Australian Government | NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF AUSTRALIA
Your story, our history

These copies are provided for research or study purposes. Before making use of the material for other purposes (for example publication) you should familiarise yourself with any copyright obligations.

# NAA: A1838, 3010/7/1 PART 1

Series number: A1838

Control symbol: 3010/7/1 PART 1

Barcode: 586784

Number of pages: 235

Thailand - Foreign policy and relations - General

RECORDED

FILE No. 30/9/17/1 Part 1

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA. Closed 30/4/55

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

# SECRET. R.P.

| SUBJECT. |
| --- |
| THAILAND<br>Foreign Policy & Relations - General |

| | |
| --- | --- |
| PREVIOUS FILE: | |
| NEXT FILE: | Part 2 |

| RELATED PAPERS. | |
| --- | --- |
| FILE No. | SUBJECT. |
| 30/1/4 | Thai activity in the U.N. |

17....

By Authority: L. F. JOHNSTON, Commonwealth Government Printer, Canberra.

401/1/1

Countries in which represented:

| | |
|---|---|
| Australia (projected) | |
| Burma | Embassy |
| Cambodia | Legation |
| France | Embassy |
| India | Embassy |
| Indonesia | Legation |
| Nationalist China | Embassy |
| Netherlands | Legation |
| Norway | Legation |
| Philippines | Legation |
| Saudi Arabia (projected) | |
| Sweden | Legation |
| Switzerland | Legation |
| U.K. | Embassy |
| U.S.A. | Embassy |
| U.S.S.R. | Legation |
| Vietnam | Legation |
| West Germany (projected) | |

Chinese People's Republic is not recognised.

Vietminh is not recognised.

Membership of U.N.O.

General Assembly
U.N.C.U.R.K.
U.N.I.C.E.F.
U.N.E.S.C.O.
E.C.A.F.E.
Trusteeship Council

National Archives of Australia

Request for Photocopying

Name:

SeriesNumber:

Item Number:

Number of pages to be copied:

Any other comments? (eg page identification)

cons ✓

National Archives of Australia

Request for Photocopying

Name:

SeriesNumber:

Control Symbol:

Number of pages to be copied:

Any other comments?
(eg page identification)

211

TRANSIT SLIP

ile No.....

ile Passed to.....

rom.....

ate.....

Please tear off and return to
Records Clerk.....Section

---

TRANSIT SLIP

File No.....

File Passed to.....

From.....

Date.....

Please tear off and return to
Records Clerk.....Section

---

TRANSIT SLIP

File No.....

File passed to.....

From.....

Date.....

Please tear off and return to
Records Clerk.....Section

---

TRANSIT SLIP

File No.....

File Passed to.....

From.....

Date.....

Please tear off and return to
Records Clerk.....Section

---

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL 210

**CABLEGRAM.**

WT.MMc

0.4997

Sent: 30th April 1955
1520

401/1/11

TO:

Australian Legation,
B A N G K O K.

124. CONFIDENTIAL.

Bandung Conference.

Please report by savingram reaction of Government to which you are accredited and of press and public opinion to results of conference. Points of particular interest to us are degree to which Chinese Communists were able to test Asian African feeling on possibility of using force to deal with Formosa problem and cold war advantages obtained by China from efforts of Chinese delegation to spread confidence in her peaceful intentions.

2. We have noted Prince Wan's role as rapporteur of Political Committee and some references to skilful course steered by Thailand. Is there any evidence of greater attraction towards neutralism than before on the part of the Thai authorities? What action is being taken to follow up Chou En-lai's invitation to inspect border area?

---

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M.'s.

(COST £15.12.0)

2nd May, 1955.

SEC A/Ss L&T(DIV.4) MR HOOD UN ER PAC&AM EA AM&SP S&SEA SA SEA E.AF&ME E AF&ME INF DL C&P

G

Copy for 401/11/1

MT

CONFIDENTIAL

401/1/4 209

AUSTRALIAN LEGATION,
BANGKOK.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
26 APR 1955
CANBERRA.

In reply quote No. 100/55/1.

Memo. No. 178/55.

21st April, 1955.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

Prime Minister's Press Conference.

---

Attached for your information is copy of a report of a press conference given by the Prime Minister, Field-Marshal Pibul Songgram on 11th April, 1955, prior to his departure on a world tour.

Second Secretary.

Mr Quinn
Mr Hood
Mr Price

P. 3/5.

27/4

P

A press conference was held yesterday morning at the Government Residence by Premier Field Marshal P. Pibulsonggram on the occasion of his departure abroad for a goodwill tour.

The conference started at 9.50 hours when the Prime Minister informed the meeting that he is leaving with an 18-man party on April 14 at 10.00 hours. His first stop will be the Philippines then Japan and Korea and back to Japan again. After a three-day stay at Honolulu, he will fly to San Francisco then cross over to Washington and thereafter leave for Europe. The tour will last 2 months and a half. He further expressed his thanks for the support given by the press to his tour, which he said, is undertaken for the benefit of the Government in the future.

Asked about the policy of the Thai Government in the forthcoming Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung in which Thai delegates will participate, the Prime Minister said that Thailand will support any meeting aimed at establishing peace. Any view to be expressed by Thai delegates at the meeting will be in conformity with the UN ideals and principles.

To a question whether the Prime Minister will make any negotiations with the US for further economic and military assistance to Thailand, the Prime Minister said that he would not. What he would do would be to present the economic and military situation of Thailand to the US for consideration, for the US, he said, gives help in order that a country may stand on its own feet.

Asked whether the Prime Minister will make any negotiations on political matter with any country during his tour, the Prime Minister said that when a head of the nation is on such a tour political negotiations are a matter of course. He further declared his four-fold aim

/2.....

of the tour as follows: firstly, to pay courtesy call on all leaders of the countries he visits, secondly to settle any unfinished problems with foreign countries, thirdly to promote relationship and better understanding between Thailand and other countries and, fourthly to meet foreign pressmen in order to give them better understanding concerning Thailand.

Speaking further about the Vietminh refugees in the north-eastern part of Thailand, the Prime Minister expounded that originally the Vietminh refugees evacuated into Thailand as political refugees after the 2nd World War during Nai Pridi's Government which set aside a budgetary appropriation of 14 million baht for the matter. Later when the war broke out in Indo-China, the Vietminh refugees gave full support to Vietminh aggression of Indo-China. As Thailand has a friendly relationship with Vietnam, she considers it necessary to repatriate the Vietminh refugees to their homeland. The Vietminh refugees, however, refused to go to South Vietnam and insisted on going to North Vietnam. But since Thailand has no diplomatic relations with the Vietminh Government which she does not recognize, she is unable to do so. At the present moment she is considering presenting the case to the UN in the hope that a solution will be found which is found satisfactory by all parties concerned. He further stressed that the refugees' recent reaction may be said to be hostile to Thailand.

Concerning assistance to Laos, the Prime Minister said, as Laos is situated in the SEATO area, Thailand considers herself responsible for giving Laos her full support in every respect so that she may be able to attain stability and internal peace. There is an active trade between the two countries. Essential goods are sent to Laos to relieve shortage there and Thailand buys from Laos through the intermediary of a firm managed by the Ministry

206

of Economic Affairs. Projects are also under way to improve the communications between the two countries. Assistance in training of the military and police personnel has also been given by Thailand.

To a question whether Thailand will send her troops to Indo-China should there be an aggression over there, the Prime Minister replied that Thailand will be ready to do so if she is called upon by the UN or the SEATO Council.

About the damage done recently by a Burmese plane to Thai residents in the Thai - Burmese border area, the Prime Minister stated that he was quite convinced that the incident was an unfortunate accident in view of the fact that the area is all jungle making it very difficult for the pilot to discern the border line. Moreover, KMT. troops resorted to the practice of flying the Thai flag in Burmese territory. The Burmese Government has ordered investigation into the matter, he revealed. The pilot, if found guilty, will be punished. Besides the Burmese Government is willing to pay compensation for the damage. The incident can, therefore, be considered closed.

Concerning the new rate of exchange recently enforced, the Prime Minister revealed that the reason for the revision is to conform to the true state of affairs and to meet the requirements of the International Monetary Fund which recommends the existence of a single rate of exchange. The Government, he said, has no intention to issue more banknotes. After the Coup d'état a law was enacted to the effect that for every single banknote issued there must be reserve fund equivalent to the value of the banknote. If inflation is considered likely the reserve fund will be sold to withdraw banknotes from the circulation. Thus inflation will be avoided.

Asked to express his opinion on Mr. Nehru's

/4....

recent comment on the SEATO, the Prime Minister refused to make any comment saying that he considered Nehru as one of the ablest heads of Government and he was quite convinced that Nehru was working for the cause of peace. However in his opinion, instead of bringing about conflict SEATO will contribute a great deal to the preservation of peace.

On the repayment of loan by the Japanese Government to Thailand, the Prime Minister said that negotiations on the matter had been completed. It was decided that the Japanese Government will pay back both in cash and in credit for purchasing Japanese commodities. The repayment is believed to amount to £15 million or about 100 million baht.

To a question on the problem of corruption in the country, the Prime Minister replied that it takes place generally wherever there is competition in trade which is a matter of course, for those who lose interest in trade naturally accuse those who make profit of practising corruption. The Thai Government has been well aware of this and has set up a committee in charge of investigating any case of corruption.

Questions were raised on other points till 11.30 hours when the pressmen asked the Director-General of the Public Relations Department to wish the Premier on their behalf a pleasant and successful trips.

---

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

**SAVINGRAM.** RESTRICTED

204

..:VA

I. 5347

Sent: 22nd April, 1955

Rec'd: 26th April, 1955
1136

FROM:

Australian Legation,
BANGKOK.

401/1/1

SAV. 8. RESTRICTED.

Summary of Recent Events: 25th March - 21st April.

1. Role of Thai Delegation at Bandung.

Local press reports of Prince Wan's opening address indicate that he queried the principle of co-existence (though not the other four) on grounds of threat of subversion from China and ambiguous Chinese attitude to overseas Chinese. Threat of subversion had made it imperative for Thailand to join S.E.A.T.O. as means of self-defence. Prince Wan also conveyed message to conference as arranged by S.E.A.T.O. Council in February. Press has also featured apparently conciliatory references by Chou En Lai to Thailand, and fact that Wan and Chou have met privately at dinner with Nehru. Wan has been elected "rapporteur" of political committee consisting of delegation heads.

2. Thai Delegation to Seat of Planners Meeting at Baguio.

Delegation will consist of 18, led by Major-General Surachit Charuserani. Other senior officers of group are:-

Major-General Rasamee Ratjanivat, Director of Army Staff College.
Colonel Phong Phekanand, Army Signals.
Lt. Col. Prasert Phoonkasem, Intelligence Directorate.
Major Sanran Phoonphat, Commodore, Operations Directorate.
M.C. Karlavanolit Diskul, R.N., Chief of Naval Intelligence.
Air-Commodore Kamol Deja Tungka, Assistant Chief of Staff Operations.
Police Col. Phot Pekanand, Chief of C.I.D.

3. Relations with Burma.

Since well acclaimed visit of U Nu referred to in our Savingram 5, three further prospective good-will visits by Thailand to Burma have been announced. A squadron of forty interceptor planes left Bangkok on 7th April for two-day visit to Burma; King Phumiphol Aduldej has been invited to visit Burma in May and while there to open third session of Sixth Buddhist Council in Rangoon; the Prime Minister, on return from world tour towards end of June is to visit Burma with a Thai cultural mission. A Burmese mission to study housing programmes in Thailand has just returned to Burma. Mission sent here at suggestion of Mr. G. J. Mylne, the Australian Housing Officer on staff at E.C.A.F.E.

... Improved/

RESTRICTED

Improved relations were recently tested when Burmese planes in pursuit of hard-pressed K.M.T. troops bombed small village on Thai side of border. While a few commentators, mainly from northern newspapers, urged the Government to take "drastic measures" to prevent further incidents, the general tone of the Press was remarkably calm compared with the attitude a year ago when another Siamese village was bombed by Burmese planes. Discussions on the incident are reported to be continuing between the two Foreign Ministers.

4. Departure of Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister Field-Marshal Pibul Songgram and party left by air on 14th April on world goodwill tour (memorandum No. 179/55).

At press conference prior to departure he stated (inter alia) Thailand is willing to send troops to fight on foreign soil in event of war but only on instructions of S.E.A.T.O. or United Nations. (Report of press conference - see memorandum 178/55).

5. Thailand-Cambodia Railway.

Thai-Cambodian train service will open on Friday, 22nd April for first time since end of war. (Previously referred to in our memorandum No. 136/55).

6. Relations with Japan.

Japan and Thailand came to agreement to settle wartime debt ten days ago (for details see our memorandum No. 182/55).

A five year cultural agreement between the two countries was also signed on 6th April.

7. Return of General Phao.

General Phao returned to Bangkok on 5th April bearing more gifts after about 3 weeks in the United Kingdom and United States. He is said to have completed plans for shipment from United States of arms and uniforms for a Thai Civil Defence Volunteer Organization of 120,000 men. A loan of £Stg. six million at 4½ per cent offered by United Kingdom for installation of electric supply in many parts of Thailand is reported to have been accepted at meeting of Council of Ministers on 20th April.

8. Relations between Laos and Thailand.

In our savingram 5 we referred to the construction of the Udorn-Nonghai railway which would result (inter alia) in the greater flow of goods through Thailand to Laos. A note of progress on construction is given in our memorandum No. 137/55. As a footnote, it might be mentioned that member of recent Thai Trade Mission to Laos commented that because of political dissension and administrative corruption conditions were not favourable to establishing a joint Thai-Laotian business in Laos. A twenty-man mission of Laotian police

arrived in Bangkok on 20th April to study various branches of work in Thai Police Department.

9. Foreign Investment Mission.

On 16th April a five-man mission headed by Lt. General Banyat Tebhasadin, Ministry of Industries, left to visit Europe, U.S.A. and Japan to "invite foreign investment in local industry".

10. Foreign Exchange Rate.

See our memorandum 172/55.

11. Relations with Iran.

Cabinet has approved opening of diplomatic relations with Iran.

- - - - - - - - - - - -

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M's.

27th April, 1955.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper ..... File No. 401/1/1

Published [redacted] Date 26th April, 1955.

291

SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS

S.E.A.

JCA

THAILAND

PROCEEDINGS OF COUNCIL OF MINISTERS Among the published proceedings of the Thai Council of Ministers on 20th April were the following decisions: to send Prince Wiwatchai Chiyany and four others to attend the 10th conference of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank to be held in Istanbul; to approve the Foreign Ministry's report that the Egyptian Foreign Minister had accepted an invitation to visit Bangkok for three days after his visit to Japan; and to grant permission for the establishment of diplomatic relations with Persia. (Bangkok 13.00, 20.4.55)

40/1/1

AUSTRALIAN LEGATION,
BANGKOK.

[redacted]55/1.

Memo. No. 179/55.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
26 APR 1955
CANBERRA.

21st April, 1955.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

Prime Minister's World Tour.

I refer to our savingram No.8 (Savingram 11 to Singapore) regarding the Prime Minister's world tour. Field-Marshal Pibul and his party left on the 14th April and are scheduled to return towards the end of June. The members of the party are:-

Field-Marshal Pibul Songgram and Madame
Major Rak Panyarachun (the Prime Minister's son-in-law) Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Madame.
Lt.-Gen. Mom Luang Kharb Kunjara, Head of the Public Relations Department, ADC to the Prime Minister, and Madame
Major-General Praphat Charusathian, Deputy Commander of the First Army.
Mom Luang Peekdhip Malakul, Director-General of Protocol Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Madame.
Lt.-Colonel Nit Wetwisit.
Police Lt.Col. Chumphon Lohachala
Police Major Ruay Sumawong
Nai Klot Wisetsurakan
Nang Suphap Wisetsurakan
Capt. Narong Ngamkorn
Lt. Fung Chantharak
Nang Buppha Ngamkorn
Nangsao Urat Kunchorn.

2. The Prime Minister's itinerary is the Philippines, Japan, Korea, Japan, Honolulu, San Francisco, Washington and then on to Europe. It is stated that this is a goodwill tour and judging from the list of people accompanying the Prime Minister this is most likely. None of them are "heavy-weights".

3. During his absence, the functions of the Prime Minister will be divided between Field-Marshal Phin Chunhavan, Minister of Agriculture and Deputy Prime Minister, and Air-Marshal Muni Vechayan Rangsarit, Deputy Prime Minister.

4. A copy of the report on the press conference given by the Prime Minister prior to his departure is attached to our memorandum No.178/55.

Second Secretary.

Copy to American

401/1/1

Memo No. 121

Australian Delegation

UNCURK

Seoul, Korea. 199

20th April, 1955

The Secretary,

Department of External Affairs,

CANBERRA A.C.T.

Visit of Prime Minister of Thailand to ROK.

In the course of his world trip Field Marshal Pibul Songgram spent yesterday in the ROK. He visited the Thai company, attached to 8th U.S. army in the fron t line and was entertained by President Rhee at a dinner.

2. On his arrival the Prime Minister praised President Rhee as a "staunch supporter of the cause of democracy and freedom not only of his own countfy but also of the whole world". He was also quoted as having said that the Thai force now in Korea would stay "indefinitely", but at dinner with the President he made it clear that Thai forces would remain as long as the 8th Army remained - ie as long as there was a U.N. force in Korea. (The present Thai force is an expanded company, about 250-300 men). The press also quotes Pibul as saying that Thailand will support the admission of the ROK to Seato, but Prince Pridi says that his Prime Minister made his reference only in respect of a possible future expansion of Seato into an organisation different from its present form. At dinner Pyun took more or less the same line; that the ROK did not want to join Seato, a South East Asian organisation, but would be interested to join if and when it was extended in scope to something paralleling NATO.

3. The remainder of the official conversations were on courtesy lines, the President and the Field Marshal getting along well together. One crisis seemed to be looming when Pibul said that Nehru was a friend of his, but he disarmingly then said that it was because they never talked politics together. The only discordant note was when the President launched into a criticism of the "co-existers", to the embarrassment of the British Minister who was present.

4. The Prime Minister was accorded full dignities during his visit, and the press has welcomed him in warm terms, comparing the difficulties which the two countries face. The Thai contribution to the U.N. Command has been praised. As the Hanguk Ilbo said: "Thailand contributed to our relentless fight for national unification and economic rehabilitation by sending her representatives to the United Nations Commission in Korea and, what was more, when the time came for the ROK to bear arms against the northern puppets of the Kremlin archenemy the Thais were among the first to take to the front lines to repel Communist aggression".

5. Prince Pridi, the Thai representative on UNCURK leaves today for extended home leave, probably about two months. He has promised to return for the signing of the report. He is well beyond retiring age, but wants to come back, I would think from a genuine sense of responsibility towards the Commission in its present thin state. When he told the President that he was going on leave, the former asked him to try and return.

(H.M.Loveday)
Delegate.

D.L. - to see A.S. 9/5

P. → S.E.A. - retain

Dept 504/19. 5/5

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper..... SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS File No. 401/1/1

Published at..... Date. April 19 H 1955.

SE-A 198

OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES

SEA

THAILAND

PREMIER SONGGRAM'S PRESS CONFERENCE At a Press conference in Bangkok on 11th April Premier Songgram said that he and a group of 18 persons would leave Thailand by air for a foreign tour on 14th April. The first stop would be in the Philippines, and then Tokyo, Korea and back to Japan. After Japan, they would proceed to Honolulu and San Francisco. They expected to be in Washington on 2nd May, and also to visit various European countries. A delegation headed by the Foreign Minister had been appointed to attend the Bandung conference, which, he hoped, would strengthen world peace. The Thai delegation would not accept the so-called peaceful proposals of the Communist side at the conference. (Bangkok 00.30, 12.4.55)

His object on this trip, Songgram said, was to explain to friendly nations the real situation in Thailand and to encourage aid, which would help in the defence against aggression and enable Thailand to maintain its independence and sovereignty. Concerning Nehru's statement in the Indian Parliament attacking SEATO, Songgram said he did not wish to comment further, because Nehru was considered to be one of the most capable Government leaders in the world. However, SEATO, had been established in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter, which was aimed at maintaining world peace. Concerning Vietnamese in North-East Thailand, the Premier said that they had come to Thailand after the second world war with the assistance (?of the Government). Later, during the war in Indochina, these Vietnamese had begun to sympathise with Ho Chi Minh, had created disturbances after the Geneva conference, and had openly voiced their support for the Communists. The Government had been, and was still, negotiating with the Government of South Vietnam for the evacuation of these Vietnamese people, and was planning to get the help of the UN in the matter. The Vietnamese concerned had expressed a desire to enter Laos and join the Government of Ho Chi Minh in Northern Laos. It was impossible for them to do so, since Thailand had no relations with the Government of North Vietnam (ibid). According to a broadcast from Vientiane (in Thai 13.15, 13.4.55), Premier Songgram also said that a number of organised pro-Communist Thai personnel in the south of Laos had infiltrated into Thailand through the north-east, and had tried to sabotage the country in many ways; the north-east however, had already been placed under Thai police control.

Concerning aid to Laos, the Premier said that Laos was also under SEATO, and Thailand had therefore a great interest in Laos, and hoped that the country would be able to strengthen its security and maintain domestic tranquillity. The Thai Government was offering essential goods to the people of Laos and at the same time buying certain goods from them. With FOA help, a new railway was being built to Nong Khai Province, and also a ferry for getting buses across the river to Vientiane. If any aggression against South Vietnam should occur Thai troops would be sent to fight abroad as they had in Korea, in accordance with SEATO, but nothing could be decided as yet, because no agreement had been reached by SEATO. The Thai Government would be pleased to act in accordance with any SEATO decision with regard to fighting. (Ibid)

In conclusion, the Premier said that the recent violation of Thai territory by Burmese aircraft was unintentional. The area concerned was difficult to identify, and the Burmese had agreed to pay compensation.

According to a Paris broadcast (12.00, 11.4.55), Songgram also said that Thailand would submit to the Security Council the problem of the 50,000 Vietnamese refugees in Thailand, considering them to be a bridgehead for communism. Thailand had tried in vain to repatriate them.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

**SAVINGRAM** CONFIDENTIAL

197

..:VA

I. 5028

Sent: 14th April, 1955

Rec'd: 18th April, 1955

FROM:

401/1/1

Australian Legation,
BANGKOK.

SAV. 7. CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated Singapore, Savingram No. 10, Djakarta, Savingram No. 2.

My telegram 83, repeated Singapore Savingram No. 9 and Djakarta Savingram No. 1. Afro-Asian Conference.

Following are additional points which emerged from talk with Prince Wan:-

(a) Having eventually accepted invitation to conference, Thais, as Asian nation, naturally hoped that it would be a success.

(b) From point of view of free nations negative results of the conference (i.e. absence of recriminatory resolutions) would be important.

(c) He did not believe that conference would work through committees but in full session. Although this method might deprive the free nations of certain advantages since they could have expected at least one chairmanship, it would at least avoid awkward choices since both China and Japan would press their claims strongly.

(d) His own tactics and strategy for conference have not yet been decided. Since returning from Japan he has not had time to study papers prepared in his absence. He intends to devote particular attention himself at the conference to major political questions such as Formosa and attitude of Chinese communists.

2. Thai delegation will certainly not be lacking in documentation, much of which has been provided by friendly missions here.

3. A curious feature which does not appear consistent with Thai desire to avoid heroic role is the Government's decision to send, at Government expense, no less than 30 pressmen to cover conference.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M's.

19th April, 1955.

SEC A/Ss MR. HOOD UN CR PAC&AM EA AM&SP S&SEA SA SEA EAF&ME E AF&ME INF DL C&P

G

CONFIDENTIAL

→ Mr Johnston Sec

SR

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Please note T/T Ho Secretary 4/4

# INWARD TELEPRINTER MESSAGE.

196
401/1/1

MESSAGE NO. 578 4.4.55

TO: MR. QUINN

FROM: MARSHALL MINS OFFIE

MINISTER HAS SEEN YOUR 458 REGARDING REFERENCE BY PHIBUL AND THINKS THIS WAS WHATHE HAD IN MIND.

MJNISTER SAID HE WOULD BE GLZD IF YOU WOULD DRAW MR. TANGE'S ATTENTION TO THE FIRST HALF OF YOUR MESSAGE IF THIS HAS NOT ALREADY BEEN DONE.

MESSAGE ENDS

Have this abbreviation recorded in ANZUS file.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

# OUTWARD TELEPRINTER MESSAGE.

195

401/1/1

MESSAGE NO 458 . 1630 4 4 55

TO MARSHALL ( MINISTERS OFFICE)

FROM QUINN.

YOUR MESSAGE NO. 564.

WE HAVE NOT SEEN A REFERENCE TO STATEMENT BY PIBUL ON STATIONING AUSTRALIAN FORCES IN THAILAND.

HOWEVER LONDON TIMES OF 22ND FEBRUARY 1955 REPORTS A PRESS CONFERENCE GIVEN BY PIBUL ON 21ST FEBRUARY AS FOLLOWS: "TO A QUESTION ABOUT SEATO BASES IN SIAM, MARSHAL PIBUL REPLIED THAT IT WAS A MATTER FOR DISCUSSION BEWH BETWEEN MILITARY ADVISERS OF THE COUNCIL. ~~IT NH~~ IF IT WAS DECIDED TO HAVE SUCH BASES, SIAM WOULD WELCOME THEM: ON THE~~XXXXX~~ OTHER HAND ANY AGGRESSION SUCH AS HE THOUGHT COULD COME FROM THE THAI AUTONOMOUS AREA OF YUNNAN WOULD FIRST BE DEALT WITH BY THE SIAMESE FOR US, AND SEATO WOULD BE CALLED IN ONLY WHEN NECESSAR

AS REGARDS YOUR FINAL PARAGRAPH, AS AR~~H~~ SAVINGRAM DATED 25TH MARCH FROM BANGKOK REPORTS ON PRESS REACTION TO AUSTRALIAN PRIME MINISTERS WASHINGTON VISIT AS FOLLOWS "THOUGH ENGLISH LANGUAGE PRESS HAS SMALL CIRCULATION IT IS OF INTEREST THAT VISIT WAS WIDELY FEATURES, INCLUDING SPECULATIVE REPORTS THAT AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED THAT IN THE EVENT OF AGGRESSION, AUSTRALIAN TROLPS ~~WHHH~~ TROOPS WOULD BE FLOWN INTO THAILAND IN U S PLANES TO RESIST ENEMY TROOPS ALREADY REELING FROM U S ATOMIC BLOWS. LATER REPORTS LED TO EDITORIAL IN "BANGKOK POST" THANKING AUSTRALIA FOR HER PROPOSED HELP.

MESSAGE ENDS FILE NO ~~XXXXX~~ 378/1/7 ABK

401/1/1

194

U.K. Embassy, BANGKOK.

Political Summary for January, 1955

Foreign Affairs

While encouraging the acceptance by the press and public of SEATO as the cornerstone of Siamese policy, the Government have sought to silence any suggestions that they were pursuing a "non-Asian" policy by developing good relations with their neighbours. Shortly after his return from the United Nations, the Foreign Minister indicated that his deputy had gone too far in telling the press that Siam would not attend the Indonesian-sponsored Afro-Asian Conference. The decision, Prince Naradhip said, must await a formal invitation. The impression grew that Siam was becoming concerned lest, as an Asian country, she should be conspicuous by her absence, and various newspapers began, in the latter part of the month, to publish articles recommending the Government take part.

GJP:PM
28.2.55.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

# SAVINGRAM.

UNCLASSIFIED.

193

I. 1924.

...:OA.

Sent: 3rd February, 1955.

Recd: 11th February, 1955.
1045.

EN CLAIR.

FROM:

401/1/1

ACTION COPY

Australian Legation,
BANGKOK.

SAV. 2. UNCLASSIFIED.
Repeated Singapore Savingram 2.
The Afro-Asian Conference.

In our Savingram No.1 of 6th January, 1955, we commented that the statement made by the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs on 24th December, 1954, was probably neither considered nor final. The statement was "Thailand has committed itself with the free democratic nations and it would not be in its interests to attend a conference with neutrality as its objective".

2. Since then there have been indications that this statement was perhaps a little hasty. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Prince Narathip, who has since returned to Thailand, was reported to have said on 7th January in answer to a question on Thailand's sending an "observer" to the conference, that the matter would be decided when a formal invitation is received. Within a few days several of the anti-Government papers urged that Thailand should attend the conference and "do all that is possible to improve relations with friendly neighbours".

3. On 28th January the official invitation to the conference was handed to the Thai Government by the Indonesian Minister in Bangkok. The Minister pointed out that observers are not being invited to the conference - only participating delegates.

4. Several press reports here (with Djakarta datelines) have emphasised the view that participation in the conference by the pro-American countries, the Philippines and Thailand would encourage other wavering nations to participate.

5. It was announced yesterday (2nd February) that, following a Cabinet decision, Thailand had accepted the invitation, and that the Thai Delegation would consist of Prince Naradhip and 12 high-ranking officials. No accompanying statement of motives or policy was made.

---

A/MIN & DEPT. E.A.
P.M'S.

11th February, 1955.

SEC A/S(ADMIN) A/S(UN) Cr(L&T) UN EA SEA@ WEST
A E CEN INF DL C&P

G

9

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper The Sydney Morning Herald File No. 401/1/1/192

Published at Sydney N.S.W. Date 14th February 1955

S.E.A.

# THAIS FOR SEA ASIA TALKS

**BANGKOK, Thurs.—Thailand has accepted an invitation to attend the Afro-Asian conference in Bandoeng, Indonesia, in April.**

Two other signatories of the SEATO agreement, Pakistan and the Philippines, will also attend.

The Thai delegation's leader will be the Foreign Minister (Prince Wan Narathip).

Thailand's decision to attend has ended weeks of speculation following an earlier statement by the then acting Foreign Minister that Thailand has decided not to attend.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of [redacted]er ... SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS ... File No. 401/1/1 191

Published at ... Date 14th December, 1954

OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES

1 SEA

THAILAND

SONGGRAM'S CONFERENCE WITH FOREIGN PRESS On 6th December (Bangkok 13.00), Premier Songgram received 11 foreign correspondents, and spoke to them in English for over an hour. Regarding the proposal for a SEACDO conference in Bangkok, the Premier said that negotiations were now going on, and the Thai Government had made preparations to use the Anantha throne room as the conference site. Asked whether he would visit foreign countries, the Premier said he intended to go to the USA next year, and would also visit every country in Europe, if possible. Regarding the evacuation of Vietnamese political refugees in Thailand, he said that negotiations were now taking place. The expense of the evacuation would be jointly covered by Thailand and Vietnam. His Government had also contacted the US Government for assistance in the return of Vietnamese refugees to Indochina. Most of them would like to remain in Thailand, where they could earn a good living, but the Thai Government, because of its anxiety that these Vietnamese might provide a pretext for the Communists to launch an aggression against Thailand, would like the refugees to be evacuated as soon as possible. Asked if the Thai Government would use force if the Vietnamese resisted evacuation, the Premier replied that it would. With regard to the Mutual Security Treaty between the USA and the Nationalist China, he said that any agreement on resistance to communism was advantageous to the free world.

Asked whether the free world considered the Mekong River a demarcation line between communism and Thailand, the Premier said that the river was only a demarcation line between Thailand and Indochina. As for resistance to communism in general, it was the business of the free world to consider that the line of resistance was beyond the Mekong River. Asked whether Thailand would sign a mutual defence agreement with Laos and Cambodia, he said that Thailand only wanted to sign trade agreements; the defence of Laos and Cambodia was already provided for by SEACDO. The King of Cambodia, the Premier said, would visit Thailand at the end of December, would stay for an official visit of three days, and remain a little longer in a private capacity. It would cause great concern to Thailand if Laos and Cambodia should fall into the hands of the Communists, because the Communists might use those countries as stepping stones to Thailand. Asked how true the stories of food shortages in North-East Thailand were, the Premier said that traditionally the people in that part of the country had troubles of that kind, but the meat which the population of Bangkok consumed came from the North-East. Considerable taxes were being collected by the Government on this meat business. The rumours of starvation in the North-East must have been spread by a group of people who desired to create dissension in order to separate the North-East from the rest of Thailand. To put it bluntly, the rumours came from the Communist side, and followed the same line as that taken by Nai Pridi Phanomyong. (Ibid)

190

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

# CABLEGRAM.

CONFIDENTIAL.

I.10460.

NG:GGA

Dated: 18th September, 1954.
1630.
Rec'd: 19th September, 1954.
0830.

401/1/1

FROM:

Australian Legation,
B A N G K O K.

86. CONFIDENTIAL.

Your telegram 131.

Thai Government has decided to ratify. The Treaty has been tabled in the National Assembly for information and ratification. The documents are now being prepared for signature by the King. He will probably sign in the course of the next week.

Ballard.

---

A/MIN.AND DEPT.E.A.
MIN.AND DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M'S.

19th September, 1954.

SEC A/Ss Cr(L & T) UN EA SEA WEST A E CEN
DL INF C & P
G

401/1/1

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

189

SECRET

*Foreign Office and Whitehall Distribution*

DS 1022/6

**SIAM**
**September 8, 1954**
**Section 1**

# SIAM'S REACTIONS TO THE INDO-CHINA AGREEMENT REACHED AT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE, APRIL–JULY 1954

*Mr. Gage to Mr. Eden.* (*Received September 8*)

(No. 87. Secret) *Bangkok,*
Sir, *September 4, 1954.*

Now that there has been time for the dust caused by the Indo-China agreement reached at the Geneva Conference to settle it is possible to give some account of Siam's reactions, always slow to find expression.

2. As you will be aware, it was not until the first Vietminh incursion into Laos in April 1953 that the Siamese Government at last awoke to the danger to them of the struggle in Indo-China. Up till then the Siamese had rejoiced that Ho Chi-minh, who was regarded as a Nationalist hero, was inflicting progressively heavy blows on the hated French. Thereafter, some Siamese leaders began to realise that if the French army pulled out of Indo-China, and more particularly out of Cambodia and Laos, a vacuum might be created which would lead to chaos and ultimately affect the security of Siam's long eastern border. Self-interest led them to modify their previous attitude to the war in Indo-China and to regard the continued presence of the French army as essential to Siam's safety. Having belatedly realised that the Red River Delta was the key strategic position in the defence of South-East Asia, the Government started to watch more closely the course of the campaign in Tongking. The fall of Dien Bien Phu worried responsible Siamese, though the press was still disposed to be pleased at so signal a defeat of the French by an Asian army. The negotiations at Geneva inspired much interest, but few hopes of a settlement. It would appear that the Siamese Government were not fully conscious of the grave dangers which confronted the French Expeditionary Force by July last and they were thus surprised by the terms of the cease fire which reflected the serious military situation. Shock and alarm combined to make the Siamese take the gloomiest view of the Geneva settlement, which they regarded as a victory for the Vietminh and a corresponding defeat for the West. Even after the lapse of several weeks they still do not consider the agreement as having made the best of a bad job. It is regarded as allowing the Communists to consolidate their gains and giving them a breathing space before their next aggression. In contrast to the general attitude in India and Burma, neither the Siamese leaders nor the press have expressed any but perfunctory appreciation of the part played by the United Kingdom and particularly by you, Sir, in avoiding a much greater conflict.

3. The Siamese outlook is conditioned by the thoughts that whereas prior to Geneva the Vietminh were heavily engaged in the Red River Delta, now they control Vietnam down to the 17th parallel, that the whole of Vietnam will within the next two years fall to communism, and that Laos and Cambodia will inevitably be subjected to increasing Communist pressures that will be felt well within Siam's own north-eastern borders. It is hard to avoid the feeling that the Siamese would have preferred to see American armed intervention in Indo-China and to have had a second Korea in Tongking. Such a solution would have had the merit in their eyes of heavily involving the Americans in a renewed struggle against Chinese communism--which is something they have long wanted—and in an area comparatively remote from Siam.

4. If the future rôle of the French army even in South Vietnam remains obscure at present, it is clear that it can play little part in Laos or Cambodia. The Siamese doubt whether the Chinese leaders can restrain their Vietminh partners from making hay

18500—346 190—21

while the sun shines for them in Laos, even if the Chinese themselves are sincerely desirous of a breathing space of perhaps two years. Recent reports from Her Majesty's Minister in Saigon about growing Vietminh obstruction over the cease-fire terms in Laos, and other reports received by the Siamese defence staff of Free Laotian soldiers going underground in Siamese territory opposite the State of Luang Prabang, suggest that the Siamese may well be right.

5. Other recent events have contributed to the alarm now felt by Siam's rulers. The emergence in Peking of Nai Pridi Panomyong, the former Prime Minister, came as a considerable shock, and was interpreted as heralding an intensive propaganda campaign. However, the solving after so long a time of the mystery man's whereabouts also had the effect of clearing the air by placing him squarely in the Communist and, above all, Chinese, camp and of forcing his friends to face that fact and choose accordingly (see my despatch No. 82 of the 21st of August). Pridi's activities were followed by a Peking broadcast tirade against persecution of overseas Chinese in Siam and the combination of the two has undoubtedly given the Government cause for thought. Then too the politically sensitive and economically backward north-eastern provinces have been much to the fore of late, beginning with the arrest in June of a former Deputy Minister of Education and some twenty others on charges of supporting a separatist movement with Communist undertones in those provinces. To make matters worse, an unusually severe drought has brought fresh misery in its train. Again, the advance of the Vietminh down to the 17th parallel, where only a narrow strip of Laos separates them from the middle section of the north-eastern provinces, has once more aroused interest in the intractable problem posed by the 50,000 Annamite refugees in that area, many of whom are Ho Chi-minh sympathisers. Effective action to reduce this danger is unlikely to be taken for the reasons given in my despatch No. 86 of the 1st of September, but at least the Siamese Government are fully alive to the problem.

6. The view is now widely held that Siam is the next main target of Communist aggressive plans. Be that as it may, the Siamese Government are fully aroused and I would not wish it otherwise: they are prone enough to relax without reasons for doing so being put into their heads.

7. Siam's alarm is readily understandable. Equally understandable has been the growing emphasis in the local press since Geneva on the need for Siam to prepare against aggression. As was to be expected, commentators have also urged the formation as quickly as possible of a South-East Asian defence organisation, while those who used to advocate neutrality have been heard less and less since the Indo-China settlement. The announcement of the Manila meeting on the 6th of September to set up the defence organisation was, of course, warmly welcomed. When, however, the list of countries participating was looked at more closely it was observed that not only was Pakistan the sole Colombo Power to be represented, but that the Philippines and Australia were far off, too distant, in fact, to be able to come effectively to Siam's aid. These considerations have led to increasing concern as it became apparent that the Great Powers were not contemplating a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation type treaty. The Siamese Foreign Minister, Prince Naradhip Bongsprabandh, gave expression to this feeling when he told me (and later the same day a press conference) on the 27th of August that the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation should be as close as possible to N.A.T.O., and that he would work to that end at Manila.

8. It is, I think, clear from the foregoing that the analysis of Siam's foreign policy contained in my despatch No. 54 of the 29th of May still holds. The importance to Siamese thinking of the Chineseness of to-day's enemy rather than his political colour has been demonstrated in their reaction to Pridi's reappearance in Peking. The danger of Communist infiltration has become more widely understood. The strong desire for a regional defence pact with teeth in it has been enhanced by the Indo-China armistice. The absence of all but one of the Colombo Powers (and that one the most distant) from the Manila meeting and the remoteness from Siam of the Philippines and Australia, together with the probability that S.E.A.T.O. will not be as cast-iron as she would wish, are likely to increase still further Siam's dependence on the United States. At the same time, Siam is now the only country in South-East Asia (except Malaya) where the United States could establish bases; indeed, the only country on the mainland of Asia with the exception of South Korea and, of course, Malaya. In other words, as a result of

Geneva Agreement is almost as important to the Americans, on the assumption that a future war is fought with any ground forces at all, as the Americans are to her.

9. I believe that in their odd way—a mixture of naïvety and superiority complex—the Siamese now feel responsible for their part of Asia. It would be to our advantage to take every possible step to strengthen and develop this new sense of responsibility.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Commissioner-General for the United Kingdom in South-Asia and Her Majesty's Representatives at Washington, Saigon and Peking.

I have, &c.

B. E. F. GAGE.

401/1/1
187

AUSTRALIAN LEGATION,
BANGKOK.

100/45/2.

Memo. No. 326/54.

31st August, 1954.

SECRET

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

South-East Asia Defence.

My memorandum 319 of 25th August, 1954.

Prince Wan has now returned to Bangkok from Geneva and the United States, and will be at Manila for the SEATO Conference on 2nd September. I therefore took an opportunity of calling on him on the 30th August for a general discussion.

2. I began by trying to get his assessment of the Geneva settlement on the security of Thailand. He said that from the military point of view he would describe the position as "uncertain" - other people might go further. It was for that reason that he had reserved the right to introduce during the forthcoming General Assembly the proposed Thai item dealing with a Peace Observation Commission.

3. The danger which had been intensified by the Geneva settlement was the danger of subversive activities and infiltration; in this connection he referred to the two pockets in Laos. This kind of subversion was really a species of aggression and he thought that the United Nations should study it. He said that he had discussed this with Sir Pierson Dixon and with the U.S. Delegation to the U.N., and they broadly agreed with this but did not think it could be undertaken at the forthcoming Assembly.

4. We then turned to SEATO and I referred to the speeches made by the Prime Minister and Mr. Casey in the House of Representatives. It was clear that he had read the extracts which I had given to the Ministry during his absence, and with some animation he said he thought they were very good.

5. He had shortly before given a press conference in which he was quoted as saying that Thailand would like South-East Asia defence arrangements to "go as near to NATO as possible". Thailand was aware however that circumstances in various Asian countries were not quite the same as in Europe and this might not be possible. In view of what the Prime Minister had told me about his satisfaction with Anzus-type commitments and this apparent emergence of two voices within the Thai Government, I tried to get a little further clarification, but the conversation at this point became very detailed and he referred to drafting changes which he had proposed to the United States, and, I think, had had accepted. I was not able to follow this part of the conversation very well because we have not seen the draft, but I remember his saying that he had procured the substitution of "endanger" for "be dangerous" with respect to aggression occurring in the area, and also he had procured the insertion of a phrase "take appropriate action" in substitution of some weaker or vaguer phrase. I tried to crystallize the position by asking him whether such amendments were designed to approximate the draft to the NATO type of commitment and he said yes.

....2/

Mr Price (on 378/1/7)

186

SECRET

6. In passing he said that he had told Cabinet that the U.S. could not be expected to delete any reference to action in accordance with its constitutional processes. At this point, and without disclosing its context, I paraphrased paragraph 3(d) of your telegram No.113 to interpolate that we would be concerned to ensure that any action taken pursuant to commitments would not be set in train by a minor or "isolatable" incident, but only by something substantial. I think he took the point but he made no comment on it.

7. I assume that Prince Wan's attitude to the U.S. Draft and the general sense of the amendments which he has proposed will be already known to you from Washington and New York. It cannot be denied, I think, that this differs somewhat in emphasis from the impression left with me by the Prime Minister. I can only explain this by suggesting that the Prime Minister was speaking in general terms and before he had gone deeply into the matter with Prince Wan on his return. We have good reason to think that Prince Wan goes abroad with very wide directives and does not report back to Bangkok very fully on what he is doing from day to day, and infer that the Thai attitude at Manila can in fact be distilled from the quotation from his press conference with which I began, namely, that the Thais would like something like NATO but are prepared to settle for something like Anzus.

8. Copies of this memorandum have been sent to Singapore and to Manila for the information of the Australian Delegation.

(Sgd.) B. C. BALLARD

Minister.

mr Johnston
of any use?

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

SECRET.

185

# CABLEGRAM.

JC:MB

I. 9539.

Dated: 25th August, 1954.
1700
Rec'd: 26th August, 1954.
0830

FROM:

Australian Legation,
BANGKOK.

401/1/1

68. SECRET.

Your telegram 110.

I saw the Prime Minister on 24th August. Full report in bag leaving on 26th August. Main points are:-

Thailand finds the United States draft generally satisfactory;

Laos and Cambodia should not be members;

A.N.Z.U.S. type of commitments desired.

Ballard.

---

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M'S.

26th August, 1954.

SEC A/Ss UN EA SEA WEST A E CEN DL INF C & P G

Mr Plimsoll to see 18/1/54

Secretary to see 4/9/1954

AUSTRALIAN LEGATION,

BANGKOK.

100/45/2.

25th August, 1954.

Memo. No. 319/54.

SECRET

401/1/1

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

Thailand and South-East Asia Defence.

Your telegram 110.

On the 24th August I had, by appointment, a conversation with the Prime Minister about SEATO and the forthcoming Conference at Manila, which was cordial, long and discursive.

2. In the first place, I should say that insofar as it was desired to convey to him that the Australian Government desired to give consideration to the views and attitudes of Thailand, as one of the anticipated foundation nation members of SEATO, and to strengthen Australian-Thai relations thereby, this objective was wholly achieved.

3. As you anticipated, he did not find it necessary to go into details but confined himself to broad questions of principle.

4. I began by saying that we desired to supplement the recent conversations in Washington by a more intimate inter-Governmental contact before the Delegates met at Manila, so that when our Delegation arrived, they would be well informed, in particular, of any special views of the Government of Thailand. Australia was firmly behind the idea of a SEATO and we understood that Thailand was also. I referred extensively to the speeches made in Parliament by the Prime Minister and the Minister of External Affairs, and very often from time to time during the conversation, had occasion to return to the principles which they had enunciated. I said that the Prime Minister had pointed out that Australia was interested in spite of our distance from South-East Asia, and that Mr. Casey had referred to its urgency for Thailand because of Thailand's proximity to danger. The Prime Minister agreed with this, saying that Thailand was now "the gateway" since the French had failed to hold the pass. I went on to say that we found the U.S. Draft substantially satisfactory, but had not reached a final position on some points, and it was for this reason, among others, that we had sought discussion.

5. At first he said that he would be discussing the matter with Prince Wan on his return from Geneva, Washington and New York, but we subsequently got much further than this.

6. One of the principal points which he gave the impression of wanting to make was that he is a convinced supporter of the regional and joint approach. He referred to the joint military activity in Korea and also to Anzus as good examples. He added that he had said before Geneva that "the French troops should have been turned into United Nations troops". Following this line of thought he said something about SEATO being an extension of Anzus. I then referred to Mr. Casey's point that we attached great importance to Anzus and wanted it to continue independently,

Mr Price

....2/

SECRET

183



and after much talking around this point am satisfied that the Prime Minister sees SEATO as parallel to Anzus and the U.S.-Philippines Treaty and not as an all-embracing regional organization of which the former two would be compartments, or in which they would be absorbed.

7. We then discussed membership and he thought that Laos and Cambodia should not be members, irrespective of what the true interpretation of the Geneva settlement is. He thought they should be neutralized and actually used the term "buffer states", although that is a term which Prince Wan prefers to avoid. He did however suggest that they might become members "when they got their full independence" which was subsequently clarified to mean after their elections. He did not touch on the possible membership of Nationalist China, Korea, Japan or Indonesia.

8. In his references to the Colombo powers a little of the smugness of long-independent Thailand vis-a-vis the recently acquired independence of the Colombo powers emerged, and he indicated obliquely that Thailand was not interested in attending any of their conferences at which the colonial question would be canvassed. He did not see any point in making non-aggression treaties with the Communists and referred with some disapproval to India's attitude in this connection. I thereupon quoted Mr. Menzies' statement of our position that we regarded neutralism as more likely to invite aggression than to repel it and he agreed.

9. It will be recalled that over the past few months the question of foreign bases and troops has been intermittently ventilated, and the Thai official position has been rather reticent and a shade ambiguous, but has left the impression on balance that Thailand wanted the best of both positions - immediate military assistance in the event of armed aggression, but, in the interim, no foreign bases or troops. Last week a meeting of Cabinet was scheduled, which was also to be attended by pro-Government First Category (elected) members of the National Assembly. Press comment before the meeting said that some Assemblymen would ask the Government whether it thought that other countries in the democratic camp would really help Thailand to fight against her enemies, and, if so, in how many days would their forces be available.

10. The meeting was duly held on 17th August and it was reported that the Prime Minister, Marshal of the R.T.A.F. Fuen Ronapakat, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs and General Sarit made replies. The press report says that they expressed the conviction that the Communists intend to invade Thailand at some time and that defence preparations were being made with the help of the U.S. They said that the U.S. had enquired about Thailand's policy on the possibility of U.S. soldiers being sent to help in defence, and Thailand had replied that its policy is against admitting U.S. soldiers, as Thailand is independent and the people would misunderstand the good wishes of America. Only the JUSMAG (Military Advisory Group) is wanted now. However, if Thailand were attacked by an aggressor American troops would be welcomed. It was stated that in an emergency U.S. air aid would be forthcoming in a matter of five to eight hours. When some members present expressed concern that the aid which the United States is giving to Thailand may include conditions which placed Thailand at a disadvantage, General Sarit assured them that there were no conditions whatsoever and that the aid which the United States is giving Thailand is similar to the aid which a wealthy person might give

....3/

SECRET

182



to a poor person. In a slightly different vein, from time to time unofficial or private suggestions are heard that a SEATO which only provided for immediate consultation after aggression would be insufficient for Thailand's needs, and that machinery on the NATO model would be preferable.

11. In view of the foregoing, I think it is important to note that not only did the Prime Minister not mention NATO at all, but indicated that commitments on the Anzus model would be sufficient. We went into this fairly fully, particularly into the substance of Article V of the Anzus Treaty, and he explicitly said that he thought that that would be enough.

12. He said that Thailand is fairly satisfied with the U.S. Draft. I led the conversation on to the topic of prospective machinery, but he was not to be drawn on this, indicating that he thought it was premature and saying that they would go to Manila and see what came out of it.

(Sgd.) B. C. BALLARD

Minister.

Note for File 410/1/11

Mr. Mendès-France's statement of 23 July 54 to French National Assembly:

"In future, responsabilities will rest with the leaders of the country [Viet Nam] to which we shall give complete independence... The future is in their hands. The rôle of France will be to protect this new independence, to help the economic development of the country, to encourage reforms. I wish to say to the young Viet Namese State that our technical aid to them is pledged. I think that under these conditions elections can be won."

180

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
16 AUG 1954
401/1/1
CANBERRA

AUSTRALIAN LEGATION,
BANGKOK.

100/45/2.

Memo. No. 295/54.

13th August, 1954.

CONFIDENTIAL

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

THAILAND AND SEATO
Your memo.251 of 29 July,1954.

The desire of Thailand for a regional defence organization can be taken for granted, but in the absence of any public statement on the matters you mention - scope, objectives, membership and commitments - before approaching the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I discussed the matter with the British and U.S. Embassies, whom I asked in particular whether they knew what the Thais were thinking on the geographical scope of the proposed pact (membership and area to be embraced) and commitments envisaged by the Thais.

2. Neither Embassy had answers to these questions, which they agreed (especially the U.S. Ambassador) were of great interest and relevance, and which appeared to have been propounded to them for the first time.

3. I then called on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and took the opportunity of giving the Director-General of the Asia Department copies of the speeches made in Parliament by the Prime Minister and the Minister of External Affairs, and going through them generally with him. He was most interested and said he would bring them to the attention of the Prime Minister.

4. I then asked, as a preliminary step, whether he was able to give me comparable background information on the Thai attitude, but it quickly became apparent that he was not in a position to talk, not from unwillingness but because he had no details to give.

5. He said that Prince Wan had approved the State Department text of the announcement proposed to be made simultaneously on 14th August, and referred to the U.S.-U.K. draft (which I take to be the material covered by pages 3, 4 and 5 of the enclosure to your memorandum 251), and said that the Thai view was being presented by the Thai Ambassador in Washington during the discussions now going on between the State Department and the Ambassadors of the presumed "foundation members" of the pact. He said that the Thai Ambassador was in close consultation with Prince Wan, who is now in New York, and I therefore feel that at the present time it is in Washington rather than in Bangkok that your queries can be answered.

B.B. Galland

Minister.

Sec. Shaw to Secretary J. Kimball 19/8/54

AAH 17/8 Copy on SEATO file please

P

179

401/1/1

C O P Y.

"P.I.-ANETA" - DJAKARTA, 8th August, 1954.

COMMUNIST CHINA AND SEATO

TOKYO, August 6:- Communist China's most influential newspaper said today that "Asian people cannot permit" the Philippines and Thailand to champion the American sponsored Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation. Radio Peiping broadcast a commentary in the Peiping People's Daily which said that important Asian countries "such as India and Indones have refused to join a US sponsored bloc".

"At the same time", the editorial said "it has been noted that the ruling clique of the Philippines and Thailand are still fervently expressing their willingness to join the US Southeast Asia military bloc and are noisily promoting it".

"The Asian people cannot permit this practice of disregarding the national sovereignty and peace of one country and following the US in its war plans in Asia." The newspaper said that through a SEATO organisation "American authorities are trying to throw a ring of encirclement around the People's Republic of China".

"This shows that the Southeast Asia bloc is designed to be an aggressive arganisation directly hostile to the Chinese people". It said no nation would follow the US if it had "an independent foreign policy of non-aggression and peaceful co-existence." -- (PI-ANETA).

SECRET 178

FILE COPY
GJP/PMF.

401/1/1.
Memo. No. 251

29th July, 1954.

The Australian Legation,
BANGKOK.

Thailand and S.E.A.T.O.

We are enclosing for your own background information only, a paper prepared in the Department setting out Australia's views on S.E.A.T.O. and a summary of the progress made in the recent talks in Washington between the United Kingdom and the United States.

2. We would be glad if you would continue to keep us closely informed of the Thai attitude on the setting up of a South East Asian Treaty Organisation. We would be most interested in obtaining as clear a picture as possible of the Thai thinking on such aspects as the possible scope and membership of S.E.A.T.O. and the nature of the commitments they envisage under it.

(D.W. McNicol)
for the Secretary.

Paper is on 378/1/7.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

177

Name of Paper The Hindu Weekly Review File No. 401/1/11

Published at Madras Date 19th July 1954

# PIVOT OF S.-E. ASIAN DEFENCE SET-UP

## THAILAND MAY BE ASSIGNED ROLE

**From K. BALARAMAN**

The United States has abandoned its "hands off" attitude towards the impending Indo-China settlement and Mr. Dulles' decision to return to Washington and send Mr. Bedell-Smith instead to Geneva is interpreted in some quarters as meaning nothing more than that the Secretary of State is trying to save his face with Republican Congressmen. His latest peregrination has, therefore, caused some amusement among foreign observers, who, also however, realise that the State Department had to go to Geneva through this circuitous route—namely, first, play tough saying that it would not participate in the conference, then rush Mr. Dulles to Paris and then agree to send Mr. Bedell-Smith to Geneva—as a sop to Congressional extremists who, thanks to Mr. Eisenhower's self-renunciation, have lately been wielding a heavy hand in shaping foreign policy, constitutionally the President's domain.

Another interpretation put on Mr. Dulles' return is that he is not satisfied with the terms of the Indo-China settlement which Britain and France are prepared to accept, but, in the interests of Western unity, has yielded to French and British pressure that the United States should also participate in the settlement: so he will send Mr. Bedell-Smith. It is also being said that in return for this gesture, the British and the French have pledged to co-operate with the United States in setting up a South-East Asia defence organisation and guaranteeing South-East Asia against any further Communist encroachment.

The United States is apparently making Thailand the pivot round which this defence organisation is to be built. The programme of additional military assistance to this country was announced last week under which, among other things, a strategic military highway from Saraburi to the east is to be constructed and a larger Siamese army created. It is understood that Thailand can now put a hundred thousand men in the field and it is expected that a hundred thousand more will be trained each year and put in the reserve.

Name of Paper: Monitoring Digest File No: 401/1/1

Published at: Malaya (Radio Services) Date: 20th-21st June, 1954



## THAI PREMIER INTENSIFIES "TERROR" CONSIDERING ANTI-COMMUNIST LAW:

The Thailand Government, on U.S. orders, is intensifying its rule of terror at home at the same time as it smooths the path for U.S. war preparations, according to Bangkok reports.

Intimidation and arrests of those who show opposition to Thailand's policy of serving U.S. aggression are mounting. Those arrested include a former Deputy Minister of Education and Members of Parliament.

To legalise the suppression of the people, a new "anti-Communist" law is being contemplated by the Luang Pibul Songgram regime. In a speech delivered on June 12, he declared viciously, "We shall have to spill blood. The penalty for going against the new anti-Communist law might be death".

### Missions To And From Washington

These moves follow intensified work by the U.S. to turn Thailand completely into a base of aggression and a source of cannon-fodder.

The U.S. authorities have been pressing Thailand's armed forces. Associated Press on June 15 revealed that the U.S. Ambassador to Thailand, William Donovan, who recently returned to Washington, was preparing to receive the Thai Military Mission.

At the same time, the U.S. Foreign Operations Administration announced on June 14 that an Operations Mission would be sent to Thailand for the "technical co-operation" programmes aimed at "enabling Thailand to maintain bigger armed forces."

The Thailand Government has been informed by the U.S. Foreign Operations Administration that military "aid" to Thailand will increase, as from the next fiscal year, to $US22,500,000 according to the Bangkok evening newspaper, Chung Yuan Pao, of June 1. Funds for the current "technical co-operation" programmes average $US7,000,000 per year. (NCNA Peking Morse English 0003 hrs June 21)

175 X

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

SECRET

*Foreign Office and Whitehall Distribution*

**SIAM**
**June 2, 1954**
**Section 1**

DS 1022/1

# SIAM'S LIKELY COURSE OF ACTION IN THE PRESENT CRISIS IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA

401/1/1

*Mr. Gage to Mr. Eden.* (*Received June 2*)

(No. 54. Secret) *Bangkok,*
Sir, *May 29, 1954.*

I have read with great interest Research Department's paper " Anglo-Siamese Relations 1941 " enclosed in your despatch No. 46 of the 19th of March. I agree that the paper is of more than purely historical interest and that a study of Siam's attitudes and more particularly of Field-Marshal Pibul's conduct in 1940–41 should prove of value in appraising Siam's likely course of action in the present crisis in South-East Asia. My United States colleague has also read the paper with great interest and has expressed appreciation of the clarity with which it was written, to which I would like to add mine.

2. It has long been felt in this Mission that the historical parallels between 1940–41 and 1953–54 should always be borne in mind as a corrective to over-optimism both as regards Siam's political rôle and the performance of her armed forces. This consideration applies with greater force to the Americans who have been inclined since the war to regard Siam through rose-tinted spectacles and to over-estimate Siam's military potential, no doubt from paternal pride in the instrument which they have very largely fashioned.

3. At the same time, however useful the parallels may be to prevent complacent optimism, they are not exact: the differences between 1941 and 1954 are at least as important to a balanced assessment of Siam's political future. Perhaps the greatest difference is between the enemy then and the enemy now. Now the enemy is China (the fact that China is also Communist is of less importance to the Siamese) and it is the Chinese—of any political colouring—of whom the Siamese are mortally afraid. Alliance with, or occupation by, Japan held no great terrors for the Siamese, rightly as events proved. Japan indeed did not pose as the " enemy " of Siam. She came forward as a powerful friend preaching co-prosperity, a text which appealed to many Siamese. Domination by China, however, with its teeming millions whose industry and skill are all too plainly demonstrated every minute of the day by the three million Chinese within Siam's borders and which have enabled that community to acquire virtual control of Siam's commerce, trade and industry, is a very different matter. In 1941 it was Marshal Pibul's policy, if Japanese troops came to Siam, to see that they came as friendly occupiers and not as invaders. In 1954, he well knows that Chinese troops would come as conquerors.

4. Other differences between 1941 and 1954 may be briefly noted. Marshal Pibul himself has learned much since 1941, though it does not follow that if he had been as experienced then as he is now his actions would have been any different, for the sufficient reason that he acted then (lacking any foreknowledge of the future) in what was almost unanimously considered to be Siam's best interests; very few Siamese believed that the Axis Powers would not win the war. Nevertheless, having reckoned without the United States of America in 1941 he is evidently determined not to repeat that error now. Again, it was Japan who obviously held the initiative in Siam in 1941, whereas it is just as obvious that it is the Americans rather than the Chinese who hold the initiative in 1954. Furthermore, there were in 1941, as the Research Department paper points out, sections of opinion which thought that Siam stood to gain by committing herself to the Japanese—whereas to-day no non-Communist Siamese believes that any gain would result from an alliance with the Communists, if only because of the Chineseness of the enemy.

5. Paragraph 41 of the Research Department paper defines Siam's traditional policy as one of sitting on the fence and avoiding implication in alliances which may involve

18500—318 189—18

war, except when one party is so obviously powerful as to leave the issue in no apparent doubt. So long as possible the Siamese will seek to maintain good relations with both parties in an international struggle and avoid committing themselves to either. Fence-sitting is not of course an heroic policy: but the Siamese are not cast in an heroic mould; not only are they happy-go-lucky and indolent, their climate and religion also militate against extremism of any kind. The Siamese tradition has, however, the supreme merit in the eyes of the people that it worked. It worked in 1917 and again in 1941 inasmuch as Siam did not become a battlefield and suffered few hardships under the Japanese occupation. Even staunch friends of Britain firmly believe that Siam's actions in 1941 were justified.

6. In the light of what has been said above of Siam's traditional policy of avoiding entanglements with major Powers, it would seem that the policy pursued since 1950 by Marshal Pibul of unequivocably aligning Siam with the Western democracies within the framework of the United Nations represents a major departure from tradition. It undoubtedly appears so to the Siamese people at large. His recognition on the 28th of February, 1950, of the Associated States of Indo-China was highly unpopular, was made against the advice of his officials and was the immediate cause of the resignation of his Minister for Foreign Affairs. With the outbreak of the Korean war shortly after, Marshal Pibul went a stage further by offering a contingent of troops for service in Korea, the first Asian country to do so. Between July and October of the same year Siam signed a series of agreements with the United States covering aid in the fields of education, economic and technical co-operation and the armed forces. Only last month, in response to Mr. Dulles' appeal for a defence alliance in South-East Asia, Siam agreed to join in principle. Siam, it would seem, could hardly be more firmly in the Western camp or more closely bound to the United States in particular.

7. And yet it would, I believe, be a mistake to assume that Siam has committed herself *irrevocably* on the side of the free world. Although Marshal Pibul's new policy has of course paid dividends in economic and military aid, this is not enough to justify to the public his break with tradition. Even the widely-held assumption that Siam has now established sufficient credit with the United States (and the United Nations) to ensure a favourable reply to a call for immediate help in the event of a Communist military threat is not enough. One thing is still lacking, namely that Siam has not so far received from the West a definite commitment in advance to go to her aid with effective military forces which must, in the Siamese view, include substantial ground troops. It was precisely such a commitment which Britain was in no position to give in 1941. Nothing less than such a commitment will satisfy Siam's security needs since she is aware that her own military strength is quite inadequate to the task of defending the country.

8. If some form of united front in South-East Asia were set up following the Geneva Conference, it should go a long way to reassure the Siamese. They would no doubt assume that, once a pact had been signed, the United States would become increasingly involved and that if United States air bases for instance were set up in the country, the Americans would not entrust their defence to the Siamese army (as indeed they could not risk doing). Alternatively, in default of a general alliance the Siamese may hope that the United States will offer a bilateral agreement, about which there has been some talk.

9. Meanwhile, it is being slowly borne in upon the Siamese mind that a considerable period must elapse before a defence alliance can come into being. Yet the sands of time appear to the Siamese to be running out fast in Indo-China. Public nervousness is increasing and so is criticism of the Field-Marshal's abandonment of traditional policy. The Chinese tiger looms nearer at home and now struts upon the stage at Geneva, while the Vietminh jackal showed at Dien Bien Phu that he is a much more formidable animal than the Siamese had imagined. Surely, argue the critics, who include former Prime Ministers and Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Siam is sticking her neck out too far. The statement by the Chief of the Defence Staff (since sacked) on the 10th of May that Siam "would have no objection to being used as a military base by the free democratic nations should such a step be considered necessary for combating the advance of communism in Indo-China and . . . South-East Asia" further alarmed the critics.

10. In these circumstances one would expect to find signs that the Siamese leaders were tentatively reverting to the old custom of keeping a foot in both camps. There

have been such signs during the past eighteen months which were reported at the time. It has, however, proved difficult if not impossible to distinguish between feelers to the Communists and attempts of a somewhat crude kind on the part of Police General Phao to infiltrate his intelligence agents into the opposing lines. There is now fresh evidence from secret sources of further links between General Phao and even Marshal Pibul himself and dissident elements in Laos and Cambodia. Efforts are of course being made to discover their precise significance.

11. I am inclined to think that in the face of the rapidly worsening situation in Indo-China the Siamese leaders would by now have made more active efforts to open communications with the Communists had it not been for Mr. Dulles' attempts to found a united front in South-East Asia. However ill-timed his proposal might seem to us and to the Asian members of the Commonwealth, to Siam it must appear as the only ray of hope in a dark picture.

12. To sum up. Self-interest—the guiding star of Siamese policy—will continue to keep Siam in the Western camp unless and until it is certain that the West will not or cannot give a firm guarantee of effective military aid. Siamese fear and rooted dislike of the Chinese would in the event of aggression produce a far better spirit in the armed forces and in the population than was apparent in 1941. If the worst happened, both active and passive resistance could be expected to continue long after Chinese domination had been imposed on the country. Siam would however not fight *à l'outrance* alone nor could their army last more than a few days at present no matter how improved its spirit. A regional pact, even if no promise of United States ground troops were given initially, would go far to resolve Siamese apprehensions. Failing that, a bilateral United States-Siam pact with teeth in it would meet the case. Without a firm promise of effective military aid from the United States—and better still from Britain as well—Siam will be increasingly tempted not so much to reinsure with the Communists which suggests allowing them to come in, as to loosen her Western ties and seek safety by adopting an inconspicuous colouring in the hope of " avoiding the eye of the tiger."

I am copying this despatch to the recipients of yours.

I have, &c.

B. E. F. GAGE.

Name of Paper: The New York Times File No: 401/1/1

Publi... at: New York Date: 1st May, 1954

S.E.A. 401/1/1

*GENEVA, April 30 (AP) — Following are excerpts from the addresses by Prince Wan Waithayakon of Thailand and Cevat Ackalin of Turkey at the Geneva conference today:*

## Statement by Prince Wan

On the question of Korea, Thailand, as a firm supporter of the United Nations, was among the first to respond to the United Nations appeal and to furnish both economic and military assistance to the Republic of Korea in order to help repel the armed attack which had been made upon it and to restore international peace and security in the area.

Not only the Government of Thailand but also its people understood the true significance and vital value of the action taken by the United Nations. The Government and people of Thailand realized that it was a clear case of Communist aggression and decided at once to support the United Nations action for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The principle of collective security which until then had only been known in the abstract as an ideal, now became a living reality. The United Nations, the people realize, will come to the help of any nation, great or small, which is the victim of an armed attack constituting a breach of the peace. Thai troops readily volunteered for service in Korea and they have willingly made the supreme sacrifice of their lives.

The armed attack having been repelled the Republic of Korea, in spite of untold losses and sufferings, stands as a free and independent nation. Permanent peace, however, has still to be concluded. That is the task to be accomplished by the present conference.

### Re-Unity of Korea Stressed

So far as Korea is concerned, it must indeed be united and independent. As an Asian nation, Thailand is strongly in favor of the principle that all Asian peoples should form united and independent states, not divided in any way or subject to colonialism or imperialism in any form, old or new.

Thailand, like other Asian nations, has felt the impact of colonialism or imperialism, and is, therefore, aware, and hence cautious, of the many insidious forms that it may take. My country, however, has had a special experience of its own in this regard. It has managed to keep its independence during the whole of the colonial period, and if it managed to do so it was because of its national policy of the open door and equal opportunities for all the powers, as well as cooperation with them. That national policy still holds good today.

Thailand, no less than other Asian nations, considers that peace in Asia should be insured, that the independence and sovereignty of Asian nations should be respected and that the National rights and freedom of the Asian peoples should be safeguarded.

The delegation of Thailand, however, has yet to learn that in order to be a good Asian one has to be an exclusive Asian. On the contrary, our national experience, acquired through more than a century of relations with the Western powers, has been that in order to be a good Asian, as a good European or a good American or, for that matter, a good African, one has to cooperate in peace with the other nations of the world organized into a world comunity of free nations.

### Worldwide Peace Is Urged

For peace is worldwide: it is one and indivisible. The people of Thailand, [illegible]

lution to the Korean question.

In the opinion of my delegation the key to that solution may be found in the United Nations General Assembly resolution of Oct. 7, 1950, whose recommendations should now be adapted and applied to the present situation so that elections under the auspices of the United Nations and other measures may be taken for achieving establishment of a united, independent democratic Korea.

S.E.A.

S.E.A.

clear case of Communist aggression and decided at once to support the United Nations action for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The principle of collective security which until then had only been known in the abstract as an ideal, now became a living reality. The United Nations, the people realize, will come to the help of any nation, great or small, which is the victim of an armed attack constituting a breach of the peace. Thai troops readily volunteered for service in Korea and they have willingly made the supreme sacrifice of their lives.

The armed attack having been repelled the Republic of Korea, in spite of untold losses and sufferings, stands as a free and independent nation. Permanent peace, however, has still to be concluded. That is the task to be accomplished by the present conference.

**Re-Unity of Korea Stressed**

So far as Korea is concerned, it must indeed be united and independent. As an Asian nation, Thailand is strongly in favor of the principle that all Asian peoples should form united and independent states, not divided in any way or subject to colonialism or imperialism in any form, old or new.

Thailand, like other Asian nations, has felt the impact of colonialism or imperialism, and is, therefore, aware, and hence cautious, of the many insidious forms that it may take. My country, however, has had a special experience of its own in this regard. It has managed to keep its independence during the whole of the colonial period, and if it managed to do so it was because of its national policy of the open door and equal opportunities for all the powers, as well as cooperation with them. That national policy still holds good today.

Thailand, no less than other Asian nations, considers that peace in Asia should be insured, that the independence and sovereignty of Asian nations should be respected and that the National rights and freedom of the Asian peoples should be safeguarded.

The delegation of Thailand, however, has yet to learn that in order to be a good Asian one has to be an exclusive Asian. On the contrary, our national experience, acquired through more than a century of relations with the Western powers, has been that in order to be a good Asian, as a good European or a good American or, for that matter, a good African, one has to cooperate in peace with the other nations of the world organized into a world comunity of free nations.

**Worldwide Peace Is Urged**

For peace is worldwide: it is one and indivisible. The people of Thailand, too, as other peoples of Asia, are concerned not only about peace in Asia, but also about peace in Europe and other parts of the world. That is why Thailand is a firm supporter of the United Nations with its principle of collective security and its high purpose for peace. That is why with full pride in its age-long national independence and with full confidence in the sincerity of the purpose for peace and for the equal rights and self-determination of the peoples on the part of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, Thailand is cooperating with these powers as well as with its neighbors in Southeast Asia with a view to promoting peace in that part of the world.

That is why in the last instance Thailand is earnestly bent upon sharing the common efforts of this conference in its endeavor to find a peaceful so-

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper [redacted] VIETNAM OF WORLD BROADCASTS File No. 410/1/1

Published at ..... Date .....

Indochina

Granting of Independence to Vietnam

A North Vietnam commentary (in Vietnamese morse 01.10, 6.5.54) said that, as they had been unable to obtain their aims by force, the French and the Americans had "staged the comedy of the puppet Government, signed and resigned agreements on independence, hoping to fool our people and the peoples of the world, but we know that the Bao Dai puppet Government formed by the French and the Americans is only a clique of traitors, bootlickers of the colonialists who only think of robbing their compatriots to grow rich". This "pseudo Government" forced their young men to serve as cannon-fodder for the enemy, forced the people into a fratricidal struggle and sowed mourning and suffering. Nevertheless, the people refused to be fooled by the traitors' comedy of independence. After a reference to the growing strength of the French people's opposition to the war and the movement in favour of negotiations with the Ho Chi Minh Government, the commentator said that these bitter failures and humiliating military defeats had forced the French Government to use the puppets to try to fool the people, whose only true representative was the Ho Chi Minh Government.

A Voice of Vietnam commentary (in Tonkinese 10.00, 7.5.54) entitled "Let us break the false independence and peace of the Bao Dai puppets" said that, just as the Geneva conference was beginning, the puppets were intensifying their propaganda campaign in the temporarily-occupied zones. "They have published two communiques signed by puppet Bao Dai and have forced the compatriots to listen to their proclamation." At the moment the puppets, on the orders of their French and American masters, were conscripting 150,000 young men and had set up their so-called War Cabinet in order to intensify their acts of banditry. They had also spread reports that the Geneva conference would fail "because we do not want peace. The aim of this slander is to hide their manoeuvres to sabotage the conference. On 4th May Nguyen Quoc Dinh said that the Bao Dai Government alone had the right to represent the people, but all the compatriots of the temporarily-occupied zones know the true face of traitor Bao Dai who, after having served as a lackey of the French, is now serving as a puppet for the Americans... The Vietnamese people are determined to break this false independence and this false peace. The Vietnamese people recognise only one Government, that of the VDR led by President Ho..."

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA

Number & Paper ..... File No. 410/1/1

Published at ..... Date .....

DEPARTMENT OF WORLD AFFAIRS

questions, particularly those of Asia." The President of the Vietnamese Women's Le Thi Xuyen, had said that the Indochinese war must be brought to an end by peace means and on the basis of respect for the liberty, independence and democracy of Vietnam. She had urged that the people of Khmer and Pathet Lao should be represent at the conference. (Ibid)

AMERICAN "SABOTAGE" A North Vietnam commentator (in Vietnamese morse 23.45, 7.5.54) said that the Press of various countries had connected Dulles's

May Day

MESSAGE FROM MINISTER OF LABOUR TO SAIGON-CHOLON WORKERS A letter addr to the workers of Saigon-Cholon by the Minister of Labour, Nguyen Van Tao, on the occasion of International Labour Day, began by recalling the past struggle of the workers of Saigon-Cholon to celebrate that day under French domination. During the last few years they had shown themselves "worthy of the boundless solicitude of Pres Ho". There followed a description of how Ho had danced and sung recently with some young children from Interzone Nine. Nguyen Van Tao told the workers of Saigon-Cho of the activities of their brothers of the free regions and went on to say: "At a t when the workers of the temporarily-occupied regions must work every day until they exhausted for a miserable salary, must suffer threats, reprimands, punishment, malt ment and unemployment, and are always afraid of the future and are forced to enrol the enemy's ranks, in the free zone the workers are masters of their workshops. T workers, men and women, elect their enterprise committee, control all the work them and try to produce as much as possible in order to improve their living conditions. They work with enthusiasm for increased production because they know that their eff will result in building their own happiness, the happiness of their class and that the people. Previously they also were subjected to the pitiless exploitation of t imperialists and the landowners. Being animated by an ardent hatred, they are reso to accomplish their mission to serve the front and always to increase production to contribute to the victory and glory of the fatherland..." (North Vietnam in Vietn

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS 401/1/1 171

**CABLEGRAM.** **SECRET.**

CET:CET

O.5557
Dated: 7th June, 1954
1900

TO:

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON

403 SECRET IMMEDIATE

Your 561.

We agree to attendance of Philippines and Thailand at military talks on Monday under circumstances mentioned by you provided:-

(A) It does not commit anyone to use of Five Power Agency as basis for development of military machinery for proposed regional arrangement,

(B) This invitation to Philippines and Thailand will not prejudice possible and hoped for co-operation in collective defence with other Asian countries such as those which attended recent meeting at Colombo.

8th June, 1954

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M's.

(cost £10/10/-)

SEC A/Ss MR. SHANN MR. MC NICOL MR. PEACHEY MR. EASTMAN

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

# CABLEGRAM.

JG:SA

I.6153

Dated: 26th May, 1954.
1800

FROM:

Recd.: 27th May, 1954.
0830.

ACTION COPY

Australian Legation,
BANGKOK.

40. CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated Savingram 3 Singapore.

Your savingram 5 and my telegram 39.

I calledon the Director-General, Asia and Africa Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 25th May and left copy of Mr. Casey's statement. Main reactions were:

Agreement as to the need for broad based support for any mutual defence arrangement, especially in respect of the Associated States. He was pessimistic about the lack of popular support for Bao Dai.

Some interest in mention of military staff talks. In answer to question as to "where and when" I said I did not yet have information.

He confirmed "in confidence" that the call to the United Nations over Indo China was going ahead. The Thai Ambassador to Washington after consultations in Bangkok is now returning to the United States. The Director-General expressed the view that appeal to the United Nations under the terms of the "unite for peace" resolution need not be delayed because of the Geneva Conference. It is perhaps significant in this connection that he spoke of the Conference as obviously already doomed to failure.

---

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M.'s

27th May, 1954.

401/1/1

SEC A/Ss UN PAC SEA@ WEST E CENT PI C&P

G

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

401/1/1.

# CABLEGRAM. SECRET.

AC[illegible]R:ER

I. 6097

Dated: 25th May, 1954
1100
Rec'd: 25th May, 1954
1720

FROM:

Australian Legation,
BANGKOK.

39. SECRET.

Repeated Savingram 2 Singapore.

Understand from the British Ambassador, following United States request conveyed by General Donovan the Thai Government agreed to instruct Prince Wan to bring position in Indo-China to the attention of the United Nations. The Foreign Office is [illegible] in its early cabled reaction as it fears detrimental effects at Geneva from an appeal to United Nations at this stage. A special full Thai Cabinet meeting took place on the 22nd May and it is reported in local press that it was devoted to "study of International situation".

---

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
" " " DEFENCE
P.M.'s

25th May, 1954

SEC A/Sa Mr. SHANN Mr. McNICOL Mr. PEACHEY
Mr. EASTMAN.
G.

168

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

# CABLEGRAM.

RESTRICTED.

HMC:HP

I.4999

FROM:

Dated: 30th April, 1954.
2105
Rec'd: 1st May, 1954.
1100

Australian Delegation to Geneva Conference,
GENEVA.

GC18. RESTRICTED.

Turkey and Thailand made brief general speeches today supporting United Nations action in Korea and referring to their own contributions.

2. Turkey said Conference would solve Korean problem in accordance with United Nations decisions and rejected North Korean proposals because they set aside the United Nations.

3. Thailand answered Communist "Asia for the Asians" speeches. Thailand stood for freedom of Asian countries from colonialism in any of its forms old or new. To be a good Asian, one had not to be exclusively Asian. Thailand would cooperate with its neighbours and other free nations in the interests of peace in Asia. Solution in Korea could be found in United Nations resolution of 7th October, 1950 adapted and applied to the present situation.

4. Next Plenary meeting will be 3rd May when R.O.K. has asked to speak.

---

A/Min. & Dept. of External Affairs.
" " " " Defence.
P.M.'s.

401/1/1

1st May, 1954.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC EA SEA WEST A E CEN PI C & P
G

401/1/1 167

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

# CABLEGRAM. SECRET.

TWP:HMcC

AMENDED COPY

Dated: 15th April, 1954.
1930
Rec'd: 16th April, 1954.
0900

FROM:-

Australian Legation,
BANGKOK.

30. SECRET. IMMEDIATE.

Addressed Canberra 30, repeated Saigon (for Minister for External Affairs) 2, and Singapore 4.

Your telegrams 54 and 56.

1. The general attitude of Thailand to Dulles proposals has been made clear by their acceptance which has been conveyed by Ambassador to Washington. Thailani Cabinet gave its approval 12th April.

2. I understand on reliable authority that message conveyed was " the Government of Thailand accepts invitation to join in arranging United front as proposed by the United States Secretary of State and would be prepared to take part in further discussions on this matter". This text has not been made public here although the fact of general acceptance has been publicised.

3. An early statement by the Public Relations Department interpreted the acceptance as amounting to a declaration warning Peking to keep its hands off South East Asia but not committing Thailand to any alliance directed against China, nor action not called for by the United Nations.

4. There is good reason to believe that the Minister for Foreign Affairs either does not know, or is not concerned for the moment with the five distinctions to be read into the precise terms of Dulles proposals. This probably explains the general, if cautious, terms of Thai acceptance. My French colleague feels however that the Minister himself contemplates eventual possibility of "United Action" even if United Nations does not call for it, perhaps as an insurance against probable United Nations delay (security council veto, slow "uniting for peace" procedure, two thirds majority, etc.).

5. Press comment is not of any great relevance generally in Thailand nor particularly in this case, as the press is not fully informed of facts, but following points have been made since announcement of Thailand's acceptance: police organs: stand of United States strengthens morale in South East Asia but in view of experience in Korea United States will try to keep some of the troops uncommitted. If P.A.T.B. were created Thailand would play a most prominent role, being the last outpost of Malaya and South Pacific (sic) countries. Should a war start Thailand would have to fight on two fronts.

Press opinion

General Sarit's press: United States is the best suited to lead the block of free nations in South East Asia, but Thailand's reply may have been somewhat quick. In view of the threat of invasion, one may sympathise with the Government for joining the United States; the Government should act cautiously and not jeopardise the Nation's sovereignty.

/ - 2 - Independent press;

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM. **SECRET.**

Independent press; United States does not believe Geneva will bring results; notes United Kingdom and French reluctance to act before Geneva. It does not follow from being ready to join in declaration that Thailand is joining an Asian anti-Communist bloc. Cambodia must get independence, otherwise only the French would be helped. The Government's decision to accept the United States plan to form an anti-Communist bloc is interpreted as exemplifying Thailand's policy of giving co-operation to the free democratic countries. However, it would be better to make this decision after Geneva.

6. My personal feeling is that the Thai policy will attempt to harmonise the following factors: The desire to preserve territorial integrity and independence; fundamental solidarity with Asia; anti-Communist attitude; desire to avoid provocation to important Asian countries, especially China; desire to have powerful anti-Communist friends; desire to have those friends (and especially the United States) committed to the local defence of Thailand. I do not venture to predict the weight which will be attached to anyone of these.

---

A/MIN & DEPT. E.A.
MIN & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M'S.

16th April, 1954.

SEC A/Ss MR. MCNICOL MR. SHANN MR. PEACHEY
MR. EASTMAN

G

165

401/1/1

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

# CABLEGRAM.

0.3667

DBR: HMcC

Sent: 15th April, 1954.
1210

OUTWARD

TO:-

Australian Legation,
BANGKOK.

56. CONFIDENTIAL. IMMEDIATE.

Glad of full report in earliest bag of Thai reactions to proposals for South East Asia defence, etc.

---

(COST £3.0.0)
15th April, 1954.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M'S.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC SEA [illegible]

File on ~~384/3/2~~ ~~399/2/4~~

DUPLICATE.

CONFIDENTIAL

160/1/3.

AUSTRALIAN LEGATION, BANGKOK

Memo. No. 133/54.

10th April, 1954.

401/1/1

MEMORANDUM for:

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

NORTH-EAST THAILAND.

Attached are three copies of a report on a visit to North-East Thailand in January, 1954, which we have obtained informally from the writer, Mr. John Dodds of the British Embassy.

2. With reference to Part (v), Annamites and the Viet-Minh, copies of the paper written by Mr. D. Rivett-Carnac of the British Embassy were forwarded under cover of our Memo. No. 297/53 of 17th July, 1953.

(Sgd.) P. N. B. HUTTON
Third Secretary.

Copy to D.L. (O. Anderson)
who will transmit
it to J.I.B. Melbourne

23/4.

Original on 399/2/4 (Internal Security)

COPY.

CONFIDENTIAL.

REPORT ON A VISIT TO THE NORTH-EAST OF SIAM.

January 11 - 18, 1954.

Just over two weeks after the capture of Thakhek by Viet-Minh troops I was given the opportunity to pay a seven day visit to the North-East of Siam where a State of Emergency had been declared following the Viet-Minh attack. Although my visit produced no startling new information I give below a record of the impressions which I gathered in the North-East.

2. My [illegible] was as follows:-

January [illegible]ok-Korat (by pl[illegible]
[illegible]ad to Banpai and [illegible]

January 12 [illegible]haen - Udorn - Se[illegible]

January 13: [illegible] Nakorn - Nakorn Pan[illegible]

January 14: Nakorn Panom - That Pan[illegible]rn

January 15: Mukdaharn - That Panom - N[illegible]enu

January 16: Muang Renu - Nakorn Panom - That Panom - Mukdaharn - Amanat Charoen - Ubol

January 18: (by plane) Ubol - Korat - Bangkok.

3. I have condensed my notes into the following sections:-

(i) General situation in the border area;

(ii) Siamese attitude to Ho Chi Minh and the Viet-Minh;

(iii) Siamese attitude to the French;

(iv) Siamese attitude to the Bangkok Government;

(v) Annamites and the Viet-Minh;

(vi) Supplies to the Viet-Minh;

(vii) Tiang Sirikhand;

(viii) Conclusion.

I have also made notes on Commerce and Trade in the area and have made road reports for J.I.B.

(i) General Situation in the Border Area.

The Viet-Minh forces warned the people in Thakhek three days in advance that they were going to attack the town. The French forces in Thakhek, which were only at company strength, hastily left Thakhek two days before the Viet-Minh forces entered the town. I heard from two or three sources that in their haste the French had left 120 jeeps, which were being held at Thakhek in reserve, behind them, having locked up the tyres and batteries of the jeeps in a go-down. Although it seems inconceivable that the French would allow so many jeeps to fall into the hands of the Viet-Minh, a Shell dealer, who impressed me as being reliable and trustworthy, told me that in the two day interval after the French had left and before the Viet-Minh came in, people from Thakhek had come to him and offered to smuggle over as many tyres and batteries as he required. The jeeps were not driven away when the French left because there were no drivers and it is possible that the French considered that their evacuation of Thakhek was only temporary. I was told that they had also left behind generators, motor-car parts, a large

/quantity .....

quantity of rice and all their petrol stores. At first they had started to dump the petrol drums into the river, but only a part of the stores were disposed of in this way. French planes returned to Thakhek some days later and successfully destroyed the remaining petrol stores. A motor-launch towing three barges from Sawannakhet to Thakhek, each of which contained 200-300 drums of Shell motor spirit (each drum holds 200 litres of motor spirit), was attacked by a French plane. The occupants of the barges cut the cables and drifted to the Siamese side of the river. The barges were eventually seized by the Siamese police and the bargees arrested and are at present under interrogation in Nakorn Panom; but only 44 of these drums were recovered by the Siamese and it is assumed that the rest were conveyed somehow to the Viet-Minh.

4. I heard that a few days before the attack the Siamese had sent over 2,000 sacks of rice to Thakhek. When the Viet-Minh seized the town they "borrowed" this large quantity of rice from the merchants, giving them certificates to say that they were on loan to the Viet-Minh forces and would be repaid "in due course". (This, by the way, is the usual method by which the Viet-Minh confiscate the property of their less enthusiastic "subjects").

5. A force of 600 Viet-Minh troops entered Thakhek supported by one tank and four trucks. The townspeople fled, the men taking to the hills and the women fleeing across the Mekong. The boats, which carried more than a thousand refugees, came from the Siamese side of the river and I heard that a good business was done in charging extortionate rates for the ferry service. It is impossible to get any true picture of the number of Viet-Minh forces in Thakhek during its occupation but they probably numbered between 600 and 1,000. As they were afraid of French bombing, they took to the hills during the day, leaving one company of fifty men to guard Thakhek and then returned at night.

6. I spoke with one Annamite man who had gone over to Thakhek on January 12 to collect some of his belongings. He said that uniformed Viet-Minh troops had been guarding the river, that various points had pickets and that patrols went about the town. He told me that they behaved in an orderly manner and that there had been no looting of French officials' houses nor of the shops in the town. A Viet-Minh officer had tried to persuade him to stay in Thakhek with them but the Annamite had said that he wanted to get back to his family in Nakorn Panom. There was no coercion to stay.

7. The Mekong, between Nakorn Panom and Thakhek, is only one kilometre wide but I could observe no movement in the town. At night it was completely blacked out. In Nakorn Panom the Siamese were taking the situation calmly. There were police and army armed patrols in the streets. In an army camp behind Nakorn Panom there were about twenty jeeps lined up and a dozen American army trucks. The beach was not patrolled and the one searchlight on the beach was unmanned.

8. There was no evidence of reserve camps at Sakol Nakorn and there was only one police check-point in the area and that was at Udorn, some 260 kilometres west of Nakorn Panom. Although a state of emergency had been declared in the area, I was not once asked for my papers. I had heard from missionaries in Khonkhaen that the police and army were occasionally involved in brawls but they appeared to co-operate quite well in Nakorn Panom and seemed in high spirits.

9. The Siamese Air Force were carrying out frequent air patrols over the Mekong River. French planes made daily patrols overThakhek and had bombed the town on several occasions. They made daily bombing raids further inland. On January 8 they dropped leaflets on Thakhek and on January 12 dropped flares. In Mukdaharn, which faces Sawannakhet, the police were much more in evidence than the army, and armed police patrolled the city day and night. Armed police were stationed on the river front and frequently used binoculars to observe movements in French-held Sawannakhet. The Nai Amphur of Mukdaharn told me that the French were fortifying Sawannakhet and were certain to defend it if attacked.

10. I returned to Nakorn Panom on January 16 where I saw increased signs of military activity. A new army unit (the 1st Battalion

/of the 13th Regiment .....

of the 13th Regiment) had arrived that day; new American army jeeps, trucks and wireless cars were dashing about the town, and all the troops were dressed in new American uniforms. I heard several reports that the main Viet-Minh forces had had with them two Russian staff officers with the rank of Colonel and forty Russian technicians.

(ii) Siamese attitude to Ho Chi Minh and the Viet-Minh.

11. I talked about this with Siamese from all walks of life. Some refused to say anything; others observed the traditional Siamese guarded, non-committal 'on the fence' attitude, but those who did express an opinion took the view that the Viet-Minh was a purely national movement with which they were in sympathy and seemed to dismiss as unimportant its Communist character. The basis for this view was their antipathy to the French, which I shall discuss in another paragraph. They said "Why shouldn't the people of Indo-China be free like us?". They thought that there was no danger of a Viet-Minh threat to Siam. Their view was that Ho Chi Minh had enough on his plate in Indo-China, so why should he be bothered to cross over to Siam.

(iii) Siamese attitude to the French.

12. The general attitude of the Siamese in the North-East to the French is one of strong hostility and everyone with whom I spoke did not hesitate to show his dislike for the French in Indo-China. Part of this dislike is, of course, traditional and long-standing, but it has been heightened, I think, by the tales of French cruelty which have been brought over the border by the refugee Annamites. The officials with whom I spoke also talked of the existence of bitter anti-French feeling in their various parishes and whilst they themselves were guarded in expressing their views, they made it quite clear to me that they too were unfavourably disposed towards the French. This anti-French feeling simmers down in ordinary time, but in times of trouble, for example the two Viet-Minh offensives in Laos, anti-French feeling is intensified, and as it is difficult for these people to discriminate between the French and other "farangs", American and Canadian missionaries living in the area are subjected to suspicion and mistrust.

13. The Siamese with whom I talked seemed secretly delighted at the French "loss of face" arising from the fall of Thakhek. Some gleefully pointed out that the French had run away before the Viet-Minh forces came near Thakhek; the more outspoken critics were convinced that Sawannakhet would fall to the Viet-Minh as the French were unable to defent it and they seemed to rejoice in this morbid possibility.

(iv) Siamese attitude to the Bangkok Government.

14. Before going to the North-East I had greatly underestimated the importance of this region, thinking of it as the "Cinderella" of Siam. In fact it has a population of six million, i.e. one-third of the population of Siam, and in this area a large quantity of rice, sugar and tobacco is grown. Most of the pork in the Bangkok market comes from the North-East and hardy breeds of cattle are found in large numbers; but the sine qua nihil of the area is water, and at this time of year the land is bare and arid. The whole region is pocked with dried-up creeks and in the past this water problem, and in fact most of the other problems of the North-East, have been neglected by the Bangkok Government. The people are extremely poor and the economy of the region is in the hands of the rice millers. When the harvest is good they of course pay a much lower price for the rice and farmers have to sell. Thus, given a certain amount of Communist propaganda amongst this simple-minded agrarian people, and given a lack of interest in the region from the Bangkok Government, it would be a potential breeding-ground for Communism. Fortunately the Government have at last turned their eyes to the North-East, realising the dangers of the Viet-Minh advance and the threat of the Pan-Laoism of Tiang Sirikhand. With the help of the American Economic Mission the Government have been constructing reservoirs in key points in the North-East to help the water problem.

/I heard .....

160

15. I heard from missionaries and also from Siamese sources that the North-East was predominantly pro-Pridi and it was generally considered that if Pridi did make a come-back, he would set up his headquarters in the North-East. I heard also that some Government officials, though loyally backing up Pibul, felt that a coalition would be the best thing for Siam. One official had favoured a coalition with Pibul, Pridi, Direk and Seni Pramoj and said that Pridi would add political wisdom to the counsels of the nation. I heard no comment about the visits of General Phao and other "bigshots" to the North-East. Prince Chumphot had made a successful visit to one small village a few months ago, where he had been feted by the village folk - perhaps another indication of the almost unanimous loyalty of the people to the Siamese throne and to their Royal family. Photographs of the King and Queen were in every house and shop, and Siamese flags, many of them bleached white by the sun, flew from a great number of non-Government buildings.

16. Before the Emergency, relations were good between the police and the townspeople. But with the arrival of police reinforcements came the fear of the police which one occasionally sees in Bangkok. I was told by many reliable sources that the towns in the Emergency provinces had many security police in plain clothes who were on the alert for any misdemeanour on the part of the townsfolk.

(v) Annamites and the Viet-Minh.

17. On the subject of the Annamites in the North-East of Siam, little can be added to the paper written by Mr. Rivett-Carnac, but one factor which was impressed upon me during my visit to the North-East was the artifidality of the river frontier in terms of this people. The same Annamite family can be found on both sides of the Mekong River with the parents in Nakorn Panom for example, and the children in Thakhek, and until the Viet-Minh invasion of Laos crossings of the river border could be made without hindrance. This explains why many of the latest group of Annamite refugees fled before the Viet-Minh attack and why they could blen into the Siamese background with little interference from the authorities. The Annamites are almost without exception pro-Ho Chi Minh and the Viet-Minh Movement, and bitterly anti-French. Most of their houses are said to contain photographs of Ho Chi Minh and in shops I saw what I can only describe as shrines to him. These shrines, three feet by two feet, have behind a glass front the usual idealistic portrait of Ho Chi Minh, and on either side of the portrait are two small vases of flowers. Slogans to Ho Chi Minh surround the shrines. I heard that at all these shrines joss-sticks are burnt to Ho Chi Minh. The shrines are put up by all loyal Viet-Minh supporters but even the less enthusiastic shop-owners have to put them up because they are likely to lose their custom and encounter difficulties in the replenishing of their stocks if the shrines are absent. Viet-Minh agents come across the border fortnightly or monthly to collect subscriptions and all Annamites have to give ten per-cent of their income and ten percent of their food to support the Viet-Minh forces. One hears of examples of fanatical loyalty to Ho Chi Minh in Annamite women turning prostitutes and sending their earnings to the Viet-Minh. The Viet-Minh agents work in the villages and the towns spreading propaganda and organising the supplies which go over the border to Viet-Minh troops. The Annamites are violently anti-French and the police chief at Norkorn Panom told me that they would attack any Frenchmen they saw if they felt they were immune from the police. The Siamese whom I met in the North-East were kind and friendly but the Annamites were surly and for the most part refused to speak to me.

18. Since the capture of Thakhek by the Viet-Minh, the Siamese authorities have imposed a curfew on all Annamites living in the Emergency provinces. No Annamite is allowed to be in the street after 6pm. and certain stretches of the river-front are put out of bounds to everyone at that hour. In addition, the Annamites have to register with the police once a week and if they wish to move from town to town in the area, they must declare their intention to the police beforehand. However, the Siamese are being fairly lax about this, and in practice the Annamites can move from town to town without hindrance; although I heard that Annamites under suspicion are followed by officers in the Siamese C.I.D. Over one thousand refugees came over when Thakhek was attacked, but these included a large number of Chinese. The Annamites who crossed

/over .....

over through fear of being involved in fighting in Thakhek were able to join their relations on the Siamese side of the border. There was little or no screening and it was common knowledge that several Viet-Minh agents came over amongst the Annamites. Otherwise the Siamese authorities appear to have behaved commendably in dealing with the refugee problem. The refugees were fed and housed where necessary and were subsequently removed to the interior.

(vi) Supplies to the Viet-Minh.

19. There are undoubtedly large quantities of food and other supplies being sent over to the Viet-Minh by the Annamites in the North-East. I heard no stories of arms and military equipment being sent over the border, nor did I gather any information on medical supplies being shipped, but every known drug and surgical instrument was on sale, so it can be supposed that if drugs and medical equipment are required by the Viet-Minh, it would not be difficult for their agents to buy these on the open market and send them over to their friends on the other side. Rice is the main commodity that is being sent over. In Nongkhai the Government had imposed rationing on rice in order to stop the large amount of smuggling that was going on in the area. This was not confined to the Viet-Minh, for unscrupulous business men had, before the rationing period been buying large stocks of rice and selling them in Vientiane at three times the Siamese price. After the capture of Thakhek and the Government ban on all water traffic, the supply of rice to the Viet-Minh was substantially reduced but the authorities are forced to admit that smuggling goes on under cover of darkness. Once river traffic had been resumed, armed police were searching all boats lying at the river-side, and they were checking everyone who had anything to do with water transport. All cargoes were examined before loading.

(vii) Tiang Sirikhand.

20 Tiang's headquarters have always been at Sakol Nakorn. I did not go to the hotel which he owns and where his brothers have a law office, but two U.S.I.S. officers whom I met in Nakorn Panom stayed at this hotel and asked Tiang's brothers where Tiang was at the present time. His brothers replied that they could only tell the U.S.I.S. Officers what they had told the hundred-and-one journalists who had asked them the same question in the last few weeks, namely that they did not know. I heard that Tiang normally does let his family know his movements but it is possible that this time his family genuinely do not know where he is. The only lead that I managed to get was from an intelligent Siamese school-master with whom I talked in Nakorn Panom. He told me that it was generally believed by the people that Tiang Sirikhand was in Laos at a point 125 kilometres north of Nakorn Panom and eastwards across the river from Beungkarn. This, if true, would place Tiang in the region of Muang Borikhan in Laos. This school-master told me that Tiang's supporters had put out the story that Tiang was in Kanchanaburi, but the school-master told me that this was only a ruse on their part to detract the attention of the authorities from his real whereabouts. Everyone with whom I spoke was intensely amused at the story that Tiang had led the Viet-Minh into Thakhek; and this story is, of course, absurd.

(ix) Conclusion.

21. Since drafting this report, Thakhek has been retaken by the French Union forces and the centres of interest in Indo-China have veered to other parts. But the attitudes of the Siamese have not changed. Though the authorities behaved in a commendable and calm manner when the Viet-Minh reached their river border, there is still this disturbing sympathy for the Viet-Minh and their barely concealed pleasure and amusement at the discomforture of their old enemies, the French. On the credit side, there is the encouraging sign that the Government is at last realising the importance of this area and is paying much needed attention to its problems. Intelligent planning and intelligent action will do much to keep the North-East sympathetic and orientated to Bangkok, will avoid it becoming a stamping ground for Tiang's Pan-Laoism and will restrict the effects of Communist infiltration to the already pro-Ho Chi Minh Annamite elements of the population in this area.

British Embassy, Bangkok.
January 27, 1954.

(Sgd.) John Dodds.

158

AUSTRALIAN LEGATION,
BANGKOK.

File No. 11/3. SECRET

Despatch No. 3/54.

17th March, 1954.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
23 MAR 1954
CANBERRA

Sir,

Continuing the Legation Annual Report for 1953, I have the honour in this despatch to give a brief recapitulation of the foreign relations of Thailand during the year.

2. Austria and Israel opened consular posts in Bangkok, and agreement was reached for the exchange of diplomatic representation between Thailand and Afghanistan, but no appointments have yet been made. The Thai Ambassador to Burma has been accredited also to Pakistan as Minister, and a Legation has been opened in Denmark, the Minister being accredited also to Norway and Sweden. No additional diplomatic missions were opened in Bangkok and the total remains at 23. Of these Belgium, Portugal, Spain and Switzerland have fewer diplomatic officers than the Australian Legation; Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, India and Vietnam have the same number of resident diplomatic officers as ourselves. Of the neighbouring countries, Burma has 5, Cambodia 6, and Laos 4. The Canadian Minister of Fisheries, the Honourable James Sinclair, paid a goodwill visit to Thailand after attending the Consultative Committee of the Council for Technical Co-operation, and an agreement in principle for the exchange of diplomatic representatives was reached but on the Canadian side at least its execution is expected to be delayed by budgetary considerations.

3. Goodwill missions or visits were made by many countries. An Austrian Trade Mission preceded the establishment of the Austrian Consulate-General. The Spanish Foreign Minister paid a visit, which was largely formal, as did also the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands on his way to Australia. The Rt. Honourable H.E. Holt visited Bangkok in the course of his Coronation visit to England and met the Minister of Foreign Affairs informally. Senator J.I. Armstrong and Mr. D.E. Fairbairn M.P. also paid informal visits. The Japanese Diet sent a parliamentary mission, which was unproductive, and the Republic of Korea sent emissaries with proposals for a regional pact, which were coolly received. Mr. Adlai Stevenson and Vice-President Nixon also came and their visits received a very good press. Coming closer to Thailand, the visit of King Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia will be recalled, which the Thais handled very tactfully, and also the Lao goodwill mission which is the most important contact outside the usual diplomatic channels yet made between Thailand and any of the Associated States.

4. Early in the year Cabinet made a formal decision to adopt a policy of promoting closer relations with the Associated States. This has been implemented in a small way by ad hoc grants of assistance and facilities to Laos and Cambodia but does not seem to have had much concrete effect in the case of Vietnam. The outstanding

/problem ....

The Right Honourable R.G. Casey, C.H.,

Minister of State for External Affairs,

CANBERRA. A.C.T.

157

problem which the Thai Government would like to clear up with the Government of Vietnam is the disposal of the Annamite refugees in the north-east provinces. The spontaneous offer of the Vietnam authorities to arrange for the repatriation of all who are willing to return, and its modest implementation, were appreciated, but bilateral negotiations for a more comprehensive operation were very halting and in fact the Vietnam Government has just signified its unwillingness or inability to do anything further. The Prime Minister stated in March that political and military experts would be sent as diplomatic envoys to neighbouring countries; this has been carried out by the appointment of "Phao men" to the missions in the Associated States, rather to the detriment, one would think, of the quality of political reporting from those posts.

5. Relations with Burma, though not bad, have been exacerbated by hit-and-run raids on Thai territory by Burmese tribesmen, and also by complaints of damage caused in the course of flights of Burmese aircraft over Thai territory. This has been reinforced, in other directions, by Burmese suspicions, if not complaints, of Thai assistance and comfort to the K.M.T. forces in Burma. These suspicions were unfounded so far as concerns the Thai Government, and specific charges of having made airfields available are likewise groundless. So far as aid was being given on an unofficial, clandestine and commercial basis, this has shown a tendency to diminish. Thailand's good faith over the K.M.T. issue was demonstrated by its active and effective participation in the Four Power Committee which succeeded in organising the evacuation, and by its grant of facilities for this purpose. Particularly since the arrival of the new Burmese Ambassador, the Minister of Foreign Affairs has been making an effort to improve the cordiality of relations through this channel, and is gratified at his progress.

6. Relations with France have also become more cordial. The Thai rejection of French requests for transit facilities during the first invasion of Laos, as well as the Thai intention at the time to bring the question before the United Nations were considered by the French as unfriendly. Border incidents along the river gave rise to numerous complaints and representations by the Thais. So far as concerns the relations between the Associated States and France as they affect Thailand, the Thai attitude has been to encourage direct contact with the several Associated States in matters within their new constitutional competence, while at the same time being careful to bring the French authorities into the circuit in defence questions still reserved to them. The Minister of Foreign Affairs has explicitly said to me that Thailand is not anti-French. There is good reason for believing that Cabinet is not unanimous in its assessment of the prospect of the military and political defeat of the Vietminh, but at least the Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs and General Phao now consider that it would be in Thailand's interests for the French to remain in Indo-China for some time to come.

7. The main foci of British interests in Thailand during the year were rice, and defence as it concerns the security of Malaya. A reversal of attitudes concerning rice occurred during the year. At the beginning, the seller's market and urgent British needs for rice dominated the situation, with the result that the British negotiators had to accept higher prices, and F.O.B. deliveries and charges. By the end of the year, however, when the time came to negotiate for supplies for the last three months, the position had changed radically. The British territories had adequate stocks, and were also finding themselves undersold by private importers of free-market Thai rice, and on the other hand the Thais had failed to realise the transformation of a seller's market into a buyer's market. Consequently, they overplayed their hand during the negotiations. The British negotiators specified the tonnage which they were prepared to take (this was by way of being a well-meant attempt to assist the Thai economy) and the Thais doubted whether so much could be made available. The British side thereupon said that they really did not need any, and the negotiations ended at that point without any hard feelings.

8. On the defence side, British policy has been to encourage and extend service relations between the Thai and Malayan services,

/particularly .....

particularly at working levels. There was no question of cutting across U.S. interests or plans in this; the U.S. Embassy was kept fully informed and adopted a co-operative attitude. Thus police co-operation along the southern border and in the southern provinces was made more efficient and progress was made with the development of a joint intelligence service. Visits both of a good-will and instructional nature were made by Thai Police and Air Force personnel to Malaya, and advance training was carried out, and on one occasion even participation in a jungle strike was undertaken.

9. During the year two important U.S. appointments were made. General W.J. Donovan was appointed Ambassador and General W.N. Gillmore took up duty as the head of the newly created Joint Military Special Mission, which operates in addition to the Military Assistance Advisory Group, and is concerned with planning rather than instruction. The distinguished and varied career of General Donovan is well known, as well as his restless energy. From early conversations with him, it is clear that the fostering of a Thai "will to resist" both in Government and popular circles, was among his prime objectives, and that he regarded this as easier to achieve in 1954 than between 1940 and 1945 because the Thai Government was now firmly committed to the anti-communist camp. No radical new measures, however, seem to have been employed by the U.S. in pursuing this objective, the means employed being the publicity and propaganda services of the United States Information Service, normal diplomatic conversations and, of course, intensified M.A.A.G. operations. On the technical military side there is, however, a significant new factor, namely a move towards the creation of a modern intelligence service - a branch in which the Thai forces have been notoriously weak. No tensions in United States-Thai relations are apparent. I have reason to believe that the U.S. Embassy is not dissatisfied with its efforts to increase the Government's awareness of the communist danger, and also that they feel that the Thai forces would be capable of some significant resistance.

10. I have no knowledge of any firm operational commitments to Thailand on the part of the U.S., more particularly should the situation be radically changed, as by an overt Chinese invasion of any of the Associated States, or of Thailand itself, and on the whole think that none exists. If one did exist, the Prime Minister would have to exercise almost superhuman restraint to refrain from hinting at it, at least, and on the other hand there was no suggestion of the kind in the remarks made by the U.S. Ambassador at a press conference which he gave on his return to Thailand after a visit to Washington made during December, 1953. On that occasion he said "the sensible and reasonable manner in which Thailand and her people have met and are continuing to meet the communist threat has enhanced her international position and importance. The Thai people are strengthening their will to resist aggression, and my own country will continue to work with the Thai people in building bulwarks in defence of her independence..... A Vietminh threat to Thailand's borders in the last month has aroused public concern in my country. The President has warned that the United States great capacity to retaliate will be used against future aggressors ..... Our Secretary of State has said that in relation to Indo-China, an open Red Chinese armed aggression would have grave consequences which might not be confined to indo-China."

11. Japanese diplomatic activity in Thailand was dominated during the year by trade promotion considerations and the negotiation of the bilateral trade agreement, which has been reported on at length and within the ambit of which the bulk of the trade between Thailand and Japan is being carried out. A Thai Police Mission visited Japan; the question of the wartime Thai loans to Japan is still open.

12. Relations with Australia have continued to be cordial and uneventful. During the year permission was obtained for regular scheduled stops at Bangkok by QANTAS Empire Airways. This permission is temporary, pending the conclusion of a bilateral air agreement,

/Australian .....

Australian proposals for which are awaited by the Thai authorities. QANTAS commercial publicity is a useful adjunct in keeping the name of Australia before the public. Various official Thai purchasing missions, as well as several private merchants visited Australia during the year, with satisfactory results. Nai Liang Chayakan, an ex-Cabinet Minister, and now a prominent Opposition Member of the National Assembly, spent some weeks in Australia and on his return wrote a book which has had a fair circulation and contains favourable comments on Australian economic and social conditions.

13. The value of Australian exports rose from £A1,076,000 in 1951-52 to £A1,222,000 in 1952-53. In the first six months of 1953-54 the value was approximately £A1,050,000.

14. Thai Glass Manufacturers, a substantial Australian Company which is a subsidiary of Australian Consolidated Industries, began operations during the year and is the only firm operating in this field. The number of Australians in Thailand continues to grow, and now stands at 120.

15. Thailand still remains on the fringe of the Colombo Plan Technical Co-operation Scheme and there was no evidence during the year of any desire by the Thai Government to modify that status, which has not prevented them from participating in seminars in Australia, accepting offers of Fellowships and even, on occasion, spontaneously asking for them.

16. As between the Thai and Australian peoples, the greatest single area of contact is still provided by the Thai students in Australia. The numbers continue to grow and there is now in Bangkok an appreciable number of returned students who form an active nucleus of goodwill. It is important, however, that administrative and technical delays and difficulties in connection with the admission of students should be kept to a minimum because the impression is still abroad that it is hard to secure permission to enter Australia, for study purposes. As I have dealt with this and related matters at length in several memoranda, I do no more here than recall my belief that the existence of our selective immigration policy is a living and active component in the emotional approach of the Thais as a whole to Australia, and that this should have a bearing on the type of publicity which we direct to this area and also sets a limit to what we can achieve.

17. Generally speaking, Thailand is as firmly attached now as in the past to the United Nations and its processes, and to the bloc of anti-communist nations. I think that it is still true, as it was this time last year, that it is a cardinal point of Thai foreign policy (of which the present Minister of Foreign Affairs never loses sight) to avoid provocation, in particular provocation of such countries as India and Communist China, and that Thailand's undoubted attachment to the free nations, most of whom are Western, should not in our thinking obscure the ineluctable fact that in the last resort, if circumstances unhappily confronted Thailand with such a dilemma, Thailand could not be expected to desert Asia.

I have the honour to be,

With the highest consideration,

Your obedient servant,

B.B. Ballard

Minister.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

401/1/1. 154

Name of Paper SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS File No.....

Published at..... Date 12.1.54.

SOUTH KOREAN GOOD=MISSION PACT. The 'Bangkok Tribune' said that at the same time that the Prime Minister of Ceylon was making arrangements for the first conference of the South-East Asian Prime Ministers, "people in the other half of South-East Asia also earnestly desire that the aged Korean President's dream of holding a similar conference of top-level officials - if not Prime Ministers - of Korea, Nationalist China, the Philippines and Thailand, (will) come true. Speculation has arisen here to the effect that Dr. Paek, Chief of the South Korean good-will mission to South-East Asia, charged with sounding Asiatic opinion regarding President Rhee's proposed anti-Communist alliance, might have an opportunity of mentioning the matter to the Premier of Thailand, Field Marshal Philbul Songgram." The paper expressed concern lest the Korean President's project should meet with failure and said that people in that part of the world still looked forward to an anti-Communist alliance of real anti-Communist countries. The paper therefore recommended Dr. Paek to make more vigorous efforts to this end rather than yield to impatience if he found that suitable occasions did not arise. (Bangkok in English 11.45, 11.1.54)

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

153

Name of Paper: SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS — File No. 40c/1/1

Published at: [redacted] — Date: 8/10/53

THAILAND

DEFENCE MINISTER ON THREATENED AGGRESSION FROM LAOS The following is the text of a Hanoi broadcast in Tonkinese on 1st October (23.00): "The Thai Minister of Defence declared on 30th September that if Thailand were threatened by Communist aggression, Bangkok would ask for aid from foreign countries. The reason which prompted this statement is anxiety over Viet Minh aggression in Laos in two weeks' time; when the Viet Minh reach the Mekong, they may cross it, thus violating the north-east frontier of Thailand. However, it is thought that this anxiety may be baseless."

NG 13/8 File

1) [redacted] Eckersley = SIAM = MacDonald's despatch

2) Mc gb JR Rowland / Joy was speaking of Vietminh support in Laos itself, and of the limited horizon of the tribal populations (y Thais, Muongs, Khas, etc etc!) who he thought wdnt have much idea of what a pan-Thai movement was about.

M. MacDonald is speaking of the Vietnamese minority in NE Thailand (of 60,000), which took refuge over the frontier in 1946-47, (mainly because they were Vietminh sympathisers), & with whom the Vietminh could link up if they reached the Mekong.

We have/ anything to suggest that among the Laotians (& other non-Vietnamese in Laos) there is significant support for the VM = the general view is, I think, that Souvannavong's

'Free Laos' Government has
few genuine Laos except himself
and (so far) is really entirely ~~very little~~ supported
by ~~except from~~ the Vietnam.

JOA 12/8

150

→ 401/1/1

① → Mr Eckersley

SIAM.

For Mr. Plimsoll:

This despatch from Mr. Malcolm MacDonald to Sir Winston Churchill is a clear exposition of the political situation in Thailand and of the dangers inherent in certain possible developments. From other information available it seems clear that the Thais would rather do a deal with Communism than have their country turned into a second Korea. If this is so, Western efforts should be concentrated on achieving success in the countries bordering on Thailand, namely Burma and Indochina.

SEA.

8 Aug 53.

DSR 3/8

Mr Rowland.

Malcolm MacDonald paints a rather gloomier picture than Roy, UK Chargé in the U.S. who seemed to regard this sort of support for the Vietminh as not amounting to much — or was he speaking mainly of Laos? Pls. confirm.

WE 3/8

Seen

Mr Mellor to see pl. D.W.R. 10/8/53

Seen J. Plimsoll 8/8/53

File pls.

WE 13/8.

401/1/1.

149

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

SECRET

*Foreign Office and Whitehall Distribution*

FS 1043/1

**SIAM**
**June 18, 1953**
**Section 1**

# SITUATION IN SIAM FOLLOWING THE RECENT VIETMINH INVASION OF LAOS

*Mr. MacDonald to Sir W. Churchill. (Received June 18)*

*Office of the Commissioner-General for the United Kingdom in South-East Asia,*
*Singapore,*
*June 13, 1953.*

(No. 31. Secret)

Sir,

I have the honour to report on certain aspects of the situation in Siam following the recent Vietminh invasion of Laos, as I observed them during my visit to Bangkok from May 24th to May 27th.

**The Vietminh Threat**

From the point of view of South-East Asia as a whole there are two particular dangers in the present situation in Siam. First, the Vietminh invasion of Laos was considerably aided by many of the 60,000 Vietnamese refugees living in north-east Siam. These Vietnamese have been riddled with Vietminh agents and impregnated by Vietminh propaganda for the past few years, and more recently they have been deliberately formed into an efficient supply organisation for the Vietminh in Indo-China. In fact they are an important section of the Vietminh movement overflowing from Vietnam into neighbouring States and ready to play their part in the Communist attempt at advance in South-East Asia.

2. Their development as a supply agency was no doubt in anticipation of the Vietminh invasion of Laos this April. They financed and organised the provision of food, clothing, medical supplies, explosives and other requirements for the invading host. Such vital aids as medical supplies and explosives were apparently bought in unlimited quantities in Bangkok, where no licences for such purchases are required and no infringement of the law was therefore involved; and these things, with large quantities of food and clothing, were smuggled across the Mekong River and distributed in Laos in strategic dumps which greeted the Vietminh troops as they advanced. The organisation in Siam was not greatly concerned with supplies of arms, ammunition and other military equipment which the Vietminh secure in adequate quantities from China.

3. If left undisturbed, the organisation will be handy for the Vietminh if they renew their aggression against Laos later this year. Should the Vietminh be successful then in reaching the Mekong, the organisation will be particularly valuable to them as an aid to their further conquests of the rest of Laos and (should it be the Vietminh's next step) their advance into Cambodia.

4. It is not possible to forecast with certainty what the next Vietminh move will be; but it seems likely that they are designed not only by Ho Chi Minh but also by the Communist leaders in Peking and Moscow as the principal instrument for achieving a step by step Communist advance through South-East Asia. If that is so, their first major objective is no doubt the conquest of Indo-China. Having failed so far to break through the French and Vietnamese defences in Tonking and overrun the rest of Vietnam from that direction, it would appear that their revised plan is to take Laos first, then Cambodia, and so to outflank Vietnam and occupy it in the third stage in their progress. Only after they have made sure of capturing all Indo-China might they contemplate an extension of forceful action to gain control of Siam—that is, if other events in Siam have not in the meantime secured Communist control of that kingdom.

5. If this be their strategy, it is important for the Vietminh that their supply organisation should remain intact in north-east Siam throughout the campaign for the conquest of Laos and Cambodia. This probably means that they have no intention of making any military attack against Siam at least until the absorption of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam is reasonably complete. Other considerations will also restrain the Vietminh. For example, they no doubt feel that they can act in Indo-China without fear of unanimous resolution or united action by the United Nations Organisation; whereas they might not be able to act with similar

impunity in Siam. They will therefore not wish to commit an act of aggression which would cause Siam to appeal to the United Nations, which might alienate Indian and other Asian sympathy from them, and which could conceivably provoke the United Nations Organisation—or at least America and Britain—to action in South-East Asia prejudicial to their progress in Indo-China. Nor are they likely to cause any political disturbance in Siam which might unite the Siamese against them and drive the Siamese Government into effective retaliatory action to destroy their supply organisation in the north-east; for that organisation is too valuable to them. This does not mean that they will not engage in propaganda and other forms of psychological warfare to frighten opportunist political elements in Siam into believing that the Vietminh are an irresistible force which it would be imprudent for the Siamese to displease.

6. One of our high priorities during the next few months must therefore be the destruction of the Vietminh organisation in north-east Siam. The first line of attack should be through the Siamese authorities, in whose own interest it is to reduce this threat to their internal security. The operation should be comparatively simple. By a policy of (*a*) arresting the ringleaders and (*b*) resettling elsewhere in Siam other important sections of this Vietnamese population, the organisation should be broken. On paper the Siamese—instigated by the American, British, French and Laotian diplomatic representatives in Bangkok—have a plan for achieving precisely that purpose; but I have little faith in their capacity to carry it out. I do not question the good intentions or faith of Field-Marshal Pibul, Prince Naradhip and some other members of the Siamese Cabinet. The Field-Marshal especially is anti-Communist and pro-West, and I believe that we can rely on him almost 100 per cent. as a political ally. But I do doubt the sincerity and zeal of General Phao and the efficiency and incorruptibility of his police in implementing the Government's policy; and it is on the police more than on any other force that its success depends.

7. Already the police seem to be failing in the preliminary moves in their task of crippling the Vietminh organisation in north-east Siam. Their first move should have been to arrest without warning all the ringleaders; but by giving them a warning and by other mistakes they have, either wittingly or unwittingly, enabled most, if not all of them, to avoid arrest. These men are still at large, in Laos or in Siam. The police are not conducting much more efficiently their policy of resettling elsewhere many of the other Vietnamese.

8. The American Ambassador in Bangkok has exerted great influence on the preparation of the Government's plans. When I expressed the view to him two weeks ago that the Siamese police would bungle their implementation, he replied that it is as yet too early for us to pass judgment on that. I agree that the Siamese practice may improve with experience, reinforced by prodding from the Americans and instructions from Field-Marshal Pibul. We must certainly continue to urge and help the Siamese authorities to do the job well. In some ways the Americans especially can give important assistance in this. For example, Field-Marshal Pibul and General Phao have asked them to help in training a few thousand extra policemen, many of whom, when trained, will be sent for duty in north-east Siam. The American Ambassador places considerable hopes on some of these policemen; but in my opinion the results are likely to be limited, owing to the cunning of the Vietminh organisers, the unreliability of the Siamese police and the political opportunism of General Phao.

9. We here are considering, in consultation with the Embassy in Bangkok, whether there are any other ways and means by which the Vietminh supply organisation in Siam might be disrupted.

**Danger of a Change of Government**

10. The second, and even more serious, danger in Siam is that a political change will occur in Bangkok causing the fall of the present Government of Marshal Pibul and substituting for it a Government inclined to compromise with the Vietminh. The principal possible rivals for power are Field-Marshal Pibul himself and his ministerial colleagues General Sarit, who is Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Commander in the Bangkok area, and General Phao, who is the Head of the Police. As is well known, Governments in Siam do not customarily change according to any established parliamentary or constitutional processes, nor in response to any calculable action and counter-action between parties pursuing defined political principles. The normal procedure for a change of Government is by a *coup d'État* engineered by an individual or a group of individuals seeking personal promotion and power. Such an event is liable to happen at any time and in any circumstances, with little or no warning.

11. The governing principle determining whether a *coup d'État* will be attempted and will be successful is not that the aspirants to power shall be able to count on a majority of votes in Parliament, but that they can rely on a majority of guns in Bangkok. This produces the chief calculable element in high Siamese political affairs, for the guns involved are distributed in fairly well-known proportions between the army, the navy, the air force and the police. At least there are no unofficial private armies in Siam.

12. At the moment the statistics concerning guns are reasonably reassuring. I understand that the Field-Marshal can at present count on the loyalty of General Sarit and the Commander-in-chief of the air force, and that these high officers can in turn count upon the loyalty of the men entrusted to their command. The navy also is believed now to be favourable to the Prime Minister; but since the fleet's abortive *coup d'État* against the same Prime Minister two years ago it has ceased to be a formidable political force. General Phao's loyalty to the Prime Minister is more dubious; and he can presumably rely on the loyalty to himself of the police. But as the army and the air force in Bangkok together have more guns than the police, the balance of political advantage at present lies in favour of the Prime Minister.

13. When one remembers that he is also the most astute living master of the art of *coup d'État* in Siam—and possibly in the world—one can feel confident that, for the time being at least, his position is secure. For these reasons General Phao at present appears to be co-operating faithfully with him, and to be a collaborator in his anti-Communist policy.

14. This state of affairs may not, however, continue for more than a few months. The national character of the Siamese is apt to be unreliable; expediency rather than principle is the guide of their conduct; and if the Vietminh were to secure successes in Laos which made it appear prudent for the Siamese to incline less favourably to the West and more favourably to the Vietminh, influences might arise in the leadership or in the lower officer ranks of the army and the air force which made the balance of power between Field-Marshal Pibul and General Phao more delicate than it is to-day, and which enabled the general to stage a successful *coup*.

15. In any case general political sentiment in Siam does not regard the Vietminh as a Communist force to be strongly condemned, but as a Nationalist force with whom good Asians can legitimately feel some sympathy. Most Siamese are therefore not hostile to the Vietminh as such. What they do fear is that at the back of the Vietminh are the Chinese Communists, that these Communists are ambitious to over-run South-East Asia, and that a Vietminh victory in Indo-China against Siamese opposition might be the prelude to a Chinese aggression against Siam. General Phao, like many who support him, is a political amateur who suffers from the illusion that if the Siamese compromise with the Vietminh, the Vietminh will use their influence with the Chinese Communists to prevent this development. There are in addition various anti-Pibul elements in politics in Bangkok which might be tempted to associate with Phao in order to get rid of the Field-Marshal.

16. One conclusion to be drawn from all this is that the Siamese will decide either (*a*) to maintain their present policy of supporting the United Nations Organisation and resisting communism, or (*b*) to reverse that policy, according to which course they calculate will better ensure their country's security from trouble. They will be attracted by whichever side commands, in their opinion, the big battalions. If they think that the United Nations Organisation is more powerful, and that in case of aggression by the Communists Siam will receive protection from United Nations Organisation forces, then Marshal Pibul's policy will prevail and he himself will probably remain Prime Minister. If, on the other hand, they think that the United Nations Organisation will be either unwilling or unable to defend Siam, then they are likely to jettison the Prime Minister and to transfer their allegiance as soon as Vietminh pressure becomes strong.

17. At present most Siamese are inclined to put their faith in the United Nations Organisation in general and the Americans in particular. The United Nations Organisation's success against the Chinese and North Koreans in Korea has impressed them. But the recent successes of the Vietminh in Tonking and Laos have made some of them believe that the Vietminh are certain before long to conquer Indo-China, and that the Siamese should prepare to compromise with them.

18. There is thus a grave danger that, by a change of Government in Bangkok, Vietminh influence will grow in the highest quarters in Siam and that by this means the Communists will be able to dominate Siam. Such a change would of course increase

immensely the external and the internal threat to Malaya. Outside Malaya the Communists would control the country just north of our border, where already the organised activities of their agents and armed gangs cause us considerable concern; and inside Malaya Communist morale would receive incalculable encouragement. It is therefore a matter of vital importance that we and our friends do everything possible to avert a change of Government in Siam.

19. This makes it all the more important that the French should show renewed strength in Indo-China, doing whatever is necessary to prevent further Vietminh successes in Laos or Tonking and to restore confidence in the ability of themselves, the Vietnamese and the Laotians to defeat Ho Chi Minh. In addition we should do anything practicable to assure the Siamese that if the Vietminh do have further successes, either the United Nations Organisation, or at least the United States and Britain, will take effective steps to help the Siamese to defend their territory and freedom. It is presumably impossible to secure from the members of the United Nations Organisation at this stage any declaration about their intentions in case of a threat to Siam; but our objective could be achieved if the American and British Governments could make a declaration to the effect that they will take any necessary action to protect South-East Asia from any further Communist aggression.

I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Paris, Washington, Bangkok and Saigon.

I have, &c.

MALCOLM MACDONALD.

DUPLICATE.

401/1/1.

147

No. 90/5/2.

AUSTRALIAN LEGATION, BANGKOK.

Memo. No. 320/53.

30th July, 1953.

MEMORANDUM for:

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

THAI NATIONALITY.

The acquisition and loss of Thai nationality are regulated by the Nationality Act B.E.2495 (1952) as amended by the Nationality Act (No.2) B.E.2496 (1953), the texts of which are to be found in the translations of the Royal Thai Government Gazette which have been forwarded to the Department.

2. The significant feature of the Nationality Act (No.2) is that it abolishes the former provision whereby all persons born in Thailand acquired Thai nationality ipso facto. One of the results of this was that children of Chinese parents or fathers had dual nationality if born in Thailand, and in view of the tenacity and exclusiveness of the traditional Chinese attitude to the transmission of Chinese nationality, this was considered to produce a division of loyalty amounting, in view of the number of Chinese in Thailand, to a security risk.

3. The new provision is as follows:-

"Section 7. The following acquire Thai nationality by birth:-

(1) A person born of Thai father whether in or outside the Kingdom.

(2) A person born inside the Kingdom of Thai mother without a lawful father or with a person without nationality as father.

(3) A person born in the Kingdom of a Thai mother.

4. In connection with Section 7(3) it should be noted that Section 13 of the Act provides that a Thai woman does not lose her nationality on marriage to an alien unless she formally renounces it on her marriage.

5. The new Section 7 is not retrospective, but will operate to exclude from Thai nationality many persons of Chinese descent in future.

6. A new Section (16 bis) has been added, which provides that "when a person, born of an alien father, who has acquired Thai nationality by reason of being born in the Kingdom takes out an identity card under the law regarding alien registration, he shall lose his Thai nationality, regardless of whether or not such identity card has been issued before or after the date of enforcing this Act". Thus the equivocal position of many Thais of Chinese descent has been clarified. No statistics are available to show how many Chinese have

S.E.A.

(original on Canberra file 1482/3)

/been ....

146

bee[illegible]affected by this last provision, or what the Chinese population of [illegible]ailand now is.

7. The new Act was introduced into the National Assembly by General Phao, who as is usual, spoke of "aliens" and not "Chinese", but there is no doubt that the measure is intended to clear up the juristic position of persons of Chinese or mixed Thai and Chinese descent. Little opposition was expressed and the Act was passed by 119 to 2 votes.

(Sgd.) E. C. Ballard

Minister.

Duplicate.

100/45/1.

Memo. No. 309/53.

SEA 145

Australian Legation,
Bangkok, Thailand.

23rd July, 1953.

MEMORANDUM for:

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

The attached translation of a "Notification of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers regarding the maintenance of security in the Gulf of Thailand" is forwarded for the information of the Department of Defence.

Third Secretary.

File - 401/1/1

For Retention
Original on 6x6/1/2/4

Mr M. Hung
From D/L 31/7

TRANSLATION



NOTIFICATION OF THE PRESIDENCY OF THE
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS REGARDING THE MAINTENANCE
OF SECURITY IN THE GULF OF THAILAND.

---

His Majesty's Government hereby makes known to all concerned that whereas the situation in this region has become increasingly beset with difficulty, His Majesty's Government has to make all necessary measures for national defence with the sole object of securing peace for Thailand and of complying with the obligation to the United Nations of jointly maintaining peace.

Now it is known that at sea in territorial waters and in the Gulf of Thailand naval craft of unknown nationality have appeared from time to time. His Majesty's Government have, therefore, instructed the Royal Thai Navy to patrol the Gulf and carry out tactical training in accordance with its rights and duties in order to maintain the security of Thai territorial waters and the Thai coasts against breaches of Thai sovereignty. The operation to be carried out by the Thai naval patrol in the Gulf of Thailand will include training in the use of arms above the sea and under the sea in accordance with the training plan.

It is, therefore, hereby notified that any war vessel of any nationality which will come in and out of Thai territorial waters are required to conform to naval practice and International Law, such as makimg advance official notification and clear display of the vessel's national flag. Otherwise, the vessel concerned may be liable to danger from the above-mentioned training operation such as the use of undersea arms.

Given on May 25, B.E. 2496.

401/1/1

# T H A I L A N D

## V. SECURITY MEASURES IN N.E. PROVINCES — SECRET

Recent reliable reports indicate that security measures in north-east Thailand (see Jibsum No.99, item V) have not been implemented very effectively, and that so far the only important move has been the evacuation of some 500 Vietnamese from the border area to peninsular Thailand. Few if any of these are believed to have been Viet Minh leaders. Apparently the Viet Minh organization among the Vietnamese in the north-east has not been interfered with to any significant extent, and the smuggling of materials across the border to the Viet Minh in Laos continues.

The basic reasons for Thai inaction appear to be:

(a) Influential members of the Thai Government do not regard the Viet Minh organization as a threat to Thailand; on the contrary, they sympathize with the Viet Minh in their struggle against the French. In particular, General Phao, Deputy Minister of the Interior and Director-General of Police, opposes any strong action against the Viet Minh in Thailand. Following the Viet Minh withdrawal in Laos, the Thai Government probably considers that the need for even token measures has now diminshed.

(b) Thai regulations for the evacuation of Vietnamese have many loopholes; numerous categories are exempt, including skilled labourers, artisans, chemists and doctors.

(c) Local police officials are often corrupt and, like most Thais in the area, regard the Viet Minh quite favourably. As a result, evacuation orders are being evaded by bribes, and smuggling, at the few points where there are border controls, is little affected by the "closing" of the frontier.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

142

Name of Paper: Summary of Happenings in Pacific Region during Secretary's absence

File No: 401/1/1

Published at: [redacted]

Date: 23 May to 18 June 1953.

**Indo-China**

29. (a) The French authorities' reaction to the King of Cambodia's self-exile was surprise and irritation; they say he left while negotiations were making progress. We have suggested to the Minister (Mr. Casey) that he should not make a statement on the matter at this stage. We will have to decide, however, what attitude to adopt if the Thai Government asks Western countries for their views on this.

401/1/1

40.1/1/1

Note for file:

Canadian H-C's office has referred to us a report from their Legation in Oslo of an account of an interview with Prime Van published by Dagbladet on 7. V. 63.

— Vietminh invasion of Laos constituted direct threat to Thailand

Tai Autonomous Area also a threat

Evacuation of KMT from Burma "by peaceful means" would remove excuse for Chinese Communist intervention in the area.

No internal threat to security from ~~Chin~~ Communists.

"It is a pleasure to me to speak with a Norwegian, for with the Scandinavians my country and I have always had cordial relations, precisely because we pursue the same policies and have the same goals and our attitude is not conditioned by special political motives".

G.O.'s Nos. 40, 164, 194. COMMONWEALTH PUBLIC SERVICE. Form P.S.B. 9.

# Appointments, Furlough, Vacations of Office, and Allowances Granted to Officers.

*Department*..... *State*.....

**RETURN FOR FORTNIGHT* ENDED**.....

**(To be forwarded in duplicate to the Public Service Board immediately after the close of each pay period.*)**

**Nil return should be submitted when no action is to be reported.**

**N.B.—Particulars in this return should be furnished in Permanent Staff List order.**

| P.S. List. | | Name of Officer. | Designation and Station. | State whether New Appointment, Furlough, Retirement, Allowance, &c. | Date. | | Allowance or Salary (Amount). £ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Page. | No. | | | | Instructions issued to New Appointees to Commence Duty. | Commenced Duty, Furlough, Retirement, Death, Allowance, &c. | |
| | | | | | | | |

401/1/4. 140

Note for file.

Summary of World Broadcasts

Bangkok Radio reported 1.VI.53:

On 1st June the Cabinet approved the appointment of Nai Thanat Khoman, Deputy delegate to the UN, and of Prince Chotsi Kritdka Thewakum, Secretary to the Thai UN delegation, as respectively Thai delegate and reserve delegate to the UN Trusteeship Council.

G.O.'s Nos. 40, 164, 194. COMMONWEALTH PUBLIC SERVICE. Form P.S.B. 9.

# Appointments, Furlough, Vacations of Office, and Allowances Granted to Officers.

*Department*..... *State*.....

**RETURN FOR FORTNIGHT* ENDED**.....

**(To be forwarded in duplicate to the Public Service Board immediately after the close of each pay period.*)**

**Nil return should be submitted when no action is to be reported.**

**N.B.—Particulars in this return should be furnished in Permanent Staff List order.**

| P.S. List. | | Name of Officer. | Designation and Station. | State whether New Appointment, Furlough, Retirement, Allowance, &c. | Date. | | Allowance or Salary (Amount). £ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Page. | No. | | | | Instructions issued to New Appointees to Commence Duty. | Commenced Duty, Furlough, Retirement, Death, Allowance, &c. | |
| | | | | | | | |

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS File No. 401/1/1

Published at ..... Date 3/6/53

THAILAND

NAVAL SECURITY MEASURES The following announcement was issued by the Premier's office on 25th May (Bangkok 13.00): "His Majesty's Government wishes to announce that, because of the increasingly critical situation in this area, it is necessary for the Government to take all requisite measures for the protection of the nation. Its aim is to preserve the peace and security of Thailand, as well as to comply with obligations to the UN in the collective preservation of peace. It has now been learned that unidentified warships have occasionally appeared in Thai waters. The Government has therefore ordered the Navy to patrol the Gulf of Siam and to blockade strategic channels in accordance with its rights and duties in order to safeguard Thailand's waters, territories and coasts against any violation. The Navy's operations in the Gulf consist of training in the use of surface and under-water weapons as called for by the plan for naval exercises. Therefore, the Government wishes to announce that all warships of any nation which are to enter Thai waters are requested to comply with navigational traditions and international laws, such as giving official notice in advance and clearly displaying the national flag of the warship concerned; otherwise, they may be endangered during training in the use of weapons - for instance, the use of under-water weapons."

401/1/1

138

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

Mr. Gilchrist to see in his U.N. capacity.

CONFIDENTIAL

7/9/53

*Foreign Office and Whitehall Distribution*

27.VII

FS 1016/34

**SIAM**
**May 27, 1953**
**Section 1**

# REVIEW OF EVENTS IN LAOS IN RELATION TO NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES AND THE FUTURE OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA

*Mr. Whitteridge to Sir W. Churchill. (Received May 27)*

(No. 74. Confidential) *Bangkok,*
Sir, *May 19, 1953.*

Although the ultimate objectives of the Viet Minh invasion of Laos are still far from clear, it seems worth attempting to review what has recently been happening there in relation to neighbouring countries and the future of South-East Asia as a whole. In particular, I should like to comment on the nature of the threat now facing Siam, the adequacy—or inadequacy—of the counter-measures being adopted by this Government, and the repercussions on our own defence plans.

2. It is of the first importance, I venture to suggest, to recognise that the most urgent threat facing Siam is political rather than military. The sweeping advances of the Viet Minh armies have naturally preoccupied the newspapers, and the military vulnerability of this area, especially if and when the Korean fighting ceases, has long been apparent. Yet the fact is that the Viet Minh invaders are now withdrawing, even inside Laos, instead of massing strength on the Siamese frontier and that this is in accordance with such information as is available to us as to their original intentions. This is not to suggest that the Viet Minh are simple Nationalists, fighting a local Indo-Chinese war. But Communist plans for any military conquest of Siam must be conditioned by two factors—the amount of strength available to them and their estimate of the probable reactions of the outside world. As to the first, Ho Chi Minh's forces are certainly not strong enough at present to take on the Siamese armed forces by themselves. As to the second, I do not believe that the Chinese would join forces with Ho Chi Minh in an open invasion of Siam, a full-fledged member of the United Nations already enjoying considerable American protection, unless and until they and the Russians were ready for a general conflagration, and I know of no evidence suggesting that that stage of Communist military preparedness has yet been reached. Is it not much more probable that Moscow's directives to Ho Chi Minh are, at this stage, confined to Indo-China? And may not Cambodia rather than Siam be his next military target?

3. The gravity of events in Laos from the Siamese standpoint lies in the fact that they open up this country to political and ideological pressures which it is sadly ill-equipped to counter. These pressures are of two sorts. First, there is an endemic tendency to keep on good terms with the winning side, and Ho Chi Minh's prestige has unquestionably risen in recent weeks. Second, and more immediately menacing, is the Communist pressure which will almost certainly grow on the politically fertile soil of north-eastern Siam.

4. The five north-eastern provinces of Siam which march with Laos have been sadly neglected by successive Siamese Governments. They are populated not only by nearly 2 million Siamese nationals but by some 60,000 Annamites, most of whom came across the border, sometimes legally, and more often illegally, in successive waves in 1946 and 1947. By their vigour and industry these refugees have acquired a position of economic influence in the north-east comparable only to the position which the Chinese minority, for largely similar reasons, have acquired in Siam as a whole. Moreover, having been thoroughly infiltrated by trained Viet Minh agents, they are well-organised and by a "levy" system raise money which finds its way across the border, either as gold or as goods. There are strong grounds for believing that this assistance from Siamese soil has played a not insignificant part in the present Viet Minh campaign. The Siamese Government have long insisted that the movements of these refugees should be restricted. Unfortunately, they chose to confine them in provinces actually on the Indo-Chinese border, and so now, unless efficient means are found for coping with them, these refugees will present a serious

problem. Their strength, taken by themselves, is limited, but common opposition to the policies of the Bangkok Government may provide a meeting ground for them, for the local Siamese population of Laotian stock and for the followers of Pridi, who have always found the north-east a happy hunting ground. This does not mean that a formal coalition of these groups is about to occur or that, even in a coalition, they will attempt a revolution by force. But, with Siam already in such a politically unstable state, the possibilities of trouble—even of threats of secession—are manifest. It may be no exaggeration to say that the defence of Siam, and ultimately of the whole of South-East Asia, will be vitally affected by what happens in the coming months in these remote, neglected, arid, but now critically important provinces.

5. What then can be said of the Siamese Government's capacity and determination to deal with this threat? First, it is necessary to remark on the extreme slowness with which the Siamese reacted to the Laotian crisis. Long after it had become clear that the whole of Laos was endangered, the Government press in Bangkok was declaring that " there was nothing to fear " and the Foreign Minister himself, an experienced diplomatist, sponsored the rejection in the Cabinet of France's bid for overt channels of supply across Siam. Gradually, however, a more comprehensible reaction began to crystallise, and on 30th April the Siamese Prime Minister announced that although his Government proposed to treat the invasion at the present stage as an " internal Indo-Chinese affair," special measures were being introduced for the protection of Siam's north-eastern frontiers. This was followed by orders to the provincial authorities to screen all new refugees; by the movement of substantial police and some military reinforcements to the border, and by air patrols; by plans to evacuate trouble-makers amongst the Annamite refugees; and by a personal tour, just completed, of the frontier areas by the Prime Minister himself.

7. It is perhaps worth noting that the view that the invasion of Laos was simply an internal affair was universally held in this country: it was not simply the calculated decision of the devious generals in the Government; it was publicly espoused also by such Opposition figures as Nai Khuang Aphaiwongse, the former Prime Minister, and by leaders of Siam's *intelligentsia*: and of course, the latest military developments appear to give a certain support to their view.

8. The important question now, of course, is to estimate the effectiveness of the Siamese counter-measures. How far will the police, army and air patrols be able to curb the two-way clandestine traffic of men, materials and ideas across the frontier? How far will the controls be neutralised, either by the bribery of local officials or by the deliberate connivance of higher authorities? How far will the partial evacuation of the Annamite refugees break up Ho Chi Minh's network in Siam? And how far will the specially trained police units referred to in my telegram No. 164 of 4th May be able to root out and dispose of the leaders of that network?

9. The fact that the Prime Minister is personally interesting himself in the area is an encouraging sign, the more so as he appears to be again more firmly in control of the councils of the Coup Party. Nevertheless, I cannot pretend to a very robust confidence about the future. With the arrival of the rains and the simultaneous recession of the military threat, Siamese enthusiasm for patrolling a barren and uncomfortable region is likely to diminish rapidly. Secondly, we have to reckon with the limits of Siamese efficiency, especially as regards counter-intelligence activities (and with the disappearance already, into the jungle or over to Laos, of many of the key figures of the Viet Minh network); and thirdly, of course, we still have to contend with the enigma of General Phao's loyalties and ambitions, and, in addition, the whereabouts of his former agent, Tiang Sirikhand, who, if still alive, may yet wreak havoc in the north-east. According to the latest information reaching me, General Phao, who has been placed in charge of the frontier, and who is well aware of the aid being provided to the Viet Minh from Siamese soil, is emasculating the plans to evacuate the Annamite refugees and has declared in private that, as the French are finished in Indo-China, he does not think it advisable to antagonise Ho Chi Minh unnecessarily.

10. It must always be dangerous to try to forecast anything so open to change as a Communist time-table; but, seen from Bangkok, the probable course of events—assuming always that the Franco-Vietnamese forces are unable to reverse the tide of Vietminh successes—now appears to be the following. We shall have a lull, both militarily and politically, for a few months,

while the Viet Minh consolidate their position and while the Siamese remain diminishingly on the alert. We shall then have a gradual increase in infiltration across the border and a converging of anti-Government elements in north-eastern Siam. By the end of the rains, *i.e.*, in December, we may have fresh military offensives by the Viet Minh, perhaps in Annam or Cambodia, accompanied by political agitation in north-eastern Siam. After that, in 1954, we may find political factions in Bangkok putting out feelers towards the dissident elements in the north-east and to Ho Chi Minh. The propaganda resources available to the new Thai Autonomous Government at Cheli may then come into play and the re-orientation of the populations in this area will be carried several stages further. By late 1954 or by 1955, this softening-up process, taken together with further military victories over the French in Indo-China (for *Pravda's* reply to General Eisenhower makes clear that *colonial* wars can continue alongside peace offensives) might then be expected to have made sufficient progress for a neutralist or pro-Communist régime to seize power—probably by a *coup d'Etat* but without the necessity of armed intervention by Chinese forces.

11. This, then, may be what the Communists have in mind: our job is to prevent it from happening. And if the analysis is anywhere near the mark, it seems clear that our own efforts must, in the first instance, still be directed more towards bolstering Siamese political solidarity than towards her military problems as such. The Americans have already agreed to speed up the delivery of munitions to her armed forces, and according to your telegram No. 179 of the 7th May they are also considering the despatch of a high-ranking American military officer who would (if the Siamese agreed) sit in on Siamese war councils. But the motive behind this and any other moves in the military sphere must be to strengthen the Siamese *will* to resist: the issue in the balance is not so much the strength of her armed forces as the side that they will ultimately fight on. Our immediate task is to find ways of countering the impression in Siamese minds that the odds on an eventual Communist victory in Southern Asia are considerably brighter than they were a few months ago.

12. Various possible means are open to us. First, it seems to me, we must do all we can to uphold the Prime Minister's influence in his own Government. Secondly, we may wish, for the political and psychological reasons mentioned above, to look again at the question of Siamese exclusion from South-East Asian defence planning. The French have apparently been pondering this problem (see your telegram to United Kingdom Delegation, New York, No. 423 of the 4th May), and the Americans, as already noted, have been thinking of another way of stiffening the Siamese will to resist. Our own gesture for the exchange of additional intelligence about Malaya has, however, fallen rather flat, since it has become clear that the biggest threat to this country is now coming from the north-east. Thirdly, there is the possibility of enlisting United Nations aid against future aggression. After withholding their appeal for the despatch of a United Nations Peace Observation Commission, in response to French pressure and the improved military situation, the Siamese are now again contemplating an approach to the Security Council. I am conscious of the many technical difficulties of handling such a matter in the United Nations and of the risks of such an appeal backfiring: but the advantages of involving the United Nations in this area *before* an irremediable crisis breaks upon us are such that the question seems to merit further study. Fourthly, and most pertinent of all, there is the question of what pressure we can exert and what assistance we can offer to ensure that the Siamese plans for controlling the north-eastern borders and for neutralising the Viet Minh network are properly implemented. My staff and I have this question very much in mind, and it is our intention to pursue it, both with the Prime Minister and with General Phao who holds the key to its solution but whose willingness to lock the door remains tantalisingly uncertain.

13. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Commissioner-General for the United Kingdom in South-East Asia in Singapore, and to Her Majesty's Representatives at Saigon, Rangoon, Paris, Washington and United Nations Headquarters in New York.

I have, &c.

G. C. WHITTERIDGE.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

401/1/1/136

# SAVINGRAM.

[redacted].HC

I.6684

Sent: 8th May, 1953.

FROM:

Rec'd: 20th May, 1953.
0905

Australian High Commissioner's Office,
LONDON.

SAV. 364. CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeat to Australian Embassy, Washington 43.

Following is text of a telegram from United Kingdom Embassy, Bangkok, to Foreign Office, dated 7th May, 1953.

The sensational headlines in the London and Singapore papers, now reaching us, stressing the possibility of an imminent invasion of Siam suggest that our press have not fully grasped the real nature of the present danger as we see it here. Neither I nor my American and French colleagues (nor of course the Siamese Government ) believe that a military invasion of this country is likely in the near future. Such action would surely be much more likely to precipitate a general conflagration in South East Asia for the Communists to risk it, all the more so now that the Siamese, as I have learned today, are thinking of submitting the threat to their fontier to the United Nations.

2. Moreover, even from the military stand - point, approach of the rains makes a large scale invasion in the coming weeks improbable. At the worst, we might face a direct military threat in six months' time.

3. The real point to be stressed now, I venture to suggest, is the general political deterioriation in South East Asia as a result of

(a) the military reverses inside Indo-China, which are sure to have an adverse effect on the Asian mind, and

(b) the increased danger of ideological pressure and infiltration of all kinds in the adjacent countries to Siam.

---

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M's

20th May, 1953.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC WEST - PT:

401/1/1 135 f

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM. **SECRET.**

..HG

I.5834

Sent: 1st May, 1953. 1200

FROM: Rec'd: 2nd May, 1953. 0830

Australian Legation,
B A N G K O K.

33. SECRET.

Laos.

The mandated policy which the Prime Minister has followed for some years (close co-operation with the West, non recognition of Peking, recognition of Associated States) is now perhaps proving inconvenient for the first time. The French request for facilities must have been awkward, and one may speculate that Thai suppleness will now come into play.

2. Their belief in their ability to wriggle out of any difficult situation (borne out to some extent by recent history) no doubt comforts them, but if they think the French are going to lose, they will be under great temptation to re-insure discreetly with the other side.

3. A certain residue of anti-French feeling as well as reservations, a Ø sincerity perhaps entering this particular phase, and a vague kinship with Laos and the Cambodians differentiates the case from Korea.

4. I have earlier reported the desire of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to avoid "provocative action" mainly in context China and India, and as my telegram 32 shows, he is still thinking along these lines.

5. With all these reasons for policy of non involvement at this stage, Cabinet's decision to shelter behind problematical United Nations action is understandable, as well as being consistent with a well publicised aspect of Thai foreign policy.

---

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M'S

3rd May, 1953.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC@ / WEST PI.

K/S.

7

Gilchrist.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

**CABLEGRAM.** **SECRET.**

Copy for 401/1/1

GL/MD

I. 5803

Dated 30th April, 1953.
2030
Rec'd 1st May, 1953
0900

FROM:

Australian High Commissioner's Office,
LONDON.

SECRET.

Addressed Canberra 1412 repeated Washington 58 Paris 11.

From External.

Our 1401.

Indo-China.

Commonwealth Relations Office telegram Y132 to High Commissioner, Canberra summarises developments up to last night.

2. No word so far received Siamese Cabinet's decision on French request for transit facilities. British Ambassador Bangkok reported yesterday he was pessimistic about prospects of agreement and feared "we shall see Siamese Government gradually but steadily sliding away from West and towards compromise with Vietminh". Ambassador also doubted whether American Embassy Bangkok were firm enough in their attitude.

---

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT: DEFENCE.
P.M.'S

1st May, 1953.

SEC A/S's UN PACO SEA WEST PI

Extract from "The Economist", May 2nd, 1953.

## THE THREAT TO SIAM

The advance of Vietminh forces to the frontier of Siam is an event of great importance for the general situation in South-East Asia. It is extremely unlikely that this offensive was planned merely as a move in the war within Indo-China and without any thought of the leverage it would provide for bringing pressure to bear on Siam; if there were any doubt on this matter, it should be dispelled by recent violent propaganda attacks on Siam from Peking. Siam is accused of helping the French colonists and the Kuomintang of having become "an American military base in South-East Asia" and of oppressing the large Chinese minority in the country. The fact that this new military drive by a force now completely dependent on Communist China for essential supplies has coincided with the intensification of Chinese political warfare against an independent Asian state which has so far failed to be submissive to Peking's "new order in East Asia" indicates that South-East Asia is not meant to be included in the list of regions to which the Soviet peace offensive is to bring quiet and relaxation. Russia, of course, is not responsible for what China does, and China is not responsible for what the Vietminh does, so that there is not much prospect for including South-East Asia in any negotiations which may be undertaken with either Moscow or Peking. Nor is even the Vietminh responsible; what is now happening in Laos is nothing but the irresistible will of the Laotian people struggling against imperialism. Soon no doubt the will of the Siamese people will be similarly invoked.

Siam can hardly be considered a reliable bulwark against an army so well equipped and battle-trained as the Vietminh, and invaders of Siam would not lack a fifth column among the Chinese minority, which has long been very discontented at the nationalist policies of the Siamese state. It is doubtful whether Siam would stand up to Chinese-Vietminh aggression better than it did to the Japanese invasion from Indo-China in 1941, unless it was confident of really effective military assistance from outside.

The question is whether the protection which has been given by the United Nations to South Korea has set an example sufficient to create such confidence. Siam is a member of the United Nations and could appeal to the Assembly if its territory were violated. But what could the United Nations do against either China or the Vietminh, under the existing rules of the cold war, except to make Siam a second Korea? And how many of the United Nations would now be willing to undertake a second Korean war?

401/1/1.

7

132

401/1/1 f

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE,
NEW DELHI.

*In reply quote No.*

Memo No.390
File No.8/10

24 April, 1953.

MEMORANDUM for:

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

On April 23 an agreement was reached for an exchange of diplomatic representatives between Thailand and Afghanistan. An unusual formality attended this agreement: it was formally signed by the Ambassadors of Thailand and Afghanistan in New Delhi at full dress ceremony complete with a display of the national flags and much press publicity.

(F.H. Stuart),
First Secretary.

S.A. Azis Kapalani

0-153/7/1 f

file — M.B. Pb. note on Representative pic

— HG 8/5

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
22 APR 1953
401/1/1
CANBERRA

131

File No. 160/1/3.

Memo. No. 161/53.

AUSTRALIAN LEGATION,
BANGKOK.

18th April, 1953.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM for:

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

401/1/1

In para. 28 of my Despatch No. 2/53 of 10th February, 1953, I made some observations on the extent to which Thai foreign policy envisaged concrete regional co-operation with other powers.

2. As reported in my telegram No. 27 of 18th April, the Minister of Foreign Affairs conveyed the message to me that Thailand "would redouble its concerted efforts with friendly powers with a view to common defence". In this connection I should mention that the British Ambassador told me briefly that during his final interviews with the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs just before he went on leave, both asked for military assistance, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs almost expressly asked what rôle Thailand was expected to play in a communist-provoked emergency.

3. The carefully repeated terms of the Minister's message to me lead to the inference that Thailand is now veering away from thinking ad hoc bilateral arrangements sufficient, and is thinking more readily of concrete regional commitments, which opens up the question of staff talks, exchange of military information, and so on.

4. The Prime Minister is reported as having said in an interview with a "Yomiuri" correspondent, that he had received no official proposal for a Pacific Pact from its chief advocate in the Far East, the Philippines, but "if a Pacific alliance is really aimed at peace in the Pacific and will guarantee security, it would be a very good thing and I will not withhold support from it." Speaking of India's position, he said he could understand Nehru's aim to steer a neutral course in the East-West conflict, he added "I am not in a position to comment on his policies, but if he does not affiliate himself with Russia and will co-operate with the U.S., I would gladly join hands with him."

B.M. Ballard
Minister.

Mr Kayley: This does not altogether square with other hints.

Dr Critchett - Please speak

RLH 30/4

HG 30/4

130

File No. 160/1/3.

Memo. No. 161/53.

Australian Legation,
Bangkok, Thailand.

18th April, 1953.

**SECRET**

MEMORANDUM for:

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

In para. 28 of my Despatch No. 2/53 of 10th February, 1953, I made some observations on the extent to which Thai foreign policy envisaged concrete regional co-operation with other powers.

2. As reported in my telegram No. 27 of 18th April, the Minister of Foreign Affairs conveyed the message to me that Thailand "would redouble its concerted efforts with friendly powers with a view to common defence". In this connection I should mention that the British Ambassador told me briefly that during his final interviews with the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs just before he went on leave, both asked for military assistance, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs almost expressly asked what role Thailand was expected to play in a communist-provoked emergency.

3. The carefully repeated terms of the Minister's message to me lead to the inference that Thailand is now veering away from thinking ad hoc bilateral arrangements sufficient, and is thinking more readily of concrete regional commitments, which opens up the question of staff talks, exchange of military information, and so on.

4. The Prime Minister is reported as having said in an interview with a "Yomiuri" correspondent, that he had received no official proposal for a Pacific Pact from its chief advocate in the Far East, the Philippines, but "if a Pacific alliance is really aimed at peace in the Pacific and will guarantee security, it would be a very good thing and I will not withhold support from it." Speaking of India's position, he said he could understand Nehru's aim to steer a neutral course in the East-West conflict, he added "I am not in a position to comment on his policies, but if he does not affiliate himself with Russia and will co-operate with the U.S., I would gladly join hands with him."

Cf. with Memo 2/53
9 30/3/53 [illegible]

Minister.

HC 15/5

129

[redacted]

Bangkok Min. despatch No. 1

→ U.N. (Polit)

~~IIIII~~ U.N. (Ec & Soc)

→ T.A.

E.R.

Central

action copy → S.E.A. ~~402/4/5~~ 401/1/1

E.A.

European

American

South Pacific

C. & P.

→ D/L

Copies to: Treasury
Defence
P.M.'s
A.G.'s
C. & A.
L. & N.S.
A.S.I.O.

Other Depts.

Please indicate additional distribution required by placing a tick against the Section or Department and return this slip to P.I. Section.

copy also on 384/7/3

F

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
9 FEB 1953
CANBERRA.

Australian Legation,
Bangkok, Thailand.

M.D. 1/53.

File No. 100/5/1. **SECRET**

29th January, 1953.

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that I called upon the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prince Naradhip, on the 23rd January last, shortly after his return from the General Assembly. As I had no specific business to transact, the conversation was general and touched on the following topics:-

2. United Nations. Prince Naradhip does not intend at present to return to New York when the General Assembly resumes and although he referred to Mr. Pearson's optimism, he does not expect any progress on the Korean question at the resumed Session, largely because he does not think that the Communist Chinese can change their attitude so soon and also because the policy of the new U.S. administration will take time to elaborate. He did not think that the resolutions adopted on the Moroccan and Tunisian questions were extreme, and in connection with the Arab-Jewish question mentioned that Thailand had "sided with the Asians".

3. Colombo Plan. I recalled the hope that he had expressed to me earlier that he would have been able to bring before Cabinet before his departure the question of Thailand's participation in the Colombo Plan, and asked whether the matter had moved at all during his absence. He said that it had not, and, mentioning that Indonesia's recent decision to join left Thailand as practically the only country in the area outside the Plan, hoped that he would be able to take the matter up soon. I gathered that his own feeling that Thailand should join remains unaltered.

4. Domestic Affairs. I touched on the recent political arrests but beyond saying that they had "cleared the air" he did not pursue this topic.

5. Pacific Pact. I referred to a recent newspaper report in which he was quoted as having said, on his return from New York, that there was a possibility of the development of a Pacific Pact Organisation on the lines of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, with the participation of America, Great Britain and France, who, he was alleged to have said, may join in such a pact because they have vital interests in this part of the world. He was also quoted as saying that while at New York he had not been approached by the Philippines Delegation with respect to President Quirino's proposals for a Pacific Pact. He confirmed to me that this was the case. It so happened that on the same day, 14th January, the press had carried a report that Mr. Churchill had suggested to Mr. Dulles a mutual defence agreement covering South East Asia and including, at the beginning, the United States, United Kingdom, France, Australia, New Zealand and Thailand.

/The .....

The Right Honourable R. G. Casey, C.H.,
Minister of State for External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

Mem Melbourne

Copy also Lon 804/7/3

127

6. The Minister said that he had not been accurately reported, and that he had given his views on the matter before he had heard of the report of Mr. Churchill's statement, although the press made it appear that he was speaking in the light of what was attributed to Mr. Churchill.

7. He said that his view was that any pact for this area should resemble NATO in its origin, growth, type of members and objectives. NATO had come into being among countries which were either strong themselves, or were being strengthened by foreign aid (in the circumstances, American aid); thus the United States was an essential partner in this area and the United Kingdom too. Thailand was receiving aid, it is true, but "did not have enough weapons yet". Any pact of the nature envisaged should be restricted, initially at least, to worthwhile and not nominal partners.

8. He went on to say that in his statement he had mentioned participation by the United States and the United Kingdom and although he had referred to France, there was a distinction between the two cases. The United Kingdom had announced its objectives in Malaya and could be relied upon to work towards them - as was proved by their past actions in the cases of India and Burma. While stopping short of saying that he did not think that the French were sincere in their expressed objectives in Indo-China, he at least hinted that he had considerable reservations. The French had not handed over enough power to the Associated States. This meant, for example, that border co-operation on the Malayan and Cambodian frontiers presented different aspects. There was no difficulty in Thai-Malayan border co-operation, but there were complications in the case of Cambodia. King Norodom had recently asked for border police co-operation but the trouble was that although the French claimed to have handed over police functions, they also claimed that police action could develop into military action or at any rate had security aspects, and, therefore, insisted on French participation.

sorted on 384/3/3

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(Sgd.) B. C. Balland

Minister.

F40 1/1/1 126

CONFIDENTIAL

# REVIEW OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN THAILAND

Appreciation of the internal situation is very much a matter of probabilities and inference from facts which are both hard to come by and incomplete. My broad conclusion is, however, that the Government (taken as distinct from the country itself) is in a state of unstable equilibrium, but that the country itself is a stable unit in the South East Asia region; in other words, it is not likely to succumb to communist pressure from within, a change of Government is not likely to result in internal chaos, and its foreign policy shows no signs of a re-alignment.

I have said that the Government is in a state of unstable equilibrium, and each element in this formula deserves some consideration. As for the Government itself, it should be recalled that it does not derive its strength from support in the National Assembly or among the people at large to an extent comparable with the adult democracies. The Government cannot afford, it is true, to disregard the National Assembly, in view of its claim to be democratic, and it must always so arrange matters that it can count on the support of more than half of the elected members, but parliamentary support is not the sole factor determining the life of a government. The main relevance of the mass of the people is that they are the reservoir from which Goverment funds are drawn and from which, in the last resort, the personal profits of the members of the Government are made.

So far as the equilibrium of the Government is concerned, there is no doubt that the Government does in fact govern, and that its authority runs through the whole of the Kingdom (in which it differs from its neighbours on the east and on the west) and there is no evidence that its replacement by a substantially different group of men is imminent, though of course it is possible.

The Government's equilibrium is, however, unstable because of its composition. A skilled juggler can spin a plate on top of a stick for an almost indefinite time but if the plate becomes lopsided or disintegrates during the performance, the act is at an end. The distribution of weight in the present Government group is always liable to shift and a split is not impossible, and either happening would result in an internal coup. Such is the situation which I observed over the last three months and it is my belief that it is endemic; that is tosay, for a considerable time to come there will be rumours of coups and some day the rumour may become a fact. I regard it, however, as quite impossible to make any reliable long range forecast in this matter.

The Government, as it well known, is a Government of Generals, Admirals and Air Marshals - of a Cabinet membership of 25 only 6 are civilians, namely the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Health, Economic Affairs and Justice, and the Deputy Ministers of Industry and Foreign Affairs. Rivalries existing between the most powerful members of the Cabinet are equally well known, so far at least as they are inter-service, and there are also rivalries proceeding from the business interests of the members of the Cabinet on which it is hard to get much light. The tendency for members of the Cabinet to continue accumulating directorships in banks and companies able to secure Government contracts has been increasing, and is no doubt of some significance. On the other hand, there are considerations

Sgn on 329 1/1

suggesting that practical limits to these rivalries exist. Thus an open clash between Lt.-General Srisd and Police Lt.-General Phao might well ruin each, and a certain measure of business co-operation in their larger ventures might well yield enough rewards to enable them to gratify the armed supporters of each. Similarly, in the inter-service field, though the expansion of the Police can scarcely inspire the Army with enthusiasm, it appears to have been effected at the expense of the Navy and the Customs and Excise departments rather than the Army. Moreover, the M.S.A. funds and U.S. aid go to the Army and not to the Police, and further, there are no reports of competition between these two services for funds in the 1952 Budget nor in the supplementary Budget under consideration. The Navy has been aggrieved since 1946 and nothing effective has been done by the coup group to reduce this, although the Prime Minister has done something to win Navy sympathy. The Navy is not at present a force of any great significance.

After the last coup the Prime Minister appeared to be the only available personality capable of handling this team. The view is now widely held, however, that he is fairly circumscribed in his activities and that while being far from a negligible figure in the Cabinet he is by no means the sole and undisputed leader. Incidentally, with the exception of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, he is the only one with any extensive contact with the world outside and foreigners generally. It may be significant that a few other members have recently made trips abroad, possibly with a view to self-education and the acquisition of broad international experience; in the case of General Phao it almost certainly meant that he felt his own position strong enough to absent himself for a total period of some months. In direct proportion as Phao and Srisd work more closely together, so the necessity of Field-Marshal Pibul remaining as Prime Minister diminshes.

On balance, I believe that the three coup group leaders (Phin, Phao and Srisd) are at present displaying a fair degree of cohesion, and are confident that provided that they can retain effective control of the armed forces, they cannot be overthrown by dissident elements. Further, they are strengthening their business and economic positions, which enables them incidentally to pass on rewards down the line. Their potential internal military antagonists include Pridi partisans, the Navy, 1932 coup groupers now outside the inner circle, 1947 coup groupers who are jealous of their leaders' profits, and dissatisfied Army officers outside the coup groups. Their political opponents could include, in addition to the Pridi faction and dissatisfied coup groupers and Army elements, elected Assembly members from the north-eastern provinces, the Khuang Aphaiwongse faction, pro Viet-Minh propagandists among the Annamites in the north-east, the Chinese community and a very large section of the press.

The Government does undoubtedly betray a feeling of uneasiness. Symptomatic of this is the alert which was imposed for about a fortnight before the Thai National Day, 24th June, and the conflicting and reticent public statements which were issued to explain it. A further brief alert was imposed shortly after General Phao returned from the International Police Conference at Stockholm. The occasion for the first alert was a real expectation of a Chinese demonstration against the increased Aliens Registration Fee on the Thai National Day, when Parliament was to be opened by the King, with a risk that its suppression might have developed into a disturbance in which some of the elements mentioned above might have been tempted to join. Also it is probable that the Government knows more than we do about activities of a so

called liberation party whose circulars, addressed to junior Navy and Army personnel, had been intercepted in the post.

The possibility of a general distrubance of this kind, which might get out of hand, attract "outsiders", and induce a reciprocal showing of strength among the services is clearly something which the Government must constantly have in mind.

Although the internal position seen against the foregoing background of the composition of the Government is rather equivocal, I should think that the position is more satisfactory as seen against the background of a possible internal insurrection.

The main purpose of American action through their Military Assistance Advisory Group is to ensure stability against such an internal insurrection and it is the view of the American Embassy that this object has been achieved, though an exception would no doubt have to be made in the case of a coup by the very Army which they have strengthened.

In considering possible sources of internal uprisings, only the Pridi faction and communism call for comment at this stage. The Pridi group is certainly not strong enough to overturn the regime unaided. A rough balance sheet of its strength and weakness would run as follows - it is strengthened by old 1932 and Free Thai loyalties, and, indirectly, by the corruption of the Government which has aroused many antagonisms which, not always for consistent reasons, could cluster round another Thai focus; it is weakened by an ideological rift between its pro-communist and conservative elements, is suspected by a large section of the people of complicity in the death of King Ananda, and is compelled to keep its leaders for the most part out of the country. It is also likely that a strong Pridi movement would have as a reaction the closing of the ranks of the coup group.

Communist action in Thailand is so far not strong. It is a commonplace that the people are well fed, and economic, social or industrial discontent, which usually nourishes communism, is absent. Precise information on the existence or extent of an organised communist party is not available; but, if it does exist, there is no evidence that its activities present any specific danger at the moment. There is no substantial active communist following among the Thais. There are, of course, in Bangkok fellow travellers, partisans of peace, and likeminded people, and there is also a communist section of the press, whose continued propaganda may have some effect in the long run. But the main distaste felt by the Thais for communism proceeds from their dislike and fear of the Chinese, and this is a most important consideration. Among the Chinese the position is different. I believe that the middle-aged Chinese who perhaps looked towards Peking at the beginning, are now disillusioned and are not likely to become disaffected, unless the trouble from the Aliens Registration Fee, which has undoubtedly annoyed them as much as anything in recent years, gets out of hand. Among the young people, however, the position is different, and there are a great number of doctrinaire sympathisers.

Thailand is happily free from the overt communist activities which afflict Malaya and Indo-China and has no problem comparable with that of Burma.

CONFIDENTIAL

In the industrial field, trade union organisation is so rudimentary that there is comparatively little scope for communist-inspired industrial disturbances. The principal labour organisations concern the samlor drivers in Bangkok and workers in the rice milling, timber, waterside and oil industries. The samlor drivers are almost wholly Thai and communism makes no great impact among them.

The Central Labour Union, which was founded in 1947 by the Pridi Government to counter the influence of the Kuomintang, is affiliated with the W.F.T.U. and has a membership of upwards of 50,000 of whom the majority are Chinese. It has, however, caused but little industrial trouble, and seems to work rather closely with the employers of its members, many of whom are Chinese concerns.

Finally, the foreign policy of Thailand seems to show no signs of deviation from its alignment with the Western democracies, support for U.N. action, and non-recognition of Peking. On his return from Washington to become Foreign Minister, Prince Wan stated that this policy would not be changed, and nothing has so far occurred to belie him.

Concerning the likelihood of an aggression against Thailand, the Department will have an overall assessment based on its knowledge of what is happening in Korea and the associated States of Indo-China but it may be added from here that in the event of Chinese aggression, especially if Indo-China falls, nobody expects that Thailand could be relied upon for anything more than a delaying action at best.

BANGKOK (MD 6)

24th July, 1952.

FTH.YJL

122

398/1/2
401/1/1

16th September, 1952.

Memo No.....

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Australian Legation,

BANGKOK

Thai Minister for Foreign Affairs.

It has been noted ~~that~~ in your memorandum No. 427/52 of 25th August, 1952 (your file 64/1) concerning the E.C.O.S.O.C. elections, that the Thai Minister for Foreign Affairs is now called Prince Naradhip. Are we to understand that Prince Wan has changed his name? It would be appreciated if you would advise us the Foreign Minister's correct name and title and whether there is any significance in the change.

(F.T. Homer)
for Secretary.

F.401/1/1 121

COPY

SECRET

No:157

(1193/15/52)

BRITISH EMBASSY,

BANGKOK.

25th August, 1952.

Sir,

I was received on 2nd July by the Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs, at my request, for a general talk prior to my forthcoming visit to the High Commissioner for the Federation of Malaya, who, I said, would wish to have a general picture from me of the situation across the Territory's Northern frontier. I was afraid, I continued, that the picture I myself would be inclined to paint would not be very cheering. On the political side I - and I thought most other outside observers - were deeply disturbed by recent developments in the internal scene. I had long ago expressed to His Royal Highness my view that the new Aliens Registration fee was bound to create a great deal of trouble; it had certainly appeared, at the time of the general alert declared a fortnight ago, that the Government were beginning to reap the harvest of that bad seed. The serious demonstrations which had been threatened for the 24th June - see my despatch No.153 of 20th June - had not in fact materialised; but the reason had been that the police had moved to clamp down on the situation rather than that the explosive factors in it had disappeared. Moreover, all my information seemed to suggest that the stresses and strains created by the alert, and by the troubles which had led up to it, had once again brought to the fore dangerous speculation upon the rivalries between Army and Police, between Generals Sarit and Phao.

2. I thought that Prince Wan was a little uncomfortable during the above rather forthright exposition of my appreciation of the situation. His official view was, however, that the dangers of the situation had been greatly exaggerated by communist propagandists. The whole situation had been discussed in Cabinet, and so far as he could see, the leaders of the Army and of the Police were pulling together in the general interests of the country as a whole. He himself felt so confident that there would be no trouble that he did not even have a police guard at the front door of his house. On the other hand, he must admit that there had been a considerable increase in communist activity in the country and, specifically, that it was communist organisation which was behind the unrest in the Chinese community over the new Registration fee. He thought, however, that the police were well-informed about these activities and that the situation was, and would remain, under control.

3. I said that I was relieved to hear this official view and that I would inform my Government of it: on the other hand I would not deny that, despite His Royal Highness' statements, I myself continued to feel somewhat uneasy about the situation. It seemed to me that the Government had given a gratuitous lever to the communists (and any other turbulent elements) over the Aliens Registration fee at a time when such developments as the fall in the prices of rubber and tin were likely to affect the whole economy of this country. This was precisely the type of situation which gave agitators a real opening; anything in the nature of a general slump while a few people collected fortunes would create really dangerous feeling. His Royal Highness would forgive me if I said that it seemed to me that economic planning in this country was itself being

/vitiated

The Right Honourable
Anthony Eden, M.C., M.P., etc., etc., etc.,

Dy on 399 1/1

[redacted]itiated by a dangerous tendency to seek rapid profits rather than real progress. I sincerely hoped that the control which the Minister of Economic Affairs had been able to establish over the rice export trade was not going to be undermined by any such short-sighted policies in respect of this essential commodity - essential to the sellers as well as to the buyers. While this was my hope, the considerable quantity of information which I received from the rice market did not conduce to any great optimism on the matter. I expected, in the not too distant future, to undertake a further round of rice negotiations and I trusted that there would be a detente in the political atmosphere before that time and that wiser economic counsels would prevail than now seemed to hold the field.

4. My object in speaking in this way was to give Prince Wan a warning that the recent actions of his Government were running counter to British interests and, if possible, to strengthen his hand in the Cabinet against the time when my rice negotiations have to start. His Royal Highness was non-committal in his comments and I myself moved quickly on to another subject.

5. His Royal Highness would, I said, have noted that there had been a good deal of speculation in the press in recent weeks about the possibility of a South East Asian Security Pact. I would be most grateful to have his views on this important and delicate matter. Prince Wan replied that he thought that discussions on this matter were premature. President Quirino of the Philippines was always launching this subject but his object was, presumably, connected with internal politics. So far as Thailand was concerned, Prince Wan thought that the Prime Minister and the present Government would not be opposed in principle to joining a South East Asian Security Pact; but that, as things stood at present, there was no possibility of giving such a pact the teeth which it would need if it were to prove effective. He had discussed the matter on many occasions with the Prime Minister and he was confident that the views he had expressed were also those of the Field Marshal; Thailand's only course was to go on slowly developing her own armed strength in the hope that, at some future time, the great Powers with whom she was collaborating in the United Nations might be able to give her such guarantees that her entry into a Security Pact would make sense. I offered some tentative speculation on the possibilities of limited aid and limited objectives; but Prince Wan was adamant and the conversation closed on the note:- "When the United States, the United Nations and the United Kingdom are able to offer us a real guarantee, that will be the time for a Pact. The development of such a pact must be gradual - like that of the Atlantic Treaty".

Confid 3991/1

6. This seems to me to represent from this country's point of view, a perfectly rational statement of policy; and I was therefore somewhat surprised, the next morning, to read the leading article in the "Bangkok Tribune" of which I think it worth while to enclose the full text. The Tribune is generally held to be the English-language mouthpiece of the Prime Minister himself. Its editor does not normally tackle, in his editorial comments, matters of international import and the enclosed article is certainly not in his usual literary style: and I have ascertained by direct enquiry that the article was in fact "inspired" by General Kharb Kunjara who combines the posts of Secretary-General in the Prime Minister's Office and of acting Director General of the Publicity Department. This is not, in fact, the first time that the General has voiced a view on the question of a Security Pact and I have good reason to believe that he may have been rapped over the knuckles for the flatly negative line taken in the press release mentioned in my Secret & Personal letter to Mr. R.H. Scott (No1193/5/52G)of 12th May. Prince Wan himself was critical of this article at the time; his view, as again stated in the preceeding paragraph, is that the Thai Government must show itself willing "in principle" to enter a pact. The

/writer

writer of this article has, however, gone far further than this. He propounds the view that Thailand and her neighbours should be prepared to join forces to resist aggression even without American aid and his concluding note that "isolationism or dependence on the United Nations alone would only be unpreparedness on the part of the countries of South East Asia" is in direct contradiction to the views expressed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs a few hours before this article appeared. The writer of the article indeed ranges widely over his subject. He suggests that the election of Mr. Taft to the Presidency of the United States would be no good thing for Thailand and that, in any case, isolationsim is growing in the United States. He also considers that this trend in American thought is already driving a wedge between British and American policy - which, as I shall take occasion to point out to General Kharb, is the chief theme of the Moscow/Peking propaganda machine.

7. I am at a loss to explain the discrepancy between this officially-inspired article and the views of the Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs. Nor did a somewhat confused conversation on the subject with Field Marshal Pibul this morning give any real enlightenment. The Prime Minister restated to me his view that no pact would have any meaning unless it was drawn up under United Nations auspices with both the United States of America and the United Kingdom as full participants. On the other hand he seemed to be nettled by the fact that President Quirino repeatedly gets the headlines with his statements on pact projects and to consider that it was time that Thailand had a bit of pact publicity. The fact that the publicty given in a newspaper known to be his own mouthpieces does not apparently represent his real views is, it seems a secondary consideration. It was merely deemed essential to say something a little startling.

8. I shall try to make some further analysis of this curious situation and of my talk with the Field Marshal on my return from Kuala Lumpur next week: but I feel that you should be informed as soon as possible that the subject of a South East Asian Security pact is again in the Thai air.

I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Washington, Saigon and Rangoon and to the Commissioner General for the United Kingdom in South East Asia at Singapore.

I have the honour to be,
with the highest respect,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,

(SIGNED) G.A. WALLINGER.

Vietnamese News
15/4/52

THAILAND AND VIETNAM HAVING A COMMON POLICY.

Prince VARN WAITHAYAKORN WORAVAN, the new Thai Foreign Minister in the new cabinet of Marshal PHIBUL SONGRAM, on the eve of his leaving for Bangkok, speaking to American pressmen, declared : "In Vietnam, the struggle against communism, which is a positive struggle, has been conducted energetically and, I may say, successfully."

Besides, the Prince, in a broadcast message, stated that he accepted the Foreign Affairs portfolio because Thailand was, at present, under the threat of a communist aggression.

CONFIDENTIAL

117

Aust. Legation, Bangkok, Thailand.
Annual Report, 1951.

25. There was no change in the foreign policy of Thailand during the year. The coup d'etat of 29th November, in particular, did not bring about any change, except that the new Government's policy towards Communism is likely to be more positive, and co-operation with the Western powers more wholehearted. The reinstatement as Prime Minister of Field Marshal Pibul Songgram, though it undoubtedly was done partly because of internal political consideration, was probably also influenced by the desire to maintain the confidence of foreign countries, where Pibul has for some time past been well and favourably known. The continued inclusion of Nai Warakan Bancha as Foreign Minister was probably also partly due to similar considerations.

/C. Relations with Australia.

204/4/1 116

E[redacted]ct

Summary of World Broadcasts

3rd June, 1952

REOPENING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH WEST GERMANY A special announcement from the Premier's Office told of the Government's decision to resume diplomatic relations between Thailand and Western Gernman now that the latter had, through the Bonn agreements, taken the first steps towards the regaining of her sovereign independence. A ceremony would be held on 28th May at the Thai Embassy in London for the exchang of documents. The dispatch of diplomatic representatives would be made later. (Bangkok 14.45, 28.5.52)

COPY

401/1/1

118

File No. 90/1/22.
Memo. No 122/52

Australian Legation
Bangkok

26th February, 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR
The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

ACT ON CONTROL OF EXPORT OF ARMS, AMMUNITION AND WAR MATERIALS B.E.2495

In my summary of items of general interest for the period 14th to 20th January. 1952, under cover of memorandum no. 51/52, I referred to the passing of the above Act.

2. I am now forwarding for your further information a copy of ~~t~~ the Act.

Charge d'Affaires.

401/1/1 114

File No. 90/1/22.

Memo. No. 122 /52.

Australian Legation,
Bangkok, Thailand.

26th February, 1952.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

ACT ON CONTROL OF EXPORT OF ARMS, AMMUNITION AND WAR MATERIALS B.E. 2495.

In my summary of items of general interest for the period 14th to 20th January, 1952, under cover of memorandum No. 51/52, I referred to the passing of the above Act.

2. I am now forwarding for your further information a copy of the Act.

(Sgd.) A. H. Loomes

Charge d'Affaires.

file 401/1/1

Original w) attachment filed 350/8/1

113

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
28 DEC 1951
401/1/1
CANBERRA

LEGATION
AUSTRALIAN CONSULATE-GENERAL
BANGKOK, THAILAND.

File No. 100/5/1.

Memo. No. 519/51.

21st December, 1951.

MEMORANDUM for:

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

RECOGNITION OF THAI GOVERNMENT.

I refer to my cable No. 141 of 10th December on this subject and your cable No. 197, and now enclose a copy of the Note of 15th December, 1951, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs. I am also enclosing copy of my Note of 20th December by which recognition of the new Thai Government was by implication accorded.

2. The delivery of my Note was made on the same day as the Notes of the United Kingdom and United States Embassies. Practically all other countries represented here have also accorded recognition.

Charge d'Affaires.

1. Mr. H. Lyons to see
2. R/S to S.E.A -

copy filed 401/1/1

No. 24900/2494

Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Saranrom Palace,

15th December, 1951.

Monsieur le Charge d'Affaires,

I have the honour to inform you, with reference to the circular note of this Ministry No. 24148/2494 of the 1st instant, that His Majesty the King has been graciously pleased to make known by Royal Command dated 6th December B.E. 2494 that the Constitution of Thailand of 10th December B.E. 2475, together with the Constitutional Amendments of B.E. 2482 and B.E. 2483 concerning the name of the country and the transitory provisions respectively, has been in force and operation as from 29th November B.E. 2494 temporarily pending subsequent revision of a new one by the Assembly of the People's Representatives.

In accordance therefore with Section 46 of the Constitution, His Majesty has been pleased to appoint, by Royal Command dated 6th December B.E. 2494, Field Marshal P. Pibulsonggram as President of the Council of Ministers and, by Royal Command dated 8th and 11th December B.E. 2494 respectively, the following Ministers of State and their portfolios:-

General Phin Chunhawan
- Deputy President of the Council,

Field Marshal P. Pibulsonggram
- Minister of Defence,

Major-General Phao Bhianlert Boribhand Yudhakit
- Minister of Finance,

Rear-Admiral Luang Yudhasat Kosol
- Minister of Agriculture,

Phya Borirak Wechakan
- Minister of Public Health,

Nai Sukit Nimmanheminda
- Minister of Industry,

Air Chief Marshal Fuen Ronaphakas Riddhagani
- Minister of Communications,

Luang Vichit Vadhakan
- Minister of Commerce,

Major-General Banyat Devahastin Na Ayuthia
- Minister of Interior,

Phra Nitithan Biset
- Minister of Justice,

General Mangkon Phromyothi
- Minister of Education,

Lieutenant-General Srisdi Thanarat
- Deputy Minister of Defence,

Rear-Admiral Luang Sunavin Vivadh
- Deputy Minister of Defence,

Major-General Prayoon Bamara Montri
- Deputy Minister of Finance,

Police Colonel Lamai Udhayananondh
- Deputy Minister of Agriculture,

Nai Luen Bhongsophon
- Deputy Minister of Industry,

Rear Admiral Luang Chamnan Arthayudh
- Deputy Minister of Communications,

Colonel Praman Adileksan
- Deputy Minister of Communications,

Colonel Siri Siriyodhin
- Deputy Minister of Commerce,

Police Lieutenant-General Phao Sriyanondh
- Deputy Minister of Interior,

Lieutenant-General Dej Dejpradiyudh
- Deputy Minister of Interior,

Air Marshal Luang Cherd Vudhakas
- Deputy Minister of Education,

Air Vice Marshal Muni M.S. Vejyant Rangsrit
- Minister of State,

Nai Khemjati Bunyaratabhan
- Minister of State,

with myself as Minister of Foreign Affairs. The new Council of Ministers having had audience of His Majesty the King on the 12th instant has assumed charge of the administration on that date.

I would add that in regard to the foreign policy, His Majesty's Government will continue to promote friendly relations with foreign countries, to observe international obligations and to enhance the ideals of the United Nations. In the capacity of Minister of Foreign Affairs which I continue to serve, I assure you that I shall strive in every possible way to promote and strengthen the friendly relations and good understanding which happily have existed with your Government. It is therefore my hope that you will extend to me your co-operation to that end.

I avail myself of this opportunity, Monsieur le Charge d'Affaires, to renew to you the assurance of my high consideration.

Warakan Bancha
Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Monsieur A.H. Loomes,
Australian Charge d'Affairs, a.i.,
B A N G K O K.

No. 100/5/1.

Australian Legation,
Bangkok. Thailand.

20 DEC 1951

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the Note of 15th December, 1951 (Reference No. 24900/2494) in which Your Excellency informed me that His Majesty the King of Thailand has been graciously pleased to make known by Royal Command dated 6th December B.E. 2494 that the Constitution of Thailand of 10th December B.E. 2475, together with the Constitutional Amendments of B.E. 2482 and B.E. 2483 concerning the name of the country and the transitory provisions respectively, has been in force and operation as from 29th November B.E. 2494 temporarily pending subsequent revision by the Assembly of the People's Representatives. Your Excellency was also good enough to inform me that, in accordance with Section 46 of the Constitution, His Majesty has been pleased to appoint, by Royal Command dated 6th December, B.E. 2494, Field Marshal P. Pibulsonggram as President of the Council of Ministers and, by Royal Command dated 8th and 11th December, B.E. 2494, respectively, certain Ministers of State. I am also pleased to note that Your Excellency has again been entrusted with the portfolio of Foreign Affairs.

I have also noted that His Thai Majesty's Government will continue to promote friendly relations with

His Excellency
Nai Warakan Bancha,
Minister of Foreign Affairs,
BANGKOK.

...../foreign countries,

foreign countries, to observe Thailand's international obligations and to enhance the ideals of the United Nations. I have also read with appreciation Your Excellency's statement that you will strive in every way to promote and strengthen the friendly relations and good understanding which have so happily existed between our two countries.

I have not failed to bring these matters to the knowledge of my Government, and I have the honour to assure you of my willingness and desire to cooperate with Your Excellency in every possible way to promote and strengthen these feelings of friendship and mutual understanding which have obtained between Thailand and Australia.

I have the honour to be,
With the highest consideration,
Your Excellency's obedient servant,

(Sgd.) A. H. Loomes

A.H. Loomes
Charge d'Affaires.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

401/1/1 108

# CABLEGRAM.

PK:ER

I.21386

Dated: 20th December, 1951
1300
Rec'd: 21st December, 1951
0830

FROM:

Australian Consul-General
BANGKOK.

ACTION COPY

147. UNCLASSIFIED. PRIORITY.

Your telegram 197. Recognition of the Thai Government.

I have today Thursday forwarded my reply to the Foreign Minister's note of Thursday according recognition. The United Kingdom, United States and France are also sending notes today.

2. Copies of the Foreign Minister's note and my reply follows by air mail.

---

Min. & Dept. E.A.
P.M's

21st December, 1951

file 401/1/1

copy for 402/1/1

DISTRIBUTION
SECRETARY
A.S. (U.N.)
A.S. (Econ.)
A.S. (Admin.)
U.K. (L. & P.)
U.N.
Tec. Ass.
E. E.
Pac.
West
Secret
P.I.
Info. & Pub.
Ant.
Admin.

107

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

# CABLEGRAM.

**RESTRICTED.**

AP - MC

ACTION COPY

O.19531.

Dated 13th December, 1951.
0200.

TO:

Australian Legation,
BANGKOK.

197. RESTRICTED. PRIORITY.

Your telegram 141. Recognition.

In the circumstances we agree it would be undesirable for Australia to refuse or delay recognition. If it appears likely that your United Kingdom or United States colleagues will be receiving instructions within the next few days to proceed with recognition, you should concert with them regarding timing of your own Note. Please keep us advised if there is uncertainty or delay on their part.

E.A.

P.M.'S.

40/1/1

13th December, 1951.

SECRETARY
A.S. (U.N.)
A.S. (U.K.)
A.S. (Admin.)
C.R. (L. & T.)
U.N.
Tho. Asia
K.R.
Pac.
West
General
P.I.
Com. & Pro.

DRAFT TELEGRAM.

TO AUSTRALIAN LEGATION, BANGKOK.

Date

No.

RESTRICTED

PRIORITY

Your telegram 141. Recognition.

In the circumstances we agree it would be undesirable for Australia to refuse or delay recognition. If it appears likely that your U.K. and U.S. colleagues will be receiving instructions within the next few days to proceed with recognition, you should concert with them regarding timing of your own Note. Please keep us advised if there is uncertainty or delay on their part.

Authorised by:

Distribution: E.A.
P.M.'s

LRMcI/CG
11th December, 1951.

file
401/1/11

13/12

Secretary
PM has OK'd

401/1/1

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

**CABLEGRAM.**

**RESTRICTED.**

105

FEL:EGM:

I. 20813

Dated: 10th December 1951
1300
Rec'd: 10th December 1951
2000

FROM:

Australian Legation,
BANGKOK.

141. RESTRICTED. IMMEDIATE.

Royal proclamations have been issued approving re-establishment of the 1932 Constitution (subject to a few unimportant amendments), appointment of Pibul as Premier and nominated Assembly. Pibul is now forming a permanent Cabinet but the main portfolios will probably be as in the provisional Cabinet.

2. Now that the King has legalised the effect of the coup d'etat, I feel little purpose would be served by withholding recognition of the new regime which is in fact, though not in form, virtually the same as before, and no change in foreign policy is likely. One cannot approve of the methods employed but from the political point of view it would be undesirable to prejudice our present good relations by refusing or delaying recognition. Both the United Kingdom and the United States Embassies and the majority of other missions feel the same way and are recommending recognition to their Governments. London has approved the United Kingdom Embassy's recommendations but we shall have to await formal statement of policy from the Minister for Foreign Affairs (which should be received within a few days) but I should be grateful for your views.

---

A/MIN. & DEPT: E.A.
MIN. & DEPT: DEFENCE
P.M.'s DEPT:

11th December 1951

401/1/1

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

**CABLEGRAM.**

**RESTRICTED.** 104

TWWP:GG

I.20459.

Dated: 3rd December, 1951.
1430.
Rec'd: 4th December, 1951.
1610.

FROM:

Australian Legation.
BANGKOK.

ACTION COPY

135. RESTRICTED. PRIORITY.

Reference my telegram No 133. Political. I have now received note from the Ministry ofForeign Affairs which sets out the developments already reported and includes the following statement "In regard to foreign policy and international obligations, theThai Ministry of Foreign Affairs begs to state that this remains the same as that of the former administration in every respect and that the change brought about is purely internal and there is no cause for apprehension for the lives and property of foreign nationals on this account".

2. Reception of the King yesterday passed off without incident and only formal speeches were made. The King said that he would govern "in accordance with the constitution" but did not specify which constitution. His attitude to the new circumatances is not yet known and any question of recognition must, I feel, await this.

3. I have sent cables numbered 130 to 134 inclusive concerning coup d'etat and also message on 29th November though the BritishEmbassy. Please acknowledge. — see file 399/1/1

---

A/ Ministerand Department External Affairs.
Ministera ndDepartmentDefence.
Prime Minister's.

4rh December, 1951.

401/1/1

WBP.



Supplément à la Revue « VIET NAM », No 15 du 1er Décembre 1951

103

# COMMUNIQUÉ OFFICIEL DE LA PREMIÈRE RÉUNION DU HAUT CONSEIL DE L'UNION FRANÇAISE

**A L'ISSUE des travaux qui se sont poursuivis au Palais de l'Elysée, les 29 et 30 novembre 1951, le communiqué suivant a été publié par la Présidence de l'Union Française :**

« Le Haut Conseil de l'Union Française a poursuivi aujourd'hui ses travaux au Palais de l'Elysée, sous la présidence de **M. Vincent Auriol,** Président de l'Union Française.

« Cette première session affirme la réalité de l'Union Française et lui donne sa vraie figure : par leur présence comme par leurs déclarations, les représentants des Etats Associés ont solennellement consacré la libre adhésion à l'Union Française que chacun de leurs pays avaient donnée dans les accords réglant leurs rapports avec le gouvernement de la République.

« Les travaux du Haut Conseil, qui se sont déroulés dans l'atmosphère la plus confiante et la plus amicale, se sont terminés par un accord complet sur les différentes questions inscrites à l'ordre du jour.

« 1) Le Haut Conseil a tout d'abord réglé sa composition et les conditions de son fonctionnement :

« a) Il a pris acte de ce que les délégations sont constituées :

— En ce qui concerne la France, suivant les dispositions de la loi du 24 avril 1949 ;

— En ce qui concerne les Etats Associés, des personnalités gouvernementales choisies par leur chef d'Etat respectif en vertu de leur législation interne et du représentant que chacun de ces derniers aura désigné auprès du Président de l'Union Française ;

« b) Le Haut Conseil a admis qu'il se réunirait au moins une fois par an, sur convocation du Président de l'Union Française, soit sur l'initiative de ce dernier, soit à la demande de l'un des Etats membres.

« Les débats du Haut Conseil ne seront pas publiés. Un procès-verbal sera établi et après avoir

été approuvé par les diverses délégations, sera déposé aux archives de chacun des gouvernements. D'autre part, il n'y aura pas de votes. Les décisions seront prises par consentement mutuel de tous les membres du Haut Conseil. En aucun cas celui-ci ne pourra prendre de décision mettant en cause les principes fondamentaux de l'Union consacrés par les textes de bases et librement acceptés par tous.

« Enfin, le Haut Conseil a pris en considération la proposition du Président de l'Union Française d'avoir auprès de lui un cabinet restreint composé de chargés de mission appartenant à chacun des Etats membres ;

« 2) Le Haut Conseil a ensuite traité du problème des relations diplomatiques des Etats Associés avec les puissances étrangères et de la représentation de ces Etats auprès des instances internationales.

« Il s'est félicité de l'évolution très favorable de la situation du Cambodge, du Laos et du Viet Nam dans ces deux domaines. Le Haut Conseil s'est également préoccupé de l'admission des Etats Associés à l'O.N.U.

« La délégation française a confirmé que le Gouvernement de la République donnerait, au moment opportun, tout son appui à leur candidature. A cette occasion, les délégations des Etats Associés ont tenu à remercier la France de l'appui sans réserve qu'elle leur avait apporté lors de leur admission à la conférence de San Francisco et à divers organismes internationaux.

« D'un commun accord, les Etats membres du Haut Conseil ont décidé que, préalablement à chaque réunion internationale, leurs représentants se consulteront sur les questions inscrites à l'ordre du jour.

« 3) Le Haut Conseil a entendu l'exposé par le général **De Lattre de Tassigny,** Haut-Commissaire en Indochine, de la situation et des perspectives militaires. Il a été unanime à adresser ses félicitations au commandant en chef pour les résultats remarquables obtenus par les forces de l'Union Française auxquelles s'adjoignent en nombre croissant les forces nationales des Etats Associés. Il a prié le général **De Lattre de Tassigny** d'exprimer aux combattants sous ses ordres la gratitude de l'ensemble des peuples de l'Union Française.

« Le Haut Conseil a examiné également les conséquences politiques qui pourraient être tirées en Asie du sud-est, du succès qu'il souhaite ardemment, des négociations engagées actuellement en Corée pour la conclusion d'un armistice.

« Le Haut Conseil estime qu'il serait alors désirable d'examiner les possibilités que pourrait offrir la situation pour provoquer une conférence internationale susceptible, dans cette partie de l'Asie du sud-est, de mettre fin à toute intervention étrangère et d'y amener la paix dans le respect des indépendances nationales que les sacrifices consentis en commun par la France et les Etats Associés ont sauvegardées ;

« 4) Le Haut Conseil a examiné la question des relations économiques entre la France et les Etats Associés.

« D'une part, il a définitivement mis au point la procédure de négociation des accords commerciaux à passer avec les Etats étrangers. D'autre part, il a décidé que, conformément aux conventions interEtats de Pau et spécialement la convention sur le commerce extérieur, des négociations seront engagées à bref délai à Paris, en vue de fixer le régime douanier applicable entre la République Française et l'union douanière consentie par le **Cambodge,** le **Laos** et le **Vietnam.**

« Les négociateurs, dans la mise au point de ce régime, auront pour directives de rechercher, en tenant compte des incidences monétaires, les moyens propres à accroître le volume des échanges entre la France et les Etats Associés et à élever le niveau de vie de leurs populations.

« Enfin, les Etats membres du Haut Conseil ont affirmé leur volonté commune d'améliorer le fonctionnement des organismes quadripartites dont les membres recevront de leurs gouvernements toutes instructions à cet effet. »

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

102

# CABLEGRAM. SECRET.

I. 21262

[redacted]EGM:

ACTION COPY

Dated: 18th December 1951
1735
Rec'd: 19th December 1951
1220

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
~~DJAKARTA.~~ Batavia

744. SECRET.

Senior member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (reference my telegram 731) told me, 17th December, that in his view, the Government's unwillingness to make up their minds in dealings with Indonesia weakened their position for the forthcoming negotiations. The Indonesians were quick to exploit their weaknesses. The Netherlands Government would not face up to possible eventualities or work out lines of action in advance. They had not made any attempt to assess public opinion. He felt that the wise course would have been for them to take up a strong stand and to have come out with a policy of development for Dutch New Guinea.

As an instance of inept handling, he spoke of the Government's protest to the Indonesian Government that they had had no official ratification of the coming of the Supomo Delegation, while at the same time Lamping had gone to the Djakarta air port to farewell the Delegation and the Deputy Minister Blom had met them at the Amsterdam air port.

In his view it would be better not to try to hurry the conference. While he thought that the forthcoming visit of the Prime Minister to the United States was valuable on general grounds, he felt that the timing (11th January to 23rd January) was bad as this might be a critical stage of negotiations with Indonesia when the Prime Minister would be needed here.

---

A/MIN. & DEPT: E.A.
P.M.'s DEPT:

19th December 1951

452/16/1

DISTRIB.
SECRETARY
A.S. (D.N.)
A.S. (G.B.)
A.S. (Admin.)
C.R. (L. & T.)
U.N.
Dep. Sec.
R.M.
Dep.
Asst.
Admin.
Finance
Mr. Cumming

NZ

No. 28
17th December.

INDONESIAN EMBASSY
Canberra, A.C.T.

newslines

Datelined : Djakarta.
15th December, 1951.

## TOUGH FIGHT PREDICTED IN FORTHCOMING INDON-JAP DISCUSSIONS.

Indonesia will only discuss matters relating to the Japan Peace Treaty. The delegation will leave aside all matters and will restrict itself entirely to discussing war reparations, fisheries and air- and seacommunications. This was stated by a Government spokesman recently. The Indonesian delegation will be led by Dr. Djuanda, Minister of Communications, and will consist of some 11 members and 12 advisors.

The first batch of those taking part in the negotiations left Djakarta on December 14th.

Well-informed circles later disclosed that Indonesia is heading for some hard bargaining with Japan as the Tokio Government is not expected to accepted nor agree to Indonesian demands for war reparations.

Among items which have been presented to the Japanese are such services, to be carried out by Japan, as salvage work and the use of Japanese technical experts.

As regards the question of fisheries, Indonesia wants waters within sixteen miles from her coastline to be reserved for her own fishing interests, whereas Japan is expected to insist on the usual three mile limits off the Indonesian coast.

Another demand put forward by Indonesia concerns the manufacture of textiles in Indonesia, instead of in Japan. Small plants should for this purpose be imported from Japan and set up in Indonesia.

One item on which Japan is thought to agree is the salvage of ships, which are mostly Dutch owned, sunk in Indonesian waters during the last war.

## DUTCH COMPANY TO PRINT BANKNOTES IN INDONESIA.

Finance Minister, Dr. Yusuf Wibisono, recently signed an agreement with the Jonan Enschede & Sons, Printers of Haarlem (Holland) for the establishment in Indonesia of a joint company for the printing of Indonesian banknotes and other valuable papers. The capital set aside for this purpose amounts to Rupiahs: 50.000.000, the majority of which will be held by Indonesian shareholders. The management will be left to Jonan Enschede & Sons.

The company will appoint two Directors, one of which will be Indonesian. Appointments will be made in consultation with the Indonesian government.

Experts to train Indonesian employees will be sent out to Indonesia from Holland, while the Indonesian technical staff will come to Holland to gain experience in the specialised field of banknote printing at the company's plant in Haarlem.

The plant in Indonesia isto be set up in the growing Djakarta suburb of Kebajoran and will ultimately give employment to some three hundred persons.

Daily Mirror 100
5.12.

5.12 DM

MBER 5, 1951.

# ARMY VIEW ON MALAYA

## Against More Troops

(D.M. World Cables)

**KUALA LUMPUR, Wed. — British Army leaders in Malaya yesterday were reported by Associated Press correspondent R. B. Hewett, to be opposed to demands by rubber planters for more troops to fight terrorists.**

Hewett said that the issue whether to send or not to send more troops into the jungle had become one of the most hotly-debated problems of fighting the terrorists, and had been one of the main subjects discussed by the British Colonial Secretary (Mr. Oliver Lyttelton) during his tour of inspection.

Army officials conceded the need for some military forces, but said the main work should be done by Malay and Chinese jungle police, and by starving terrorists out of the jungle by denying them food from the towns, said Hewett.

### Informer's Tips

He said that the "hit and run" tactics of the terrorists was one of the main difficulties of rooting them out.

**Army and police officials agreed that practically every success so far had been due to tips from informers or from captured terrorists. Hewett said.**

Mr. Lyttelton got an example of this yesterday when he was told two Communists had been killed as a result of a tip from a terrorist captured at Bentong on Monday, said Hewett.

In another instance, two Communists, one a platoon sub-commander with a price on his head, were shot down by security police in an ambush near Seramban.

The London Evening News says that at least one important development is likely to follow Mr. Lyttelton's visit.

This is the setting up, early in the New Year, of a joint Anglo-French War Council to co-ordinate strategy against the Communists in Malaya and Indo-China, with a large-scale exchange of officers between the two armies

431/4/1

THE DAILY

# PUBLIC ASKED TO CUT DOWN

# BUY NO

## Xmas and New Year Greetings

UDIOS extend thanks for the Xmas season to of clients, and sincerely New Year.
tia's leading portrait ialises in bridal por- otography and repro- ographs.

[redacted]

GRAPHERS
ARNET ST., SYDNEY. Tel. M 2959
PARRAMATTA. Tel. UW 9650
of N.S.W. Towns.
concession offer of four full oil colour—for only for a limited period on vertisement.

12.51

## CROFT'S SLACKS

WITH THE

**3 INCH BOLERO BAND**

with 3-button extension.

24" cuffs—fractional fittings — full range of tropical weight materials in all shades — plain, striped, over-checked and herringbone

**75/- PER PAIR**

file 452/1/2
99

Extract from memo No 698/51 dated 12 December from Djakarta (file 450/2/1)

... "Yesterday it was reported in Antara News Agency an "reliable authority that Dr Hanafiah would shortly be appointed as Ambassador to the Foreign Ministry. Now that Subandrio, formerly an Ambassador, has become Foreign Minister, Dr Hanafiah, formerly an Ambassador, has become Secretary General," this apparently left Dr Hanafiah second to the top level policy makers makes it, consequently, this report surprising of this press report in connection with Dr Hanafiah's appointment from the Health Ministry to become one of the seven policy makers in the Foreign Ministry."

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE, NEW DELHI.

## PRESS CUTTINGS.

1. Name of Paper ... Statesman
3. Published at ... New Delhi
3. Dated ... .... December 12, 1951. Page

# KAREN THREAT TO INVADE RANGOON

RANGOON, Dec 11.—According to a rebel Karen radio broadcast, the Karens have threatened to invade the Burmese capital on December 15, a diplomatic source said here tonight.

Government sources, however, do not attach importance to this "empty threat", because they believe there is no Karen stronghold in Rangoon's vicinity for a concentrated attack.

However, the Government has taken military precautions at Dallah, a town across the Rangoon river, half a mile from the capital, which was attacked and looted by Karen insurgents two days ago. A dusk-to-dawn curfew has been ordered in the town.

Many of the 3,000 residents of this town, which was attacked, today appeared to be evacuating to Rangoon for protection. The rebels killed one person and injured five, looted 50 houses and took 50 women as hostages. The women were later released.—PTI-Reuter.

388/2/4

J Panfi to retain

Extract from
Summary of Items of General Interest
25.31/10/51

---

In an interview with the press on 24th October the Foreign Minister, Nai Varakarn Bancha is reported to have stated that Thailand was ready to permit allied troops inside the country to help fight off aggressors in the event of an attack in overwhelming force. Nai Varakarn denied reports that the US government had requested military bases in Thailand and explained that American military advisers had only studied Thailand's defense plans and recommended points where Thai forces should be concentrated.

---

401/1/1 96

401/1/1

6. Press comments in Siam on events leading to the withdrawal from ABADAN have been plentiful. Local newspapers have been careful not to jeer or to express open satisfaction at British discomfiture. Nevertheless, the Siamese are fully alive to the implications of the withdrawal and frankly expect and fear a weak British policy in the dispute with Egypt. There is rather more understanding of the international importance of the Egyptian situation than there was of the Persian oil problem, but the Siamese are unable not to feel glee at seeing the mighty humbled, and although officially they are sympathetic, the attitude of private citizens can be expressed in the words of the Chinese proverb "It is most pleasant to watch your neighbour fall off his roof".

7. The Minister of Foreign Affairs with five officials of his Ministry left for Paris on the 28th October to attend

the/

Savingram 85
10110/19/51
6-11-51

Summary of Items of General Interest
Period 10th to 17th October, 1951.

---

401/1/1

Speaking to the Ceylonese community of Thailand at Don Muang airport on 12th October Mr. D.S. Senanayake, Prime Minister of Ceylon is reported to have stated that the Government of Ceylon is planning to establish diplomatic relations with Thailand.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: Monitoring Digest  File No.: 401/1/1

Published at:  Date: 19/9/51

## "FREE ASIA MUST BE UNITED," SAYS THAI MINISTER

The Thai Foreign Minister declared yesterday: "If foreign aggression comes to Thailand, the United Nations will give aid to Thailand as they are giving it to Korea."

He added: "The Thai Defence Ministry is fully prepared against aggression. Free Asia must be united, and Free China, Japan, Indonesia, Malaya, Indochina and Thailand must cooperate adequately to resist aggression by the Communist group and to achieve victory." (Taipeh Radio Voice Kuo-yu 2230-hrs 19 Sept.)

P

93

Bangkok ..... MIN. / DEP. Despatch No. 1 .....

Distribution

Thailand - Restriction of Foreign Investment.

(Copies also to T.A. & E.R).

Defence
Aust N.Z. Sec.
Treasury

Copies to Pacific

Distributed 26-9-51

Divisional File Number 401/1/1

For Pol.
Get copy for two years 402/1/1

DUPLICATE.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
Rec'd 5 SEP 1951
File No. 401/1/1

File No. 100/33/1.

New Series No. 1/51.

AUSTRALIAN CONSULATE-GENERAL,
BANGKOK, THAILAND.

28th August, 1951.

Sir,

I have the honour to report certain recent measures adopted by the Thai Government which seem to indicate an intention to restrict foreign investment in the country and to place the exploitation of its natural resources more and more in the hands of the Thai Government and of Thai nationals.

2. Some of the largest foreign firms here are engaged in the extraction, treatment and export of timber, particularly teak, which is an industry which is almost entirely in the hands of foreign interests. The largest concessions in the north of Thailand are held by three British firms, the Borneo Company, Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation, and Anglo Thai Company. These firms have for a very long period carried on business here and have accounted for more than 50% of the total timber exports. The concessions have been for varying periods, but I understand that all of them will expire within four years. It has been now authoritatively stated that the Thai Government will not renew the timber concessions of foreign firms, and these concessions will either be handed over to the Forest Industry Organisation, a Government body, or will be granted to the highest bidder of Thai nationality. This measure has not of course yet been implemented by any legislative provision, and indeed no such law would be necessary, as already the grant and renewal of timber concessions are discretionary powers vested in the Government.

3. Some of the more irresponsible Thai newspapers have also long been advocating the exclusion of foreign interests from other industries, such as tin-mining, but no official backing seems to be evident at present.

4. Another important policy, at present in the early stages of implementation, is aimed at improving the conditions of the Thai rice farmer and excluding to some extent the influence of the Chinese in this important industry. Practically all of the rice-bearing lands of Thailand are owned by Thai nationals, but a great number of the poorer peasants are heavily indebted to Chinese financiers who reap the rewards of the peasants' labour through exorbitant rates of interest. Practically all of the rice-mills, on the other hand, are owned directly and operated by Chinese. To a large extent therefore the real economic control of the rice industry is vested in Chinese

...../hands.

The Right Honourable Mr. R.G. Casey,

Minister of State for External Affairs,

CANBERRA. A.C.T.

Australian Consulate-General
Bangkok, Thailand

28th August, 19

hands. This state of affairs has long been a source of bitterness amongst the Thai people, but the Government has been prevented from effecting any real reforms by the power of Chinese wealth. Corruption existing amongst high officials has also probably been an element in preventing any change. Recently, however, the Government has announced an intention to take some remedial measures which, though not as far-reaching as many Thais would desire, nevertheless are aimed at placing Thai nationals in a more advantageous position. These reforms are to be effected by the greater use of cooperative societies and by direct financial and other assistance to Thai farmers.

5. There has for some time past existed machinery for the establishment of Government-sponsored cooperatives, but it has been little used. Recently, however, the scheme has been re-introduced on a much larger scale, with Government financial assistance, to permit farmers to use common facilities, such as farming equipment, and also to permit of a more satisfactory and advantageous method of marketing of rice. It has also been stated that silos and rice-mills will be set up and run by Thais on a cooperative system, and so avoid the necessity of marketing all rice through Chinese-owned mills. This step could lead ultimately to a considerable decrease in the power of the Chinese in this industry, but naturally it would necessarily be a gradual process.

6. Credit cooperatives now set up number 7690. T societies jointly obtain loans from the Government for imp ment and development schemes for their lands and for the of farming equipment. The Government has at present a Baht 8 million for these credit cooperatives, and it is that the Cabinet Council has approved of an additional Baht 51 million for extending the activities of cooperative societies. It is also proposed to raise the status of the present Cooperatives Department to a full Ministry, and a bill to effect this is expected to be brought forward at the next session of Parliament in October. It is worthy of note, that membership of cooperative societies is limited to Thai nationals.

7. On the question of direct financial aid to farmers, it has been announced that the Ministry of Agriculture has allocated the sum of Baht 10,500,000 this year as a revolving fund to help farmers. This will be used for the purchase of seed-rice of improved varieties, the purchase of livestock i farming purposes, and the purchase of pumps and other farmin machinery. These will be made available to farmers who nee them at nominal costs. The administration of this fund wil entrusted to a special committee called "Committee for Agricultural Promotion".

8. Apart from providing valuable aid to farmers, these reforms will to a large extent ensure that the hold over farmers by Chinese financiers will be relaxed.

9. The Government has also announced a policy designe to encourage and assist farmers to own their own land without encumbrances. The only immediate practical result of this policy is a decision to divide up a large area of Crown P Department land into small holdings, for the time being, on lea with fixed and low rents, but with the apparent intenti to enable farmers to own it.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,

(Sgd.) A. H. Loomes

(A.H. Loomes)
Consul-General for Australia
in Thailand.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

90

Name of Paper Summary of Items File No. 401/1/1

Published at of General Interest Date 6-12/9/51

In a statement to the Press on 7th September Nai Warakarn Bancha, Minister of Foreign Affairs, supported the basing of American troops in Japan after the completion of the Japanese Peace Treaty, and the building of a strong Japanese army to take over later the defense of its own country. He is reported to have added that although U.S. troops will be needed initially to assure Japan's defense they should not stay too long lest misunderstanding and resentment be caused.

Nai Warakan is also reported to have stated that Thailand favours promotion of light and heavy industries in Japan since Japan could then increase its supply of needed capital equipment and consumer goods at reasonable prices. Japan should be developed into the work-shop, not only for Thailand but also for South East Asia.

---

note on 401/5/1

Extract from "Foreign Report" of 23rd August, 1951.

89

## CHINA'S CHANCE TO ENTER BURMA

A complicated and potentially dnagerous situation now exists on the border between China and Burma. This frontier has never been properly demarcated (see Foreign Report of May 24th). There are four factors involved :

1. Chinese Nationalist troops under General Li Mi, several thousand strong, who crossed into Burma when the Communists took over Yunnan province, but were not interned because of the powerlessness of the Burmese Government in the border region, have recrossed the frontier and made raids for some distance into China. They are based on Kentung in north-east Burma, but are reported to have occupied a strip of Chinese territory on which aircraft from Formosa can make landings. The Burma border is thus the only area in which the Chinese civil war is still being fought out by organised forces. Peking now accuses the Americans of having organised the whole affair and of sending American officers to help General Li Mi.

2. The Burmese Communist rebels, who were formerly operating mainly in the Yamethin area, about 250 miles north of Rangoon, have been moving northward and infiltrating into the part of the Shan States adjoining the frontier of Communist China. A group of guerrillas from Burma are reported to be already undergoing training with the Chinese Communists at Paoshan in Yunnan.

3. Chinese Communist comment on the report of a commission sent to study the problems of the non-Chinese minorities in south-west China shows strong dissatisfaction with the attitude of the Kachins, who live partly in China and partly in Burma. The Kachins and other tribes are stated to be "an important factor in national defence," but their "upper strata" have "direct or indirect relations with the imperialists", and British and American Christian missionaries are accused of "fabricating rumours, sowing dissension and inducing minorities to migrate."

4. A lively smuggling trade exists along the old war-time Burma Road, by which small quantities of strategic materials such as petrol, lubricating oil and rubber tyres are sent into China. They are said to fetch two to five times Rangoon prices at the Chinese frontier.

The present confusion in Burma affords great opportunities to the Chinese Communists, if they are not too much occupied elsewhere to take advantage of them: (a) the crossing and recrossing of the frontier by General Li Mi's force would give Peking a pretext for pursuing him into Burma, on the ground that the Rangoon Government is unable to perform its obligation in international law to intern the Kuomintang force; (b) even without any entry of Chinese Communist troops into Burma, Burmese Communist rebels concentrating near the border could be supported with supplies and training facilities, just as the Vietminh have been on the Indo-China border; and (c) alleged "imperialist" intrigues among the Kachins could be made an excuse for action against the Burma Kachins in territory which has in any case been claimed in the past as part of China, there being no agreed frontier north of the Shan States.

L401/1/1

88

The Burmese Government has recently somewhat improved its position in the southern part of Burma, and the Karen revolt has largely collapsed. But the Communists and the "White Band" People's Volunteers control the countryside round Mandalay, and there would be little prospect of extending Rangoon's authority if they got backing from Yunnan.

Burma, following India's example, recognised the Chinese People's Republic, but the disadvantages of recognition have so far been more obvious than the gains, and the Burmese act in fear of China. Burma has a large Chinese minority which is traditionally accustomed to look to Chinese consular or diplomatic representatives for protection; now that these are all appointed from Peking, the local Communist element has had the upper hand in the Chinese community. The commercial interest of Burma Chinese in the legal and illegal Burma Road trade with China also indirectly strengthens Communist influence over them. On the other hand, the ferocity of the "extermination" drives against "Counter-revolutionaries" in China is reported to have greatly reduced goodwill for the Communists among the Burma Chinese, and even to have revived sympathies for the Kuomintang.

## Siamese Worried

To make matters more complicated, Siam also comes into the picture, since :

1. Siam has not recognised Peking, but maintains diplomatic relations with the Chinese Nationalist Government in Formosa.

2. The Nationalist Embassy in Bangkok is reported to have arranged for supplies of ammunition to be sent to General Li MI's army in the Shan States through Siam.

3. If defeated, Li Mi may retire into Siamese territory.

Siam is certainly taking a strongly anti-Communist stand, in contrast to Burma, and Burmese-Siamese relations are none too good.

The Burmese have asked Washington to use its good offices to stop frontier violations by the Chinese Nationalists; but Chiang Kai-shek can have no interest in stopping them, even if Li Mi would obey him. As the Burmese are unable to do anything about it, Li Mi will no doubt go on until the Chinese Communists drive him out of the Shan States, and then he may withdraw into Siam. An occupation of the Shan States would put the Chinese Communists on the frontier of Siam, and Siam is already preparing for defence in that quarter.

Bangkok now anticipates possible Communist attacks through both Indo-China and Burma. Strategically, invasion from the direction of Saigon would be the greater threat, but since General de Lattre restored the military position in Indo-China, the possibility of a collapse in Burma looks to the Siamese like the more serious danger.

D. M. R.

New York. 9/8/51

Thailand Tightens China Embargo.

Thailand announced that it has widened the scope of its embargo of strategic goods for shipments to Communist China and North Korea. The new list of materials includes ores, rubber, pasture fed, oil and kapok. Thailand is one of 45 countries which have already notified the U. N. of their compliance with the General Assembly's embargo resolution.

401/1/1

86

THAILAND

Aug. 2, 1951

DECREE CONTROLLING EXPORTS PROMULGATED

Bangkok, Thai Home Service, July 31, 1951, 1300 GMT--B

(Text)

"In the name of His Majesty, King Adundet, the Regent Prince, Thani Niwat, issued the following proclamation on July 23, 1951:

"Because it is deemed expedient to control the exporting of certain kinds of goods, the King, in accordance with Sec. 157 of the Constitution and Sec. 3 of the Act of 1939 for the control of exports and imports of certain kinds of goods, has ordered the enactment of the following decree:

"Sec. 1--This decree shall be called the 23d Decree of 1951, Controlling the Exportation of Certain Kinds of Goods.

"Sec. 2--This decree shall be in force from the date of its publication in the GOVERNMENT GAZETTE.

"Sec. 3--Exports of the following are prohibited: Tin ore, iron ore, wolfram, tungsten, antimony, lead metal, lead ore, zinc, para rubber, castor beans, castor oil, and kapok; except as permitted by the Minister of Commerce or persons authorized by the Minister of Commerce.

"Sec, 4--The provisions of Sec. 3 shall not apply to goods taken out by a person for his personal use, or by a vehicle for the use of such vehicle, or taken out as necessary for sample purposes.

"Sec. 5--The Minister of Commerce and the Minister of Finance shall administer this decree.

"Prime Minister Phibun Songgram, executor of His Majesty's order."

Commerce Ministry's Instructions

Bangkok, Thai Home Service, July 31, 1951, 1300 GMT--B

(Excerpt)

"Following the proclamation of the 23d Decree of 1951, Controlling the Exportation of Certain Kinds of Goods, the Ministry of Commerce wishes to give instructions about applying for permission to export goods under control according to this decree.

"1--Ores: The Director General of the Department of Mines, or his representative, and the (Mines Provincial Commissioner), or his representative, are authorized by the Ministry of Commerce to give permission to export. Exporters should contact the said authorities.

"2--Para rubber: The Chief of the Rubber Control Division, or his representative, and local authorities according to the Rubber Control Act of 1938 are authorized by the Ministry of Commerce to give permission to export. Exporters should contact the said authorities.

"3--Castor beans, castor oil, and kapok: Applications to export can be made at the Goods Control Division of the Foreign Trade Department in the Ministry of Commerce in the same way as for other controlled goods.

"Ministry of Commerce, July 31, 1951."

B R I E F S

OFFICIAL APPOINTMENTS--His Majesty has ordered the appointments, to be effective immediately, of the following officers: Rear Admiral Prince (Khanthukon) APHAKORN, Deputy Chief for Administration of the Naval General Staff Department, as Deputy Chief of the Defense General Staff; 2--Rear Admiral LUANG (Vichien Nawa), Commander of the Second Naval Command, as Naval Inspector General; 3--Rear Admiral (Snoh Raktham), Commander of the Naval Air Corps, as Commander of the Sattahib Naval Station. (Bangkok, Aug. 1, 1951, 1300 GMT--B)

RADIO STATION--To promote communications facilities for the people, merchants, and Government organs, a radio communications station has been set up by the Post and Telegraph Department in Kanchana Buri Province. Regular service has been available since July 28. (Bangkok, Aug. 1, 1951, 0030 GMT--B)

CHINESE SCHOOLS--The Delhi radio broadcast news July 23, saying that NCNA had reported that the Government of Thailand has increased violent activities against the Chinese in Thailand and ordered the closing of many Chinese schools. The Ministry of Education wishes to announce in regard to Chinese private schools that the report as broadcast by the Delhi radio is not true. The closing of some Chinese schools occurred in 1949 and 1950 as a result of violation of Thai laws. At present, no private, including Chinese, schools have tried to violate laws and the Ministry has not revoked the permit of any school. (Bangkok, July 31, 1951, 1300 GMT--B)

POSTAL RELATIONS--The Ministry of Communications calls attention to a REUTERS report from Hong Kong July 29 saying the Peking radio reported Thailand had officially announced discontinuation of postal communications with Communist China, cutting off 3½ million Chinese from communications with their Motherland. This report is untrue, the Ministry says. No such announcement as that quoted by Peking has been issued. (Bangkok, Aug. 1, 1951, 1300 GMT--B)

copied

THAILAND

Aug. 1, 1951

INDOCHINA INVASION WOULD INVOLVE THAIS

Bangkok, Thai Home Service, July 27, 1951, 1330 GMT--B

(Department of Publicity Article: "Thailand Is in a War Situation")

(Text)

"Good evening listeners: If you are interested in foreign political news and have consistently followed world developments, you will have seen that since the end of the last World War up to the present there has been no sign of permanent peace in this world at all. During the last World War it was said that it was a great war to end all wars. It was the greatest World War in history. Uncountable lives and properties were destroyed. It was hoped that there would be peace after such a war, for the beginners of the war were already defeated. But it did not turn out as expected. Fighting in the form of civil wars has constantly occurred in various places. Besides, there is a so-called Cold War which derives from the political gestures of the big powers. This may at any moment develop into a hot war.

"You can see that the World has been confused and disturbed since the last World War. There was a civil war in Greece between the Government and the Communist Forces, and the Communists were defeated. A territorial dispute between the Jews and the Arabs in Palestine was brought to an end by U.N. mediation. There was a blockade of Berlin by Soviet Russia, in which the Western Powers were obliged to use airplanes as a means of communication and transportation. In the Far East there has been fighting all over. The major trouble is between the Communist Chinese and the Nationalist Chinese. They have been fighting for nearly 5 or 6 years. Next come Burma, the Philippines, Malaya, and Indonesia, where Government forces have been fighting with insurgents up to now.

"As for the fighting in Indochina between the Bao Dai Government's forces and the Viet Minh Army, which has been backed by the Communists from the beginning, it is likely to develop into a big war in the near future, for it appears that the Communist Chinese are hurriedly working on the Yunnan-Hopei railroad in order to reach the Indochina border. It is expected to be completed by the end of August this year at the latest. It is likely that when this railroad is finished, the Communist Chinese will give full support to the Viet Minh. Their next move may be to send troops to invade Indochina, as they are doing in Korea at present. As it is reported that 300,000 Communist Chinese troops are now massing at the Indochina frontier, it is likely that a great war will break out in Indochina in the near future.

"Whenever this war in Indochina eventuates, the situation will be the same as in Korea. That is, when it appears that the Communist Chinese have used forces to invade Indochina, the United Nations will consider it necessary to oppose them. There will be a resolution branding the Communist Chinese as aggressors and Armed Forces will be sent to help Indochina as the next immediate step to expel the Communist forces from Indochina. A big war will start at that moment.

"All you listeners may recall that the land called Indochina is composed of three different States--Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia. These three States already have status as independent countries, but they are still being protected by France, the former guardian country. As France is a great power with a big voice in the United Nations, she will certainly not let Indochina be invaded without seeking help from the United Nations. From a geographical point of view, Indochina may be compared to a door to Communist China. If the Korean war is ended, where else will a new war break out in the Far East? Experts on the world situation answer that we should look to Indochina for the next Communist war. Since Indochina is menaced by Communist aggression, all the democratic countries have been so worried that the United States of America has concluded a mutual military aid agreement with Indochina. Arms and military equipment have been dispatched ever since.

Situation in Thailand

"Now let us turn to look at Thailand's situation. Thailand adjoins Indochina with the Mekong River as a major boundary. If a big war breaks out in Indochina, the Mekong River will not be a serious natural hindrance to Communist aggression. You listeners may wonder why the Communists will invade Thailand. Four reasons can be given:

"1--The Communists already have a plan to occupy all the land in East Asia. The invasion of Thailand is according to plan.

"2--Thailand is an important country with the richest natural wealth in this area. Therefore it is the desire of the Communists to occupy and use her as a base to invade other countries.

"3--The Red Chinese radio has often denounced Thailand as abusing the Chinese people in Thailand. The Communist Chinese may take this matter as grounds for the invasion of Thailand.

"4--Thailand has sent troops to fight the Communists in Korea. Indirectly, then, it can be considered that Thailand is in a state of war with the Communists.

"These four reasons clearly indicate that if there is a big war in Indochina, Thailand will surely not be immune from Communist aggression shortly thereafter. You listeners can see that the world atmosphere at present is such that a World War can be touched off any time, today or tomorrow. Minor wars are in progress in various places. Disputes which may lead to further fighting and destruction are already found in many places. India is about to make war with Pakistan over the Kashmir question. The oil dispute between Britain and Persia is serious enough to have provoked a disturbance ....

Conditions in Middle East

"The dispute between Britain and Egypt over the Suez Canal is another which may develop into a big incident in the near future. This is because the situation has become graver since Egypt demanded the withdrawal of British troops from the Suez Canal. British cargo ships were bombarded and seized recently. This has caused the newspapers in London to demand that the British Navy take strong measures to cope with future incidents. As a consequence, it appears that Britain has sent many destroyers to the Red Sea.

"Conditions in the Middle East, especially in the Arab bloc, are becoming more unstable daily. In the past few weeks the Prime Minister of Lebanon and King Abdullah of Jordan were assassinated, making the situation more tense in lands where the war atmosphere is hotly seething. The loss of King Abdullah has threatened the security of Central Asia. King Abdullah was one who most strongly exercised policy. He had the most efficient Army in the Middle East. It is generally believed that because of Jordan's strong Army the problem of unreliability as regards the peace treaty between Israel and the Arabs could be solved. King Abdullah was the only Arab who supported the policy of (nonhostility) to the State of Israel.... All these complicated situations in the Middle East may lead to a World War in the near future.

"Now let us turn to the role of the United Nations. The aim of the United Nations is to prevent or stop wars. Whenever there occurs a dispute which may lead to fighting, the United Nations extends a mediating hand to settle the matter so as to prevent the spread of war. In the conflicts between Israel and Palestine the United Nations was able to bring peace. In case a country is invaded, the United Nations promptly sends Armed Forces to help the invaded country, as in Korea. The United Nations has had to perform such duties for nearly 5 or 6 years, yet there seems to be no sign of general peace in the world. There has always been trouble and confusion, even in the United Nations. This is because members of the United Nations have been divided into two parties since establishment of the organization. They are those of the democratic countries on one side, and of the Communist countries on the other.

"The democratic side desires to have perpetual peace, but the Communists oppose this. However, the Communists have fewer members and are defeated in every vote. When they cannot get what they want in the meetings they try to find other ways. How can peace exist while disturbances all over the world are being created by the Communists. One side or the other must eventually be defeated. There will be peace then, but it will be a peace on heaps of ashes in an empty world without lives.

"A war to stop war is taking shape in the mobilizing of all democratic Armed Forces. Communist countries have an advantage in this mobilization race because they have long since decided to make war. So the immense armed might of Communist fighting power is not a surprise. As for the democratic countries, after exerting their utmost efforts to secure peace they were forced to realize there could be no peace while the Communists wanted war. So preparations to cope with Communist aggression were hastily begun among the free democratic countries.

"There is now the North Atlantic Pact consisting of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Great Britain, and the United States of America. Besides these, there are many that intend to join. This pact is designed to stop Communist invasion of West European countries. Gen. Eisenhower has been appointed Commander in Chief of the Armies raised under this pact. Also, many divisions of troops have been sent by the United States of America to join European forces.

Agreements in Pacific Area

"As for the Pacific Ocean side, there is a military agreement between the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. Other countries are permitted to join, however. According to the peace treaty between America and Japan which will be concluded soon, America and Japan will have military relations with each other. Besides this military agreement, the United States has also concluded military aid agreements with Thailand and Indochina.

"All our listeners can now see that all democratic countries are already prepared to meet Communist aggression from any direction. As for mobilization, the democratic countries are speedily carrying it out. Especially in the United States, arms and other military equipment are being produced in enormous quantities. These arms and equipment are being sent to Europe and Asia steadily, just as they are being received by Thailand and Indochina.

"You listeners can see that the world situation is in a general turmoil. Incidents which may lead to war have occurred in Europe and Asia--from the Atlantic coast to the Pacific Ocean on the China Sea. Although the democratic countries have exerted their utmost efforts to prevent the outbreak of war, they are unable to avoid it; for the other side desires war.

Negotiations in Korea

"If the cease-fire negotiations in Korea now being carried out become effective, it will only be a temporary cease fire to prepare for a new fight. Whether the new fighting place is an old battlefield or a new one depends on the aggressors. From the very first day of the cease-fire talks, there has been no sign that the war can be settled, for the Communists demand something which is unacceptable to the United Nations. If the proceedings continue like this, it is likely that the negotiations will be in vain. Since the oral negotiations cannot settle the dispute, it must be settled with guns.

"Where will the Communists begin their next aggression--in Southeast Asia? According to one report, the Communist Army has moved to the south and is massing 300,000 troops near the Indochina frontier. The Red Chinese are hurrying work on the Yunnan-Hopei railroad to reach the Indochina border. It is scheduled to be completed next month. All these things indicate that the Communists will invade Indochina as their next move. And if Indochina is invaded, Thailand would not be able to escape, because our territories are contiguous. Besides, there is no natural barrier capable of obstructing Communist aggression.

"Dear listeners, all the developments described above clearly show that the world in general is now in a war situation. As for Thailand, indirectly speaking we are also in a war situation because we have already sent troops to fight the Communists in Korea. Furthermore, the Government is expeditiously preparing to cope with any violent situation which may arise in the future.

"Therefore, all our dear Thai brothers should realize that our country at present is not in a normal situation, although we see people ambling around enjoying themselves. Please realize that we are in a war situation. In such a critical situation as this, our country wants every Thai to perform his duty in unity and harmony in order to help the Nation avoid possible future disaster. Please give up all self-interest which may harm the interests of the Nation. Please do not indulge in amusements without regard for the present world situation."

T H A I L A N D

July 30, 1951

401/1/1

PREMIER TALKS TO DEPARTING SERVICEMEN

Bangkok, Thai Home Service, July 26, 1951, 1300 GMT--B

(A farewell address by Prime Minister Phibun Songgram at the ceremony for the departure of Thai troops to join U.N. Forces in Korea, replacing the first group of Thai soldiers, who have returned to Thailand)

(Excerpts)

"Dear brother Army and Navy servicemen: In the name of the Thai people, I have the great honor to bid you farewell today. I wish to remind every serviceman that approximately 30 years ago, at this place, we held a farewell ceremony for our brother Thai soldiers going to join the Allied Nations in Europe. They returned with great honor and benefit to the Kingdom. I hope that you will follow in the footsteps of our World War I veterans.

"You are the soldiers of the Nation and the King, and you are being assigned to perform your significant duty: War combat. You must always remember to perform your best duty in order to preserve the honor of the Nation and the world--an honor offered to everyone participating in this war. Even though there are only a few leaving at this time, it is understood that you are a significant part of the national machine. As I am holding the position of Prime Minister and concurrently Minister of Defense, I have the opportunity to serve the Nation in administering a Kingdom representing 18 million people.

"I have observed that the present world situation is full of disturbances everywhere. We may say that the world already is approximately 75 percent of the way to war. At present, all democratic nations in Europe on our side are intensively increasing their military strength in order to protect themselves from Communist aggression. There are also disputes in Egypt, Iran, and Arabia (sic).

"In Burma, Vietnam, Cambodia, China, and finally in Korea--which is your destination--there are disputes between Communism and democracy. That is why both sides at present are preparing for war. In Korea fighting is going on. Our country is part of the democratic camp, and is trying to avoid war in favor of peace, but the world at present is approximately 75 percent on the way to war, and there is only a 25-percent chance of escaping another war.

401/1/1

"Everyone standing here is considered very important to the Nation during this uncertain world situation. If you can halt Communist aggression in Korea by joining the U.N. Forces there, you can also stop the spread of Communist aggression to the south, that is, to Vietnam and our country, Thailand, and to Burma, and other Nations.

"As I have already said, you are a significant part of our national machine. Our future depends on you; if you lost to the aggressors there, they will surely spread their aggression to Thailand. We experienced hardship, sorrow, and disorder when our enemies invaded and occupied our country. If you defeat the enemy in Korea, they will not be able to invade our country. The Government then will govern the Nation peacefully. Our brother citizens of Thailand will have the opportunity to work and to produce food.

"As you have been told by your commanders, you are leaving to join the U.N. Forces. The past two World Wars destroyed everything. That was why, after the Second World War, the United Nations was established. The United Nations has one main policy, and that is to prevent any Nation from carrying out aggression against another. If any Nation violates this agreement, all members of the United Nations will send their forces to fight against the aggressors. Thailand is a member of the United Nations. Therefore we give support by sending our troops to join the U.N. Forces in Korea.

"Finally, may I beg for the mercy of our Lord Buddha and all miracles in this world to give protection, happiness, and success to every brother serviceman who is leaving to perform his important duty in Korea."

## B R I E F S

ARMY CORRECTIONS--The Thai Army announces that the THAI MAI said July 26, quoting "informed sources," that all military units would be moved out of Bangkok, making it an "open city." This report is inaccurate; the Government never entertained any such plan. The LIBERTY called the parade of provincial military units on July 30 "large-scale maneuvers." This is inaccurate, and may tend to create misunderstandings. (Bangkok, July 28, 1951, 1300 GMT--B)

RAILROAD COMMITTEE--The Council of Ministers has approved appointment of the Committee of the Railroad Company of Thailand as follows: Chairman, (Leng Srisomwong); members, Lt. Gen. CHAROON RATANAKUN SERIREOENGRIT, Nai SAPHRANG THET-HATSADIN NAAYUTHAYA, Phra PISARN SUKHHUM, Nai (Kasem Sriphayak), and Col. (Pramarn Adiregsarn). The name of the sixth member is unintelligible. (Bangkok, July 27, 1951, 1300 GMT--B)

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
31 JUL 1951
CANBERRA.

File No.100/5/1.

Memo. No. 315/51.

~~453/2/1/2~~

AUSTRALIAN CONSULATE-GENERAL,
BANGKOK, THAILAND.

24th July, 1951.

401/1/1 Ker 401/1/4 } Keel Records Walker Lawson

MEMORANDUM for:

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

I refer to your memorandum No. 110 of 6th July 1951 (file No.453/2/1/2) seeking elaboration of certain statements by Thai officials which purported to quote the views of the United States Government on conditions in Indochina and South East Asia generally.

2. The matter has recently been discussed with Mr. Hannah First Secretary (Political) at the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok.

3. Mr. Hannah was clearly anxious to minimise the significance of the statements of the Thai officials. He stated that the U.S. government had indicated to the Thai Government a considerable time ago (presumably in early January of this year) that conditions in Indochina were deteriorating. The situation had since improved in that country, however, and the Thai Government was aware of America's less pessimistic views in this connection. The U.S. Government is well known to have long held fears that the Chinese Communist Government might at any time choose to interfere substantially in the South East Asian area, whether through open aggression with "volunteer forces" or by a substantial increase in the supply of arms to and general logistic support for presently active rebel forces.

4. These fears had naturally been communicated to the Thai Government. The extent of these fears does furthermore normally fluctuate to some extent with current trends in the wider field of East West relations. However no special fears of increased Chinese Communist or other communist interference in this region have in recent months been communicated to the Thai Government.

5. Mr. Hannah explains the misleading statements of the Thai officials quoted in my Summary of 13th to 19th June as being issued solely for the purpose of covering up the real reason for the recent decision to limit the Thai contribution of troops to the Korean war from the earlier proposed figure of 4,000 to the present actual figure of 1,200 (approx.) The real reason, in Mr. Hannah's view, behind this decision was that the financial cost of maintaining a fighting unit in Korea is far higher than the Thai Government had originally anticipated and would, if the present force of some 1,200 men were increased, become a financial burden at home so prejudicial to the economy (and hence to the security) of Thailand as to more than offset the value of the increased contribution to U.N. fighting strength in Korea. The removal from Thailand of an additional first class fighting unit of some 3000 men might equally be less advantageous to the U.N. than prejudicial to Thai securi[ty].

J.P. A/S with papers MC 31/7

.....6. It is the view

CONFIDENTIAL

80

Australian Consulate-General,
Bangkok, Thailand.

Memo. No. 315/51. -2-

6. It is the view of the U.S. Government that Thailand's position in the United Nations is, by virtue of its unusual situation in a troubled and threatened region, unlike that of the majority of members of the United Nations. The U.S. therefore feels that Thailand's contribution of rice to the Korean people should be supplemented rather by only a token expeditionary force than by any more substantial unit. These views have been communicated frequently to the Thai Government and were undoubtedly taken fully into account when the decision to limit the T.E.F. in Korea was made.

7. Commenting on more recent reports that Thailand is prepared to double the size of its expeditionary force in Korea (see my Summary of Items 20th to 27th June) Hannah stated that the statement was in his opinion irresponsible or at least, made with an eye on press reports then current that truce talks might soon be called in Korea.

8. In the course of his remarks Hannah acknowledged that the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok is not at all closely acquainted with the present situation in Burma. It was evident from his discussion however that, in at least his own view, of all the countries in this region Burma presents at present perhaps the most insecure appearance. He postulated tentatively future Communist activity amongst the Shan and Kachin peoples with or without military or logistic support from China. I have at present no evidence which would either favour or contradict such a postulation but will, if opportunity offers, endeavour to obtain a picture of conditions in that area.

CONSUL-GENERAL.

F.O. print no. 1015/27. Siam.
10/7/51

Abortive coup de main in Siam.

In foreign politics the Minister of Foreign affairs has already said there will be no change and there is no reason why there should be. It may be expected that everything will be done to placate America and to prevent the cessation of American aid. The military clique are solidly and strongly anti-Chinese and anti-communist, and their co-operation whether with ourselves on the malayan border or with the U.N. can be counted on as much in the future as in the past. There is good reason to suppose that such co-operation will be more resolution.

for BL.

401/1/1

FILE COPY
JMc/AC

78

453/2/1/2

Memo No. .....

6th July, 1951.

MEMORANDUM for:

The Australian Consul-General,
BANGKOK.

I refer to item No.6 in your Summary for 13th-19th June, 1951.

2. We would be glad to receive further particulars regarding the reports to which you refer of

(a) "advice received from the United States that conditions in Indo China are deteriorating".

(b) "advice from the United States of America that the war in Korea may be extended to South East Asia."

3. Please ascertain the views of U.S. officials in Thailand regarding these reports.

Secretary.

W.B.P.

ITEM 6 COPIED FROM

A SUMMARY OF ITEMS OF GENERAL INTEREST, PERIOD 13TH TO19TH JUNE.

Speaking on 11th June, the Minister of Finance, Phra Manubhan Vimolsastr, is reported to have stated that the decision recently taken to maintain a Thai force of 1200 rather than of 4000 in Korea, was taken in the light of advice received from the United States that conditions in Indo-China were deteriorating.

A subsequent repoet published by a local Thai language newspaper ~~quoted a militia~~ quoted a senior officer of the Military General Staff Department as having stated in the course of an interview that the decision taken regarding the Thai Expéditionary Force had been made "following receipt of the advice from the U.S.A. that war in Korea might extend to South-East Asia in the near future".

The Minister of Foreign Affairs is not reported to have elaborated significantly on his announcement concerning the governments decision in this matter. (See Items of Interest 6-12 June) save briefly on the 13th June when according to a Thai language newspaper he stated in the course of an interview that the decision had been made "owing solely to some exigencies".

---

B

DUPLICATE.

CONFIDENTIAL

46

Mr. Hasluck
" Burkett
" McEwen

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
Rec'd 10 JUL 1951
Fds. No. 453/9/1/1

File No. 100/5/1.

AUSTRALIAN CONSULATE-GENERAL,
BANGKOK, THAILAND.

28th June, 1951.

DEPARTMENTAL DESPATCH NO. 11/51.

FROM: The Australian Consul-General, BANGKOK. THAILAND.

TO: The Secretary, Department of External Affairs.

THAI ATTITUDE ON THE PERSIAN QUESTION.

Much publicity has been given in Thailand to the nationalisation measures of the Persian Government against the British owned Anglo Iranian Oil Company, particularly among the Thai and Chinese language press.

2. The Government has been very careful not to commit itself in support of either Britain or Persia, in accordance with their usual policy of keeping as far as possible out of affairs which do not specifically and directly concern them. Ministers and Government officials likewise are not prepared, even in private conversation, to express their opinion on the issues, except to express apprehension at the situation and hope that some amicable settlement will be arrived at. The Government-sponsored Thai language newspaper"Thammathipat" has likewise been non-committal and has confined itself for the most part to purely factual reporting.

3. Other newspapers, however, to a large extent supported the policy of Persia. The Communist press used the opportunity of attacking Britain for its "imperialistic" policy, and other leftist newspapers followed suit. The most important and significant comments, however, come from the hitherto mildly leftist "Siam Nikorn" and "Siam Rath". These journals together have the largest circulation of all Thai newspapers, particularly "Siam Nikorn", which is owned by the Thai Commercial Press Company, and their influence, especially amongst the more educated people, is therefore great.

4. The main line adopted by these newspapers is that the present Persian situation is an example of the growing independence of the small nations, particularly Asian nations. The"Siam Nikorn"expressed the opinion that the "Persian Government would win the sympathy of the small powers in a matter which concerns Persian sovereign rights." It further points out as a warning to any show of force by Britain: "They (the British "hotheads") have probably overlooked the fact that Persia today is not the same as in 1933. The mentality of the Asians today is not that of the beginning of the 20th Century". This theme was further developed by "Siam Nikorn" in considering the effect of the Agreements made by Persia. In part, it said in an editorial:-

Ambassador Defence Aust N.S. Sec Central Sec

...../"Western insistence

CONFIDENTIAL

Australian Consulate-General,
Bangkok, Thailand.



"Western insistence on legal rights without consideration of the temper of the countries in the East only induces anger. In fact, the argument of the Eastern nations that legal obligations had been imposed upon them when they were still weak and ignorant is quite reasonable.

The example of Persia shows that Western countries can no longer deal with Eastern countries on the basis of greater power and intellect."

5. The other journal leading the attack on British policy, the "Siam Rath", adopted the line that it is unreasonable for Britain, which itself advocates socialism and the nationalisation of industry, to object to Persia's action on legalistic grounds, especially as, it stated, the treaty on which Britain relied had been "imposed" on Persia when it was a weak nation. This journal further expressed the opinion that the despatch of troops by Britain, and the threat of force is tantamount to starting war.

6. The most significant conclusion drawn by "Siam Rath" from its discussions on Persia is that Eastern countries should follow "Persia's good example" and that Thailand should nationalise such industries as rice, forestry and mining, and take these important industries out of the control of foreigners, who "exploit Thailand's natural wealth solely in their own interests and in the interests of their countries". It concluded this proposal by saying, optimistically:-

"If nationalisation is taken up seriously, the Thai Government, which represents the owners of the country, should be able, with the help of patriotic persons to operate these industries with success".

This theme was taken up by some other newspapers, including the left-wing group, but no comment has yet been made by any Government source.

(Sgd.) A. H. Loomes

CONSUL-GENERAL.

U.S.S.D.F.E. Wireless Bulletin.

3/7/51

22. NO CHANGE IN THAI FOREIGN POLICY, PRIME MINISTER SAYS.

Washington, July 2. Prime Minister Phibun Songgram has informed United States Charge d'Affaires William T. Turner at Bangkok that there will be no change in Thailand's foreign policy, State Department Press Officer Lincoln White announced today.

The Prime Minister escaped from an insurgent group of Thai naval marines Sunday. He had been seized by the diasident group Friday in an abortive attempt to seize control of the government.

White added that, according to cables received from Turner, a cease fire order had been broadcast to the marines by Admiral Luaung Singu Songgramchai and that fighting appeared to have ceased. He said that reports indicated there were no casualties among American citizens in Bangkok.

Prime Minister Phibun, White stated, was unharmed while in custody of the insurgent group and promptly resumed office on his return.

White repeated today a statement he made Saturday to the effect that there are no signs of Communist implications in the attempted coup, saying it appeared to be entirely a matter of internal politics.

Thailand is one of the smallest of the 16 nations contributing military assistance to the United Nations effort against Communist aggression in Korea.

453/9/1/1

Summary of Items of Gen Interest.

9-15/5/51

The Minister of Foreign Affairs strongly denied on 9th May recent reports that negotiations were at present in progress to draw up a defence treaty with Laos, Burma and Vietnam. He stated that Thailand had made no contact whatsoever in this matter with any of those countries. 453/9/1

---

Main: Annual Review.

23rd April, 1951

On 28th February, 1951, Pibul announced the recognition of the governments of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, with the French Union. There was no doubt of the unpopularity of this move, which was made against the advice of his officials, and which was the immediate cause of the resignation of his Minister of Foreign Affairs.

For. Pol.

453/9/1/1

Siam: Annual Review 1950.

April 23, 1951

Relations with the United Nations and with the Major Powers.

The Korean Crisis. First reactions were that Siam could do little to help, but despite opposition Pibul rapidly made an offer of 4,000 men, the first by any Asian country. Subsequently he also agreed to supply 40,000 tons of rice. This was greeted enthusiastically in the country & has earned him greatly increased goodwill with the United ~~States~~. The Thai expeditionary force at present exists only ~~in~~ ~~Japan~~ of about 1,500 men and their part must perforce be small. Three units of the Royal Thai Navy (corvettes) accompanied the troops and have seen some action in Korean waters. Thousands in Siam are experiencing vicarious thrills from the exploits of the Siamese troops and recruiting for the Thai Expeditionary force went with a swing, rapidly becoming oversubscribed.

453/9/1

For Pol.

SECRET

Ref: 2/147

40

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
Rec'd 12 APR 1951
File No. 453/9/1

With the compliments

of the

Official Secretary to the

United Kingdom High Commissioner,

Canberra.

copy forwarded reference by PMG's.

11/4/51

Mr Cutts

- Please let me know if any action is necessary on this
RLH.

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER

FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM,

CANBERRA. A.C.T.

69

SECRET

Ref: 2/147
JM:GT

11th April, 1951.

Dear Sir,

With reference to recent communications on the subject of the situation in Thailand, ending with your letter No. 154/64 of the 30th January, I am directed by the High Commissioner to inform you that the United Kingdom Charge d'Affaires has enquired of the Thai Minister for Foreign Affairs whether he could give any information in regard to recent reports that orders had been issued by the Thai Government for the retention in the Service, of conscripts due for release on 1st April for a further three or four months. The reports added that this action was taken because trouble was expected in Thailand in mid-April. The Thai Minister for Foreign Affairs informed the United Kingdom Charge d'Affaires that these reports were correct. The Thai Government had, from various reports that it had received, concluded that an intervention by the Chinese Forces on behalf of Ho Chi Minh in Indo-China might take place towards the middle of this month and ~~that~~, as such an intervention would probably completely change the external picture, the Thai Government had decided, as a first step, not to release these conscripts on 1st April but to keep them in Service. The Thai Government was also apprehensive of coming events in South Yunan and the Shan States. It was thought that the Kuomintang Troops in that area were about to launch important guerilla attacks on the Chinese Communists. It was also suspected that the Chinese Communists had come to terms with various Shan States who had been won-over by the Chinese promises of independence and it was consequently feared that a Communist incursion into that area might be imminent. Two Chinese divisions were, indeed, reported to be stationed on the Burma Road for this purpose.

2. As regards the internal situation, the Minister for Foreign Affairs said that no trouble was expected either from the Chinese or the Thai Communist elements. He denied that the Government were worried about South Thailand and dismissed, as groundless, a report in the local newspaper that the Chinese were thought to be plotting to seize Kra Isthmus. The Viet Minh refugees in North East Thailand might possibly be a source of trouble but they were quiet for the present and were being carefully watched. He finally emphasised that the Government's main preoccupation was to prepare for a possible Chinese attack on Indo-China which might be followed

(a) by a French appeal to the United Nations for assistance, and

(b) by a direct threat to Thailand itself.

3. In regard to (a) above, His Excellency intimated that the Government had reached no decision as to whether or not to send aid to Indo-China in the event of a call from the United Nations.

The Secretary,
Prime Minister's Department,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

4 copies please.
J. Peverill.

4. In reply to an enquiry as to whether further preparations could be contemplated, the Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that further steps might be considered at the Meetings of the Central Security Council and that the United Kingdom Charge d'Affaires would be promptly informed. The latter impressed upon the Minister for Foreign Affairs that he was vitally interested in being kept informed of these measures, in view of British interests generally and of the proximity of Malaya in particular.

5. From the general tone of the Minister for Foreign Affairs' conversation, the United Kingdom Charge d'Affaires gathered that he was himself not particularly perturbed about the situation. The Prime Minister himself was indeed stated to be "most optimistic". The Commander-in-Chief of the Thai Air Force, on the other hand, was in some apprehension when he warned a member of the United Kingdom Embassy Staff to be "on the lookout" for trouble in the near future and said he feared the Chinese Communists, finding themselves foiled in Korea, would attack in the direction of Thailand. The Prime Minister and the Commander-in-Chief of the Thai Navy were, however, apparently unperturbed by this prospect.

6. The United Kingdom Charge d'Affaires reported that from general conversation with a variety of knowledgeable persons and from the tone of certain organs of the local press he does, however, detect a growing sense of uneasiness. He anticipated that when the news about conscripts was made public a fast flow of alarmist rumours could be expected. He saw no reason, however, for anticipating immediate or serious internal trouble in Thailand.

7. In communicating the above information to the Commonwealth authorities I am to emphasise that the action of the Thai Government is merely a reasonable precaution, that, as stated by the United Kingdom Charge d'Affaires, no serious internal trouble is anticipated in Thailand and that the rumours referred to in paragraph 2 above may well be without foundation.

8. I am sending two copies of this letter to the Secretary, Department of External Affairs.

Yours faithfully,

(Signed) JAMES MARJORIBANKS

Official Secretary.

---

Bangkok Summary 9.1.57

453/9/1

At a meeting of the Council of Ministers on 3rd January a resolution is reported to have been carried calling for the exercise of more stringent control in respect of the reexport of merchandise from Thailand to communist held territories. Control measures are reported to have been placed in the hands of the Central Peace Maintenance Committee as well as the Ministries of Commerce and the Interior.

---

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
Rec'd 4 JAN 1951
File No.

File No. 100/5/1.

Memo. No. 460/50.

AUSTRALIAN CONSULATE-GENERAL,
BANGKOK, THAILAND.

22nd December, 1950.

MEMORANDUM for:

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

THAILAND FOREIGN POLICY

I enclose herewith two copies of an undated communique issued by the Office of the Prime Minister of Thailand and received in this office on 21st December 1950.

CONSUL-GENERAL.

Copy to East Asia.

453/9/1

TRIPLICATE. 65

File No. 100/5/1. Thailand.

Memo. No. 460/50.

22nd December, 1950.

MEMORANDUM for:

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

THAILAND FOREIGN POLICY

I enclose herewith two copies of an undated communique issued by the Office of the Prime Minister of Thailand and received in this office on 21st December 1950.

(Sgd.) A. H. Loomes

CONSUL-GENERAL.

Communique of the Office of the Premier.

Foreign Policy of Thailand is to develop the country and to make the Thai people happy. We do not want war; we want peace, but we will resist any aggression to the best of our ability. We will cooperate with the United Nations who are on the side of democracy especially the United States and Great Britain in all intents and purposes with the aim of attaining everlasting peace throughout the world. The Release of U.P. Agency from Tokyo that Thailand is the only nation in Asia that wants appeasement is utterly untrue and unfounded. Our troops are still fighting in the Korean War along side with the forces of the democratic nations of the U.N. and even during this week. The Government is negotiating with H.Q. of General MacArthur to send more Air Force to supplement the Ground Force already fighting there.

Publicity Department.

## Communique of the Office of the Premier.

Foreign Policy of Thailand is to develop the country and to make the Thai people happy. We do not want war; we want peace, but we will resist any aggression to the best of our ability. We will cooperate with the United Nations who are on the side of democracy especially the United States and Great Britain in all intents and purposes with the aim of attaining everlasting peace throughout the world. The Release of U.P. Agency from Tokyo that Thailand is the only nation in Asia that wants appeasement is utterly untrue and unfounded. Our troops are still fighting in the Korean War along side with the forces of the democratic nations of the U.N. and even during this week. The Government is negotiating with H.Q. of General MacArthur to send more Air Force to supplement the Ground Force already fighting there.

---

Publicity Department.

Foreign Office and Whitehall Distribution

28/11/50.

"But the live issue (the importance of which was immediately grasped by the Communists) is that of foreign policy. By aligning himself uncompromisingly with the West, Pibul has made himself doubly vulnerable."

453/9/1

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

**CABLEGRAM.**

**RESTRICTED.**

61

EGM:MD

I.18668.

DECYPHER FROM:

Dated: 21st November, 1950.
2312.
Rec'd: 22nd November, 1950.

The Australian Delegation,
United Nations Assembly,
NEW YORK.

1035. IMMEDIATE. RESTRICTED.

1. First Committee commenced Chinese complaint (23).

Chinese Delegate supported resolution in a long speech, (copy by bag), which sought to prove -

(a) That Communist China was Soviet-controlled.

(b) That Soviet had taken considerable areas over, and obtained extensive concessions.

(c) That there was now resistance to the Communists inside China on a large scale (over one and a half million combatants).

2. Dulles followed with moderate speech, (text by bag), announcing general support of resolution. He traced recent history of China and related it to Soviet theory of exploiting Asiatic nationalism, saying finally that investigation of facts would be useful, and that terms of resolution did not condemn or endorse either party.

3. Malik refuted the Chinese accusations by copious quotation from the United States White Paper. Thailand supported the Chinese resolution.

4. In reply to a French enquiry, China said that the Commission might well be one of individuals, as Dulles had proposed. These might be proposed by the Secretary-General, and approved by the Interim Committee. Syria, while supporting the idea of an enquiry, opposed establishment of any new commission, and suggested reference to the Interim Committee. Egypt considered a new commission impracticable. Peru favoured the idea. United Kingdom said that enquiry by Commission could do no good, and might make more difficult the solution of other Far Eastern issues of crucial importance.

5. After some discussion of the further suggestion by Syria that matter be referred by parties to the International Court, meeting was adjourned.

6. My telegram 1029, paragraph 2. No text has yet been presented, and none may be. Meanwhile, several delegations including Canada and the Netherlands are considering voting against the Chinese resolution. United Kingdom may do the same. I would propose to support United Kingdom attitude, to vote against proposed commission, and abstain from vote on the remainder of the resolution.

---

MIN. & DEPT. EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
P.M.'S DEPT.

23rd November, 1950.

453/9/1

60

26/9/50

PHIBUL SONGGRAM announced that Thailand would definitely not recognize the regime of the puppet Government in Peiping. He gave the following reasons: 1--MAO TSE-TUNG is a Communist. He wants to eliminate world peace. Thailand has a democratic government, a religion, and an emperor which Communist Mao will demolish. What good is it for Thailand to recognize Mao? 2--At present Mao does not completely rule all of China. 3--China is still engaged in a war which may last for years, and our recognition of an interim government is unnecessary. 4--There are many Overseas Chinese in Thailand and to recognize Red China means to encourage them to believe in Communism. Premier Songgram further said that even if the United States, which is now against Mao, recognizes him some day, Thailand still will not recognize Mao. He also added that merchants in Thailand would be prohibited from dealing with Communist China and all merchandise and food would also be restricted from going to Red China. The Premier said that he made this statement in order to clarify rumors concerning Thailand's recognition of Mao. (Taipei, Voice of Free China in Mandarin, Sept. 24, 1950--B)

453/9/1

7/7/50

THAI STAND--Premier PHIBUN SONGGRAM told a group of newsmen on June 30 that his country would stand with democracy if the Korean situation develops into a world war. He also said that Thailand was ready to do her best to render assistance to fight Communism in Korea. On the possibility of a clash with Red China, the Premier replied, "Thailand has not recognized Red China because the latter is not in complete control of the country." (Taipei in English, July 1, 1950--R)

453/9/1

# EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

1. [redacted] 6/7

2. [redacted] Ag. 10/7

3. SEA.

~~RHH~~
BW BW.
HS

4/I/50

DUPLICATE.

57

File 100/5/1.

xxxx Thailand.

Memo. No. 212/50.

28th June, 1950.

CONFIDENTIAL.

MEMORANDUM for:

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

THAI ATTITUDE ON KOREA.

Although, at this stage, it is not possible to give an accurate assessment of Thailand's attitude on the Korean situation, the first reaction is a typical and interesting one.

2. Thailand is not directly affected by the outbreak of hostilities, except to a small extent on the economic side, but, so far as can be gauged, the situation is looked upon as a test of the willingness and capacity of the Western Powers, and particularly of the United States, to give aid to small nations within their sphere of interest. It is felt that Korea, more than any other Asian country, has been "adopted" by the United States as specially under its protection, and, if it should fall to Communism, other Asian countries are not likely to obtain much effective aid against Communist pressures. These are the views which have been expressed to me by various Thai officials in the last few days, and seem to be the Government's views also. Today's press published a report that a source close to the Prime Minister had stated that "the Government is waiting to see how far the U.S. will go to support small nations against Red aggression". The attitude which is adopted by the Western Powers will be watched with very close interest by Thailand, and their prestige in this country, and probably other parts of South East Asia, will be greatly affected by the decision which is taken.

3. Meanwhile, there has been much speculation as to whether Thailand should endeavour to enter into military alliances with the United States, the United Kingdom and France. It seems fairly clear that such a course is favoured by the Prime Minister, Field Marshal Pibul Songgram, but there may be opposition from other sources.

CONSUL-GENERAL.

Orig. handed to E. Asia.

SIAM NOT ANTI-SOVIET, BUT ONLY ANTI-COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY

Bangkok official dispatches say that the Foreign Minister told a press conference yesterday, "Siam has a democratic government. It has considered recognition of the Peoples Republic of China and is maintaining friendly relations with the Soviet Union. The anti-Communist policy of Siam is not aimed at the Soviet Union, but is based on opposition to Communist ideology." (Taipeh Radio Voice Kuo-yu 2300-hrs 17 Mar.)

453/9/1

55

---

It is reported that the Thai Government is considering the possibilities of commercial and navigation treaties with India, the Philippines, Burma, China and Australia (No approach has been made to this Consulate-General in the matter.)

---

Items of Interest
Thailand

7-13/12/49

453/9/1

The Government's proposal to hold a foreign poli
has been postponed following objections raised at a Cabin[illegible]y debate
on 12th December. The debate was originally proposed as [illegible]t meeting
testing Parliament's attitude on the question of "partiali[illegible] means of
two camps of ideology". It is reported that Cabinet deeme[illegible]ty to the
debate unnecessary as Thailand had clearly stated on which[illegible]d such a
stood, and dangerous because of the possibility of "undiplo[illegible] side she
statements in the House which might embarrass the Governme[illegible]omatic"
the Nation's prestige. [illegible]nt and lower

Thailand
News of Interest
7 – 13/12/[illegible]9

453/9/1

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
Rec'd 19 DEC 1949
File No.

53

File No. 40/9/1.

AUSTRALIAN CONSULATE-GENERAL,
BANGKOK, Thailand.

Memo. No.C 469 /49.

12th December, 1949.

MEMORANDUM for:

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

On 6th December 1949, on the occasion of the birthday of His Majesty the King of Thailand, the Regent, His Royal Highness Prince Rangsit of Jainad, received the Diplomatic and Consular Corps in the Throne Hall at the Royal Palace. An address of congratulation was delivered by Sir Geoffrey Thompson, the British Ambassador and Dean of the Corps, and the Regent personally greeted each member of the Corps.

I enclose for your information copies of the address of congratulation, and of the reply given by the Regent.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Nai Phot Sarasin, also entertained the Diplomatic and Consular Corps at a formal dinner at the Saranromaya Palace on the 5th December, 1949.

CONSUL-GENERAL.

Copy on 453/1/1/1

27/12/49

453/9/1/1

ADDRESS OF CONGRATULATIONS FROM THE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULARCORPS ON THE OCCASION OF THE BIRTHDAY OF THE KING OF THAILAND - 6TH DECEMBER, 1949.

Your Royal Highness -

It is once again my honour and privilege to convey to His Majesty the King through Your Royal Highness' gracious intermediary, the congratulations and best wishes of the Diplomatic and Consular Corps in Bangkok on the happy occasion of the anniversary of His Majesty's Birthday.

On behalf of my Diplomatic and Consular Colleagues and myself permit me, Sir, at the same time to beg you to express to His Majesty the satisfaction with which we have learnt that His Majesty's health has improved and that we may soon have the honour of participating in His welcome on His return to His country.

May I also request Your Royal Highness on behalf of my Colleagues and Friends here present and myself, to assure His Majesty The King that we shall at all times continue to do our utmost to foster the friendliest relations with the people and appointed rulers of this kindly and hospitable Kingdom? It is our common hope that under His Majesty's auspicious reign the Thai nation will enjoy throughout the coming year and subsequently harmonious, prosperous and peaceful development.

English Translation of the Speech
delivered by His Royal Highness the Regent
on 6th December, 1949, in reply to the
Address of Congratulations delivered by
the Dean of the Diplomatic & Consular Corps,
on the occasion of the Birthday of His Majesty
The King of Thailand.

---

Monsieur le Doyen,

In the name of His Majesty the King, I ask Your Excellency and the members of the Diplomatic and Consular Corps to accept my sincere thanks for the congratulations and best wishes which Your Excellency has conveyed on the occasion of the anniversary of His Majesty's Birthday as well as for the hope that under His Majesty's auspicious reign the Thai nation will continue to enjoy throughout the coming year harmonious, prosperous and peaceful development.

The expression of gladness in regard to His Majesty's improved health and prospective return to Bangkok which Your Excellency has so felicitiously expressed on behalf of your colleagues and on your own will be most gratifying to His Majesty and it is my hope that His Majesty Himself may soon have an occasion to receive the members of the Diplomatic and Consular Corps accredited to His Court.

I am pleased to receive, in the name of His Majesty The King, the cordial assurances conveyed by Your Excellency of the desire of the foreign representatives in Bangkok to do their utmost to foster the friendliest relations with the people of this Kingdom. In this respect I would assure you that on their part this desire is most warmly reciprocated by the Government of His Majesty and the people of Thailand.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

# CABLEGRAM.

50

HP

I.13498

SAVING FROM:

Australian Consul-General,
MANILA.

Dated: 9th September, 1949.
Nil
Rec'd: 13th September, 1949.
9.59 a.m.

Saving No.52. UNCLASSIFIED.

South-East Asia Union.

Romulo has now reported to President Quirino that initial contacts with representatives at Lake Success of countries in South-East Asia area have been satisfactory and that invitations would be issued for a Conference at Baguio in January or February, 1950.

2. The Thai Premier, Phibun Songgram announced on 7th September that he was calling a South-East Asia Conference in Bangkok in November to which the Philipppines, India and Burma would be invited. He added that Nehru had already promised Indian participation. Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs stated that so far no official report had been received from Bangkok. Reuters reported from Rangoon that Burmese Government had not yet decided to attend.

---

Min. & Dept. of External Affairs.

13th September, 1949.

453/9/1

---

The Government is reported to be planning the appointment of an Ambassador to Burma and Ministers to India and the Philippines. Luang Phinit Aksorn, Consul-General designate to Australia, is mentioned in the report in connection with the Indian post. (The countries above-mentioned already have representatives in Thailand). A Minister has not been appointed to Moscow and it is understood that Thailand's diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. will continue to be handled by the Thai Legation in Switzerland.

---

Items of Interest

Bangkok

31-8-49 —— 6-9-49

453/9/1

SOUTH-EAST ASIAN UNION ADVOCATED BY PIBUL. Marshal Pibul Songgram, the Siamese Prime Minister, today indicated that he was planning to organise a union of South-East Asia. Reliable government sources later said that he would call a regional conference in Bangkok before the end of the year.

Brazzaville
29/8/49

453/9/1

SIAM AND PACIFIC PACT. In Bangkok, according to Manila Radio, Thailand's Prime Minister, Pibul Songgram, has told Philippines Minister, (Domingo Imperial), that Thailand has not yet decided to join any anti-Communist pact of Asian countries. Manila Radio reported that Mr. (Imperial) met the Thailand-Premier in a 45-minute conference, during which he presented this suggestion.

N/Y 11/8/49

453/9/1

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

# CABLEGRAM.

46

/MG

I. 12061
Dated 5th August, 1949

SAVINGRAM FROM:

Rec'd 16th August, 1949
10 a.m.

Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations,
LONDON.

H. No. 208 Saving . CONFIDENTIAL.

My telegram of 19th May, H. No. 136 Saving.

S I A M.

The Siamese Constituent Assembly, set up in July 1946 to draft a permanent constitution, presented their proposals to the legislature in January 1949. After prolonged debate proposals were eventually carried in both Houses and, on 25th March, were approved by the Council of Regency. (A summary of the constitution, with an outline of background events, is being sent to you seperately.)

2. The new constitution provided for a lower House of 121 members and consequently necessitated the holding of elections for 21 new seats to bring the old House up to the required numbers. When Parliament reassembled on 15th June, after the elections, Marshal Pibul accordingly presented his resignation to the Regent. After nearly a fortnight's uncertainty he was eventually asked to form a new Government. The composition of the Cabinet was announced on 29th June. It turned out to be a reshuffle of the previous Cabinet, the most significant change being Pibul's relinquishment of the Ministry of the Interior and his assumption of responsibility for Foreign Affairs.

3. The new Cabinet presented their statement of Policy to Parliament on 6th July and a prolonged debate ensued. It concluded during last week of July with vote of confidence from both Houses. Figures were:-

| | |
|---|---|
| Senate | 74 - 22 |
| Lower House | 63 - 31 (27 abstentions) |

4. During the Debate in Parliament many questions and criticisms were directed against Marshal Pibul's administration and the vote of confidence in the Lower House was not overwhelmingly in the Marshal's favour. The new Government may therefore be expected to follow a policy of moderation and caution both at home and abroad.

. . . . . .

MIN & DEPT EA
MIN & DEPT DEFENCE.

16th August, 1949

453/9/1

SUMMARY OF ITEMS OF GENERAL INTEREST
PERIOD 8TH TO 14TH JUNE 1949.

453/9/1

In a recent interview with the Press, a Government spokesman is reported to have stated that Thailand is ready to join a Pacific pact to halt the spread of Communism, but is not prepared to take the initiative in the matter, lest, by so doing the Kingdom, which is primarily interested in preventing the spread of Communism within its own borders should be obliged to shoulder larger responsibilities.

The spokesman is further quoted as saying that the Thai Government believes that Britain is hoping for India to take the initiative in calling a conference which would eventually lead to the setting up of an anti-Communist pact in Asia, but he intimated that to date no official intimation had been received to confirm this belief.

44

Recent Press reports indicate that Siam's applications for membership of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Rehabilitation will have favourable results. Ministry of Finance officials stated on 28th March that Siams subscription to these organisations will total 150,050,000 baht and will permit the Government to apply for loans, which it is expected will total 950 million baht over a period of five yeare and will be used in financing the proposed hydro electric plant and the Chainat Irrigation Dam project.

IGI. 2285/49.

453/9/1

SIAM.

The Siamese Government declines to rescind its order declaring a state of emergency in Siam. Certain newspapers are subject to censorship and the Prime Minister is no longer holding press conferences. The advance of the Communist forces occasions anxiety in Siam and in the north and north-eastern provinces army units have been ordered to check the infiltration of immigrants from Burma, China and Indo-China. The activity of armed gangs, suspected of being Communists, on the border separating Siam from Malaya, continues.

On 29th April, there was considerable police activity in Bangkok and the sound of much shooting was heard in the city. Police apparently fired shots in the air to stop car drivers in the course of a security check. A special appropriation of 5 million kaht has been set aside for payment to policemen engaged on extra duty and all police leave has been cancelled.

Siam and France have agreed to their diplomatic missions at Paris and Bangkok to the status of embassies.

SIAM ANXIOUS FOR TREATY. In Bangkok, a Siamese Cabinet spokesman said that his country was anxious to join all possible Pacific and Asian Defence blocs, similar to the set-up envisaged in the Atlantic Pact. Siam was considerably interested in the possibility of such an alliance emerging from the visit to Australia and New Zealand of Lord Listowel.

RA/3/49 New Delhi

453/9/1

AV-3/9/1



22nd March, 1949.

Manila M. 74/49.

MEMORANDUM for :

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA A.C.T.

Philippine - Siamese Relations.

A group of officers of the Siamese army is scheduled to arrive on March 24th or 26th to inspect Philippine army bases and installations.

Headed by Maj. Gen Luang Dejdej Pradiyudh, chief of staff, the party includes Maj. Gen. Vichien Suntantanont, chief of ordnance, Gen. Kharn Janong Punie Vejhien, chief of army welfare service, and Col. Turnorn Opertun Tarnom.

In addition, an officer of the Philippine Foreign Service is being attached to the U.S. Legation in Bangkok to deal with Consular matters. Exchange of diplomatic representatives, although agreed to in principle more than a year ago, has not yet taken place.

Consul-General.

Ang 405/14/1

40

5. Changes in Siamese Representation Abroad.

On 20 th May the Siamese Government confirmed that the following changes had been arranged in Siamese representation abroad:-

M.C. NAKKHAT MONGKOL KITIYAKARA from Minister to France to be Ambassador at the Court of St. James vice Nai DIRECK JAYANAMA who resigned his post during the term of office of the KHUANG Government of the ground that he considered that he did not enjoy the confidence of the Government. M.C. NAKKHAT MONGKOL KITIYAKARA had formerly been Minister in London prior to Nai DIRECK JAYANAMA's appointment.

Phya APHIBAL RAJAMAITRI to be Ambassador to China vice Nai SANGUAN TULARAKS who resigned his post earlier in the year in protest against the coup d'etat. Phya APHIBAL RAJAMAITRI is a respected and experienced diplomat who, before going into retirement just before the war, had been Minister to Washington.

Nai VISUTR ARTHAYUKTI to be Minister to France to fill an existing vacancy. Nai VISUTR ARTHAYUKTI was Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs at the time of receiving this appointment.

6. Changes in Foreign Representation in Siam.

Following on the resignation of Dr. LI TIEH TSENG earlier in the year, Dr. HSIEH PAO TSIOW was appointed as his successor and is due to present his credentials to the Regency Council today.

The Indian Charges d'Affaires, Mr. BHAGWAT DAYAL has been appointed Minister and presented his credentials to the Regency Council on 28th May.

I have the Honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(A.J. Eastman)
CONSUL-GENERAL.

The Right Honourable
H.V. Evatt, K.C., M.P.,
Minister of State for External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

for obituary of career of

U TIN TUT.

see "Asiatic Review" — Vol XLIV — No. 158
of April 1948, pps 212—219
article entitled "Spending of an Asian Town" by Barbara Whittingham-Jones.

— U Tin Tut was first Burmese barrister of I.C.S.
& was of the highest grade; a brilliant
athlete; educated Dulwich College & Queen's
College, Cambridge
his grandfather was Maha Minhla Raza,
provincial governor under King Bodaw of
the Seven Hills district of Arakan between
Arakan & the Irrawaddy River

U Tin Tut served on the legislature & was
twice a member of the Burmese State at how delhi
represented Govt of Burma at Geneva ILO conference
& drafted the labour legislation in Burma's 1951
constitution — a principal official adviser to the
cabinet visited London with U Saw — 1941 — In Dec 1946
he founded the Rangoon Times — at elections
for constituent assembly — April, 1947 U Tin Tut as an
AFPFL candidate polled 9164 votes against Burma's
the Communists 1539 — a majority known throughout
in central Burma. L.M.S.
29.6.48

F

H53/9/1 38

# SIAMESE MISSION

## Military Party Visiting Europe And America

## SWISS RECOGNITION

Bangkok, Jan. 7.

A Siamese military mission will shortly leave for Europe and the United States, under Colonel Luang Sura Narong to study military matters, the Siamese Defence Ministry announced to-day.

Dr Paul Lanzinger, Swiss Consul, said to-day that his government had extended de facto recognition to the present Siamese Government which seized power in November. This is the first de facto recognition since Marshal Pibul Songgram carried out the coup.—Reuter.

## RECOGNISED BY SWISS

Bangkok, Jan. 8.

The first *de facto* recognition of the new Siamese Government has been communicated from Switzerland through the Swiss Legation here.

Meanwhile, it was reported that Siam's immigration quotas this year remained unchanged, namely, 10,000 Chinese and 200 other nationals. —United Press.

## SIAMESE BUS AMBUSHED

Penang, Jan. 7.

Border bandits killed three persons and wounded five in a New Year's Day ambush of a civilian bus just inside Siam, delayed reports said.

A Siam constable was among the dead. The Malayan police had offered US$10,000 reward for the capture of the gang.—Associated Press.

"South China Morning Post"
9. 1. 48.

8/1/48 - 1.30 p.m. NEW DELHI. NEWS (continued)

SWITZERLAND RECOGNISES SIAMESE GOVERNMENT. The Swiss government has extended de facto recognition of the present Siamese government.

SIAMESE MISSION FOR EUROPE AND AMERICA. The Siamese Defence Minister has announced that a Siamese Military Mission will shortly leave for Europe and the U.S.A.

New Delhi 8/1/48.

P 4r/49/r
35

Siam is a member of

U. N

I. L. O

F A. O

I C A O

Universal Postal Union

Internat. Telecom. Union

10.11.47

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

**CABLEGRAM.** **SECRET.**

JW/HR.

I. 23066.

DECYPHER FROM:

Dated 25th November, 1947.
1101.

AUSTRALIAN CONSUL GENERAL
MANILA.

Received 25th November, 1947.
2.55 pm.

146. MOST IMMEDIATE

Burton from Copland.

We are without credentials and have no advice as to when we may expect them despite request by both cable and letter. The question is arising as to whether we can sit especially in view of doubt being cast on Siamese Delegation. Please cable urgently direct to E.C.A.F.E. Baguio informing them of the personnel of the Delegation and advise us when we may expect credentials.

External Affairs (attn)

25th November, 1947.

P45/49/5.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

33

# CABLEGRAM.

BO'C:EGM:

ENCODED TO:

AUSTRALIAN CONSUL)GENERAL,
BANGKOK.

O. 16477
Sent: 30th. September 1947
10. 40 A.M.

58.

Your B164. Statement now being prepared.

Regret unlikely completed before mid-October.

E.A. (I.C. 47/11/8)

30th/ September 1947

BB Bruce Chrisholm

Relations Siamese Foreign

Copies received

Secretary
AS (P)
E
ME
A
LC
PI
Pac
N
ER
Adm

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

32

# CABLEGRAM. SECRET.

PEC:MD

DECODE FROM:

AUSTRALIAN CONSUL GENERAL,
BANGKOK.

I.19050.
SC.65.
Dated: 23rd September, 1947.
1425.
Rec'd: 23rd September, 1947.
7.38 p.m.

B.184.

My letter C.130 20th May. Would appreciate early advice of consular privileges and examptions in Australia.

---

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS (ATTENTION)

IC 47/11/5

24th September, 1947.

L.R. Mct.

BB.

Have I sent the letter C.130?

BB/ Left on P46/49/5

K.K. This letter

K.K. 25/9/47

+ link up that file with earlier foreign affairs index P46/49/18, P46/49/Belg. pln.

K.K. 26.9.47

No. C.130/47.

AUSTRALIAN CONSULATE-GENERAL,
BANGKOK, SIAM.

20th. May, 1947.

Dear Department,

Privileges and exemptions
Diplomatic Representatives and Consular Officers.

Could this post please be supplied with details of privileges and exemptions granted under Commonwealth or State law to members of diplomatic missions and to Consular representatives, de carriere and otherwise, stationed in Australia ?

2. I enclose for your information copies of corresponding instructions issued by the Siamese Government as follows:-

(a) Instructions to Customs Department.
(b) Rules relating to registration of motor vehicles.
(c) Rules relating to registration of firearms.
(d) Exemptions under the Excise Act.

3. The instructions, so far as they relate to customs and excise, may not be altogether clear. Their effect is briefly as follows:-

Customs Tariff Act.

There is no mention in the Act or regulations of diplomatic privileges, which depend solely on ministerial directions.

In the case of Ambassadors, Ministers, Chargés d'Affaires etc., baggage and effects accompanying them, postal packages addressed to them and goods imported by them direct are all exempt from customs duty, examination and (except in the case of importation) entry. No privilege is granted in respect of imported goods purchased through a local firm.

Subordinate officers of an Embassy etc., have no privilege except in respect of baggage and effects which accompany them.

Consular officers have none of the foregoing privileges.

Excise Act.

In the case of Ambassadors, Ministers, Chargés d'Affaires etc., spirits which accompany them or are imported by them direct are exempt from excise duty. No privilege is granted in respect of imported spirits purchased through a local firm.

Subordinate officers of an Embassy etc., have no privilege except in respect of spirits which accompany them.

Consular officers have no privileges under the Act.

Yours sincerely,
CONSULATE-GENERAL.

Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

(C O P Y)

TRANSLATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO CUSTOMS DEPARTMENT
REGARDING DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES.

(a) MINISTERS AND CHARGES D'AFFAIRES.

The accompanied baggage and effects of a Minister accredited to His Majesty's Government and members of his family and suite, are exempted from examination or Entry.

All postal packages addressed to a Minister are exempted from examination or Entry.

Direct importations addressed to a Minister will normally be delivered unexamined, on receipt of a Letter-of-Advice from the Minister concerned, through the Foreign Office. Such Letter-of-Advice will indicate the total number of packages and which of them, if any, contain spirituous Liquers.

Goods consigned or invoiced to a Minister, and for which no Letter-of-Advice has been received, shall be deposited in an Approved Godown pending receipt of the required Authority. On receipt of the Letter-of-Advice delivery will be allowed.

Chargé d'Affaires, and heads and members of special diplomatic missions or delegations when duly accredited to His Majesty's Government and authorized to represent their country in Siam, will receive treatment similar to that accorded to an accredited Minister.

(b) COUNSELLORS, SECRETARIES AND ATTACHES.

The accompanied baggage and effects of a Counsellor, Secretary and Attaché to a Legation and members of their respective families are exempted from examination or Entry.

(c) CONSULAR OFFICERS.

None of the foregoing privileges is extended to any Consular Officer.

(d) LEGATIONS AND CONSULATES.

Furniture for the apartments of Foreign Legations and office furniture, stationery and similar articles for official use in foreign Legations and Consulates will be exempted from Duty, but not from Entry.

When a Letter-of-Advice is received through the Foreign Office from the Legation or Consulate concerned the Director-General (if satisfied that the goods were purchased abroad by, or on behalf of, the Legation or Consulate) will authorise delivery on a free Entry. If examination is deemed advisable it will be conducted under the supervision of a senior Inspector.

If a Letter-of-Advice is not received, or if the Director-General is not satisfied, either that the goods are for bona fide official use, or that they were purchased abroad for the Legation or Consulate, they will be warehoused in an Approved Godown pending inquiry. Any unsettled dispute will be referred to the Ministry of Finance.

Bangkok, 15th August B.E. 2478.

# RULES REGARDING THE REGISTRATION OF MOTOR VEHICLES OWNED BY MEMBERS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS AND CONSULAR REPRESENTATIVES.

---

1st. All motor vehicles owned by the Legation - that is, by the foreign government for the use of the Legation, and all motor vehicles owned by the Heads of Missions, and all motor vehicles owned by Counsellors, Secretaries, Military, Naval and Commercial Attachés shall be registered free of charge and through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

All such motor vehicles shall have special number plate marked with the Siamese letter " " (An agreement has been made between the Ministry of Interior and the Foreign Office to the effect that diplomatic number plates for Legations' motor cars should have distinguished character:-

viz:- ground - white; number - black.

Notice shall be given to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when such motor vehicles are disposed of or sold.

The certificate and the number plate should be returned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs whenever the holder ceased to have the right to the exemption.

2nd. All motor vehicles owned by the other persons connected with the Legation shall be registered in the usual manner, by application to the Director-General of the Police Department and upon payment of the customary fees.

3rd. All motor vehicles owned by consuls or members of the consular corps shall be registered and licensed in the usual manner, by application to the Director-General of the Police Department and upon payment of the customary fees.

These rules and regulations shall come into force from and after April 1st, 1928.

Application to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the registration of motor vehicles coming within the class exempt from the fees, should contain the following information:- the name, nationality and residence of the owner; make of motor vehicle; colour of body and mud-guards; number of cylinders; horse-power; number of engine and where made.

---

# RULES REGARDING THE REGISTRATION OF FIREARMS OWNED BY THE MEMBERS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS AND CONSULAR REPRESENTATIVES.

1st. The Heads of Mission accreditted to His Majesty's Court, and all members of the Legation entitled to the diplomatic rank are requested to apply for registration and permit of all firearms owned by them to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The registration and permits shall be made without charge.

2nd. All other members or employees of the Legation should register their firearms and secure permits in the usual manner by application to the Director-General of the Police Department, Bangkok, and upon payment of the usual fees.

3rd. All members of the Consular Representatives should register their firearms and secure permits in the usual manner by application to the proper authority (in Bangkok to the Director-General of the Police Department, in the provinces to the District Officers) and upon payment of the usual fees.

Application to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for registration and permits for firearms owned by the Heads of Missions and Members of the Diplomatic Corps entitled to free permits, should contain the following information:- name and nationality of the owner; the make, type and calibre of the firearms.

It is requested that owners of guns exempted from the payment of fees should not dispose of their firearms except upon notice to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and permits should be surrendered to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when the owners thereof cease to be entitled to the exemption.

COPY

27

(Translation)

INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES IN RESPECT OF EXEMPTION FROM THE APPLICATION OF SECTIONS 4 and 5 OF THE EXCISE ACT (No.4) B.E. 2486.

---

1. Ambassadors, Ministers and Chargés d'Affaires.

a. The accompanied spirits belonging to an Ambassador or a Minister accredited to His Majesty's Government and members of his family and suite are exempted from the application of Sections 4 and 5 of the Excise Act (No.4) B.E. 2486.

b. Direct importation of spirits addressed, consigned or invoiced to an Ambassador or a Minister will be delivered on receipt by the Customs Department, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, of a Letter-of-Advice from the Ambassador or Minister concerned. Such Letter-of-Advice must indicate the total quantity of each kind of spirit.

Chargés d'Affaires, and Heads of Special Missions or of Delegations when duly appointed to His Majesty's Government and authorised to represent their countries in Thailand, will receive treatment similar to that accorded to an accredited Minister.

2. Counsellors, Secretaries and Attachés.

The accompanied spirits belonging to a Counsellor, Secretary or Attaché, or to members of their respective families are exempted from the application of Sections 4 and 5 of the Excise Act (No.4) B.E. 2486.

3. Consular Officers.

None of the foregoing privileges is extended to any Consular Officer.

Spirits that are exempted from the application of Sections 4 and 5 of the Excise Act (No.4) B.E. 2486 may be taken to and consumed only in the Embassy, Legation or the residences of those who enjoy privileges in accordance with these instructions. If the spirits are to be taken to places other than those already mentioned, the possessors shall first affix excise stamps on their containers in accordance with the law.

The Customs Department shall notify the Excise Department of the kind and quantity of spirits which have been exempted from obtaining the permission to import and from affixing excise stamps.

These instructions shall come into operation as from the 25th May, B.E. 2486.

MINISTRY OF FINANCE,

25th May B.E. 2486.

(Signed) Major-General P. Boriphan-Yuthakit,

Minister of Finance.

THE FRENCH CONSUL IN BANGKOK left Saigon this morning for France to make a report to his government.

---

Singapore 30/5/42.

For refn. in Siam

[illegible] 4/5/42

of this

LEGATION IN SIAM. The Indian Consulate in Siam has been raised to a Legation. The former Consul, (Mr. Noan), has taken over as Charge d'Affaires. N.D. 3/9/47

For. Relt.

P-5/49/5

5
P46/49/5.

13th March, 1947.

**MEMORANDUM: for**

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE.
DEPARTMENT OF NAVY.

**The following two items of news have been received from the Australian Consul General, Bangkok and are forwarded for your information.**

**"..On the 24th February, 1946 the Siamese Cabinet appointed Rear Admiral Luang Joladharn Pruetikrai as Siam's representative at the International Hydrography Conference to be held in Monaco.."**

**"..On the 1st March it was announced that the British Navy had agreed to sell to Siam two sloops and a mine-sweeper at a cost of £450,000. One of the vessels id expected to arrive on about 15th March.."**

**Secretary.**

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. 23

CABLEGRAM. **SECRET.**

337.

/HM
DECYPHER FROM -
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS
LONDON :

I. 29453
XB 159
Dated 13th December 1946
1045
Rec'd 15th December 1946.
1.50 p.m.

D. No. 1160.

Secret. Siam.

The Siamese Minister for Foreign Affairs recently told the United Kingdom Minister Bangkok in confidence that the Soviet Government had agreed to the immediate establishment of Diplomatic relations with Siam, but had proposed that this fact should be announced in a communique which, Inter Alia, would indicate Russian satisfaction regarding the action of the Siamese Government in "abandoning unfriendly policy which for so long had found expression in Siamese Legislation".

The Minister for Foreign Affairs explained that this proposed reference to repeal of anti-communist law (passed in 1932 suppressing Communist activities propaganda etc. and repealed in September of this year) was not absoutely certain and he hoped that the Siamese Minister in Stockholm might be able to persuade the Russians to drop it. The Siamese Government had, however, to step rather carefully in this matter as they desired to avoid at all costs continued Soviet opposition to Siam's application for membership of the United Nations.

---

Minister & Department E.A.

" " Defence

16th December 1946.

| | | Action |
|---|---|---|
| P | | |
| EA | | |
| EA | KK | |
| WP | | |

Copies received
Secretary ✓
AS (P) ✓
E
ME
A
LU
PI ✓
Pac ✓
UN
EB
Adm
A/cs

Extract from APRO Memorandum No 20. 22



PART II

FOREIGN RELATIONS.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, in a statement which he made to the Assembly on 29th August, said nothing new or unexpected about Siam's relations with foreign countries. After declaring that the Foreign policy of the Siamese "is dictated by a desire for peace and cordial relations with democratic war-hating powers of the world" he emphasised that the Government had "neither instigated, condoned nor had prior knowledge of" the recent attacks on Angkhor.

2. A few days earlier, after a debate on a vote of confidence, the Minister for Foreign Affairs told the British Minister that great interest had been displayed in Siam's relations with the outside world and in particular in her application to join UNO. The M.F.A. said that he had left the debate with the impression that the stability of the new administration would depend very largely upon the fate of that application.

Pridi's Tour.

3. At his regular weekly Press conference on 16th October the Prime Minister told pressmen that Siam had agreed to cede the disputed territories to France following advice from friendly powers; to maintain peace in South East Asia and to uphold the United Nations principle of peaceful negotiations. The Prime Minister also revealed that Pridi Phanomyong was to leave Siam by the end of October to visit foreign countries on a goodwill tour. Apart from cementing friendly relationship between Siam and foreign countries Pridi will also perform other business entrusted to him by Government Ministries relating to foreign affairs, finance and agriculture. Pridi will also have audience with the King at Lausanne.

Siam and the Allies.

4. The official communique issued early in July relating to the state of internal emergency made the following reference to relations between Siam and the Allied:

> "Although the state of war between Siam and certain countries has been terminated by final agreement the state of emergency in the country still exists. It is apparent that the country has not yet returned to its pre-war state. The country has obligations to fulfil towards certain countries as a consequence of the war. These obligations have not yet been completely fulfilled. The Government is, however, endeavouring to remedy the situation, for instance, the supply of rice to the United Nations."

5. The remarks in the communique relating to Franco-Siamese relations were as follows:

> "In regard to the country's relationship with France, the latter country still considers itself in a state of war with our country, although we do not consider ourselves in a state of war with France. The border dispute between France and our country still continues and the Government has been adopting peaceful means to this issue while at the same time maintaining peace and order."

China.

6. The new Chinese Ambassador to Siam, LI TIEH TSENG, arrived at Bangkok on 6th September, thus inaugurating the first established diplomatic relations between China and Siam. He was given a great reception at the airport by hundreds of Chinese residents. A delegation from local British Indians also attended. For some days, houses and shops in the Chinese quarter had been decorated with flags of both countries. Mr. LI has set up his quarters in the former Japanese Embassy, which the Chinese community have lavishly equipped, including a flagstaff of the same remarkable height as that in the grounds of the British Legation.

7. The Siamese witnessed all these manifestations and the welcome accorded the new Dean of the Diplomatic Corps with very mixed feelings. For the first time the odd four million Chinese in Siam (some 250,000 of whom live in Bangkok

P45/49/5

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.

AUSTRALIAN COMMISSIONER,
SINGAPORE.

itself) are officially represented and this fact is bound to introduce a new and considerable factor into local politics. Thoughtful Siamese, cherishing their ancient sovereignty and independence, and conscious of the Chinese stranglehold on the economic life of the country, view with apprehension the growth of Chinese political influence throughout S.E.Asia. And they derive little comfort from the knowledge that the new Ambassador will in all probability be followed by a Russian mission by the end of the year.

8. In addition, China is to establish shortly Consulates-General at Bangkok, Chianmai and Songhla, and Consulates at Nakorn, Sritamarat and Paknampho.

Repeal of Communist Act.

9. Early in September a Bill to repeal the Communist Act was introduced to the House of Representatives and was passed after some debate. The Bill will then go to the Senate (or House of Elders), where it is not expected to meet with any opposition. It is thought that the abrogation of this Bill is a move aimed at strengthening relations with Russia. The recent Russian opposition to Siamese membership of UNO undoubtedly influenced the idea, as it severely shook both public and official circles in Bangkok. In addition, a new policy which allows any Chinese Communists to come into the open and confess their faith may afford greater control, and towards this end it is thought the new Chinese Ambassador may play no small part.

10. Siamese policy towards China has also been one of appeasement and with the arrival of the new Ambassador the 1937 Anti-Chinese Act has been considerably relaxed, allowing for the opening of Chinese schools and the acceptance of Chinese immigration on an increased scale.

11. At the end of August the Siamese Government informed the United States and United Kingdom Ministers of their concurrence in the proposed participation of China and India in the Rice Commission. The text of the note stated:

> "I have the honour to refer to the tripartite agreement concluded on May 6th, 1946, between the Government of the United Kingdom, the Government of Siam and the Government of the United States, which, inter alia, established a Combined Rice Commission to co-operate and assist the Government of Siam in promoting the production and export of rice to countries in short supply of this essential food commodity. By agreement between the aforementioned Governments I am authorised on their behalf to extend to Your Excellency's Government an invitation to appoint a member on the Commission to represent the Governments of China and India. An invitation identical terms is being addressed to the Governments of China and India."

Soviet Union.

12. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, on 14th May told the British Minister that the Siamese Government had informed the Soviet Government of their willingness to enter into diplomatic relations, explaining however that the difficulty of finding a suitable envoy for Moscow might entail some slight delay before an appointment can actually be announced.

13. It seemed that the most recent Russian reminder contained a request for an assurance that the Siamese no longer entertained any of the Russophobe sentiments she might have acquired while under Japanese occupation. The Minister for Foreign Affairs told the British Minister on this point he had replied that as a democratic state Siam's feelings towards the Soviet could only be friendly.

14. At a press conference on 6th September the Minister for Foreign Affairs announced that the Siamese Government had submitted to the Soviet Government through the Siamese Legation at Stockholm the name of the Minister they propose appointing to Moscow. Bangkok newspapers declared the nominee to be PRINCE CHALERM SAWATDIWAT. Little is known about this Prince except that he has lived abroad for many years and was in Russia during the Tzarist days, when he received military training.

15. Russian opposition to Siamese membership in UNO came as rather a shock to public opinion in Bangkok and the Government have been at pains ever since to show that if there has been delay in the establishment of diplomatic relations it is primarily one to slow-motion in Moscow.

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.

AUSTRALIAN COMMISSIONER,
SINGAPORE.

Australian Representation.

16. At a press conference on 6th September the Minister for Foreign Affairs was reported to have stated that negotiations would start soon for the establishment of diplomatic relations between Siam and Australia. In September Mr. A.J.Eastman took up residence in Bangkok as Australian Acting Consul-General.

American Representation.

17. Mr. Edwin F. Stanton celebrated Independence Day by presenting his credentials to the Council of Regency as the first post-war United States Minister to Siam. In the course of an interview with the British Minister Mr. Stanton said that the State Department were very pleased with reports they had received on the cordial relations existing between the British and American Legations at Bangkok.

Siamese Representation in London.

18. Prince Nakkhatra (Monchao Nakhatmonykon) was appointed Siamese Minister to the United Kingdom in July. He reopened the Siamese Legation in Kensington with a staff of whom the majority were in London before the war began. Some, including the First Secretary, had just been demobilised from the British Army. The Prince, a cousin of the young King of Siam, began his education in 1910 in an English school and then went on to St. Cyr and other French military academies. He served in a French regiment towards the end of the first world war.

19. Prince Nakkhatra stated on taking up his post described Siam today as a country increasingly striving towards democracy in the Western sense. One of the social reforms which the Siamese Government was encouraging was to educate farmers in Siam to adopt modern methods of cultivating the land.

Service Missions to Britain.

20. In the middle of September the British Minister received a letter from the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs informing him of the desire of the Ministry of Defence to send a Military Mission to the United Kingdom and asking him to secure "the permission and assistance in this matter". The purpose of the Mission was stated to be: (a) study of the present British system of military training; (b) inspecting modern equipment, and (c) observing modern tactics in the field. The Mission would probably consist of five officers headed by a Major-General. The British Minister urged sympathetic reception to the idea. A Military Mission, following upon the Naval Mission already en route and an Air Mission about to leave would mean that in a few months the United Kingdom would have renewed friendly relations with the whole defence set-up in Siam and encourage a useful number of leading Siamese officers to begin in informative visits to Britain. This should strengthen British influence in the country.

21. The British War Office shortly afterwards confirmed that they would welcome a visit of a Siamese Military Mission "to study training, arms and equipment of the British Army. It was desired that the Mission should reach the United Kingdom by about November 15th and to stay one month.

22. During a talk with the British Counsellor in Washington on 8th October Prince Svasti said that he was somewhat perturbed at arrangements which were apparently being made for sharing advice and assistance of the Siamese Army and Navy. He understood that the Army would be under the American wing and that the Navy would be the British province. This was, in his opinion, a thoroughly bad arrangement and one likely to perpetuate the factional disputes and intrigues which were such a regrettable feature of Siamese official life. Could the United Kingdom, he asked, press for both Services to be with the British sphere of advice and for the Americans to be content with advisory functions in the Departments of Agriculture, Education and possibly others? The Prince added that he admitted a personal bias in favour of the United Kingdom for such duties but he could also say that he and many other Siamese would consider it almost a disservice to Siam if two great powers were to cast their influences in this particular way. The Services were inter-dependent and to base the Army on one standard and the Navy on another was to diminish the defensive strength of the whole. He thought that, in framing an over-all policy for South East Asia, the United Kingdom should prefer to consider Siam's defence force as an integrated service.

23. A Siam Naval Mission arrived in England in September to discuss training facilities, while a similar Purchasing Commission visited Singapore to inspect British naval vessels for sale before taking passage for Ceylon to view other units.

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.

AUSTRALIAN COMMISSIONER,
SINGAPORE.

A royal Siamese Air Force Mission left for England the same month and was to go on to the United States afterwards. The United States is to discuss training facilities with a Siamese Naval Mission which has arrived in the country. In Manila a Purchasing Mission is examining U.S. Naval vessels.

India.

24. In July the United Kingdom Government approved a proposal to appoint an Indian Consul to H.M. Legation, Bangkok

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.

AUSTRALIAN COMMISSIONER,
SINGAPORE.

D. SIAM.

FEIR

1. Rice.

On November 13th Mr. Somerset Butler, head of the Combined Rice Commission in Siam is reported to have told the Press in Singapore that it would take at least three years for the rice supply in South East Asia to return to normal. Siam's exportable rice supplies have been exhausted until the new crop is harvested and the commitments to deliver one million two hundred thousand tons of rice up to April 1947 were not likely to be carried out in full. If the supply position improved, the Siam rice Commission might be dissolved next August. Otherwise it would be necessary to conclude a fresh agreement between Britain, the United States and Siam. Questioned about rice smuggling, he replied "A ton of rice in Siam costs £15. In Malaya the same rice costs £200. Isn't that incentive enough for any smuggler ?

Reuter reports that the French Government has promised to approach the British Government to obtain "a considerable reduction" in the amount of rice to be supplied by Siam under the agreement with Britain

/concluded

P4/4915

3. Siamese Relations with Canada -

Prince SAKOL VARAVARN, Siamese Government delegate to the International Labour Office, is in Montreal to study the Royal Canadian Mounted Police as a model for his country's rural police force. Explaining why a member of the Siamese Royal Family attends the I.L.O., the Prince said that this was not strange as each member of the Royal House was a specialist. He himself studied economics.

H.S.H. Prince SAKOL VARAVARN, eldest son of H.R.H. the late Prince NARADHIP, was appointed in January 1945 Chairman of the Special Committee of the National Assembly formed to increase the State Revenue; is a member of the Controlling Board of the Bank of Siam and Chairman of the Committee to control the Siamese Broadcasting Corporation.

The "rural police forces" referred to are the Siamese Provincial Gendarmerie trained and originally officered by Danish Army Officers.

(F.E.I.A.I.R. No. 72 - Oct. 1st,1946)

FE I+I R No 75 22 Jul 46.

4. Russo-Siamese Relations

Reuter on October 20th, quotes well-informed circles in Bangkok as saying that the Siamese Parliament's repeal of the anti-Communist Act is intended to be a step towards establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

5. U.N.O.

SUCHIT H IRAMPRUK, the Siamese delegate to the United Nations left Bangkok for Washington on October 19th to attend the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York next Wednesday.

PL 5749/5.

P45/49/5

SIAMESE MESSAGE OF GOODWILL. The President of the Siamese Anti-Fascist League has sent a message of good-will to the people of Indonesia, expressing the desire to establish close contact among all peoples of South-East Asia. The letter was addressed jointly to President Soekarno and Premier Sjahrir.

EXTRACT FROM DESPATCH NO. 1 DATED 1ST OCTOBER 1946 FROM THE ACTING CONSUL-GENERAL, BANGKOK

6. Russia. Negotiations for the exchange of diplomatic representatives with RUSSIA are continuing through the agency of PRIDI's brother, who is Siamese Consul-General in STOCKHOLM. The British Legation considers this as evidence not so much of the growth of communistic sympathies as of the desire to:-

(a) remove Russian objection to Siamese membership of United Nations, and

(b) accentuate domestic strife between Kuomintang and Communistic factions amongst the local Chinese, in the hope of strengthening the position of the Siamese in their own country.

---

File for Relations with Soviet Russia?

Rolt.

EXTRACT FROM DESPATCH NO. 1 DATED 1ST OCTOBER 1946 FROM THE ACTING CONSUL-GENERAL, BANGKOK

6. Russia. Negotiations for the exchange of diplomatic representatives with RUSSIA are continuing through the agency of PRIDI's brother, who is Siamese Consul-General in STOCKHOLM. The British Legation considers this as evidence not so much of the growth of communistic sympathies as of the desire to:-

(a) remove Russian objection to Siamese membership of United Nations, and

(b) accentuate domestic strife between Kuomintang and Communistic factions amongst the local Chinese, in the hope of strengthening the position of the Siamese in their own country.

---

NAS 277
June 1990

# Australian Archives
## DOCUMENT REMOVAL ADVICE

Folio/s numbered 12
has/have been removed from this item.

**Series/Accession No.:** A1838/280 **Item No.:** 3010/7/1 Part 1

Document description: Thailand. Foreign policy and relations – General

Reason for removal: Withheld pending agency advice

A copy/expunged copy has been inserted in place of folio/s

Number of folios removed: 1

Removed documents now controlled as:

Removed by: M. J. Della Bodella Position No. 30067 Date 11 November 1994

1. Item copy

(b) Russia. The Siamese Foreign Minister has stated that Siam was willing to enter into diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia (Kuala Lumpur, 18/7/46) (1).

---

(1) Siam maintained very friendly relations with Czarist Russia but these ended with the Russian revolution. After that, Communism was feared in Siam and persons spreading Communist doctrines were punished by long terms of imprisonment. In 1941 negotiations with Moscow were reopened.

10

n Government reception in Paris.
State, wags a finger at M. Molotov, WILL
n, from left, are Mrs. Dogomolov,
ssador, Mr. Jefferson Caffery, and M ATTEND
emier of Indian Punjab, extreme right.
WEDDING

## ORLD STAGE AND AUSTRALIA



**PRINCE NAKKHATRA,** new Siamese Minister to Britain. A cousin of the King of Siam, he went to Britain to reopen the Legation of Siam, which was closed during the war when Siam was under occupation by the Japs.

AY, AUGUST 15, 1946

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

# CABLEGRAM. SECRET.

PEC/JT

DECYPHER FROM -
F.K. OFFICER, ESQ.,
AUSTRALIAN MINISTER,
BANGKOK.

I.6680
LHQ NR761
DATED 15th March, 1946.
1710
RECEIVED 16th March, 1946.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

O.33. Your telegram 104 was undecypherable after paragraph 6. On the basis of instructions regarding Articles 1 and 8 I continued discussions this afternoon.

2. After some discussion Wan agreed to accept Clause 1 as drafted provided the words "pursuant to the above mentioned declaration of war" were inserted after "measures". He argued that these words were implied from the first part of paragraph 1 of the exchange of notes. In confidence he explained that unless they were inserted the Chinese would have an argument for the inclusion of certain measures taken before the declaration of war. As I assume we have no intention of referring to anything before that event I hope the insertion of these words can be agreed to.

3. Prince Wan agreed to accept Article 8 provided in the first part only the words "in Siam or as the result of Siamese Ø individual Siamese" are substituted for the words "by the Government of Siam or their agents or by persons subject to their jurisdiction" on grounds that this would agree with the wording of Clause 2 (b)4 of the agreement. It seems reasonable that if we insist on the wording of the agreement in case* we should accept it in another and I hope this can be agreed to.

5. We continue on Monday afternoon so I hope to have your instructions on this and regarding Articles 4, 5, 10, 11 and 14 before then.

Officer.

---

Min.& Dept. External Affairs

Ø mutilated
* as received

(First paragraph fixed by Cables)

18/3/46

FILE
P45 49/5

KK

RECD 18 MAR 1946

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
RECORDS
P45/49/5-8
Indexed By

Dept. of Information Review.

Bangkok in Thai

13.5.45

THAILAND: GERMAN LEGATION CLOSED.

Bangkok, May 13th. The Thai Foreign Minister on May 11th informed the German Minister that, owing to the collapse of Germany, relations between Germany and Thailand ceased to exist from that day. The German Legation and German nationals will henceforth come under control of the police authorities.

-- in Thai, 10.35 p.m.

4915

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
RECORDS
P45/49/5-7
Index

Dept. of Information Weekly Review

5-6.45.

Tokyo Radio

THAILAND.

1. External Relations.

Bangkok radio continues to observe silence on home events of any interest. Japanese radio also very rarely refers to Thailand now. There were, however, two references, this week, both of the usual pattern, stressing Thailand's co-operation. "Thailand is playing an important role as a supply base," declared the Japanese ambassador to Thailand in an interview in Saigon. (Singapore, 29/3/45,8 p.m. English). More //specifically the ambassador said that "In addition to tens of thousands of her national defence army, there are tens of thousands of police under General Adun getting ready, completely armed, charged with mutual defence with our garrison army. ..... The country is busily engaged in the production of wooden ships, weapons, ammunition, rice, leather and other products and as a line of communications Thailand is playing a vital role." The ambassador also suggested that Thailand should exchange rice for medical supplies etc. from Indo-China exporting the rice to Luang Prabang. (30/3/45 Domei in Japanese Morse). (1)

49
rels + Japan

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
RECORDS
R45/49/5-6
In[illegible]

Dept. of Information Review

up to 12.4.45.

External Relations.

Chungking broadcast at great length an article published in the Central Daily news reviewing Thailand's military, economic and geographical situation and exhorting her to follow the example of Rumania and other countries and throw off the Japanese yoke. Thailand's possible maximum mobilisation was put at 1 million soldiers, and her airforce at 400 planes. Marshal Chiang Kai-shek's broadcast to Thailand on 26th February 1943 advocating her continued independence was referred to (Chungking 5/4/45, 12.30 a.m.)

49/5

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
RECORDS
P45/49/5-5

D. of I. Weekly Review

up to April 5, 1945.

THAILAND.

1. External Relations.

Bangkok radio continues to observe silence on home events of any interest. Japanese radio also very rarely refers to Thailand now. There were, however, two references, this week, both of the usual pattern, stressing Thailand's co-operation. "Thailand is playing an important role as a supply base," declared the Japanese ambassador to Thailand in an interview in Saigon. (Singapore, 29/3/45,8 p.m. English). More //specifically the ambassador said that "In addition to tens of thousands of her national defence army, there are tens of thousands of police under General Adun getting ready, completely armed, charged with mutual defence with our garrison army. ..... The country is busily engaged in the production of wooden ships, weapons, ammunition, rice, leather and other products and as a line of communications Thailand is playing a vital role." The ambassador also suggested that Thailand should exchange rice for medical supplies etc. from Indo-China exporting the rice to Luang Prabang. (30/3/45 Domei in Japanese Morse). (1)

49/5

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
RECORDS
A45/49/5-4
Released by

Dept. of Inf. Review.

31. 3.45.

B. DOMEI TRANSMISSIONS IN JAPANESE MORSE.

30/e/1945 - 3.30 p.m.

Reception: Fair.

STEADY JAPAN-THAI RELATIONSHIP. Saigon, March 28th. Minister Mizuno to Thailand, at present in Saigon, made this statement on the 27th instant concerning the state of affairs in Thailand: "The Thai people, to whom independence is a first desire, see clearly to a man the fact that they must share destiny with Japan for that purpose. Thus, Thailand, with all her people, believes firmly in Japan's eventual victory In Thailand at present, in addition to her national defence army at a strength of 'maru maru' ten-thousand men, there are 'maru Maru' ten-thousand police in the command of General (Note: or Admiral) Adoun. Both forces are getting ready in complete armament and are being charged with mutual defence with our garrison army. Moreover, the country is also busily engaged in the production of wooden ships and weapons and ammunition besides producing rice, leather and other products, and, as a line of communications, Thailand is playing a vital role. Making one step further, Thailand should be able now to assume commodity exchange with Indo-China, for instance in exporting rice to northern Indo-China by way of Luang Prabang and importing coat, medical supplies etc. from Indo-China. Hence, Thailand, Indo-China, Burma and Malai have become completely fused as one body.

49/5

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
RECORDS
R45/49/5-3
Indexed



Dept. of Information Review

Tokio 11. 3. 45.

THAILAND: JAPAN EXPLAINS FIC INCIDENT.

Tokio, March 11th: "According to Domei at Bangkok, our Ambassador Yamamoto called on Thai Premier Aphaiwongse and Foreign Minister Sri Sena on the night before last to explain Japan's independent action for the defence of Indo-China and to ask for Thailand's co-operation. In other words, the Ambassador stressed that there would be no change whatsoever in the intimate relationship of co-operation hitherto existing between Japan and Thailand disregarding the new situation arising from the FIC incident, and that it was the policy of the Imperial Japanese Government rather to further strengthen its co-operation. When the Ambassador asked simultaneously that Thailand co-operate in connection with the present step taken by the Japanese army in Indo-China, Premier Aphaiwongse expressed complete understanding of Japan's stand point and gave a clear-cut reply, accepting the request."

-- Home & Empire, 7.30 a.m.

49/5

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
RECORDS
R45/49/5 - 2
Index

Dept. of Information Revenir

10.3.45.

THAI ATTITUDE.

Tokio, March 10th. The C in C Expeditionary Force in Thai last night conferred with Thai's national defence minister ..... and Commander in Chief Thai national defence army ..... (NOTE: Both named) and requested the co-operation of Thai army in view of new situation devoloping in FIC and made the following requests, inter alia, 1. To close the frontiers of Thai and FIC temporarily, 2. To disarm any FIC troops entering Thai from FIC, and 3. The Japanese army will not interfere in (the guarantine) between Thai and France. Thai officials agreed to co-operate with Japan to the fullest extent.

-- Home and Empire, 8 p.m.

49

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
RECORDS
R45/49/5-1
Indexed

Extract I.P.R. Conference
Jan. 1945
Round Table on Dependent
Areas.

THAILAND: The Thai statement of aspirations for complete recovery of sovereignty included an assurance that the Thais will play an active part in the liberation of their own country, if granted the opportunity.

(b) An American called attention to the fact that both Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek and President Roosevelt have made statements assuring the future independence and territorial integrity of Thailand and went on to state that the lack of a parallel declaration on the part of Great Britain caused uneasiness in the minds of Americans who are conversant with the problems of South-east Asia. There was a British rejoinder to the effect that British policy as a whole was perfectly clear; that Britain desired no territorial aggrandizement or political encroachment on other people; and that in the particular case of Thailand it should be remembered that Thailand had declared war on Great Britain. This brought out the fact that Thailand had also declared war on America. A further American statement was made to the effect that the American people would not be satisfied with the existing statements of colonial powers.

AUSTRALIAN ARCHIVES
A1838 /280
3010/7/1 PT1
Box: 0 Job: 16170/98
1 2 233 2 1 4 - 236 3 7 4
A6776P PSR
07/12/1998 01:07 PM
10:26 AM

~~OPEN WITH EXCEPTION~~

OPEN

ACCESS 3/1/95

FILE No.: 3010/7/1 Pt 1.