation - The NEDB, in cooperation with DOLA, ARD, CD and NSO, has been giving assistance to the 15 northeast changwats in Provincial Plan Formulation. This assistance has been funneled through the NEED Changwat Planning Center at Khon Kaen, with technical assistance from the USOM-financed NEED Planning Advisory Group. The Changwat Plans, which have all been completed in preliminary format, provide for greater popular participation in the planning process and better integration of locally funded projects with national development programs.

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