
DECLASSIFIED
NND 969044
RG# 59
ENTRY 1613
BOX# 2619
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SCREENED
GENERAL RECORDS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SUBJECT NUMERIC FILES, 1970-73
POLITICAL & DEFENSE
FROM: POL 7 THAI
TO: POL 15 THAI
FROM: POL 15 THAI
TO: POL 17 THAI
FROM: POL 23 THAI
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RG#	ENTRY	BOX#
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By SJR Date 4/24/03

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RG 59 GENERAL RECORDS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUBJECT NUMERIC FILES, 1970-73
POLITICAL & DEFENSE

FROM: **POL 33-3 THAI**

TO: **POL 17 THAI-US**

BOX 2625

NWDPH-2 1997

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DEPT. DISTRIBUTION
A/ACTION
A-8

REP	AF	ARA
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AIRGRAM

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POL THAI-US
XR PPB 9 THAI
FILE DESIGNATION

A-52
NO.

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RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MAR 20 1973
RS/AN
ANALYSIS BRANCH

TO : Department of State and VIENTIANE

INFO: SAIGON, PHNOM PENH,

FROM : Amembassy BANGKOK DATE: Feb 28, 1973

SUBJECT : Spurned by Thanat

REF :

We are enclosing for your delectation a cartoon depicting Thanat Khoman throwing Miss Liberty out into the rain.

UNGER

Encl #1: Cartoon and description

Action assigned to TB

Action Taken

Date of Action 3/7

Action Office Symbol TB

Name of Officer

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FORM DS-323 10-64

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☑ In ☐ Out

Drafted by:	Drafting Date:	Phone No.:	Contents and Classification Approved by:
POL:HPClarkJr:bd	2-26-73	411	POL:LGPickering

References:

NODIS-FILES 1975

306400

10:30

1973

NODIS REVIEW

Caption removed;
transferred to O/FADRC
Transferred to O/FADRC
with additional access
controlled by S/S
C - Caption and custody
retained by S/S

Reviewed by: Allen

Date: 8/8 1978

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Bangkok 17936
12/20/73

Pol 17 Thai-US

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PT. DISTRIBUTION
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COM	FRB	INT
TAR	TR	XMB
ARMY 3	NAVY 7	OSD 34
NSA 3	CIA 16	NSC 6

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AIRGRAM

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XR PPB 9 THAI
FILE DESIGNATION

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HANDLING INDICATOR

A-52
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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COPY FOR

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In Out

FORM DS-323
10-64

by:	Drafting Date:	Phone No.:	Contents and Classification Approved by:
POL:HPClarkJr:bd	2-26-73	411	POL:LGPickering

nces:

Siam Rath Feb. 19, 1973
สยามรัฐ



The cartoonist compares THANAT's former policy toward America to THANAT being a husband and America being a wife - and they got along well. But soon after THANAT was not reappointed to the new Cabinet, he told America (his wife and her child - U.S. troops) to leave Thailand.

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES

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NODIS FILE

7306400

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

S/S

April 6, 1973 10:30

NODIS REVIEW
Cat. A - Caption removed; transferred to O/FADRC
Cat B - Transferred to O/FADRC with additional access controlled by S/S
Cat. C - Caption and custody retained by S/S
Reviewed by:
Date: 8/8 1978

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

To: P - Ambassador Porter

From: EA - Marshall Green

Background for Thai Ambassador's Call on You Monday, April 9

Ambassador Anand's call is primarily for courtesy purposes and thus it is not likely that he will want to discuss at length any particular substantive issues. For background, however, you may be interested in the attached paper prepared for General Haig's forthcoming visit to Bangkok.

The paper discusses the following four topics:

1. Thai Uneasiness Over Indochina;
2. US Military Presence and Thai Bases;
3. US Military and Economic Assistance; and
4. Thai SGUs in Laos.

You may want to ask Ambassador Anand for his thoughts on the first two topics. He may very well bring up the third. We doubt that the fourth will come up and suggest that you not raise it.

Attachment:

Background Paper on Thailand for General Haig

Drafted: EA/TB:JBDexter:fmk
x23698:4/6/73
Concurrence:
EA - Mr. Hummel

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec 3.6
NW 28158
By HNM/AL Date 7/23/0

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STATE DEPARTMENT GUIDELINES REVIEW
☒ Retain classn ☐ Change/classify to ____
☐ Declassify with concurrence of ____ Date 6/13/96
EO 12958, 25X 6
FPC/HDR by HLS
Reviewed 6/13/06
Withdrawal No. ____

Pol 17 Thai - US

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BACKGROUND PAPER ON THAILAND FOR GENERAL HAIG

The following are current issues of importance in Thailand that General Haig should be familiar with during his forthcoming visit to Bangkok.

1. General: Thai Uneasiness Over Indochina

Thai officials and opinion leaders outside the government are anxious over future developments in Indochina and over US intentions. They have little confidence that the Vietnamese ceasefire will hold and even less that stability will ever come to Laos under arrangements that insure that country's independence from Hanoi domination. The Thai are also disenchanted with Cambodian political leadership and seriously apprehensive over the prospects for peace in that country. At the same time, there is widespread uneasiness over US intentions with respect to our future stabilizing role in the area. This uneasiness is manifested most sharply in official concerns about US aid levels and in public questioning of the US military presence. These issues are covered below.

The ferment in Thai thinking about their international relationships is reflected in the intensification of publicized RTG interest in promoting contacts with Peking and Hanoi. No dramatic new decisions have been taken with respect to either the PRC or North Vietnam and there is by no means a stampede toward "accommodation". Nevertheless, the Thai are making no secret of their hope that contacts with the PRC will expand and that a dialogue can be opened with Hanoi.

2. US Military Presence and Thai Bases

There are still about 44,000 US military personnel in Thailand utilizing seven Thai air force bases for operations in Cambodia and for possible Vietnam and Laos contingencies. While Thai Government leaders support this continuing presence, there is growing criticism from non-official circles in Thailand and this has begun to bother the RTG.

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Critics are attacking the need for keeping this large force after we have signalled our intention to withdraw from our combat role in Indochina. They doubt that the United States would really be prepared to use it if the Indochina situation deteriorated. In the meanwhile, they see our presence as being provocative to Hanoi and thus as exposing Thailand to undue risks. They also argue that it stands in the way of Thai rapprochement with both Peking and Hanoi. Finally, they are concerned about what they feel is the adverse impact of our troops upon Thai culture and morals.

Critics are thus far confined to a small minority, but among them are some highly prestigious figures including former Foreign Minister Thanat. Also, such criticism is becoming more and more fashionable among educated and articulate Thai and is likely to increase, especially among student groups.

Thai leaders have expressed their concern about the criticism and have been forced to respond by publicly reminding the people that our presence is only temporary. In conversations with US officials, they have noted the risks Thailand is incurring by permitting our forces to stay on in Thailand and have cited these risks as an important justification for additional US military assistance. It is clear that they would welcome a force reduction.

Ambassador Unger is most worried about this problem. In Bangkok 4623, he recommended that, in order to defuse Thai public criticism, we make a modest beginning in force reduction by withdrawing the Marine wing from Nam Phong. This recommendation has been brought to White House attention.

3. US Military and Economic Assistance

Concurrently with the growing concern in Thailand over our military presence, there has been mounting pressure from the RTG for increases in our planned security assistance levels, especially MAP.

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They have had this subject in the forefront of their minds for several months and it was the major topic raised with General Haig during his January visit to Bangkok. It was also raised with the Vice President the following month. In addition to talking about it with the Vice President, they gave him a memorandum in which, inter alia, they asked for a special military assistance commitment including a program level "up to at least three times as (sic) usually granted each year" beginning in FY 74. They said their desired level was $225 million annually, implying that they consider the "usual" figure to be $75 million. (NOTE: We have always considered it to be $60 million.)

In late February the RTG was informed that our FY 73 MAP level under the Continuing Resolution Authority would be only about $40 million. The following is the summary portion of Bangkok 3675 reporting Praphat's reaction to this news:

> "In meeting with me March 5, General Praphat reacted very strongly to low FY 73 MAP levels and made hard-hitting presentation including expression of serious concern about extent to which he sees real danger of Thai-U.S. relationship deteriorating. Praphat was reflecting lengthy session earlier in day with Thai military leaders who are deeply concerned over MAP levels as well as recent manifestations of anti-Americanism among students and intellectuals. Exceptional effort is needed to get MAP level up, to locate excess military equipment for Thailand and to develop offsets to supplement MAP level."

In response to the RTG appeals, Washington made a serious effort to find additional assistance resources for Thailand. With MAP funds limited under the Continuing Resolution Authority, the best that could be done was to offer some excess defense articles and a development loan of $5 million for agriculture. The excess defense articles included eight C-123K aircraft and twelve self-propelled 105MM Howitzers.

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The Thai were told about this and also were informed that we were continuing to look for additional EDA. The Thai reacted with mild appreciation, expressing hope that we would be able to find something more.

At about the same time, the Embassy submitted a recommendation for further assistance to support a special counterinsurgency program. The suggested equipment package would cost about $3 million. Wellknown funding constraints made it impossible to consider this package as an add-on to FY 73 MAP or Supporting Assistance but we suggested that the Mission examine excess lists to see if appropriate materiel could be found there. Otherwise, we saw no alternative but to substitute recommended items for materiel already planned for FY 73 or FY 74 MAP.

4. Thai SGUs in Laos

The fate of the SGU program is still undecided. The Thai would like these units to be maintained with US support even after their withdrawal from Laos and have requested that they be allowed to keep their weapons and equipment, which were supplied under Laos MASF.

Current Washington thinking is that Laos MASF funds for FY 73 could be used to support the SGUs in Thailand during a termination phase that would not last beyond FY 74. Relevant Congressional committee leaders have indicated to DOD that this would be acceptable. Washington planning, therefore, is directed toward withdrawal from Laos as soon as possible, hopefully this fiscal year, and support of a declining residual force in Thailand through FY 74 with no US-supported force after that. As for the weapons, Washington is prepared to arrange for transfer of most of these to the Thai through excess procedures, but does not want this mentioned to the Thai until the complete SGU termination plan has been developed and until the decision can be discussed simultaneously with the RLG. Guidance to the field is now in preparation.

EA/TB:JBDexter:fmk
4/6/73