Australian Government | NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF AUSTRALIA
Your story, our history

These copies are provided for research or study purposes. Before making use of the material for other purposes (for example publication) you should familiarise yourself with any copyright obligations.

NAA: A1838, 3010/9/1 PART 1

Series number: A1838

Control symbol: 3010/9/1 PART 1

Barcode: 547783

Number of pages: 304

Thailand - Activities in the United Nations [3 cm]

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

File No. 3010/9/1

SUBJECT: THAILAND - Activities in the United Nations [PART 1]

RECORDED **SECRET.**

RELATED PAPERS	
FILE No.	SUBJECT

FORMER PAPERS

LATER PAPERS PART. 2.

ARCHIVAL ACTION

Folio No.	Referred to	Date	Clearing Officer's Initial	Date Cleared	Folio No.	Referred to	Date	Clearing Officer's Initial	Date Cleared	Folio No.	Referred to	Date	Clearing Officer's Initial	Date Cleared
	Peacock	17/2		19/2										
	PA	19/2												
	Mr Boneham	10/8		10/8										
	PA	10/8												
	Dorehan	23/8		23/8										
	PA	23/8												
	P.T.B.J.	3/12												
	P/A(B)	20/3												

CLOSED

File No.

KEY PAPERS ON FILE

(e.g. Cabinet papers, Policy matters, &c.)

FOLIO No.	SOURCE	DATE	DETAILS

Australian Government | NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF AUSTRALIA

DOCUMENT REMOVAL ADVICE

Series number: A1838, **Control symbol:** 3010/9/1 PART 1 **Barcode:** 547783

Folio/s numbered 43 folios

have been removed from this item because they,

[ ] are exempt from public access under section 33(1) of the Archives Act 1983,

[ ] are vulnerable to loss, or

[ ] have been referred to another agency for advice, or

[x] not in the open period as defined in the Archives Act 1983.

A copy or expunged copy has been inserted in place of folio/s:

For further information about the removal of folios from this item, please ask a reference officer.

Removed by: Access Examiner

Position or designation: APS 5/6

Date: 3 Nov 1998

When completed place this Advice on the file from which the documents have been removed. Place a copy of it with the removed documents.

RE8.

Department of Foreign Affairs

File Number 3010/9/1

Part Number 1

FILE
CLOSED

This part opened on ...../...../.....

This part closed on ~~30/10/75~~ 7/12/72

Subsequent correspondence on Part/~~File~~ Number 2

3010/9/1 281

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

CD: I. 75553.

FROM: DATED: 14TH NOVEMBER, 1967. 1940 LT.

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK. REC'D: 15TH NOVEMBER, 1967. 1133 LT.

UN. 1773. CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED CANBERRA UN 1773, REPEATED WASHINGTON, OTTAWA 570, LONDON (EXTERNAL) 695, WELLINGTON 73, ROME 7, BRUSSELS 10, TOKYO 12, TAIPEI 4.

CHINESE REPRESENTATION.

THERE WAS A FURTHER MEETING OF THE SPONSORS AT THE UNITED STATES MISSION ON 14TH NOVEMBER.

BUFFUM (UNITED STATES) SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WAS ANXIOUS THAT PLENARY SHOULD BEGIN WORK ON ITS AGENDA ITEMS THIS WEEK.

MANESCU HAD AGREED WITH BUFFUM THAT IT WOULD BE INADVISABLE TO HAVE PLENARY DISCUSSING THE NON-AGGRESSION ITEM WHILE THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS CONSIDERING THE MIDDLE EAST.

FOR THIS REASON THE UNITED STATES WOULD LIKE TO SEE PLENARY TAKE UP THE CHINESE REPRESENTATION ITEM, PROBABLY BEGINNING 16TH NOVEMBER.

2. THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR EXPRESSED A PREFERENCE OF AVOIDING, IF POSSIBLE, CONCURRENT MEETINGS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

IT WAS AGREED THAT THIS WOULD BE DESIRABLE, ALTHOUGH THE SPONSORS RECOGNIZED PRESIDENT'S CONCERN THAT PLENARY HAD NOT BEGUN WORK ON ANY OF ITS MORE SUBSTANTIVE ITEMS.

3. THE MEETING DISCUSSED WHICH OF THE SPONSORS SHOULD INTRODUCE THE IMPORTANT QUESTION RESOLUTION, AND WHO SHOULD MOVE PRIORITY FOR IT.

UNITED STATES SAID THAT THEY THOUGHT THE RESOLUTION SHOULD BE INTRODUCED BY AN ASIAN NEIGHBOUR THOUGH THIS WAS LESS IMPORTANT IN THE CASE OF THE DELEGATION WHICH MOVED PRIORITY.

...2

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

CD:

IN THE UPSHOT JAPAN AND OTHERS SUGGESTED AND WE AGREED, THAT WE MIGHT MOVE PRIORITY, AND IT WAS ACCEPTED THAT ONE OF THE ASIAN COUNTRIES (IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHICH) SHOULD INTRODUCE THE RESOLUTION.

4. AT PROMPTING OF THAILAND, THE ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE SAID THAT THEY HAD NOW RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO GO AHEAD WITH THEIR STUDY COMMITTEE RESOLUTION AGAIN THIS YEAR.

HE CONFIRMED THAT CHILE AND NETHERLANDS HAD AGREED TO CO-SPONSOR, WHILE A NUMBER OF OTHER COUNTRIES WERE STILL CONSIDERING THEIR RESPONSE.

THE LIKELIHOOD OF AN EARLY CHINESE DEBATE WOULD MEAN THAT THE SPONSORS WOULD HAVE TO MOVE FASTER THAN THEY HAD ANTICIPATED.

ITALY WOULD WELCOME CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE SPONSORS OF THE STUDY COMMITTEE DRAFT AND SOME OF THE SPONSORS OF THE IMPORTANT QUESTION RESOLUTION.

5. BUFFUM SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD NOT TAKEN ANY POSITION ON A POSSIBLE ITALIAN STUDY COMMITTEE RESOLUTION - THEY WOULD REVIEW THEIR POSITION IN THE LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE LAST ASSEMBLY.

THE THAI REPRESENTATIVE QUESTIONED THE TIMELINESS OF THE ITALIAN INITIATIVE AND EXPRESSED A FEAR THAT IT MIGHT RESULT IN SOME LOSS OF SUPPORT FOR THE INPORTANT QUESTION RESOLUTION.

MIN. AND DEPT OF E.A.
MIN. AND DEPT OF DEFENCE
P.M.'S

15TH NOVEMBER, 1967.

(E.A. PLEASE ADVISE COMMUNICATIONS DUTY OFFICER WHETHER TELEGRAPHIC TRANSMISSION TO TAIPEI IS DESIRED)

SEC DEP SEC FAS(1) SEA M FAS(2) UN(ACTION) PACAM
ASPAC EA AMSP PPO FAS(3) AS(JIC) INT ICR PIO
FAS(4) EAMEC

BRUSSELS LONDON OTTAWA ROME TAIPEI TOKYO WASHINGTON
WELLINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

279

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

3010/9/1

WK

I.71008

FROM:

DATED: 27TH OCTOBER, 1967.
1145 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
BANGKOK.

REC'D: 27TH OCTOBER, 1967.
1810 LT

1488. RESTRICTED. PRIORITY.

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 1488, REPEATED NEW YORK U/N.

UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW.

YOUR SAVINGRAM 54.

2. TO DATE THAILAND IS COMMITTED TO SUPPORT ONLY TWO WESTERN EUROPEAN AND OTHER STATE CANDIDATES, NAMELY AUSTRIA AND ITALY, WHO IN TURN HAVE AGREED TO SUPPORT THAILAND'S CANDIDATURE FOR ONE OF THE ASIAN SEATS.

3. AUSTRALIA IS THE THIRD COUNTRY AFTER AUSTRIA AND ITALY TO SEEK IN A FORMAL WAY THAI SUPPORT FOR A CANDIATE FOR A WESTERN EUROPEAN ETC. GROUP SEAT.

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT DESK OFFICES LEVEL, EXPERSSED SYMPATHY WITH OUR REQUEST AND SAID THAT THAILAND HAD GENERALLY IN THE PAST SUPPORTED AUSTRALIA IN ELECTIONS OF THIS NATURE.

HOWEVER THAILAND HAD ALREADY SOUGHT AUSTRALIAN SUPPORT FOR THAI CANDIDATE (OUR CABLE 1267 AND MEMORANDUM 1356) AND DESK OFFICES ASKED WHETHER AUSTRALIA WOULD BE PREPARED TO EXCHANGE VOTES.

WE SAID WE WERE SURE THAI REQUEST WAS UNDER CONSIDERATION IN CANBERRA AND THAT YOU WERE PROBABLY WAITING WHILE ALL CANDIDATES WERE KNOWN, BEFORE DECIDING ON THE BASIS OF MERIT WHO TO VOTE FOR.

WE UNDERTOOK TO LET MINISTRY AND THAI MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS KNOWN AS SOON AS A DIVISION HAD BEEN TAKEN.

GRATEFUL YOUR ADVICE.

VN

4. WE BELIEVE THAI SUPPORT FOR OUR CANDIDATE WILL BE FORTHCOMING.

HOWEVER, MINISTRY SEEMS UNUSUALLY ANXIOUS TO SECURE ELECTIONS OF THAI CANDIDATE AND IT MAY BE THAT THAI SUPPORT WILL ONLY BE GIVEN ON AN EXCHANGE BASIS.

.../2

FIN

RESTRICTED RESTRICTED RESTRICTED

3010/9/1 228

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

JW

I.32244

FROM.

DATED. 22ND MAY, 1967
1710 LT

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION,
KUALA LUMPUR.

REC'D. 22ND MAY, 1967
2033 LT

1320. SECRET. PRIORITY.

REGIONAL CO-OPERATION.

THANAT KHOMAN VISITED KUALA LUMPUR ON 20TH MAY TO DISCUSS THE SEAARC PROPOSAL WITH THE TUNKU. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS THEIR DISCUSSIONS COVERED THE EXPANSION OF REGIONAL CO-OPERATION AND POSSIBLY OF ASA AND THANAT "EXPLAINED'S THE PROPOSED NEW REGIONAL ORGANIZATION TO THE TUNKU. THANAT DECLINED TO ELABORATE ON THE LATTER ASPECT UNTIL OTHER COUNTRIES HAD BEEN CONSULTED.

2. TUNKU STATED TO THE PRESS SUBSEQUENTLY THAT THE TALKS HAD BEEN EXPLORATORY BUT THAT AGREEMENT TO FORM A NEW ORGANIZATION HAD BEEN REACHED IN PRINCIPLE, PROVIDED IT SERVED THE INTERESTS OF COUNTRIES IN THE REGION. .MALAYSIA COULD NOT AFFORD TO ISOLATE ITSELF FROM ANY FORM OF REGIONAL CO-OPERATION. TUNKU WOULD NOT NAME THE PROSPECTIVE MEMBERS BUT INDICATED THAT THANAT WOULD SOUND OUT SINGAPORE, INDONESIA AND THE PHILIPPINES. BEFORE HE LEFT KUALA LUMPUR THANAT REPORTEDLY SAID THE NEW ASSOCIATION WOULD BE A CONTINUATION OF THE CONCEPT THAT ASA HAD BEGUN.

3. IN CORRESPONDENCE PRECEDING HIS VISIT THANAT HAD INDICATED TO THE TUNKU THAT THAILAND AND INDONESIA WOULD SPONSOR THE NEW ORGANIZATION AND THAT ITS ESTABLISHMENT WOULD BE ANNOUNCED AT A MEETING IN BANGKOK IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE ASPAC MEETING IN JULY. SINGAPORE WOULD JOIN AND THE PHILIPPINES HAD ACCEPTED THE SEAARC DRAFT DECLARATION AS IT STOOD (INCLUDING THE REFERENCES TO FOREIGN TROOPS AND BASES ALONG MAPHILINDO LINES). THE TUNKU HAD SAID IN REPLY THAT HE WOULD PREFER FORMATION OF THE NEW ORGANIZATION TO BE POSTPONED AND WISHED ASA TO CONTINUE: BUT MALAYSIA WOULD BE PREPARED TO JOIN IN IF HER NEIGHBOURS WISHED TO GO AHEAD IMMEDIATELY.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE

23RD MAY, 1967

SEC DS FAS(1) SEA M&I M DL SA FAS(2) UN PACAM
EA AMSP PPO FAS(3) AS(JIC) INT ICR PIO FAS(4)
EAMEC

SECRET SECRET SECRET

RESTRICTED

3010/9/1

File No. 915/2

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Record of Conversation with the Thai Charge d'Affaires (Mr. Owart Suthiwart-Narueput)

on 30th November 1966

Officers Present Mr M. R. Booker

MAIN SUBJECT(S): Chinese Representation in the United Nations

---

The Thai Charge d'Affaires called to say that his Government hoped that Australia would join with Thailand in opposing the Italian resolution for the setting up of a committee to study the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations.

2. I was able to tell Mr. Owart that we had voted against the Italian resolution. I said that in making this decision the firm attitude of the Thai Government had been very much in mind. We had also accorded much weight to the wishes of the Republic of China.

DISTRIBUTION: Minister; Acting Secretary; FAS Div I; FAS Div II; FAS Div III; Pacam Br; UN Br; ~~SEA~~ Br; A/S(JIC); Prime Minister's Dept.
Posts - Taipei, New York, Washington, Tokyo, Wellington, Ottawa, London, Rome, Brussels, Bangkok.

Report prepared by M. R. Booker

(M. R. Booker)

ACTION:

5818/66.

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM

MJR:

O. 27723.

TO:

3010/9/1

Sent: 15th July, 1966.
2311.

Australian Embassy,
BANGKOK.

1260. CONFIDENTIAL.

I.A.E.A. : Presidency of 1966 General Conference.

In accordance with customary practice, the South East Asia and Pacific Area members could be expected to provide the Presidency of the General Conference beginning in Vienna on 21st September. In view of the widely differing degrees of interest in atomic energy among members of the area (Australia, Cambodia, Indonesia, New Zealand and Thailand) and the fact that Indonesia, alone of the area members has already been President (1958), the "area choice" on this occasion might be between Thailand and Australia.

2. In line with this thinking, our Resident Representative in Vienna has indicated to his U.S. colleague that we would favourably consider supporting the Thais if they were seriously interested in providing a President this year; otherwise we might be prepared to consider accepting nomination ourselves. We understand from the Americans in Vienna that the U.S.A. is sounding out the Thais on their intentions.

3. We should be glad to know if the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok has any information as yet on the matter. We would not wish you to approach the Thais directly at this stage.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.(719/7/10)
MIN. I/C. A.A.E.C.
A.A.E.C.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M.'s. DEPT
P.M.'s.

16th July, 1966.

SEC FAS(1) S&SEA M&I M DL SA FAS(2) UN PACAM
AMSP FAS(3) AS(JIC) INT ICR PIO FAS(4) EAMEC E
ER@

WASHINGTON VIENNA LONDON MOSCOW

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

VB.

I.33761

DATED: 5TH JULY, 1966.
1210 LT

FROM:

REC'D: 5TH JULY, 1966.
1720 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
BANGKOK.

1028. UNCLASSIFIED.

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

I HAVE RECEIVED A NOTE FROM THE FOREIGN OFFICE INDICATING THAT THE THAI NATIONAL GROUP IN THE PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION HAS NOMINATED THANAT KHOMAN AS A CANDIDATED FOR ELECTION TO THE I.C.J. AT THE 21ST SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY.

THE NOTE STATES THAT THE THAI GOVERNMENT FULLY SUPPORTS THE CANDIDATURE.

IT ADDS THAT NO THAI NATIONAL HAS YET PLAYED THE ROLE OF REPRESENTING THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THIS PART OF THE WORLD IN THE COURT.

IT REQUESTS THAT THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT INCLUDE THANAT'S NAME IN THE LIST OF NON-NATIONAL NOMINEES OF THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL GROUP AND LEND SUPPORT TO THANAT'S CANDIDATURE.

TEXT OF NOTE AND CURRICULUM VITAE BY BAG.

LOOMES.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
A.G. & DEPT
P.M.'S DEPT
P.M.'S

5TH JULY, 1966.

Discussed with Mr Pettenbridge.
— He is waiting for Holt before approaching Australian Group.
China & Philippines are entitled to Kirin Seat. remainder held by China according to custom which we support, & Security Council Permanent members a place on the I.C. Bench. GW. 6/7.

SEC DEP SEC FAS(1) S&SEA M&I M@ DL SA FAS(2)
UN@ PACAM AMSP PPO FAS(3) C&P ICR PIO L&T FAS(4)
EAMEC LA SAS(MS)

F. 3010/9/1 ✓

3010/9/1

DEPARTMENT OF EMBASSY BANGKOK

CONFIDENTIAL 274

OUTWARD SAVINGRAM

DF 1966 JUN 20 AM 9:19 I.32334

FROM: Dated: 17th June, 1966

Rec'd: 28th June, 1966
1919 LT

Australian Embassy,
BANGKOK.

Savingram No. 17 : RESTRICTED.

DEVELOPMENTS TO THE PERIOD UP TO 17TH JUNE 1966

Major developments have involved A.S.A. (Standing Committee Meeting in Bangkok) and A.S.A.P.A.C. (Ministerial meeting in Seoul) and these are reported elsewhere.

Vietnam events have been reported in detail, accompanied as usual by reticence in official comment. We have already reported on a different level how the Thais are stung by any suggestion that they are "stooges" of the United States. They were stung too by the "Izvestia" report of 30th May which attacked Thailand's role in Vietnam and reflected on the freedom of the Thai press. These charges were refuted apparently by the Thai Embassy in Moscow. Similarly there was refutation of the charges here (by Yong Polbul, Foreign Ministry spokesman) in terms that are familiar enough and rested on Thailand's notification to the Security Council of its decision, and the reasons for its decision, to send forces to Vietnam.

Prime Minister Thanom, on 13th June, commenting on Senator Robert Kennedy's reported support for Communist China's admission to the U.N. said that that was Mr. Kennedy's personal viewpoint not shared by the majority. Thailand, he added, is still firm in her determination not to support Red China's entry into the U.N.

The position reached with - not to mention the reasons for - Thailand's request to the United Nations Secretary General to send a representative to observe the Thai-Cambodian border situation remains a little confused, and, not surprisingly, reflects discreditably on the Thais. Thanom claimed publicly on 13th June that there was no need for U Thant to consult, as he was doing, Cambodia as - in the Thaiview - any U.N. representative should be asked to stay in Thai territory only and not be in that of Cambodia. Thailand clearly remains reserved about U Thant's wish to send a personal representative to both Thailand and Cambodia, and the question of yielding is due to be considered by Cabinet on 21st June after Thanat has returned from Seoul.

An official release during the period summarised the position reached with implementation of the Japanese "reparations" agreement. It stated that following the Thai-Japanese agreement concluded in 1962 on Japan's repayment of 9,600 million Special Yen to Thailand, a sum of 4,000 million yen has been paid in four instalments. The fifth instalment amounting to 1,000 million was due on 31st May. According to the Comptroller-General, the payments were to be made in eight instalments, each at 1,000 million yen, but the eighth and final instalment is to be 2,600 million yen. All the paid money so far has been spent for development purposes including the purchase of diesel engines, railway cars, sea vessels, a weaving factory and other items.

...2/

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD SAVINGRAM
OUTWARD SAVINGRAM

It was reported here this week from "reliable sources" that the surrender of General Siho Lamphoutacoul, former Chief of Special Police of Laos was arranged by Thai officials with Major General Kouprasith Abhay Laotian Army Commander-in-Chief. Vientiane no doubt will be able to corroborate this report as necessary.

Reports that General Ne Win of Burma might be making an official visit to Japan and the United States led to speculation that he might visit Thailand. It was suggested, unofficially, that Ne Win has an open invitation to visit Thailand at any time but may be specifically invited to do so in mid September. (Rangoon memorandum of 7th June.)

A reminder of the continued United Nations Command presence in Korea was contained in the prepations for movement next week of the main body (the advance guard left earlier) of 152 officers and men of the 21st Regiment, Royal Queen's Guards, to replace the 17th Thai Company in Korea and thus maintain symbolic Thai support for the United Nations/United States forces there.

Light on Thailand's part in drug traffic was thrown by a reported acknowledgment by Police Major General M.R. Nit Bhanumas, Secretary General of the Narcotics Suppression Committee, on 10th June that Thailand is the most convenient route through which opium grown in Yunnan and the Shan States can be smuggled to the outside world. He claimed, however, that no heroin is smuggled into Thailand from Communist China. He stated that, in 1965 six tons of opium and about one ton of morphine had been confiscated by the authorities here. He referred to cooperation with the Hong Kong authorities in suppressing the traffic. The Department will be aware of the U.N. Narcotics Commission survey proposed for Northern Thailand at the end of this year.

Domestic

The period under review has been a somewhat depressing one from the security point of view. Apart from the continuing minor acts of terrorism aimed at Government officials and teachers in the North East, there have been two incidents of considerable significance in Sakhol Nakhorn province. In the first incident a jeep was ambushed on a major highway shortly after first light. The ambushers used automatic weapons and hand grenades. They killed all five occupants of the jeep, removed their weapons and set the jeep on fire. We understand that the Government has not been able to trace any of them. The second incident occurred a few days later, again on a major highway and in broad daylight (at about 1000 hours). On this occasion the ambushers attacked an army truck and forced it off the road. Some of the soldiers aboard it were killed. The situation was saved when two following army trucks reached the scene and the ambushers dispersed into the jungle. We have heard from a reliable source that the first reaction of the soldiers was to take defensive precautions, i.e. to flee, and then to radio for helicopter and armoured car support; there was apparently no attempt to follow any form of ambush drill.

The significance of these two incidents seems to lie in the boldness and efficiency of the ambushers and the instinctive reactions of the ambushed. The reliance of the Thai Army on machines is growing but it is a habit not encouraging for survival in circumstances of terrorist activity in jungle conditions.

CONFIDENTIAL

.../3

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY, BANGKOK

CONFIDENTIAL 272

INWARD SAVINGRAM

OUTWARD SAVINGRAM

3. I.32334

A spectacular clash also occurred near Chiengdao in the North of Thailand, between 100 armed Yunnanese members of the Kuomintang, who came from Fang, and Sau Noy, a Shan chieftan and political refugee from Burma and his followers. The clash resulted from a conflict over opium dealing. Many Shans were killed but the leader managed to escape. The Yunnanese reportedly captured the Shan leader's two wives and some of his children. The attack itself is of little significance, although its organisation (the preliminary dropping of leaflets calling upon the Shans to surrender their leader, and the use by the Yunnanese of three trucks and two jeeps) was better than usual. Such clashes are not uncommon in the North and can usually be traced to attempts by different groups to encroach on or take over the opium distribution rights of other groups.

A Political Parties Bill is at present under examination by Cabinet. Surprisingly, details of the Bill have not yet been leaked to the press nor announced by General Praphas at his weekly news conference. We understand that the Bill attempts by various means to limit the number of political parties to two or three only. Cabinet is not likely to complete its examination of the Bill until such time as the new Constitution is promulgated.

The press has recently devoted some attention to the operations of the Ministry of the Interior, which controls the commercial pig-slaughtering monopoly in Thailand. Earlier allegations have been rehearsed of General Praphas" manipulation of the monopoly and the company's funds of 40 million baht for expenditure on behalf of the pro-Government political party. This allegation has provoked a sharp reply from General Praphas, who, as well as denying it, has hinted that the Government would take action to close newspapers which continue to print such damaging lies. A few days later the Government did in fact revoke temporarily the licence of the editor of Thai Rath, the largest newspaper in Thailand, allegedly for use of bad language.

Air Chief Marshal Dawee has stated that the United States has agreed to build a military airstrip at Khon Kaen, in the North East. Construction would be completed in two years.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE

28th June, 1966

SEC FAS(1) FAS(2) FAS(3) FAS(4) SAS(MS) AS(JIC) S&SEA M&I M@ DL INT UN PACAM AMSP EAME E CR ICR PIO C PPO

BONN HONG KONG KUALA LUMPUR LONDON MOSCOW NEW DELHI NEW YORK(UN) OTTAWA PARIS PHNOM PENH SEOUL SINGAPORE TOKYO WASHINGTON WELLINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

VB.

I.24722

FROM: 3010/9/1

DATED: 18TH MAY, 1966.
1840 LT

REC'D: 19TH MAY, 1966.
1455 LT

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK.

UN571. CONFIDENTIAL.

REPEATED WASHINGTON, LONDON (EXTERNAL) 155, BANGKOK 2, SAIGON 4.

VIETNAM : CONTRIBUTION OF THAI ARMED FORCES

FOLLOWING IS TEXT (FROM NEW ZEALAND MISSION) OF LETTER DATED 16 MAY FROM THAILAND TO PRESIDENT OF SECURITY COUNCIL FOR INFORMAL CIRCULATION TO COUNCIL MEMBERS BEGINS-

"I HAVE THE HONOUR, UPON INSTRUCTIONS FROM MY GOVERNMENT, TO INFORM YOUR EXCELLENCY THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THAILAND HAS DECIDED TO DESPATCH UNITS OF ITS ARMED FORCES TO SOUTH VIETNAM IN ORDER TO ASSIST IN SECURING THE DEFENCE OF THE FREE AND INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AGAINST THE ARMED AGGRESSION INITIATED, SUPPORTED, ORGANIZED AND DIRECTED FROM OUTSIDE THAT REPUBLIC.

THIS DECISION HAS BEEN MADE AT THE REQUEST OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND IN FULFILMENT OF THAILAND'S OBLIGATIONS AS A MEMBER OF THE FAMILY OF FREE AND SOVEREIGN NATIONS.

IN ADOPTING SUCH A DECISION, THAILAND BASES HERSELF ON HER INHERENT RIGHT OF COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENCE AND IS ACTING IN CONFORMITY WITH THE SPIRIT AND THE EXPRESS PROVISIONS OF THE CHARTER, AND WITH THE VIEW TO FOILING THE COLONIALIST AND EXPANSIONIST ATTEMPTS TO DOMINATE AND CONTROL THAT COUNTRY WHICH IS STRUGGLING TO PRESERVE ITS FREE AND INDEPENDENT EXISTENCE.

IN SO DOING, THE GOVERNMENT OF THAILAND IS PROMPTED BY THE DESIRE TO SEE LASTING PEACE AND STABILITY PREVAIL IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA AND TO BRING FIGHTING NOW RAGING IN THE AREA TO A SPEEDIER END''.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE
HON W. MCMAHON
SIR ROLAND WILSON
MR C.L. HEWITT
P.M.'S

19TH MAY, 1966.

SEC DEP SEC FAS(1) S&SEA M&I M DL SAMT MT FAS(2) UN PACAM AMSP PPO FAS(3) AS(JIC) INT ICR PIO FAS(4) EAMEC E SAS(MS)

BANGKOK BONN HONG KONG LONDON MOSCOW NEW DELHI OTTAWA PARIS PHNOM PENH SAIGON SINGAPORE VIENTIANE WELLINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL 10 JUNE 1966

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

FROM NEW YORK

TO RR WELLINGTON 335
RPTD RR BANGKOK 53 LONDON 172 WASHINGTON 159 OTTAWA 156 CANBERRA 161
SVNG LONDON TT PARIS 56 THE HAGUE 56

WELLINGTON TT NEW DELHI 12 KUALA LUMPUR 11 TOKYO 55

VIETNAM ELECTIONS

I TOLD THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (WHO HAD STAVROPOULOS AND ROLZA-BENNETT WITH HIM) THAT NO RPT NO REPRESENTATIVE HAD SUGGESTED THAT HE SHOULD AUTHORISE DISPATCH OF OBSERVERS ON HIS OWN AUTHORITY AND NO RPT NO REPRESENTATIVE HAD YET REQUESTED A MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. AT LEAST EIGHT MEMBERS FAVOURED IN PRINCIPLE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVATION OF THE ELECTIONS BUT, IJ VIEW OF THE STRONG OPPOSITION OF A FEW MEMBERS, IT SEEMED TO BE THE VIEW OF THOSE MOST IN FAVOUR THAT IMMEDIATE ACTION SHOULD NOT RPT NOT BE PRESSED BUT THAT MEMBERS SHOULD REFLECT FURTHER UPON THE MATTER.

2. WE DISCUSSED WHAT REPLY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SHOULD MAKE TO THE VIETNAM OBSERVER. HE RAISED THE QUESTION OF WHETHER HE SHOULD REPLY AT ALL AND WHETHER ANY SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBER HAD OBJECTED TO HIS RECEIVING THE COMMUNICATION. I TOLD HIM OF THE SOVIET STAND. HE SAID THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT RPT NOT WISH HIM TO REPLY BECAUSE THEY DID NOT RPT NOT RECOGNISE THE KY GOVERNMENT AND HE SEEMED TO THINK THERE MIGHT BE A CASE FOR HIS NOT RPT NOT ANSWERING THE LETTER. I ARGUED THAT IN THESE CASES IT DEPENDED ON THE EXTENT OF THE RECOGNITION. IF A GOVERNMENT WERE RECOGNISED BY ONLY A HANDFUL OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS (AS IN THE CASE OF EAST GERMANY) IT WOULD BE A PARTISAN ACT FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ENTER INTO OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE WITH THEM. BUT IF A GOVERNMENT WAS RECOGNISED BY A MAJORITY OF STATES, AS WAS THE CASE WITH SOUTH VIETNAM, IT WOULD BE PARTISAN FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO REFRAIN FROM ANSWERING ITS LETTERS. THE SECRETARY GENERAL ACCEPTED THAT HE SHOULD REPLY. AS TO THE TIMING: WE AGREED THAT THERE WAS NO RPT NO URGENCY AND IT MIGHT BE BETTER IF THE REPLY CAME AFTER THE PRESS HAD LOST INTEREST, AS IT NOW SEEMED TO BE DOING.

(T.16133)

/3. THE

CONFIDENTIAL

100,000/1/66—14970 W

3. THE SUBSTANCE OF HIS REPLY WAS THE SECRETARY~GENERAL'S BUSINESS, BUT WE DISCUSSED SOME ASRECTC. IT SEEMED BETTER (BECAUSE IT COULD PRECIPITATE FORMAL OBJECTIONS) NOT RPT NOT TO SAY SPECIFICALLY THAT THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL HAD CONSULTED MEMBERS AND THAT AS A RESULT OF THIS THE SECRETARY~GENERAL DID NOT RPT NOT CONSIDER IT POSSIBLE TO TAKE ACTION. NOR WAS IT DESIRABLE TO SAY THAT 'AS NO (RPT NO) MEMBER STATE HAD SPONSORED THE REQUEST', BECAUSE THIS COULD CAUSE EMBARRASSMENT TO THE UNITED STATES AND EVEN FORCE THEM TO CALL A MEETING. THE UNITED STATES DESERVED CONSIDERATION FOR THEIR FORBEARANCE IN NOT RPT NOT PRECIPITATING A CONFRONTADION IN THE COUNCIL. WHAT SEEMED BEST WAS SOME FORMULA TO THE EFFECT THAT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES SUFFICIENT AGREEMENT DID NOT RPT NOT EXIST TO ENABLE POSITIVE ACTION TO BE TAKEN ON THIS REQUEST FROM A NON~MEMBER STATE+ STAVROPOULOS AND ROLZ~BENNETT WILL HAVE THE TASK OF DEVISING SUITABLY INNOCUOUS WORDING

(T.16133)
PRIME MINISTER
SECRETARY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
10/2300Z

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

VB:

I.28353

FROM:

DATED: 7TH JUNE, 1966.
1945 LT

REC'D: 8TH JUNE, 1966.
1513 LT

AUSTRALIAN CONSULATE-GENERAL,
NEW YORK.

UN636. CONFIDENTIAL. 30109/1

REPEATED WASHINGTON, LONDON (EXTERNAL) 180, BANGKOK 6, PHNOM PENH 5.

THAI-CAMBODIAN RELATIONS.

OUR TELEGRAM 628.

2. WE DISCUSSED THAI APPROACH TO SECRETARY-GENERAL WITH CAMBODIAN DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TODAY 7TH JUNE.

3. OR KOSALAK SAID SECRETARY-GENERAL YESTERDAY, 6JUNE, HAD SIMPLY ADVISED PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE (SAMBATH) OF THAI PROPOSAL AND INVITED CAMBODIAN REACTION.

OR KOSALAK EMPHASIZED THAT SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD HIMSELF MADE NO PROPOSAL TO THE CAMBODIANS AND AS FAR AS WE COULD ESTABLISH HAD NOT AT THIS STAGE RAISED WITH THE CAMBODIANS SUCH POSSIBILITIES AS THE STATIONING OF OBSERVERS ON THE CAMBODIAN SIDE OF THE BORDER.

WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER SECRETARY-GENERAL SHOWED CAMBODIANS THE THAI LETTER, OR WHETHER HE SIMPLY REPORTED THE SPECIFIC PROPOSALLS TO SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE PLUS OBSERVERS.

4. WHILE THE MISSION HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS, OR KOSALAK SAID THEY FELT SURE THAT PHNOM PENH WOULD NOT BE LIKELY TO OBJECT TO THE STATIONING OF UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS ON THE FRONTIER" PROVIDED THE CIRCUMSTANCES WERE APPROPRIATE."

BY APPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES HE INDICATED THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT - AND HE REPEATED THIS SEVERAL TIMES - WOULD BE THE FEELING THAT BANGKOK WAS SINCERE.

OTHERS WERE THAT A FORMAL PROPOSAL CAME FROM THE UNITED NATIONS, THAT THERE WOULD BE SUFFICIENT OBSERVERS TO BE EFFECTIVE, AND THAT SUFFICIENT PORTIONS OF THE BORDER WOULD BE OBSERVED TO BE SATISFACTORY.

HE RECALLED CAMBODIAN PROPOSALS TO HAVE THE ICCS FUNCTIONS EXTENDED TO ENABLE IT TO OBSERVE CAMBODIA'S ENTIRE FRONTIER, INCLUDING WITH THAILAND, BUT SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THIS WOULD BE AN OBSTACLE TO CAMBODIAN AGREEMENT UNDER THE ABOVE CIRCUSTANCES TO UNITED NATIONS OBSERVATION OF THE BORDER WITH THAILAND.

HE SAID IT WAS A COMPLETELY DIFFERENT CASE FROM THE QUESTION OF UNITED NATIONS OBSERVATION OF THE CAMBODIA-SOUTH VIETNAMESE BORDER, INASMUCH AS THAILAND AND CAMBODIA WERE BOTH MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND SUBSCRIBED TO THE CHARTER.

HE COMMENTED THAT IN ANY CASE "DIFFICULTIES ELSEWHERE" MADE ANY STRENGTHENING OF THE CAMBODIAN ICC UNLIKELY IN AT LEAST THE NEAR FUTURE.

(ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT SAY WHERE "ELSEWHERE" THE DIFFICULTIES

.....2/

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

WERE, HE LATER SAID, IN REFERRING TO THE EASTERN BORDER, THAT " THOSE MAKING THE CHARGES" OF CAMBODIAN ASSISTANCE VIETCONG WERE OPPOSING THE STRENGTHENING OF THE ICC.)

WHILE HE LAID GREAT STRESS ON CAMBODIA'S "INNOCENCE", AND WILLINGNESS TO HAVE ANY IMPARTIAL OBSERVERS ON ANY PART OF CAMBODIAS FRONTIER, OR KOSALAK DID NOT SUGGEST, AS MIGHT HAVE BEEN EXPECTED, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF CAMBODIAN CLAIMS THAT THE BORDER TROUBLES ALL ORIGINATE FROM THAILAND, THAT PHNOM PENH WOULD INSIST ON HAVING OBSERVERS ON THE CAMBODIAN SIDE OF THE BORDER ALSO.

5. OR KOSALAK MADE THE USUAL REMARKS ABOUT CAMBODIA'S DESIRE ONLY TO MAINTAIN ITS NEUTRALITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, ITS "OBVIOUS" LACK OF AGRESSIVE INTENT AGAINST THAILAND BECAUSE OF ITS RELATIVELY SMALLER SIZE, AND REHEARSED THAI HOSTILITY, FAILURE TO ACCEPT THE 1904 TREATY BORDER, THE ICJ FINDING ON PREAH VIHEAR AND SO ON.

HE NEVERTHELESS GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE MISSION WAS INCLINED TO ACCEPT THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT THAILANDS MOVE WAS NOT PURELY FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES.

6. THAI ACTING PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE DOES NOT EXPECT TO BE CONSULTED BY SECRETARY-GENERAL AGAIN UNTIL AFTER CAMBODIANS HAVE RESPONDED.

7. WE HAVE GIVEN ABOVE REPORT TO UNITED STATES MISSION.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE
P.M.'S

9TH JUNE, 1966

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SEC DS FAS(1) S&SEA M&I M@ DL SAMT MT
FAS(2) UN PACAM EA AMSP PPO FAS(3) AS(JIC)
INT C&P ICR PIO FAS(4) EAMEC E SAS(MS)

BANGKOK HONG KONG LONDON L MANILA MOSCOW NOUMEA
OTTAWA PHNOM PENH SAIGON SINGAPORE TOKYO VIENTIANE
WELLINGTON

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

566

CONFIDENTIAL

BK.

I.24943

FROM:

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON.

3010/4/1

DATED: 19TH MAY, 1966
1920 LT

REC'D: 20TH MAY, 1966
0951 LT

1933 CONFIDENTIAL.

REPEATED UN NEW YORK, COPIES TO PHNOMPENH, BANGKOK, LONDON.

THAI-CAMBODIAN RELATIONS.

TRUEHEART (DIRECTOR, SOUTH EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS) WAS INTERESTED IN KANTOLS VIEWS AS REPORTED IN PHNOM PENHS TELEGRAM 280 TO YOU, BUT WAS INTRIGUED BY HIS HAVING SAID THAT WHAT CAMBODIA SOUGHT WAS OBSERVERS NOT CONCILIATORS.

TRUEHEART SAID THAT HE HAD THOUGHT THAT IN 1964 CAMBODIA HAD BEEN ABSOLUTELY OPPOSED TO OBSERVERS.

2. WE TOOK UP WITH TRUEHEART SOME OF THE POINTS IN NEW YORKS TELEGRAM 566.

HIS FOLLOWING COMMENTS MAY BE OF INTEREST..

(A) ALTHOUGH THE SITUATION ON THE THAI/CAMBODIAN FRONTIER WAS UNDOUBTEDLY HIGHLY CHARGED, THERE WAS TO HIS KNOWLEDGE NO LACK OF PRECISION ABOUT WHERE THE BORDER LAY IN THE AREAS IN QUESTION.

THAILAND WAS VERY UNHAPPY ABOUT PREAH VIHEAR JUDGMENT, BUT HAD GIVEN PUBLIC ASSURANCE THAT THEY WOULD NOT SEEK TO UPSET IT BY FORCE.

(B) HE CONFIRMED THAT ACTING PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THAILAND STILL LACKED INSTRUCTIONS AND THAT U.S. HAD BEEN ARGUING AGAINST DIRECT REFERENCE TO SECURITY COUNCIL AND IN FAVOUR OF PRELIMINARY APPROACH TO SECRETARY GENERAL.

(C) WHETHER OR NOT THAI MOTIVES WERE DUAL (AND THERE WAS, OF COURSE, GOOD REASON TO THINK THAT HOWEVER SINCERE THEY WERE IN WANTING OBSERVERS THEY WOULD NONETHELESS SEEK TO MAKE PROPAGANDA AGAINST CAMBODIA), HISTORY HAD GIVEN THAILAND AND CAMBODIA SUCH GOOD REASONS FOR MUTUAL SUSPICION THAT THERE WAS BOUND TO BE PUBLIC ACRIMONY ABOUT THE PROPOSAL, WHICH MIGHT FOR THIS REASON NEVER GET OFF THE GROUND.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE
P.M'S

20TH MAY, 1966

SEC DS FAS(1) S&SEA M DL SAMT FAS(2) UN PACAM
AMSP PPO FAS(3) AS(JIC) INT ICR PIO FAS(4) EAMEC
E SAS(MS)

BONN HONG KONG MOSCOW NEW DELHI OTTAWA PARIS SAIGON
SINGAPORE VIENTIANE WELLINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

EM

I.24062

FROM:

DATED: 16TH MAY, 1966
1635 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
BANGKOK.

REC'D: 16TH MAY, 1966
2225 LT

731. CONFIDENTIAL.

REPEAT PHNOM PENH 33 (CANBERRA PLEASE PASS). 3070/9/1

THAI/CAMBODIAN RELATIONS.

NEW ZEALAND AMBASSADOR (WEIR) HAS ADVISED ME OF APPROACH MADE TO HIM YESTERDAY BY SOMPONG (SECRETARY TO THANAT) TO DISCUSS A PROPOSAL UNDER CONSIDERATION BY THE THAI GOVERNMENT AIMED AT RELIEVING TENSION ON THE THAI/CAMBODIAN BORDER.

THAIS ARE MAKING SOUNDINGS AMONG FRIENDLY DELEGATIONS IN NEW YORK AND PROBABLY YOU ALREADY HAVE DETAILS FROM THAT SOURCE.

PROPOSAL IS THAT INTEREST OF EITHER THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS OR THE SECURITY COUNCIL MIGHT BE ENGAGED WITH A VIEW TO SENDING OBSERVERS TO CRITICAL POINTS SUCH AS THE TEMPLE AREA OF PREAH VIHAR, HAAD LEK AND THE REGION IN SURIN PROVINCE WHERE THE MAIN ROAD REACHES THE BORDER.

PARTICULAR APPROACH WAS MADE TO WEIR BECAUSE OF NEW ZEALAND CHAIRMANSHIP OF SECURITY COUNCIL DURING JUNE.

2. WEIR INDICATED TO SOMPONG INTEREST IN THIS THAI INITIATIVE AND SAID THAT NEW ZEALAND WOULD WELCOME ANY APPROPRIATE ACTION THAT COULD BE TAKEN TO REDUCE THE BORDER TENSIONS.

3. THIS INITIATIVE WAS NOT ALTOGETHER EXPECTED.

SEE OUR TELEGRAM 683 OF 6TH MAY REPORTING THANOM'S QUESTIONING OF THE DAWEE'S SUGGESTION THAT THERE MIGHT BE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS ON EITHER SIDE OF THE BORDER.

THAI INTEREST IN THE PROPOSAL NOW COULD BE A REFLECTION OF THEIR GENUINE CONCERN ABOUT THE DETERIORATING SITUATION PARTICULARLY IN THE TEMPLE AND THE SURIN ROAD AREAS.

(THERE HAVE BEEN TWO RECENT CASES OF LAND MINE EXPLOSIONS UNDER BUSES IN SURIN PROVINCE WHICH THE THAIS HAVE BEEN INCLINED TO ATTRIBUTE TO CAMBODIAN SABOTEURS.)

THE INITIATIVE ALSO OF COURSE COULD TAKE PRESSURE OFF THAILAND'S S.E.A.T.O. ALLIES TO URGE HER TO DO SOMETHING CONSTRUCTIVE ABOUT THE BAD STATE OF THAI/CAMBODIAN RELATIONS.

MARSHALL.

(M PLEASE ADVISE COMMUNICATIONS DUTY OFFICER WHETHER TELEGRAPHIC RETRANSMISSION TO PHNOM PENH IS DESIRED.)

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE
P.M.'S

17TH MAY, 1966.

SEC DEP SEC FAS(1) S&SEA M@ DL SAMT FAS(2) UN PACAM EA AMSP PPO FAS(3) AS(JIC) INT C&P ICR PIO LA FAS(4) EAMEC

LONDON NEW YORK(UN) PHNOM PENH WASHINGTON.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

3070/9/1 264

INWARD SAVINGRAM

F
relevant to V. Nam
Thailand.

JDF

I.55590

FROM.

DATED. 7TH DECEMBER, 1965

AUSTRALIAN CONSULATE-GENERAL,
NEW YORK.

REC'D. 10TH DECEMBER, 1965

SAV. 85. UNCLASSIFIED.

WASHINGTON FOR INFORMATION.
REPEATED OTTAWA SAV.78, LONDON SAV.134, PARIS SAV.78, MOSCOW SAV.91 NEW DELHI SAV.91. SAIGON SAVING 1.

INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF STATES.

THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WAS MADE BY MR. SHAW IN UNITED NATIONS 1ST COMMITTEE ON 7TH DECEMBER, 1965-

FIRST OF ALL, MAY I SAY THAT THE AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION JOINS WITH A NUMBER OF OTHER DELEGATIONS IN WELCOMING THE INITIATIVE TAKEN BY THE DELEGATION OF THE SOVIET UNION IN PROPOSING A DISCUSSION ON THIS ITEM.

THIS SUBJECT, NAMELY, THE QUESTION OF INTERVENTION IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF STATES, GOES TO THE VERY HEART OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER.

ONE NEED NOT LOOK BEYOND THE PREAMBLE TO THE CHARTER WHICH EXPRESSES THE DETERMINATION OF THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS "TO PRACTICE TOLERANCE AND TO LIVE TOGETHER IN PEACE WITH ONE ANOTHER AS GOOD NEIGHBOURS."

THE BASIC ASSUMPTION OF ARTICLE 1 OF THE CHARTER, WHICH SPELLS OUT THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS, IS THAT ALL COUNTRIES HAVE THE RIGHT TO LIVE LIVES OF THEIR OWN CHOOSING IN PEACE IN A WORLD ORDER FOUNDED ON INTERNATIONAL LAW.

I THINK THAT ALL OF US HERE ARE AGREED ON THE PRINCIPLES AND PURPOSES WHICH UNDERLIE THE CHARTER.

WHAT IS MORE DIFFICULT IS HOW TO APPLY THEM IN PRACTICE AND HOW TO DETERMINE IN SPECIFIC TERMS AND IN SPECIFIC CASES WHETHER ACTION IS BEING TAKEN BY SOME STATE WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THOSE PRINCIPLES AND PURPOSES.

IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS THERE HAVE BEEN MANY ATTEMPTS TO DEFINE THE TERM "AGGRESSION" BUT THESE ATTEMPTS HAVE NOT SO FAR SUCCEEDED.

WE ARE THEREFORE LEFT WITH A SITUATION IN WHICH THE SECURITY COUNCIL, IN RESPECT OF THE RESPONSIBILITIES ENTRUSTED TO IT UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE CHARTER, HAS THE TASK OF DETERMINING THE EXISTENCE OF ANY THREAT TO THE PEACE, BREACH OF THE PEACE OR ACT OF AGGRESSION.

...2/

WE KNOW, HOWEVER, HOW DIFFICULT IN PRACTICE IT IS FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO ARRIVE AT AGREED CONCLUSIONS.

WE KNOW THAT THERE HAVE BEEN MANY THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION OTHER THAN THOSE WHICH THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS FORMALLY FOUND TO EXIST.

AGAIN, THE CONCEPT OF INTERVENTION IS CLOSELY RELATED TO THAT OF AGGRESSION AND THE SAME PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES ARISE IN ATTEMPTING TO DEFINE IT.

THIS HAS BEEN PROVED BY THE EXPERIENCE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO STUDY THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERNING FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND COOPERATION AMONG STATES.

THAT COMMITTEE, WHOSE REPORT AS WE KNOW IS NOW CURRENTLY BEFORE THE SIXTH COMMITTEE, HAS TRIED TO DEFINE THE DUTY OF STATES NOT TO INTERVENE IN MATTERS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF OTHER STATES.

THE DIFFICULTY OF THIS SPECIAL COMMITTEE, AT ITS MEETING IN MEXICO, IN REACHING A CONSENSUS ON THIS PRINCIPLE, REFLECTS THE DIFFICULTIES INHERENT IN DEFINING THE CONCEPT OF INTERVENTION.

HOWEVER, IN OUR DEBATE IN THIS COMMITTEE, WE ARE NOT SIMPLY ENGAGED IN AN EXERCISE OF SEMANTICS.

WE MUST FACE THE FACT THAT THERE ARE MANY MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AS WE HAVE HEARD IN THE PAST FEW DAYS AND THIS MORNING, WHICH ARE CONFRONTED WITH AND HAVE HAD TO RESPOND TO ACTS OF INTERVENTION AND AGGESSION.

IN SAYING THIS, I AM NOT SIMPLY REFERRING TO ACCUSATIONS LEVELLED AT ONE OR OTHER OF THE GREAT POWERS.

A NUMBER OF OTHER MEMBERS OF THIS ORGANIZATION HAVE FAILED TO LIVE UP TO THEIR CHARTER OBLIGATIONS.

MOREOVER, WE HAVE THE ENORMOUS PROBLEM OF HOW TO DEAL WITH A POWER OUTSIDE THIS ORGANIZATION WHICH IS DISINCLINED EVEN TO ACKNOWLEDGE -- LET ALONE LIVE BY -- THE PRINCIPLES AND PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

OUR TASK IN THIS COMMITTEE IS TO TRY TO IDENTIFY AND DEFINE PRACTICAL ACTS OF INTERVENTION WHICH WE BELIEVE ARE CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLES AND PURPOSES OF THE CHARTER.

LOOKING BACK, I SUPPOSE THAT WE CAN SAY THAT IN EARLIER TIMES THE PROBLEM OF IDENTIFYING AGGRESSION WAS NOT SO DIFFICULT.

SITUATIONS TENDED TO BE MORE CLEAR-CUT.

FOR EXAMPLE, ON 4 AUGUST 1914 GERMANY INVADED BELGIUM AND MY COUNTRY AND OTHER COUNTRIES WERE AT WAR.

ON 3 SEPTEMBER 1939, IN RESPONSE TO A GERMAN INVASION OF POLAND, MY COUNTRY AND OTHERS WERE AGAIN AT WAR.

...3/

CLEAR AND OVERT CASES OF AGGRESSION SUCH AS THESE, WHICH ARE THE ULTIMATE FORM OF INTERFERENCE IN THE AFFAIRS IN OTHER COUNTRIES, ARE LESS LIKELY TO TAKE PLACE IN MODERN CIRCUMSTANCES.

WARS ARE NO LONGER FOUGHT WITH BOWS AND ARROWS OR WITH RIFLES AND BAYONETS.

IN THIS AGE OF NUCLEAR POWER, EVEN SO-CALLED CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS HAVE REACHED SUCH A STATE OF WHAT WE CALL "SOPHISTICATION" THAT NO GOVERNMENT THAT IS RESPONSIVE TO THE WELFARE OF ITS PEOPLE COULD CONTEMPLATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF TOTAL WAR.

THAT IS NOT TO SAY THAT THE THREAT OF WAR, THE BALANCE OF CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR FORCES AND THE WAGING OF WHAT WE CALL LIMITED WARS ARE NOT STILL PRACTICAL REALITIES.

BUT TOTAL WAR AS A DELIBERATE ACT OF POLICY IS SOMETHING WHICH WE BELIEVE THAT NO MAJOR POWER REPRESENTED AROUND THIS COMMITTEE TABLE IS PREPARED TO CONTEMPLATE.

WE CANNOT FORGET, OF COURSE, THAT THERE ARE SOME OTHERS WHO ARE APPARENTLY PREPARED TO CONTEMPLATE AND ACCEPT THE CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH A POLICY.

I BELIEVE THAT IT IS PARTLY AS A RESULT OF THE ACCEPTANCE OF THIS NEW FACTOR IN INTERNATIONAL LIFE, THE REJECTION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF USING TOTAL WAR AS AN ACT OF POLICY, THAT THE DANGER OF AN ESCALATED WAR ARISING FROM SOME EVENT ORIGINATING IN EUROPE HAS LESSENED.

WE WERE AT WAR IN 1914 FOLLOWING AN ASSASSINATION AT SERAJEVO.

WE WERE AT WAR IN 1939 BECAUSE THE NAZIS MADE A PRETEXT OF THEIR CLAIM TO DANZIG TO PURSUE THEIR AGGRESSION.

WE WERE NEARLY INVOLVED IN A WAR IN 1948 ORIGINATING IN BERLIN.

NOW, WE HAVE THE HOPE AND PERHAPS THE BELIEF THAT WHILE THE PROBLEMS OF EUROPE ARE NOT ALL SOLVED, AT LEAST THE PEOPLES OF THAT CONTINENT ARE MORE PREPARED TO ACCEPT DIFFERENCES AMONGST THEMSELVES AND TO LIVE TOGETHER IN PEACE.

I THINK THE DANGERS OF WORLD CONFLICT NOW ARISE FROM INTERVENTION BY MEANS SHORT OF OPEN WARFARE.

I REFER TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TECHNIQUES OF PROPAGANDA, SUBVERSION, INFILTRATION, TERRORISM AND THE TAKE-OVER OF OTHER COUNTRIES BY MINORITY GROUPS WHICH WE EARLIER SAW USED BY THE GERMAN NAZIS.

THIS TECHNIQUE WAS EXPLOITED TO FURTHER COMMUNIST REVOLUTIONARY DOCTRINES, FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE BALKAN AREA OF EUROPE IN THE YEARS FOLLOWING THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR.

HOWEVER, AS I SAID, IN RECENT YEARS THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF CO-EXISTENCE IN RELATIONS BETWEEN EUROPEAN STATES HAS RELIEVED THE POSSIBILITY OF CONFLICT THERE.

....4/

IT IS ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD THAT WE FIND THE MAIN PRESENT EXAMPLES OF INTERVENTION.

WE HAVE HEARD FROM A NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES OF LATIN AMERICA A GOOD DEAL OF THEIR EXPERIENCE OVER THE YEARS IN FORMULATING PRINCIPLES REGARDING INTERVENTION.

WE HAVE HEARD FROM THEM OF THE NEW AND PRESENT DANGERS WHICH A NUMBER OF LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES ARE FACING BECAUSE OF ORGANIZED SUBVERSION AND INFILTRATION EMANATING FROM A NEARBY COUNTRY.

OUR EXPERIENCE ELSEWHERE LEADS US TO UNDERSTAND AND RESPOND MOST SYMPATHETICALLY TO THE APPEALS OF OUR LATIN AMERICAN COLLEAGUES ABOUT THE DANGEROUS AND INTOLERABLE SITUATION WHICH THEY ARE THUS FACING.

TO WHAT I HAVE SAID I WOULD ADD ONLY THAT THE ADVOCACY OF THE PEKING CHINESE OF WHAT THEY CALL "WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION" IN LATIN AMERICA IS A NEW FACTOR WHICH HAS TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IF PEACE IS TO BE SECURED IN THAT AREA.

THE SAME THOUGHT APPLIES TO AFRICA.

HERE AGAIN AN EFFECTIVE COUNTER MUST BE FOUND TO THE ADVOCACY FROM OUTSIDE OF REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS TO OVERTHROW THE NEWLY ESTABLISHED GOVERNMENTS OF THE PEOPLES OF AFRICA.

NATURALLY ENOUGH, WHEN WE IN AUSTRALIA SPEAK OF THE MENACE ARISING FROM THE INTERVENTION OF STATES IN THE AFFAIRS OF OTHERS WE THINK IN PARTICULAR OF INDIRECT AGGRESSION AS PRACTISED IN ASIA.

WE DO SO FOR TWO REASONS: FIRST, BECAUSE THIS IS THE PART OF THE WORLD NEAR WHICH WE LIVE, AND SECOND, BECAUSE IT IS IN ASIA THAT WE BELIEVE THE EXAMPLES OF INTERVENTION ARE MOST DANGEROUS, FOR IT IS THERE THAT THEY HAVE THE IMMEDIATE BACKING OF A MAJOR POWER.

NOW, I SPEAK ON THIS SUBJECT AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF A COUNTRY WHICH HAS NO WISH OR INDEED NEED TO INTERVENE IN THE AFFAIRS OF ANY OTHER STATE.

AUSTRALIANS INHABIT A LARGE AND DIFFICULT CONTINENT WHICH PRESENTS US WITH ALL THE CHALLENGES WHICH A YOUNG NATION COULD WANT.

AUSTRALIA IS A HARD COUNTRY WHICH PRODUCES WEALTH ONLY THROUGH THE APPLICATION OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH, TECHNICAL SKILL, MANAGERIAL CAPACITY, CAPITAL AND HARD WORK.

WE HAVE NO NEED FOR LANDS NOR ANY CLAIMS ON PEOPLES ANYWHERE.

WE KNOW, HOWEVER, THAT WE CAN LIVE AS A PEACE-LOVING AND DEVELOPING COUNTRY ONLY IF OTHER COUNTRIES IN OUR AREA HAVE THE SCOPE TO DEVELOP THEIR OWN NATIONAL IDENTITIES FREE FROM OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE.

WE KNOW, MOREOVER, THAT UNFORTUNATELY THE COUNTRIES OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA ARE FACED WITH A POWER WHOSE UNREMITTING PRESSURE IS DIRECTED NOT TOWARDS ESTABLISHING SOME KIND OF COEXISTENCE WITH ESTABLISHED

...5/

SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT, BUT TOWARDS THE OVERTHROW OF THE EXISTING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL STRUCTURES OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION.

WHAT AUSTRALIANS HAVE TO ASK THEMSELVES IS WHETHER THEY CAN STAND BY AND WATCH OTHER COUNTRIES BROUGHT UNDER DOMINATION BY FORCE, AND AGAINST THEIR WILL, BY MINORITIES SUPPORTED FROM AN EXTERNAL SOURCE OF POWER.

IT WAS WITH DISTASTE AND RELUCTANCE THAT MY COUNTRY HAS BEEN FORCED TO EXPAND ITS EXPENDITURES ON DEFENCE.

SUCH RESOURCES AS WE HAVE ARE ALREADY FULLY COMMITTED TO OUR OWN DEVELOPMENT, TO THAT OF THE PEOPLES OF PAPUA AND NEW GUINEA, FOR WHOM WE ARE RESPONSIBLE, AND TO ASSISTING OUR NEIGHBOURS IN THEIR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRAMMES UNDER THE COLOMBO PLAN AND UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS SCHEMES.

THE NECESSITY TO DIVERT OUR RESOURCES INTO OUR DEFENCE FORCES HAS BEEN BROUGHT ABOUT AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE POLICIES OF INTERVENTION BY OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE AREA IN WHICH WE LIVE.

AS AN EXAMPLE OF THIS, I REFER FIRST TO THE POLICY OF CONFRONTATION WHICH INDONESIA HAS DIRECTED AGAINST ITS NEIGHBOURS MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE.

THE THREAT TO "CRUSH MALAYSIA" HAS CONSISTED NOT MERELY OF POLITICAL PROPAGANDA, BUT OF THE INFILTRATION OF ARMED PERSONNEL AND UNITS OF THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES, TOGETHER WITH TRAINED TERRORISTS AND SABOTEURS ALSO.

MEMBERS OF THIS COMMITTEE WILL RECALL THAT MALAYSIA BROUGHT THIS QUESTION BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL LAST YEAR.

NINE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, INCLUDING ALL THE AFRO-ASIAN AND LATIN AMERICAN MEMBERS, VOTED FOR A RESOLUTION DESIGNED TO RESTRAIN THE AGGRESSION COMPLAINED OF, BUT THAT RESOLUTION, AS YOU REMEMBER, WAS VETOED BY THE PERMANENT MEMBER WHO NOW BRINGS THIS ITEM BEFORE OUR COMMITTEE AS THE CHAMPION OF NON-INTERVENTION.

IN SPEAKING OF INDONESIA, I DO SO WITH MANY PERSONAL MEMORIES AND WITH MANY HOPES.

I THINK I AM RIGHT IN SAYING THAT MY GOVERNMENT HAS ALWAYS TAKEN ACCOUNT OF THE INTERNAL STRESSES UNDER WHICH INDONESIA IS SEEKING A FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY BEST SUITED TO ITS OWN CONDITIONS.

WE IN AUSTRALIA STRONGLY HOPE THAT INDONESIA WILL BE BLESSED WITH STABILITY AND PROSPERITY, SO THAT ITS PEOPLE CAN WORK OUT THEIR OWN DESTINY IN THEIR OWN WAY.

WHILE DETERMINED IN OUR SUPPORT OF MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE AGAINST INDONESIAN CONFRONTATION, THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE HAVE KEPT OPEN THE DOORWAY TO COOPERATION WITH OUR NEIGHBOUR, SINCE THERE ARE SO MANY WAYS IN WHICH AUSTRALIA AND INDONESIA COULD WORK TOGETHER FOR THE MUTUAL BENEFIT OF OURSELVES AND OUR REGION.

...6/

THE OTHER MAJOR CASE OF INTERVENTION IN THE AFFAIRS OF NEIGHBOURING STATES THAT IS COMPELLING THE EXPANSION OF THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCES LIES IN VIET-NAM, WHERE WE SEE THE APPLICATION OF THE TECHNIQUES OF INDIRECT AGGRESSION BY NORTH VIET-NAM IN SOUTH VIET-NAM.

MUCH HAS BEEN SAID ABOUT THE ORIGINS OF THE CONFLICT IN VIET-NAM.
IT IS NOT NECESSARY HERE TO SAY MUCH MORE THAN THAT THE 1954 GENEVA AGREEMENTS LEFT VIET-NAM A DIVIDED COUNTRY.
WHILE THE 17TH PARALLEL WAS NOT INTENDED TO BECOME A PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY, IT IS FACT ESTABLISHED TWO SEPARATE ZONES.
ONE REFLECTION OF THIS WAS THE ENORMOUS FLOW OF NEARLY ONE MILLION REFUGEES FROM THE NORTH TO THE SOUTH.

THE REGIME IN POWER IN NORTH VIET-NAM IS THE LAO DONG, OR VIET-NAMESE COMMUNIST PARTY.
THIS PARTY RECONSTRUCTED NORTH VIET-NAM ALONG COMMUNIST LINES.
I COULD DESCRIBE THAT PROCESS AT LENGTH BUT IT WILL NOT DO SO HERE.
I WILL NOT QUOTE ANY "WESTERN OR NEUTRAL SOURCES EITHER IN REFERRING TO IT, BUT I THINK IT IS REVEALING TO QUOTE VERY BRIEFLY GENERAL GIAP, A LEADING MILITARY FIGURE OF THE NORTH VIET-NAMESE REGIME, WHO, ACCORDING TO THE COMMUNIST PARTY NEWSPAPER "NHAN DAN" OF 31 OCTOBER 1956, REPORTED TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE LAO DONG PARTY IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS:
"WE ATTACKED THE LAND-OWNING FAMILIES INDISCRIMINATELY.... WE EXECUTED TOO MANY HONEST PEOPLE.
WE ATTACKED ON TOO LARGE A FRONT AND, SEEING ENEMIES EVERYWHERE, RESORTED TO TERROR, WHICH BECAME FAR TOO WIDESPREAD...
WE FAILED TO RESPECT THE PRINCIPLES OF FREEDOM OF FAITH AND WORSHIP IN MANY AREAS...
TORTURE CAME TO BE REGARDED AS A NORMAL PRACTICE DURING PARTY REORGANIZATION".

THE AIM OF THE HANOI REGIME IS TO EXTEND THIS TYPE OF RULE OVER THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIET NAM.
WE DO NOT SHARE THE VIEW OF THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SOVIET UNION THAT THIS WOULD BE IN LINE WITH WHAT HE CALLS "THE ADVANCE OF HISTORY".

THE DECISION OF THE HANOI AUTHORITIES TO STEP UP THEIR INTERVENTION IN SOUTH VIET NAM WAS TAKEN WHEN THEY REALIZED THAT SOUTH VIET NAM WAS NOT GOING TO FALL EASILY INTO THEIR LAP.
IT SHOULD NOT BE FORGOTTEN THAT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN MAKING PROGRESS WITH ITS PROGRAMMES OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT DESPITE THE DESTRUCTIVE ACTIVITIES OF THE VIET CONG ELEMENTS WHICH HAD REMAINED IN THE SOUTH AFTER THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS.

...7/

NOR SHOULD IT BE OVERLOOKED THAT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT WAS FACING ALL THE WELL-KNOWN DIFFICULTIES WHICH MANY OTHER GOVERNMENTS OF NEWLY INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES FACED.

LIKE ALL NEWLY INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES, THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT HAD TO ESTABLISH THE ADMINISTRATIVE, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURES MOST SUITED TO THEIR COUNTRY'S PARTICULAR HISTORY, ENVIRONMENT AND NATIONAL TEMPERAMENT.

ADDED TO THESE NORMAL STRAINS WAS THE TERRIBLE BURDEN OF THE CAMPAIGN OF TERRORISM AND ASSASSINATION MOUNTED FROM OUTSIDE.

THIS COST THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT THE LIVES OF MANY THOUSANDS OF THEIR MOST SKILLED ADMINISTRATORS AND TEACHERS, WHO WERE MURDERED BY THE VIET CONG.

IT IS AS WELL TO REMEMBER ALSO THAT AT THAT TIME WHEN NORTH VIET NAM EMBARKED ON ITS ACTIVE POLICY OF ASSASSINATION, TERRORISM, MILITARY INFILTRATION AND SUBVERSION, THE FOREIGN MILITARY ADVISORS IN SOUTH VIET NAM NUMBERED ONLY A FEW HUNDRED.

AT THAT TIME THE MAJOR FOREIGN ASSISTANCE EFFORTS IN SOUTH VIET NAM WAS AID IN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT.

THESE PROGRAMMES BECAME THE TARGETS OF VIET CONG SABOTAGE.

FOR EXAMPLE, ONE OF THEIR EXPLOITS WAS TO ATTACK A DAIRY FARM PROJECT WHICH HAD BEEN SET UP WITH AUSTRALIAN EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL NEAR SAIGON FOR THE PURPOSE OF DEVELOPING A FRESH MILK SUPPLY FOR VIET NAMESE CHILDREN.

THE VIET CONG DROVE OFF THE ANIMALS, SMASHED THE MACHINERY AND RUINED THE PROJECT.

I MENTION THIS ILLUSTRATION ONLY BECAUSE IT WAS NOT AN ISOLATED ACT.

IT WAS, OF COURSE, OF RELATIVELY SMALL IMPORTANCE COMPARED TO THE MANY BRUTAL ACTS OF MURDER AND TERRORISM OF THE VIET CONG.

DESPITE THE STRAINS CAUSED BY SUCH TERRORIST OPERATIONS AND DESPITE DIFFERENCES AMONGST THEMSELVES, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIET NAM TO RESIST THE CAMPAIGN WAGED FROM THE NORTH HAS REMAINED STRONG.

THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIET NAM KNOW THAT THIS IS NO WAR OF NATIONAL LIBERATION AND THAT IS NOT A CIVIL WAR FOR THE SUBSTITUTION OF ONE GOVERNMENT FOR ANOTHER.

THEY KNOW THAT THIS IS A WAR TO DESTROY ANY SEPARATE EXISTENCE OF VIET NAM AND TO IMPOSE ON THE SOUTH THE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT OF THE NORTH, AND TO UNIFY THE COUNTRY NOT BY NEGOTIATIONS BUT SOLELY ON THE TERMS DICTATED BY THE NORTH.

THE THREAT TO VIET NAM IS NOT AN ISOLATED ONE.

IN OTHER SOUTH EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES DISSIDENT MOVEMENTS HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED OR ENCOURAGED AND ARE BEING USED BY OUTSIDE INTERESTS AS INSTRUMENTS FOR SO-CALLED WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION.

...8/

THIS MORNING WE HEARD A MOVING APPEAL FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF LAOS TO BE WITNESS TO AGGRESSION AGAINST HIS COUNTRY FROM NORTH VIET NAM.

IN LAOS WE CLEARLY HAVE A SITUATION IN WHICH THE COMMUNIST-LED PATHER LAO, AT THE INSTIGATION OF NORTH VIET NAM AND IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE 1962 GENEVA AGREEMENT, IS CONTINUING TO USE SUBVERSION AND FORCE IN SETTING ITSELF UP IN OPPOSITION TO THE NEUTRALIST GOVERNMENT OF PRINCE SOUVANNA PHOUMA.

A FURTHER EXAMPLE IS THAILAND, WHOSE REPRESENTATIVE SPOKE YESTERDAY.

THAILAND, WHICH IS NOT A NEWLY ESTABLISHED COUNTRY BUT ONE WITH A LONG AND PROUD HISTORY OF INDEPENDENCE AND A LONG RECORD OF SOUND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, IS ALSO UNDER THREAT FROM OUTSIDERS WHO CLAIM THE RIGHT TO OVERTHROW ITS GOVERNMENT.

THE VOICE OF THE SO-CALLED THAILAND PATRIOTIC FRONT EMANATES FROM PEKING AND HANOI IN CLEAR BREACH OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION.

PEKING AND HANOI HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE SAME TECHNIQUE OF INDIRECT AGGRESSION THAT THEY ARE USING ELSEWHERE IS TO BE USED AGAINST THIS INDEPENDENT COUNTRY.

IN SUCH A SITUATION IN SOUTH EAST ASIA, THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE HAVE LENT THEIR SUPPORT TO THE INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENTS OF SOUTH EAST ASIA WHICH HAVE REQUESTED IT.

WE BELIEVE THAT WHAT WE HAVE DONE IS CONSISTENT WITH OUR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER.

WE HAVE GIVEN OUR SUPPORT IN THE CONVICTION THAT THE SMALLER COUNTRIES OF THE REGION IN WHICH WE LIVE MUST STAND TOGETHER.

WE REGARD VIET NAM AND THE OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE SOUTH EAST ASIAN AREA AS PARTNERS WHICH SHARE WITH US THE COMMON ABHORRENCE OF INTERVENTION AND AGGRESSION AND A COMMON DETERMINATION TO LIVE OUR LIVES AS WE CHOOSE.

IT IS IN THIS SPIRIT THAT THE AUSTRALIA GOVERNMENT IS HELPING TO DEFEND SOUTH VIET NAM AT ITS REQUEST WITH POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY SUPPORT.

OUR AIM IN VIET NAM IS TO DETER AND NOT TO DESTROY.

OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO HOLD AND BLUNT THE OFFENSIVE AND MAKE IT CLEAR TO THE VIET CONG THAT THEY CANNOT WIN IN SOUTH VIET NAM.

SO FAR AS CONCERNS THE AGGRESSOR, NORTH VIET NAM, WE HAVE NO MILITARY DESIGNS AND NO PURPOSE OTHER THAN TO PROVE THAT INTERVENTION AND AGRESSION, DIRECT OR INDIRECT, WILL NOT SUCCEED.

IT IS OPEN TO NORTH VIET NAM, AS IT HAS BEEN FOR A LONG TIME, TO AGREE TO DISCUSSIONS WITHOUT ATTACHING CONDITIONS THAT IN EFFECT CALL FOR POLITICAL AND MILITARY SURRENDER.

IN THE AREA AS A WHOLE OUR OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE IS A JUST AND LASTING PEACE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER.

SUCH A SETTLEMENT MUST SERVE THE INTERESTS AND NEEDS OF THE ASIAN

...9/

PEOPLES THEMSELVES.

WE BELIEVE THAT NEITHER THE SECURITY OF THIS REGION NOR ITS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT CAN BE REALIZED WITHOUT EXTERNAL AID.

THEREFORE, BEHIND ANY LOCAL SETTLEMENT IN SOUTH EAST ASIA LIES THE NEED FOR THE GREAT POWERS, ALL OF WHICH HAVE INTERESTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN THIS REGION, TO JOIN IN THE NECESSARY GUARANTEES AND AID.

WHAT WE ENVISAGE IS A RETURN TO THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS OF 1954, WHICH EMBODIED THE RESULT OF NEGOTIATIONS AND AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES IMMEDIATELY CONCERNED AND THE GREAT POWERS.

FROM SUCH A STARTING POINT WE CAN HOPE FOR MORE WIDELY RANGING NEGOTIATIONS AIMED AT ESTABLISHING, WITH APPROPRIATE GUARANTEES, THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH COUNTRIES OF SOUTH EAST ASIA CAN HAVE SOME REASONABLE CONFIDENCE IN THEIR FUTURE, FREE FROM OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE.

IN SEEKING SUCH A SETTLEMENT, NONE OF US IS BLIND TO THE EXISTENCE OF THE SEVERAL HUNDRED MILLION PEOPLE OF CHINA.

OUR MOST DIFFICULT AND PRESSING PROBLEM IS HOW PEOPLES LIVING NEAR CHINA CAN COME TO TERMS WITH THE CHINESE SO THAT THEY AND OTHER PEOPLES CAN LIVE TOGETHER IN PEACE AND MUTUAL RESPECT.

I HAVE SPOKEN AT SOME LENGTH ON SOUTH EAST ASIA IN THE BELIEF, AS I SAID, THAT INTERVENTION IN THAT AREA CONSTITUTES THE MOST EXPLOSIVE AND DANGEROUS THREAT TO WORLD PEACE.

A PURPOSE WILL HAVE BEEN SERVED IF OUR DISCUSSION IN THIS COMMITTEE THROWS SOME LIGHT ON THE NATURE OF ACTS OF INTERVENTION.

WE SHALL HAVE ACHIEVED SOMETHING MORE IF, SPEAKING AS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, THE UNITED NATIONS MAKES IT CLEAR THAT INDIRECT AGGRESSION BY WHATEVER TECHNIQUES OR FOR WHATEVER PURPOSES IS UNACCEPTABLE AS A MEANS OF CONDUCTING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

IT IS OUR HOPE THAT ALL MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS, AND IN PARTICULAR THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WILL ACT TOGETHER TOWARDS THAT END.

COUNTRIES SUCH AS MY OWN, THAT IS THE MIDDLE SIZE AND SMALLER POWERS, WHICH CONSTITUTE THE GREAT BULK OF THE MEMBERSHIP OF THIS ORGANIZATION, HAVE EVERYTHING TO GAIN FROM THE DEVELOPMENT OF THAT WORLD ORGAN IN WHICH STATES ARE WILLING TO MAINTAIN RESPECT FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF OTHER STATES.

THESE ARE THE PRINCIPLES LAID DOWN IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THESE ARE THE PRINCIPLES WHICH ALL NATIONS MUST ACCEPT IF THEY ARE TO LIVE ALONGSIDE ONE ANOTHER IN PEACE.

IT IS IN THE LIGHT OF THESE PRINCIPLES THAT THE AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION WILL DETERMINE ITS POSITION ON THE DRAFT DECLARATION AND THE OTHER DRAFT RESOLUTIONS AND AMMENDMENTS WHICH HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO THIS COMMITTEE.

...10/

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

255

INWARD SAVINGRAM

GSW -10- I.55590

WE MAY WISH TO SPEAK ON THESE DRAFTS AT A LATER STAGE.

A/MIN. & DEPT E.A.
A/MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE

13TH DECEMBER, 1965.

A/SEC FAS(1,2,3,4) SAS(MS) AS(JIC) SAMT S&SEA
M&I M DL SA INT UN PACAM AMSP EA
EAMEC E AFME ICR PIO MT ER

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

3010/9/1 254

RAD

I.17951

DATED: 3RD MAY, 1965.
1806

FROM:

REC'D: 4TH MAY, 1965.
0330

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION,
LONDON.

CONFIDENTIAL

3454 CONFIDENTIAL.

FROM EXTERNAL.

S.E.A.T.O. COUNCIL MEETING.

1. VIETNAMESE OBSERVER AGREES TO PUBLIC USE OF HIS STATEMENT TO CLOSED SESSION, (OUR 3439).
MINISTER SUGGESTS THAT IT BE DUPLICATED AND GIVEN WIDE CIRCULATION IN AUSTRALIA THOUGH FACT OF DELIVERY AT S.E.A.T.O. COUNCIL SHOULD NOT BE MENTIONED.

2. YOU MIGHT ALSO CONSIDER GIVING WIDE CIRCULATION TO RELEVANT PARTS OF BALL'S STATEMENT AT PUBLIC SESSION (FULL TEXT IN OUR 3444).

3. FOLLOWING IS EXTRACT FROM THAI FOREIGN MINISTER'S STATEMENT AT PUBLIC SESSION -

"ALTHOUGH SOUTH VIETNAM IS ACTUALLY A PROTOCOL STATE PLACED UNDER THIS ORGANIZATIONS PROTECTIVE UMBRELLA AT THE INSISTENCE OF ITS FORMER COLONIAL RULERS, S.E.A.T.O. HAS SHOWN LITTLE IF ANY ABILITY TO DEAL WITH THE EMERGENCY.
IN FACT, HAD IT NOT BEEN FOR THE WILLINGNESS OF A MEMBER OF THIS ORGANIZATION, THE UNITED STATES, TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY AND TO ACCEPT SACRIFICES FOR THE DEFENCE OF SOUTH VIETNAM THAT NATION MAY WELL HAVE BEEN LOST TO THE COMMUNIST AGGRESSORS.
ON THIS OCCASION I SHOULD LIKE TO PAY THE RESPECTFUL TRIBUTE OF THE THAI GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE TO THE GALLANT MEN AND WOMEN OF SOUTH VIETNAM AND THE UNITED STATES WHO GAVE THEIR LIVES TO UPHOLD THE CAUSE OF PEACE AND FREEDOM IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

MAY I ADD HOW HEARTENING IS TO US ALL THE DECISION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA TO SEND A CONTINGENT OF AUSTRALIAN FORCES INTO SOUTH VIETNAM.

AS WE MEET HERE TODAY, I HOPE NONE OF US WILL FAIL TO REALISE HOW CRUCIAL THE STRUGGLE IN VIETNAM IS AND THAT THE OUTCOME WILL TRANSCEND THE BORDERS OF THAT COUNTRY AND IS BOUND TO AFFECT NOT ONLY SOUTH EAST ASIA BUT THE ENTIRE FREE WORLD."

A/MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE
P.M.'S

4TH MAY, 1965.

SEC DS FAS(1, 2, 3, 4) SAS(MT) AS(JIC) SAMT S&SEA M&I M DL SA INT UN PACAM AMSP EA EAMEC E PIO ICR MT@
BANGKOK KARACHI LONDON MANILA NEW DELHI PARIS SAIGON SINGAPORE WASHINGTON WELLINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

253

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

3010 9/1

DWB: I. 8103.

FROM: DATED: 26TH FEBRUARY, 1965. 2135.
REC'D: 28TH FEBRUARY, 1965. 1027.

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK.

UN232. CONFIDENTIAL.

REPEATED WASHINGTON, OTTAWA CABLE 61, LONDON FOR EXTERNAL CABLE 120 PARIS CABLE 83, MOSCOW SAV. BAG 42, NEW DELHI SAV. BAG 44.

PEACEKEEPING SPECIAL COMMITTEE

OUR TELEGRAM 224.

2. SPAIN TODAY PROTESTED TO WEST EUROPEAN MEETING ABOUT ITS TREATMENT BY QUAISON- SACKEY.
AFTER, WE GATHER, AWKWARD DISCUSSIONS CO-CHAIRMEN PLUS WEST EUROPEANS ALREADY NOMINATED FOR COMMITTEE PERSUADED IRELAND TO WITHDRAW IN FAVOUR OF SPAIN, ON GROUNDS THAT ITS EMBARRASSMENT AT NOT BEING INCLUDED WOULD BE LESS THAN SPAIN'S SINCE LATTER HAD BEEN NOMINATED FIRST.
IRELAND RECEIVED LITTLE SUPPORT AMONG WEST EUROPEANS, MANY OF WHOM SAID THEY FELT CONTRIBUTIONS TO PEACEKEEPING WAS IRRELEVANT CRITERION, AND OVERRULED BY GEOGRAPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS.
IRISH, JUSTIFIABLY, ARE SOMEWHAT ANNOYED WITH THIS.
QUAISON SACKEY AGREED TO RESTORE SPAIN.

3. AFRICAN GROUP THIS MORNING ALSO HAD CLASH, AS BETWEEN CAMERON AND MAURITANIA, LATTER EVENTUALLY RETAINING ITS POSITION.
WE UNDERSTAND MOROCCANS HAVE SENT FORMAL LETTER OF PROTEST TO QUAISON SACKEY ON PROCEDURE ADOPTED BY AFRICAN GROUP IN REACHING THIS DECISION.

4. QUAISON SACKEY EVENTUALLY AGREED TO INCLUDE THAILAND AS SIXTH ASIAN, PROVIDED LATINS DID NOT SEEK A SIXTH AS A CONSEQUENCE, CHAIRMAN OF LATIN GROUP (EL SALVADOR) TONIGHT AGREED TO THIS, PRESUMABLY AS RESULT OF SPAIN'S EVENTUAL INCLUSION.
COMMITTEE THUS STANDS AT THIRTYTHREE.

5. UNITED STATES THIS MORNING OBJECTED TO INCLUSION OF MAURITANIA, EXCLUSION OF CHINA, NUMBER OF EAST EUROPEANS AND ABSENCE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN (SINCE REMEDIED).
HOWEVER, TONIGHT MISSION TOLD US THEY HAD DECIDED TO RECOMMEND TO WASHINGTON ACEPTANCE OF COMMITTEE OF THIRTYTHREE, DESPITE THEIR DISSATISFACTION ON FIRST THREE POINTS.
MISSION EXPECTED AGREEMENT TONIGHT AND UNDERSTOOD QUAISON-SACKEY WOULD THEN PUBLISH FINAL LIST, TONIGHT (EVEN THOUGH SOME LATINS STILL WANTED PARITY WITH AFRICANS AND ASIANS), AS HE FELT HE COULD NOT ACHIEVE ANYTHING BETTER.

6. HOWEVER QUAISON SACKEY HAS NOT ISSUED LIST TONIGHT, BUT WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO DISCOVER WHETHER HE WAS PREVENTED FROM DOING SO BY FAILURE OF WASHINGTON TO AGREE. SOME OTHER DISAGREEMENT (REF) LATINS, POSSIBLE SOVIET OBJECTION TO SPAIN), OR FOR PURELY TECHNICAL REASONS.

(Ø AS RECEIVED) 2/...

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

I.8103

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE
TREASURER & TREASURY
P.M'S

1ST MARCH, [illegible] 1965.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SEC DS FAS(1,2,3,4) AS(JIC) LA S&SEA M SA UN@
PACAM AMSP EA EAMEC E AFME ER CR ICR C PIO PPO
MR WHITE MR MCMILLAN

3014/9/1 25

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

FD: I. 34578.

FROM: Dated: 20th October, 1964.
1636.

Australian Embassy,
SAIGON. Rec'd: 20th October, 1964.
2155.

806. RESTRICTED.

Paris OP46.

United Nations Commission Elections.

Vietnamese candidate is Nguyen Quoc Dinh. Curriculum Vitae by bag.

A/MIN. & DEPT E.A.
P.M.'s. 21st October, 1964.

SEC FAS(1,2,3,4) SAS(MS) AS(JIC) S&SEA M&I M@ DL INT UN@
PACAM PPO AMSP EAMEC E INF PIO MT

RESTRICTED RESTRICTED RESTRICTED

3010/9/1

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

MB. I.7151.

FROM: Dated: 3rd March, 1964. 1615.

Australian Embassy, BANGKOK. Rec'd: 3rd March, 1964. 1945.

207. RESTRICTED. PRIORITY.

Your telegram 186 and Savingram 31.

Points regarding "middle zone" position and Papua and New Guinea made to Thais. They appear to accept points sympathetically but made no specific comments.

2. Prebitsch proposals have not yet been fully digested but Cabinet expected to take a decision next week. Preliminary official thinking is:-

(a) Primary commodities should be dealt with on a commodity by commodity basis. They are primarily seeking access to E.E.C. and consider that G.A.T.T.8 point programme covers aspect of 'access'. With rubber in mind they have some hesitations about general endorsement of price increases which might favour synthetics but they endorse idea of remunerative returns.

(b) The reference to developing countries is endorsed but they need to examine implications of preferences between developing countries.

(c) Compensating finance should be subject to further study in view of many problems to be solved. However, they do not rule out endorsement of the principle involved.

(d) They see no need for new machinery (e.g. I.T.O.).

3. In general, Thais may well adopt wait and see attitude at U.N.C.T.A.D. Their attitudes are likely to be dominated by their interests in rice, rubber, tin, benaf, cassawa and maize.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT TRADE (C)
MIN. & DEPT P.I. (C)
TREASURER & TREASURY
P.M.'s

4th March, 1964.

SEC FAS(1, 2, 4) AS(3) AS(JIC) LA S&SEA M&I M DL
INT UN@ INF ER PIO MR ARNOTT

RESTRICTED RESTRICTED RESTRICTED

COPY

OF LETTER FROM
AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
750 THIRD AVENUE NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

219

3010/9/1.

26th February 1964

File No. 105/2

Memorandum No. 312/64

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra A.C.T.

Nineteenth Session of the General Assembly
Vice-Presidencies

....

Attached is a copy of a note, dated 19th February 1964, from the Permanent Mission of Thailand, seeking Australia's support for its candidature for one of the Vice-Presidencies of the Nineteenth Session of the General Assembly.

→ S.E. Asia file

Original on 906/19/1

DA 3/3.

M. L. [illegible]

Permanent Representative

/fdb

Permanent Mission of Thailand
to the United Nations
20 East 82nd Street, New York 28

No.166/2507

The Permanent Mission of Thailand to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Permanent Mission of Australia to the United Nations and has the honour to state that the Government of Thailand has decided to be a candidate for one of the Vice-Presidencies of the Nineteenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly.

The Permanent Mission of Thailand earnestly hopes that the Government of Australia will lend its valuable support to this candidature.

February 19, 1964

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

207

3010/9/1

LJH.

I. 28344.

Dated: 15th October, 1963.
1445.

FROM:

Rec'd: 16th October, 1963.
2015.

Australian Embassy,
BANGKOK.

429. CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated Phnom Penh 24. (Canberra please pass)

Thai Cambodian Relations.

When I saw Thanat Khomn yesterday, I mentioned the press report referred to in Washington's 2690 (your 710). Thanat said that there were some discussions in New York with U Thant and the Cambodian representative seemed to be reasonable. However, Sihanouk has not ceased to attack Thailand and the Phnom Penh press continues to be hostile, and it was hard to see how in these circumstances, any return to normality could be expected. Thanat who is very emotional on this subject said that Thailand "was in no hurry".

A/MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE.
P.M.'s.

16th October, 1963.

SEC FAS(1, 2, 4) AS(JIC) S&SEA M&I M DL INT UN PACAM
AMSP EA EAMEC INF MT

PHNOM PENH

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD SAVINGRAM

2010/9/1

206

:GS

I.26469

DATED: 28TH SEPTEMBER, 1963

FROM: REC'D: 30TH SEPTEMBER, 1963

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS,
NEW YORK.

SAV.82. UNCLASSIFIED.

WASHINGTON FOR INFORMATION, REPEATED LONDON SAV.686, OTTAWA SAV.644.

UNITED NATIONS GENERAL DEBATE.

SPEAKERS YESTERDAY WERE ALBANIA THAILAND NEPAL AND ITALY AND GHANA INDONESIA AND CHILE.

RIGHTS OF REPLY WERE EXERCISED BY AUSTRIA, ITALY, MALAYSIA, AND UNITED KINGDOM.

2. ALBANIA PRESENTED VIEWS ON THE WORLD SITUATION INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM PEKING'S EXCEPT PERHAPS FOR VEILING ITS ATTACKS ON THE U.S.S.R. AND IN NOT REFERRING TO A DIVISION OF THE WORLD INTO WHITE AND COLOURED.

3. THAILAND (THANAT) SPOKE FEELINGLY OF THE PROBLEMS POSED BY SUBVERSION AND COVERT AGGRESSION WHICH THE TEST BAN TREATY LEFT UNTOUCHED, REFERRED IN MODERATE TERMS, THOUGH WITH A BIT OF A STING IN THE TAIL, TO THAI-CAMBODIAN TROUBLES, AND EMPHASIZED THE BLOCKS PLACED IN THE WAY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE SMALLER COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY THOSE RELYING ON THE EXPORT OF PRIMARY COMMODITIES.

WELCOMED MALAYSIA.

SPOKE IN SORROW ON SOUTH VIETNAM.

4. NEPAL. RESPONSIBILITY FOR DISARMAMENT LAY WITH THE GREAT POWERS BECAUSE THEY ALONE COULD START GLOBAL WAR.

SPOKE ON CHINESE REPRESENTATION, COLONIALISM SINO-INDIAN DISPUTE, SOUTH VIETNAM APARTHEID EQUITABLE AFRO-ASIAN REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND FINANCING.

NEPAL'S FOREIGN POLICY WAS DIRECTED TOWARDS HIGHLIGHTING NOT IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES BUT ECONOMIC DIFFERENCES WHICH UNLESS MINIMIZED, ARE BOUND TO BECOME A THREAT TO WORLD PEACE.

5. ITALY CONCENTRATED ON DISARMAMENT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

REPLIED TO AUSTRIA ON ALTO ADIGE.

6. GHANA (BOTSIO) DEVOTED MUCH TIME TO DISARMAMENT AND NUCLEAR TESTS AND SAID FOREIGN MILITARY BASES WERE DECIDEDLY A DANGER TO PEACE.

HE SPOKE ON CHINESE REPRESENTATION, THE STIGMA OF COLONIALISM

.../2

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
10 SEP 1963
3010/9/1
CANBERRA

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
BANGKOK.

In reply quote No.

Memorandum No. 1320

6th September, 1963.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

I enclose a press account of an interview with the Foreign Minister on the subject of his forthcoming trip abroad, as of possible interest.

(A.H. Borthwick)
Counsellor

P.A.
Mr Bentley GPS
Mr D. Wilson

Talks With Thant On Khmer, With Others On Steel

Most Pressing Problem At General Assembly Is Economic One

By Theh Chongkhadikij
Post City Editor

When Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman leaves Thailand later this month for the United Nations General Assembly, he will carry out certain important missions for Government and country.

First, at the United Nations Headquarters, he will discuss with U Thant, Secretary-General of the United Nations, Thailand's relations with Cambodia.

Second, within the General Assembly, he will (1) participate in the discussion on the nuclear test ban agreement to which Thailand is a party; (2) make moves jointly with other developing countries for an appropriate balance in the prices of primary products and those of manufactured goods; and (3) work for increase in memberships of the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and other important bodies of the UN.

Third, outside the United Nations, in America and other countries, he will hold talks and conduct negotiations with interested concerns with the objective of having a steel industry established in Thailand.

Delegation Members

Yesterday the Cabinet named Nai Thanat as the leader of the Thai Delegation to the 18th General Assembly in New York which will open September 17. Nai Direk Jayanama, Ambassador to Bonn, is the alternate leader taking over when Nai Thanat is not in New York.

Other members are Nai Somchai Anumanrajdhon, Ambassador to the UN; Nai Upadis Pachariyangkur, Director-General of the Economic Department; Nai Chamnian Kartinarth, Nai Anant Panyarachun (who will be secretary-general to the delegation); Nai Vichien Watanakun, Nai Sommai Visuthtitham, Nai Nissai Vejjachiva, Nai Kosol Sinthvanon, adviser; and Nai Paibul Maolanon, adviser.

Regarding the problem of Cambodia, Nai Thanat, in an interview today, recalled that the United Nations recently sent its Undersecretary, Mr. C.V. Narasimhan, here to find ways and means of solving this matter.

Mr. Narasimhan informed Nai Thanat that U Thant would like to discuss various subjects of importance, including questions to which Nai Thanat had directed the Secretary-General's attention.

The foremost matter to be brought up will be that of relations between Thailand and Cambodia, since the UN, at the request of Thailand and later of Cambodia, has been trying to effect normalization of Thai-Cambodian relations.

Nuclear Test Ban

Among the important items on the General Assembly agenda will be the nuclear test ban agreement which, Nai Thanat pointed out, has been signed by Thailand because of Thailand's interest in peace in the world.

Some other subjects—Angola, Rhodesia and other African problems—will also be discussed but they have no direct bearing on Thailand.

The most pressing problem, explained Nai Thanat, is an economic one. "While the prices of primary products are declining, those of manufactured goods are rising. These trends, if they are allowed to continue, will adversely, and most seriously, affect the economies of the developing countries which depend on sale of primary products to obtain foreign exchange with which to purchase machinery and other capital goods for development projects.

(Cont. on Pg 16)

16 Of 17 In Laos

THANAT KHOMAN

(Cont. from Pg. 1)

With the price trends moving in the direction they do, an ever-widening gulf will grow between the advanced industrialized countries and the developing countries, affecting the living standards of people in the latter, including Thailand.

"This is a situation not less critical than war. Not as dramatic as war, it is with us every minute, a silent threat insidiously undermining our livelihood and our living standards. Thailand considers this danger as serious as, if not more so, than war or subversion.

"We will find ways and means to have an appropriate balance between the prices of primary products and the prices of manufactured goods. I believe we will get much support in the United Nations because there are more countries like us in the UN than industrialized countries."

Regarding memberships in UN bodies, the Foreign Minister noted that the membership of the UN itself has increased 65 percent over the time when the Councils were first formed. "This is a question affecting the organizational framework of the UN itself."

The memberships in the Security Council, UNESCO and other bodies should be increased proportionately, he said.

Nai Thanat pointed out that there are political and other difficulties involved in the question. Explaining one of the political difficulties, he said:

"The Soviet Union has blocked attempts to increase the membership of the Security Council and would not allow an increase until Communist China is admitted into the United Nations or into the Security Council."

However, Nai Thanat mentioned the possibility that the USSR attitude might change as a result of the ideological dispute between itself and Communist China.

The permanent Thai delegation to the UN is getting support for efforts to increase the memberships of the Security Council and other bodies.

While abroad, Nai Thanat will talk with prospective investors on setting up of a steel mill in Thailand. A number of countries have shown interest, including America, Russia and Austria. "We will consider acceptance of a proposal on establishment of a steel industry that has no strings."

Among the American firms interested is Koppers.

The German firm of Krupp is conducting an economic feasibility survey for a steel mill.

Nai Thanat, who is also Deputy Minister of National Development, is departing for Phuket tomorrow to inspect tin mines and discuss with tin miners and traders the price of this primary product, and their problems. He is preparing himself with necessary knowledge for his missions abroad.

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
BANGKOK.

In reply quote No. 330/1/5

Memorandum No. 1240

CONFIDENTIAL

15th August, 1962.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.

U.N. Secretary-General

I refer to your savingram AP.86 of 23rd July.

2. The Thais are perfectly content to see U Thant continued in office and have no views on any alternative.

(A.H. Borthwick)
Counsellor

Original on 851/13

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

3010/9/12x3

SRG

I. 11593

Dated: 16th May, 1962
1726

FROM:

Rec'd: 17th May, 1962
1404

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK.

UN 682. UNCLASSIFIED. PRIORITY.

Washington for information.

Ottawa Sav. 422, London Sav. 476, Paris Sav. 84,

LAOS:

Following is the text of a letter, dated May 15th, 1962 transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by Ambassador Charles W. Yost, Deputy United States Representative to the United Nations:

Begins:

I wish to inform you that in response to a request of the Government of Thailand, the President of the United States has ordered additional elements of United States military forces to Thailand.

Your will recall that, in his address on September 25th, 1961 to the General Assembly, the President brought to the attention of the General Assembly two threats to the peace which caused concern to the United States. The first concerned South East Asia and the second Germany and Berlin. Consistent with the policy of the United States to keep the United Nations fully informed as to events affecting the maintenance of international peace and security in South East Asia, I am informing you of the President's decision. This decision was considered necessary because of recent attacks in Laos by Communist forces and subsequent movements of Communist military units toward the border of Thailand. The forces of the U.S. are to help ensure the territorial integrity of Thailand which now faces a threat of Communist aggression.

Ends:

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE
P.M's

17th May, 1962

SEC A/S's MR. LOOMES UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA@ SA SEA EAF&ME E INF DL MT IC

G

BANGKOK KARACHI KUALA LUMPUR MANILA MOSCOW NEW DELHI NEW YORK(UN) PHNOM PENH RANGOON SAIGON SINGAPORE TOKYO VIENTIANE WELLINGTON

SECRET

242

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

3010/9/1

BJS

I.27104

Sent: 8th November, 1961
1515

FROM:

Recd: 9th November, 1961
2105

Australian Mission to
the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

UN.1477 SECRET

Washington for information. London Sav.114.

Talk with Acting Secretary General.

Yesterday I had my first talk with U Thant since he became Acting Secretary General. He expressed his thanks for the message of congratulations and good wishes from Mr. Menzies which had been delivered to him earlier in the day.

2. On the Congo, he said that Zorin had pressed him hard for a Security Council meeting this week. U Thant had argued firmly against it and had pointed out to Zorin that nobody seemed clear on what was wanted to emerge from the meeting and it would be better to wait a few days until ideas had clarified. I told U Thant I thought it would be a good thing if he first had a meeting with the Congo Advisory Committee because his position in the Security Council would be strengthened if he had had this talk with the nations providing forces. I also advised U Thant not to be in a hurry to go out to the Congo himself and that it would be better to get a grip on things here first. He said that he did not see any point in his going to the Congo unless he knew beforehand that the conditions had been established for his mission to be successful.

3. I asked whether he thought of going out to our part of the world in the foreseeable future or of visiting Burma. He did not see any likelihood of doing either though he thought he might have to visit Cambodia and Thailand early next year in connection with the dispute between them. He attributed most of the trouble to Sihanouk whom he said he knew very well and who was very mercurial.

4. On U Thant's initiative, we had some discussion of Netherlands New Guinea. He said that "in their hearts" most Asian governments knew Indonesia was in the wrong. However, these governments now felt themselves committed by the decision of the Bandung Conference. In addition there were many emotional pressures including public opinion in some Asian countries. He asked me about the

../2..

→ 3010/9/1 241

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL

OUTWARD SAVINGRAM

PH

O.14243

Sent: 21st September, 1961.
1109

TO:

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK.

SAV. 159 CONFIDENTIAL.

Thais have agreed to exchange support with us. They are advising their delegation in New York by telegram.

MIN & DEPT. E.A. (852/18/1/1) 22nd September, 1961.

SEC A/Ss MR LOONES UN ER PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SEA E.AF&ME E INF DL IC

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

240

KFH

I.20176

Dated: 21st August, 1961.
1710
Rec'd: 22nd August, 1961.
1450

FROM:

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK.

File 3010/9/1

UN975. UNCLASSIFIED.

Washington for information, Ottawa Sav.708, London Sav.708.

Tibet.

Malaya and Thailand have requested inclusion on the agenda of the Sixteenth Regular Session of the General Assembly of an item "the question of Tibet".

MIN.&DEPT.E.A.
MIN.&DEPT.DEFENCE
J.I.C.
P.M's

22nd August, 1961.

MR.LOOMES
SEC A/Ss / UN@ PAC&AM EA@ AM&SP S&SEA SA SEA EAF&ME
E INF DL MT IC
BANGKOK COLOMBO HONG KONG KARACHI NEW DELHI TOKYO WELLINGTON

RESTRICTED

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
BANGKOK.

In reply quote No. 330/2/10

Memoranaum No. 1369

18th August, 1961

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.

Codification and Development of International Law

Please refer to our memorandum 974 of 15th June, 1961.

2. During a conversation with the Head of the Legal Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 16th August, 1961, we were told that the Thai Government had authorised the Ministry to have informal consultations with Australia, United Kingdom, Netherlands, United States and Japan about arranging a co-ordinated policy before and during the forthcoming meeting of the Sixth Committee. The Thais have not yet spoken to other countries named but will do so within the next week. Although their position is flexible and could be adjusted to facilitate the co-ordination mentioned above the Thais consider that the following topics (in order of priority) would provide an acceptable programme for the I.L.C.:

1. Consular intercourse and Immunities
2. Law of Treaties
3. Succession of States and Governments
4. Jurisdictional immunities of States and their property
5. Recognition of State and Governments
6. Treatment of aliens
7. State responsibility
8. Right of assylum
9. The Law of Overflight.

3. With regard to the views of the uncommitted countries, the Thais asked whether we have made any enquiries, and if so, whether we would be prepared to advise them on likely attitudes. Your advice on this enquiry would be appreciated.

~~SEA~~ Folio 3010/9/1

Original on 852/15/8

22/8

(W.P.J. Handmer)
First Secretary

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

238

→ 3010/9/1

JAJ

I.3832.

Dated: 14th February, 1961.
1720.

Rec'd: 15th February, 1961.
1910.

FROM:

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK.

UN.153. CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated Washington for Information.

Thai Mission expect appointment as Thai Permanent Representative here of Somcha (Former Thai Ambassador to Cambodia and later to Burma).

Plimsoll.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'s

16th February, 1961.

SEC A/Ss MR. EASTMAN UN PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA SEA E.AF&ME INF DL MT INTELL

BANGKOK

3010/9/1

227

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

::HP

I.10404

Dated: 10th May, 1960.
1640
Rec'd: 11th May, 1960.
0841
(Via leased channel)

FROM:

Australian Mission to the
United Nations,
NEW YORK.

UN378. CONFIDENTIAL.

Presidency of General Assembly.

Boland has given us details of promises of support he has so far received and his expectations from other countries. These details are being sent to you by bag. Philippines and Thailand have not yet promised support and he would be grateful of any assistance you could give in Manila and Bangkok.

.....Plimsoll.

A/Min. & Dept. External Affairs.
P.M.'s.

11th May, 1960.

SEC A/Ss LA UN@ PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA EAF&ME E INF G

→ 3010/9/1

3010/9/1

234

CONFIDENTIAL

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

LAW OF SEA - MEMORANDUM 7 (BANGKOK DISCUSSIONS)

With Ambassador Waller on 4th March I saw Prince Wan, the leader of the Geneva delegation; Chapikorn, acting Legal Adviser, Foreign Ministry; and U.S. Ambassador Alexis Johnson, who was assisted by the First Secretary (Ben Dixon).

2. Prince Wan said their position was flexible in the sense that they could probably accept any six-mile solution that could secure a sufficient majority for adoption as a convention. But they preferred the Canadian formula. He had had some difficulty in explaining to the Cabinet the various alternatives and he had been left with a good deal of discretion.

3. Prince Wan said there were no established foreign fishing interests which they would be obliged on the U.S. formula to recognise, though they were not altogether sure what Japan might claim. There was some Thai fishing in Cambodian waters which they might lose on the Canadian formula. But this loss would not be significant. Their reason for preferring the Canadian position was that many people in Thailand really wanted 12 miles, and the Canadian position was xxxxxx the nearest to that.

4. I found that the United States Embassy was completely informed as to the Thai intentions. They did not however appear in the least disturbed. I drew the inference that they were quite confident that they would, in the critical stages of the conference, get Thai support, and that they could rely on the element of flexibility in the instructions that the delegation had received. I was glad to find that Ambassador Waller took the same view of the Embassy's attitude. I do not want to be thought to differ from this American appraisal of the position.

5. I learned from Ambassador Waller that the United Kingdom Embassy had been entirely inactive in recent months so far as concerns the law of the sea, so I did not open the matter with them.

(K. H. Bailey)

7th March, 1960.

CONFIDENTIAL

3010/9/1/1

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD CABLEGRAM

JERC:HC

I.19919

Dated: 2nd November, 1959.
1800
Rec'd: 3rd November, 1959.
0830

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
BANGKOK.

531. CONFIDENTIAL.

United Nations representation in Laos.

Your saving telegram 55.

Thanad told me today that he considered, and Khampan Panya, whom he had seen this morning, agreed, that since any kind of United Nations committee in Laos was now out of the question, the best that could be hoped for was a visit by Hammarskjoeld, who would then have a United Nations Secretariat official in Vientiane. Official would report to him direct. Hammarskjoeld told him that he would follow this course even though the U.S.S.R. objected. Thanad believed we should avoid Assembly debate at this stage, although it might be necessary to return to the Assembly if the situation in Laos deteriorated.

2. On the question of a regional representative he said Thailand, Laos, and Burma had been agreeable and Cambodia, although reluctant, had also agreed, but subsequently had second thoughts. Hammarskjoeld had then dropped the idea.

3. He saw advantages in keeping S.E.A.T.O. in the background at present and pushing the United Nations forward. If, however, the situation deteriorated, S.E.A.T.O. might again be needed.

A/MIN. DEPT. E.A.
MIN. DEPT. DEFENCE
J.I.C.
P.M's.

3rd November, 1959.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

CONFIDENTIAL

F. 3010/9/1 Pt 2
3010/87/1

3010/11/87/1

Please open new file Thai relations with Tibet D.S. 19/10

AH: I.18561

Sent: 14th October, 1959.
1725

Received: 15th October, 1959.
0830

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
BANGKOK.

505. CONFIDENTIAL.

Addressed Canberra, repeated Australian Mission to United Nations New York 1.

Reference your telegram 585, Tibet.

The Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said today that the Government has already instructed the Thai delegation to the General Assembly to support the resolution.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A. (852/10/49/1)
P.M.'S 15th October, 1959.

SEC A/Ss LA MR.EASTMAN UN@ PAC&AM EA@ AM&SP S&SEA SA EAF&ME E ME INF DL INTELL

G

COLOMBO DJAKARTA KARACHI KUALA LUMPUR LONDON MANILA NEW DELHI PHNOM PENH RANGOON SAIGON TOKYO WASHINGTON

F. 3010/9/1

233

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

A.18416.

LS.

Sent: 12th October, 1959.
2000.
Rec'd: 13th October, 1959.
1251.
(Via leased channel)

FROM:

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK.

UN947 UNCLASSIFIED.

REPEATED: Washington (Mr.Casey to see).

TIBET.

General Assembly discussed recommendation of General Committee that Irish-Malayan Item be inscribed on Agenda. Under rules of procedure, speakers were limited to three for and three against.

2. Shanahan (N.Z.) supported inscription basing his case on Human Rights.

3. Ali Sastroamidjojo (Indonesia) opposed inscription on three grounds;

(a) Tibet is part of China, and hence item was ruled out by Article 2(7) of Charter;

(b) Communist China was not represented in the United Nations, though it ought to be;

(c) Inclusion would intensify cold war and sharpen lines of division among great powers.

4. El Salvador supported inscription, referring to events of 1950.

5. Kuznetsov (U.S.S.R.) opposed inscription. Real authors were not Ireland and Malaya but United States State Department which was acting in order to impede process of creating warmer relations between States. Action by United Nations would be intervention in matters of domestic jurisdiction which was ruled out by Article 2(7). References in debate to Human Rights were not justified because what had existed in Tibet was a cruel and barbarous system of serfdom. Democratic reforms were aimed at bringing about United Nations Declaration of Human Rights in that country.

6. Thailand spoke as a Buddhist State in support of inscription.

7. Roumania opposed inscription.

8. Assembly decided by 43 votes to 11 with 25 abstentions to inscribe item.

.../2.

CONFIDENTIAL 3010/9/1

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

I. 17184/5/6

Dated: 26th September, 1959.
1840.
Rec'd: 27th September, 1959.
0917.

:MP

(via leased channel)

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

2078. CONFIDENTIAL

Repeated to Austunat, New York (for Minister).

LAOS.

Following from Usher (Deputy Director, S.E.A. Affairs) on 25th September.

MILITARY SITUATION.

2. Military briefing by R.L.G. Defence Ministry on 23rd September (the latest official information available to State Department) indicated some minor skirmishes and some Pathet Lao recruiting and propaganda activity but otherwise situation was quiet.

UNITED NATIONS SUB-COMMITTEE.

3. According to United States Embassy in Vientiane members of United Nations Sub- Committee appeared to have been favourably impressed by quality of document submitted to them by R.L.G. Document gave account of history of Pathet Lao movement and treated recent military activity in three periods: (a) period 19th July to approximately 6th August, (b) period 6th to 30th August., and (c) the attack in Nam Ma River region on 30th August, which was treated in considerable detail. Sub-Committee had now submitted a questionnaire to R.L.G. to elicit details of R.L.G. dispositions during various periods, further information on particular aspects of fighting (e.g. regarding use of artillery on Communist side), and full list of R.L.G. Posts which were lost and those subsequently regained.

4. Usher said State Department did not yet have any firm indication of when Sub-Committee would be visiting Northern Provinces but expected that this would be soon. (He mentioned that R.L.G. ban on entry of Foreign Journalists into Northern Provinces was partly due to anger over press statements that there had been little or no fighting in Sam Teu area, and partly because Sub-Committee did not wish to be followed by train of reporters when it visited Northern Provinces).

./.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

I. 17184/5/6

INWARD CABLEGRAM

EVIDENCE OF VIET MINH INTERVENTION

5. Evidence of Viet Minh intervention to date consisted of witnesses who had been forced to carry mortars and other equipment by the Communists in Nam Ma River fighting and who claimed to have heared Vietnamese being spoken., and items such as shell fragments, newly manufactured grenades and other light weapons which it was believed could only have come from outside. R.L.G. had some Pathet Lao prisoners but nothing very satisfactory had emerged from interrogation of them.

NORTH VIETNAMESE STATEMENT.

6. Usher regarded statement issued by North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokesman on 24th September as a continuation of Communist attempts to discredit work of United Nations Sub-Committee. Statement was hotch-potch of falsifications and untruths.

7. Regarding allegation in statement that movement of United States Army Signals Personnel was cover for movement of United States Troops into Laos, Usher said that some United States Army Signals personnel had been sent to Laos in civilian clothes to improve communication facilities at United States Embassy in Vientiane which had been found to be inadequate for current traffic. He mentioned that United States in announcing movement of this personnel to the Far East had played down their significance but unfortunately move had coincided with routine Navy movement of some 500 Communications personnel throughout Pacific and this had aroused press attention.

THAI AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE INTEREST

8. Usher commented that both Thailand and South Viet Nam gave impression of "straining at the leash" in their desire to go to the aid of Laos. Their objective of course was to carry Western countries with them. He believed, however, that Thai vociferousness derived from genuine fears and desire to demonstrate that they would not lag behind if any action was initiated.

FLYING TIGERS.

9. Usher mentioned report from Hong Kong that group of American fliers were forming a volunteer air group to help fight Communists in Laos. There had been another report from New Mexico which quoted some flier as claiming to be Deputy Chief of this Group. He was reported as saying that Madam Chiang Kai-Shek would be providing Group with two or three C.46 transport aircraft and that Group was hoping to negotiate contracts with R.L.G. Usher said these reports had taken State Department by surprise and more information was being sought.

A/MIN.&DEPT. E.A. 27th September, 1959.
MIN.&DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M's

SEC A/Ss LA CONFIDENTIAL MR EASTMAN UN PAC&AM
EA AM&SP S&SEA SEA@ E.AF&ME E INF DL MT INTELL
BANGKOK LONDON SAIGON SINGAPORE

File please - 3010/9/1

File No. 220/7/2/5

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Record of telephone conversation with.....
Nai Vadhana Isarabhakdi, Thai Ambassador.

on.....
4th September, 1959.

Officers Present.....
D. J. Munro.
J.W.C. Cumes

MAIN SUBJECT(S):

Election of Thailand to Board of Governors of I.A.E.A.

Mr. Munro rang the Thai Ambassador in connection with the earlier Thai request that Australia support Thailand for election to the Board of Governors of the I.A.E.A., an election which would take place at the Annual Conference of the Agency in September.

2. Mr. Munro explained that he had now completed certain enquiries about support for the Philippines for the Far East seat. These enquiries revealed that there was a good deal of support for the Philippines and that if there were a contest for the seat, it seemed that the Philippines might well win it.

3. In these circumstances, we thought that it might be in Thailand's best interests not to stand for the Far East seat this year but to wait for the election to the South-East Asia and Pacific seat next year. If Thailand did this, we felt certain that they must stand an excellent chance of election to that seat next year. On the other hand, if Thailand stood for the Far East seat this year and were defeated, it might prejudice their right to stand for the South-East Asia and Pacific seat next year. In the circumstances, we would like to know whether Thailand proposed to continue its candidacy for the Far East seat. If she did and still sought our support, we would place the matter before the Acting Minister.

4. The Thai Ambassador undertook to cable Bangkok. He would get in touch with Mr. Munro again in about a week and would then advise whether Thailand proposed to continue with its candidacy or would wait to stand for the South-East Asia and Pacific seat next year.

DISTRIBUTION:

Minister				
Secretary				
A/S Div. 1	Pac. & Am. Br.	S. & S.E.A. Br.	M.T. Br.	
A/S Div. 2	U.N. Br.	E.R. Br.	Com. Rel.	Ex. Comms. Br.
A/S Div. 3	Admin. Br.	Finance Br.	Sydney Office	Melbourne Office
A/S Div. 4	E.A.M.E. Br.	C. & P. Br.	Inf. Br.	Antarctic Division
Legal Adviser				
A/S Div. 7	D.L. Br.	E. & T.A. Br.		

Report prepared by.....
(J.W.C. Cumes)

FOLLOWING POSTS:

Bangkok, Washington, Ottawa, London.

ACTION:

Await further advice from the Thai Ambassador.

5962/58.

3010/9/1 229

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

FPG/JS

I. 15432

Dated: 3rd September, 1959.
1845
Recd: 4th September, 1959.
0830

(VIA LEASED CHANNEL)

FROM:

Australian High Commission,
O T T A W A.

399. CONFIDENTIAL. PRIORITY.

Repeated Washington no. 502, London savingram 55.

I.A.E.A. Board of Governors.

Miss Burwash (External Affairs) has indicated Canadians intend supporting the Philippines. They feel it is inappropriate for Thailand to offer for this regional seat and that it would be preferable if Thailand waited until next year. Miss Burwash understood that the United States would support the Philippines.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. I/C A.A.E.C.
A.A.E.C.
TREASURY
P.M.'s. DEPT.
P.M.'s.

4th September, 1959.

SEC A/Ss LA MR. EASTMAN UN ERO PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA E.AF&ME E INF DL INTELL C&P

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. CONFIDENTIAL

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

MP:FPG 0.11550

Sent: 3rd September, 1959
1925
* (Via leased channel)

TO:

Australian Embassy,
* WASHINGTON. 1075

Australian High Commission,
* OTTAWA. 305

Australian High Commission,
LONDON. 2525 (FOR EXTERNAL)

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY.

Our 1051. Washington.
294. Ottawa.
Sav. 17. London.

I.A.E.A. Board of Governors.

Glad urgent advice regarding support for Phillipines and Thailand.

A/ MIN. & DEPT. E.A.(720/7/2/5)
MIN. I/C A.A.E.C.
P.M.'S DEPT.
A.A.E.C.
P.M.'S.

4th September, 1959.

SEC A/Ss UN ER@ PAC&AM EA AM&SP S&SEA SA SEA E.AF&E
E INF

F. 3010/9/1

227

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD SAVINGRAM

..MMc

I.15298

Dated: 28th August 1959

Rec'd: 3rd September 1959

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
BANGKOK.

SAVING 31. UNCLASSIFIED.

United Nations - Thai Policy.

Minister of Foreign Affairs stated yesterday that Thai United Nations delegation would be as follows:-

Leader - Nai Thanad Khoman - Foreign Minister
Prince Wan - Deputy Prime Minister
Luang Visutr Arthayuk - Ambassador in Washington
Luang Bhadravadi - Ambassador in Pakistan
Nai Konthi Suphamongkol - Former Ambassador in Canberra
Prince Jotesri Devakul - Minister in Washington
Nai Proti Visessurakan
Nai Anand Panyarachun
Nai Savan Phingprayon

2. Thanad does not expect to stay long in America after the S.E.A.T.O. meeting in Washington and Prince Wan will then head the Delegation - Prince Wan will also attend the Law of the Sea meetings in Geneva. It was not originally intended to include Prince Wan in the Delegation to the Assembly and his inclusion has pleased the old man greatly.

3. Thanad is not seeking election to any office this year but will be a candidate for Eco.Soc. next year.

4. Thanad stated that "Thailand would side neither with France nor the Algerian Nationalists on the question of Algeria" but will seek a realistic solution based on common ground between the two parties. "In global policy, Thailand will strive for compromise solutions..... In Asian-African policy, Thailand will strive for achievement of interests of this minority group because it is one of it but it will not do so at the expense of global interests. On regional policy, Thailand will strive for stability in South East Asia".

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A. 3rd September, 1959.

SEC A/Ss LA MR. EASTMAN UN@ PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA
SA SEA E.AF&ME E INF DL MT INTELL

GENEVA NEW YORK (UN) WASHINGTON

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

RESTRICTED

F. 3010/9/1 126

~~F. 3040/9/1~~

~~F. 3040/11/161~~

CW I.15120

Dated: 28th August, 1959.

Rec'd: 29th August, 1959.
1618
(Transmitted via leased channel)

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

1820. RESTRICTED.

(Information copy London and Ottawa).

I.A.E.A. Board of Governors.

Your 1051 and our 1631.

1. In reply to Thai approach the State Department had said that the United States had already told the Philippines that the United States would support its candidature for South East Asia Seat. The Thais had also been told that their proposal to stand for either the South Asia or Far East seat raised certain difficulties as Thailand was considered to be in the South East Asia region. It had in fact been elected as Vice President from that region at the last Conference and had contested this seat against Indonesia in 1958.

2. The Thais had been told that United States was not as yet committed for the South Asia seat but that the United States thought it would be preferable for Thailand to prepare ground for election to the South East Asia seat next year.

3. Keller (United Nations Political Affairs) told us that the State Department disliked 'area hopping' and hoped that Thailand would not stand for election this year.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. I/C A.A.E.C.
CHAIRMAN A.A.E.C.
P.M'S DEPT.
P.M'S

30th August, 1959.

SEC A/Ss UN ER COMREL PAC&AM EA AM&SP S&SEA
SEA E.AF&ME E INF

SEOUL KARACHI TOKYO

RESTRICTED

F.3010/9/1

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. CONFIDENTIAL

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

225

FPG:CW 0.11279

Sent: 28th August, 1959.
1836
(☆ Transmitted via leased channel)

TO:

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.....1051 ☆

Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA.....294 ☆

REPEAT

Australian High Commission,
LONDON.....SAV.17 (Washington please pass)

CONFIDENTIAL.

Our 914 Washington
235 Ottawa
Saving 113 E.A.London (Your Saving 335 refers).

I.A.E.A. Board of Governors.

Please advise present degree of support for Phillipines and your assessment of support for Thailand if latter decide to contest seat against Philippines.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. I/C A.A.E.C.
CHAIRMAN A.A.E.C.
P.M'S DEPT.
P.M'S

31st August, 1959.

SEC A/Ss UNER PAC&AM EA AM&SP S&SEA SA SEA
E.AF&ME E INF

CONFIDENTIAL

File No. 3010/9/1/1

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Record of Conversation with Professor Philp, Acting Professor of Education, Sydney.

on 29th April, 1959

Officers Present W.D. Forsyth

R. Throssell

3010/9/1/1

MAIN SUBJECT(S):

Professor Philp: Appointment in Thailand.

Professor Philp said he had applied for appointment as Director of the UNESCO Institute of Child Development in Bangkok. He understood that there were two candidates under final consideration: An American and himself. He asked if the Department would consider that there was any special interest in the appointment of an Australian.

2. Mr. Forsyth explained that the selection of personnel for Technical Assistance appointments, such as this, was in the hands of the Technical Assistance Administration and the Specialized Agency concerned, in this case UNESCO and was subject to the confirmation by the host Government. The sponsorship of the Australian Government was not required, and it was not the policy of the Government to intervene in international appointments, except in very exceptional circumstances. Should the Thai Government request the views of the Australian Embassy in Bangkok, Mr. Forsyth was sure that the Department would be able to inform the Ambassador that we have no objection to Professor Philps appointment.

3. Professor Philp said that he had no knowledge of the American candidate. He understood that the Institute had failed in the past to provide adequately for the training of Thai experts. He understood that the new appointment had been made on the recommendation of a visiting committee of inquiry of which Professor Oeser of Melbourne was a member. (We are informed that Professor Oeser is a candidate for the appointment).

4. Professor Philp believed that as Director of the Institute he would be able to influence the selection of Thai candidates for training in Australia and improve the quality of trainees coming to this country.

5. Mr. Forsyth undertook to have a study made by the appropriate Branches of the question whether there would be any special interest in the appointment of an Australian which might justify our exercising whatever influence might be permissable with the Thai authorities.

DISTRIBUTION:

Minister				
Secretary				
A/S Div. 1	Pac. & Am. Br.	S. & S.E.A. Br.	M.T. Br.	
A/S Div. 2	U.N. Br.	E.R. Br.	Com. Rel.	Ex. Comms. Br.
A/S Div. 3	Admin. Br.	Finance Br.	Sydney Office	Melbourne Office
A/S Div. 4	E.A.M.E. Br.	C. & P. Br.	Inf. Br.	Antarctic Division
Legal Adviser				
A/S Div. 7	D.L. Br.	E. & T.A. Br.		

FOLLOWING POSTS:

Report prepared by R. Throssell.

ACTION:

5962/58.

F. file 3010/9/1 23

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
BANGKOK.

In reply quote No. 330/6/1, 421/6
Memorandum No. 526

30th April 1959

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.

The texts of a letter from the U.N. Secretary-General to the Prime Minister and Field Marshal Sarit's reply have been made public: They are as follows -

Secretary-General's Letter

"I was deeply moved by your generous gesture to send me a personal letter welcoming me to Thailand. This action of yours is an additional proof of the spirit in which you and your Government support the United Nations and its efforts. I can assure Your Excellency that this spirit has also in other ways been amply demonstrated through the excellent arrangements made for my stay in the Far East. I take this opportunity for sending Your Excellency my deepfelt thanks for the generous hospitality of your Government".

"You kindly refer to the mission of Ambassador Johan Beck-Friis. It was a privilege for us to assist the Government of Thailand and the Government of Cambodia in their efforts to re-establish friendly relations. We are deeply gratified with the outcome rendered possible by the attitude taken by the two Governments. I wish to express my warm hopes that on the foundation laid the friendly ties between the two countries will be further strengthened to the benefit of all the countries of the region, and indeed of the world. The Organisation owes a debt of gratitude to the two Governments for their statesmanlike approach to the recent difficulties which sets an example which, I hope, will receive the attention it so richly merits.

"May I, in conclusion, send Your Excellency my warmest wishes for your speedy recovery, hoping we will soon see you resume your important and difficult tasks. I regret not to have had the opportunity to pay you my respects personally but appreciate the chance to communicate with you, which your kind letter has given me".

Prime Minister's Reply of 30th March

"Your visit to my country and neighbouring States has brought home to the peoples of this region the good work of the United Nations for peace and international co-operation. This will not only strengthen their support for the United Nations but will also promote friendly relations among them.

"So far as the relations between Thailand and Cambodia are concerned, I can assure you that His Majesty's Government will make full use of the re-establishment of diplomatic relations, which you and your special representative helped bring about, in order to develop friendly and good neighbourly relations between the two countries.

"It is very kind of your Excellency to send me your good wishes for my speedy recovery, for which please accept my warmest appreciation and thanks. I am glad to say that the operation was successful and I am now convalescing satisfactorily, hoping soon to return to my task not only of developing the prosperity and welfare of the Thai people but of promoting the United Nations cause of peace and international co-operation".

"With my best wishes for the continued success of your own efforts in the promotion of this noble cause, I would ask you to accept, Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration".

R. A. Peachey
(R. A. Peachey)
Counsellor

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

301/9/1

LStL 0.440

Dated; 13th January, 1958
TO; 1229

(via leased channel)

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

SAV.2 CONFIDENTIAL

Thai/Cambodian relations : United Nations Mediation.

Our Embassy in Bangkok has reported that Hammarskjoeld recently appointed Baron Beck-Friis to act on his behalf in the Thai/Cambodian dispute, and that Beck-Friis will arrive in Bangkok soon. We understand that this follows Hammarskjoeld's agreement, at the request of both countries, to provide good offices, and attempts to find a solution at meetings arranged by him in New York between Prince Wan and Son Sann.

2. We also understand that shortly after the withdrawal of diplomatic missions in Phnom Penh and Bangkok, Cambodia sent a formal letter to the United Nations Secretary-General advising that it had severed relations with Thailand because of the latter's border activities.

3. Glad of any further background information concerning the above, and particularly the status and terms of reference of Beck-Friis.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A. (3006/3/3)
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE

14th January, 1959

CONFIDENTIAL

220

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

3010/9/1

SDP

I:17000

Dated: 30th September, 1958.
2200

Rec'd: 1st October, 1958.
1636

FROM: (Via Leased Channel)

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

NY898. UNCLASSIFIED.

Repeated Washington for information.

General debate continued this afternoon with statements by Bulgaria, Norway, Thailand and Costa Rica.

2. Norway suggested, if parties to Warsaw talks were not able in the near future to make progress, they be assisted by "small balanced group of nations acceptable to the parties "or perhaps by the Secretary General, with a view to arriving at mutually acceptable solution to ease immediate tension. Attempts to use normal United Nations machinery might prove difficult since Communist China was not/"no matter how /member severely we condemn resort to armed force to achieve ones aims, surely interests and issues directly at stake in Straits of Taiwan are not such as to justify on part of anyone measures might/ which/ jeopardise peace of the world ". Norway also referred to harmful effects of fluctuations of commodity prices. On Law of the Sea Canadian six plus six proposal was "reasonable and well balanced compromise solution". Decision by Assembly to convene second Conference was hoped for.

3. Thailand said policy of good neighbourliness which applied to Burma, Laos and Malaya also applied perhaps specially to Cambodia. Dispute over Shrine was family quarrel, Bangkok negotiations had failed but both sides had declared for further negotiations and for peaceful settlement. Thailand fully respected Cambodia's neutralist policy. Relations with other neutralist neighbours were excellent; no reason why those with Cambodia should not be. On the far East, besides Warsaw negotiations there were United Nations. Especially the Secretary General, and members with diplomatic representatives in Peking as instruments of conciliation.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
ATTORNEY-GENERAL's. DEPT.
PRIMARY INDUSTRY (C-M)
DEFENCE
P.M's.

2nd October, 1958.

SEC A/Ss LA UN CR PAC&AM EA AM&SP S&SEA
SA SEA E.AF&ME E INF DL MT C&P

G

BANGKOK HONG KONG TOKYO

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. CONFIDENTIAL

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

3010/9/1

DBB:ABK

O.11478

Sent: 10th September, 1958.
1855.

TO:

Australian Embassy,
BANGKOK.

321 CONFIDENTIAL

For Ambassador.

Your memorandum 1028 - Thailand's candidature for I.A.E.A. Board of Governors.

2. For your own information Australian representative on Board of Governors was approached at last Board meeting early in July for support of Indonesia's re-election to the Board after having served a one-year term only. Our Embassy in Djakarta was also approached subsequently. As there was no other known candidature for the South-East Asia and Pacific seat, and as usual term two years, we indicated to the Indonesians that we were favourably disposed towards their candidature.

3. Although we avoided a final commitment to Indonesia at that stage, the Acting Minister has now decided, following fresh representations made to us by Indonesia, that we should support their re-election.

4. In informing the Thai authorities of our inability to support them because of our commitment to Indonesia, please point out that the Acting Minister has approved our support of Thailand in elections to Eco Soc.

5. You may also indicate that whilst we cannot support their election to the Board of Governors of I.A.E.A. at forthcoming Conference, we will be sympathetically disposed towards Thailand's election to the Board at a future date.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. I/C A.A.E.C.
CHAIRMAN A.A.E.C.
P.M.'S DEPT.
P.M.'S.

(Cost £21/9/-)

11th September, 1958

CONFIDENTIAL

3010 | 9/1 | 218

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM CONFIDENTIAL

MP:CM

0.11090

Sent: 4th September, 1958.
1005
(☆ Transmitted via leased channel)

TO:

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.....1357 ☆

REPEATED

Australian Embassy,
BANGKOK.....304

CONFIDENTIAL. PRIORITY.

Your 1635. Presidency of I.A.E.A. Assembly.

Desire you follow up with United States Department on a firm basis our suggestion that Prince Wan might be suitable. You could say that our enquiries in Bangkok lead us to believe that Prince Wan might be receptive to the idea, but there is need to act quickly since he is due to leave Bangkok on 8th September for Europe. He is not at present scheduled to attend the I.A.E.A. Conference.

2. If the United States authorities agree we would be prepared to concert with them in an approach to Prince Wan.

3. We agree with your doubts regarding U Hla Nyunt and have expressed similar views to United States Embassy here.

For Bangkok.

Please inform your United States and United Kingdom colleagues of foregoing. Please note that suggestion of deferring date of commencement of United Nations General Assembly has now been dropped. We would not however think that Prince Wan's attendance at General Assembly would necessarily preclude him from also going to the Vienna Conference. Incidentally, we have not heard his name mentioned in relation to United Nations General Assembly offices.

Please advise early as possible.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.(720/7/2/4)
MIN. I/C A.A.E.C.
CHAIRMAN A.A.E.C.
P.M'S DEPT.
TREASURY
P.M'S

Cost £22/4/0

4th September, 1958.

SEC A/Ss LA UN ER@ PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA E.AF&ME E
INF DL C&P

CONFIDENTIAL

3010/9/1 217

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

LStL

I.15182

Dated: 2nd September, 1958
1458

Rec'd: 3rd September, 1958
0830

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
BANGKOK.

210 CONFIDENTIAL

Your telegram 300.

International Atomic Energy Agency.

Prince Wongsa (permanent Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs) told me Prince Wan leaves on 8th September for Europe where he will visit the Brussels Fair and see General de Gaulle in Paris, and from there to New York for the Assembly.

He is not at present scheduled to attend Vienna meeting for which Thailand delegation is mainly scientific. However, if the Assembly opening date is delayed I should judge he would be receptive to the idea of Presidency of the Vienna meeting.

A/- MIN. & DEPT. E.A. (720/7/2/5)
MIN I/C A.A.E.C.
CHAIRMAN A.A.E.C.
P.M.'s DEPT
P.M.'s

3rd September, 1958

SEC A/Ss LA UNC ERD S&SEA SEA INF C&P

E

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

3010/9/1

216

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM. CONFIDENTIAL

MG:SDP

O:10928.

Sent:29th August, 1958.

TO:

1900

Australian Embassy,
BANGKOK.

300. CONFIDENTIAL.

For Waller.

Reference your memorandum 1028 about candidacy of Thailand for seat of Board of Governors.

2. For your information we were approached some time ago by Indonesia who were at that time the only candidate for the South-East Asia and Pacific seat. We indicated that we were favourably disposed although we said we would have to leave final decision until closer to the Conference which is due to commence 22nd September in Vienna. Indonesia is at present on the Board but has had only one year instead of the regular two years term.

3. We would like to do something for Thailand in relation to the I.A.E.A. and we have been thinking that Prince Wan would be most suitable for the Presidency of the Conference. The general view is that the President should come from one of the under-developed and preferably Asian countries. We have tentatively mentioned Prince Wan to the United States State Department who think this well worth considering. Confidentially, the only other likely candidate is Bhabha (India) and neither U.S.A. nor United Kingdom is enthusiastic.

4. Would appreciate your views whether Prince Wan likely to be interested. We assume he will be attending the United Nations General Assembly, but this would not necessarily rule out his attendance at the I.A.E.A. Conference, particularly if the present move in New York for the deferment of opening date of the Assembly to late September were to be generally agreed on.

5. For your own confidential information, it would help us in regard to Thailand's candidacies in other organizations if Prince Wan were elected to Presidency of the I.A.E.A. Conference. Regardless of this, we would like to see Wan become President of the I.A.E.A. Conference.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A. (720/7/2/5)
MIN. I/C A.A.E.C.
CHAIRMAN A.A.E.C.
P.M's. DEPT.
P.M's.

(Cost - £32.8.0)

1st September, 1958.

SEC A/Ss LA UN@ PR@ S&SEA SEA INF C&P

F

CONFIDENTIAL

RESTRICTED

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
BANGKOK.

25

Title 3010/9/1

In reply quote No. 330/2/7.
Memorandum No. 103/58.

26th August, 1958.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

THIRTEENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY

THAI DELEGATION

I refer to your Savingram 0.10190 of 14th August 1958.

2. The Thai delegation has been only tentatively chosen; a final decision will be made in the next few days. It is not a large delegation, and is drawn entirely from the Foreign Office. It will be leaving Bangkok on 8th September. Its distribution between the Committees will be decided in New York.

3. The tentative list is -

Leader: Prince Wan Waithayakon (Foreign Minister)

Delegates: Nai Thanad Khoman (Ambassador to Washington)

M.R. Thuaiphep Devakula (Deputy Permanent Delegate to U.N.)

Nai Sawaike (Private Secretary to Prince Wan)

Nai Chapikom Settabutr (Assistant Legal Adviser - attended Geneva Law of the Sea Conference).

The Head of the Asia Branch in the Asia and African Department.

An officer from the Protocol Branch.

The First Secretary from the Thai Embassy in Washington.

4. A copy of this memorandum is being sent to our Mission in New York.

[illegible] G. N. Upton

(G. N. Upton)
Counsellor.

RESTRICTED

852/17/13/4

3010/9/1
3040/9/1 214

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. CONFIDENTIAL

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

O. 10678.

:MP Sent: 26th August, 1958.

*(via leased channel)

TO:

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK.....472. *

REPEATED (for information) SAVINGRAM TO -

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.....SAVING 206.* (Washington please pass to London)

Australian High Commission,
OTTAWA.....SAVING 70. *

Australian High Commission (for External)
LONDON.....SAVING 112.

Australian High Commission,
WELLINGTON.....SAVING 77.

Australian Legation,
RIO DE JANEIRO..SAVING 16.

Australian Embassy,
DJAKARTA.....SAVING 77

Australian Embassy,
MANILA.....SAVING 29

Australian Embassy,
BANGKOK.....SAVING 75.

Australian Embassy,
TOKYO.....SAVING 29

Australian High Commission,
ACCRA.....SAVING 16

Australian High Commission,
NEW DELHI..SAVING 37.

CONFIDENTIAL

ELECTIONS AT THIRTEENTH SESSION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Our Candidature for a Vice-Presidency

Please let it be known that following our normal practice we will support Latin American group candidates for Security Council, Trusteeship Council, Eco.Soc. and Non-Self-Governing Territories Committee elections as well as for two Committee Chairmanships and Two Vice-Presidencies. Also that if a Latin American candidate emerges for the Presidency our sympathetic consideration can be expected. Then draw attention to our candidature, stressing that it is for one of two "Western European and other countries" positions.

Rio informs us that support from Brazil and Paraguay is assured. Please follow this up.

Argentinians could be reminded of our support for Latin American candidates for I.A.E.A. Board of Governors (our 344).

Thais have told us to get in touch with delegation who will be informed of results of Bangkok's 'favourable consideration'. Please do this.

CONFIDENTIAL ./.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL

OUTWARD CABLEGRAM.

O. 10678.

2.

We are notifying Indonesia that we accept offer of an exchange of votes. Please inform permanent delegation of this.

Committee Chairmanships

Apart from Latin-Americans we are only indicating support to Japan for Hagiwara at this stage.

Security Council

Apart from Latin bloc selection we have said that we will support Italy as she is supporting for our Vice-Presidency candidature. We will await developments on Iran's candidature.

Eco.Soc.

In discussion please make it clear that we are firmly in favour of election of New Zealand to replace Canada. We will wait a little longer on Spanish candidature. Replacement of Yugoslavia by an Asian seems desirable to us as a means of taking pressure off the "old" Commonwealth seat.

As Indonesia has just served one term we would prefer to see the Philippines or Thailand take her place. As a choice here is difficult we would appreciate any comments on the progress of their respective campaigns. If Indonesia emerges as firm choice of Afro-Asian bloc we may have to reconsider our position.

Trusteeship Council

In view of Burma's unsatisfactory performance in the past we will await developments before giving our support. We are informing Ghana that we will support election to Committee on Non-Self Governing Territories (United Kingdom has done the same). If Ghana withdraws, as we hope, from Trusteeship Council contest we would be agreeable to support Ethiopia for the U.A.R. seat but we will make no commitment yet.

Committee on Information from N.S.G.T.'s

We will support re-election of China and India, Ghana and Latin American nominee. Please indicate to Indian Delegation that we will support them on assumption that India will be supporting our Vice-Presidency candidature.

A/MIN.&DEPT. E.A. (852/9/3) 26th August, 1958.

SEC A/Ss LA UN@ PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SEA
E.AF&ME E INF DL C&P

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

212

file 3010/9/1

HB

I.7997/98/99/800

Dated: 16th May, 1958.
1630
Rec'd: 17th May, 1958.
1810

FROM: (via leased channel)

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

NY.329. CONFIDENTIAL

Repeated Washington for information, London for External savingram 54, Ottawa savingram 45.

Thirteenth General Assembly - Elections.

Our 311.

Following is a roundup of the present position on the elections:-

Security Council

Retiring members Colombia, Iraq, Sweden. Announced candidates - Italy. We understand that Italy is generally acceptable to the Western European group to take Sweden's place. No candidates have yet come forward for the Iraqi and Colombian seats though Argentina has been mentioned as a possible successor to Colombia. A suitable successor for the Iraqi seat may present some problems. Iran served immediately before Iraq and can therefore be discounted. Malik (Lebanon) is a candidate for the presidency leaving a choice for this Council seat to be made, if it is confined to the Arabs, from among Saudi Arabia, United Arab Republic, Jordan, Morocco, Libya and Tunisia. Of these Tunisia, if represented, in the person of Mongi Slim, would be the best. He would face strong but not decisive French opposition. A United Arab Republic candidate cannot be discounted.

Economic and Social Council

Retiring members Brazil, Canada, Greece, Indonesia, United States, Yugoslavia. Announced candidates New Zealand, Spain, Ireland, Bulgaria, Afghanistan, Thailand, Philippines.

United States will doubtless seek re-election and we understand from the United Kingdom that Venezuela will succeed Brazil. This leaves four seats for seven candidates: New Zealand for Canada's - Bulgaria for Yugoslavia's - Ireland and Spain for Greece's - and Afghanistan, Philippines and Thailand for Indonesia's. The United Kingdom, with United States support are working towards the objective of

CONFIDENTIAL /wresting the Yugoslav

F.D

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

211

INWARD CABLEGRAM.

tui
3010/10/2

I.7401

Dated: 8th May, 1958.
1918
Rec 'd: 9th May, 1958.
1030

:HB

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
BANGKOK.

121. UNCLASSIFIED

McEwen, Minister for Trade from Swartz.

Pleased to report successful result in Thailand despite some economic difficulties. Organisation and publicity splendid. Full report shortly Canberra.

Regards.

MIN. DEPT. TRADE (C-M) 9th May, 1958.
E.A.
P.M's.

SEC A/Ss LA ER S&SEA SEA INF C&P

→ S.E.A. Branch

CONFIDENTIAL

DS 1641/2
SIAM/15/57

The Police Force of Thailand

Contents

1. Origins.
2. Para-military character of the Police.
3-4. Post-war situation: rise of General Phao's influence; use of Police as a political instrument.
5-7. Improved efficiency of the Police; organization.
8-9. Unpopularity of the Police.
10-15. Rivalry between Police and Army and between General Phao and General Sarit; their relative strength.
16. General Phao's attitude to subversive elements.
17-18. Intelligence system.
19-20. Temporary diminution of General Phao's influence, 1955-56.
21. General Phao's defeat by General Sarit, 1957.

1. The Thai Police originated in 1862, when 55 men, most of whom were Malay or Indian, were formed into the Bangkok City Police under the command of an Englishman. By the 1890s, this force which had expanded to some 1,500 men, with little or no foreign element, had become notorious for its inefficiency and its corruption: and in 1896 a British police officer was borrowed from Burma to remodel the force, which soon became a moderately well organised body of 3,500 men with, from 1902 onwards, a Criminal Investigation Department. Also in the 1890s steps were taken to form a police force for the provinces: a gendarmerie of 8,000 men was established, initially under the guidance of officers from Denmark.

2. Both the Bangkok City Police and the gendarmerie came under the command of a Director-General, responsible to the Ministry for the Interior. The force was organised in a quasi-military fashion: the men normally carried small-arms, and the officers bore military titles. Most of the officers were recruited to the rank of Police Second-Lieutenant by means of a qualifying examination and an interview by a selection board, though promotions from the ranks were sometimes made; a good many of the officers were, in the later 1930s and after, graduates of the University of Moral and Political Sciences.

3. Owing to the presence of the UMPS element, the Police were in general sympathetic to the Pridi régime in the post-war era and opposed to the militarist represented by Marshal Pibul; and at the time of Pibul's resumption of office in 1948 the Director-General, Luang Chart-trakarn Kosol, was himself well disposed towards Pridi. But General Chart sought to keep himself and his men aloof from active participation in politics and he retained his appointment. Nevertheless, the new régime felt some mistrust of the Police, and steps were taken to limit the influence of the UMPS element. A number of Army officers were transferred to the Police, nominally to strengthen the force; and the principal of these was Major-General Phao Sriyanond, who was appointed Assistant Director-General for Crime Suppression by Nai Khuang's Government in the interval between Nai Pridi's fall and the formal resumption of the Premiership by Marshal Pibul.

/4.

4. General Phao had, as a young officer, been one of the supporters of the revolution of 1932 which overthrew the autocratic monarchy, and he had remained since an ardent member of the militarist group. Before long his influence began to overshadow the authority of his nominal chief, General Chart: he set up his own headquarters, distinct from that of the Director-General, and his Crime Suppression Division acted almost as an independent force. General Phao and his men became notorious, too, for their harsh and overbearing attitude towards the civil population. The increased ruthlessness of the Police was especially noticed after the abortive Pridi coup of February 1949, when several Free Thai were shot "while attempting to escape". About this time, General Chart protested to the Prime Minister against Phao's harshness and his independence in action; but, apart from finding Phao's ruthlessness an advantage in suppressing civilian opposition, Pibul wanted to use him as a means for building up the strength of the Police to a degree which would provide some check on the power of the Army and Navy; Pibul had been restored to power by the militarists, but those who installed him in power might likewise remove him, and some alternative source of power was therefore needed. Pibul was thus reluctant to take any step which would weaken the ability of General Phao to use the Police as a political instrument for the maintenance of the régime, and in 1951, General Chart was transferred to the office of Director-General of Customs; Phao succeeded him as Director-General of Police.

5. At this time the force contained about 35,000 men. Under Phao's influence a good deal was done to enhance its efficiency and morale. The training of officers was improved by the introduction of a three years' preparatory course, of a military character, followed by a further course of two years, the last of which was devoted to the study of law; local training schools in the several police regions were also improved. Partly because of the respect which General Phao professed for the British Police system, officers were sent to the United Kingdom and to Malaya for training. New equipment was introduced: a good communications system was built up by the installation of radio-telephones between the provincial Police and headquarters in Bangkok; in the capital, the Police were provided with walkie-talkie apparatus, and the system of police telephone-boxes was extended. Measures were taken to improve discipline by forbidding officers to drink in public bars or to attend race-meetings, and another order prohibited love-making in police telephone-boxes. Some improvement in pay was secured; smarter uniforms were introduced; and prestige and self-confidence were enhanced by holding an annual Police Day Parade. By 1954, the Police absorbed 15 per cent of the national Budget and their strength had increased to 42,000 men.

6. The organizational distinction between the Bangkok City Police and the provincial Police was maintained. Basically, the Bangkok Police comprised, besides the headquarters administration under a Police Major-General as Commissioner, three territorial Divisions, namely, North Bangkok, South Bangkok, and Thonburi, each under a Police Colonel as Superintendent, and also a Patrol Division of which General Phao was himself Superintendent and which included a mechanized subdivision.

/The

The basic organization of the provincial force consisted of a headquarters administration under a Police Major-General as Commissioner, and nine police regions, each of which was commanded by a Chief Inspector with, as a rule, the rank of Police Colonel; within the regions, each province formed a police division under a Superintendent bearing the rank of Police Major. In addition, the Police included the important Special Branch of the Criminal Investigation Department, concerned with security and political work; a Water Police Division for river and coastal work; an Armoured Car section, forming part of the mechanized subdivision of the Bangkok Police; a War Tactics Division which, like the armoured car section, came immediately under the command of the Director-General and which consisted of a small number of parachutists trained for jungle operations on the frontier; and a Frontier Police of six battalions, armed up to medium machine-gun level, specially formed for watch and ward on the north-eastern and southern borders.

7. In addition, a Civil Defence Volunteer Force of some 30,000 men was built up; this consisted largely of junior officials and school-teachers, i.e. of men who could exercise local influence. Strictly this body was not a Police organization, but it was administered by the Ministry of the Interior and was in effect controlled by General Phao.

8. There is no doubt that General Phao improved the bearing and morale of the Police; but his measures were not unattended by disadvantages. Clearly, the Thai Police were charged with duties which, in any way in the United Kingdom, would lie outside the sphere of a civil Police force, though to some extent parallels could be found in British practice elsewhere: for example, the Frontier Police battalions in Thailand resemble the former Burma Military Police, which was legally a Police under the control of the Home Department but which was organized on a military pattern. In general, under the Phao régime there was increased emphasis on the para-military character of the force. Training in the use of all classes of automatic weapons, the use of armoured cars, the introduction of parachute training and training in guerrilla warfare, all stressed the abnormal character of the Thai Police, and led to criticism in the press. The Police were responsible, too, for censhorship of the press: for example, in June 1954, a Police notification forbade the publication of news about military matters or statements on international affairs 'likely to affect friendly relations' with other countries. Such circumstances necessarily tended to make relations between Police and public the more difficult.

9. Moreover, despite some improvement in rates of pay, the salaries received by the Police remained low enough to give an incentive to corruption; the carrying of arms and the resultant ill-judged use of force at times also aroused public resentment; and local police officers in remote parts tended to an undue exercise of authority.

10. From 1951 onwards, moreover, the Police tended to become increasingly a political instrument, used by General Phao for his own interests. Marshal Pibul, as Prime Minister, was initially ready to give General Phao a free hand in developing the Police, so that the force might serve as a counter-balance to the armed services; but General Phao soon came to aim at a good deal more

/than

than this. Till 1951, the principal service rivalry in Thailand lay between the Army and the Navy, and the Police were a third force which might be used to determine the issue as between these two factors and so preserve the Pibul régime; but after its attempted coup against Marshal Pibul in 1951, the Navy was reduced to impotence and ceased to be a political factor. The Police thus no longer served as a balancing force between Army and Navy; instead, the way was open for the Police themselves to come to the fore as the political rival of the Army and for the Director-General to find in this way an opening for furthering his own ambitions, which might include even an aspiration to occupy the highest office of state.

11. General Phao's position seemed to be a strong one. Apart from the power which the command of a para-military force conferred on him, he was not without friends in the Army, for he was son-in-law to Marshal Phin, Commander-in-Chief of the Army and from 1951 onwards Deputy-Premier; he was therefore not likely to be faced with a united opposition on the part of the Army. His influence was further increased when after the coup of November 1951 he became Deputy-Minister for the Interior and, in January 1954, also Deputy-Minister for Finance; in 1952, as well, he became Secretary-General of the Legislative Study Commission, the organisation of the Government supporters in the Assembly.

12. On the other hand, General Phao's pretensions and the increasing strength of the Police aroused apprehension among some of the personnel of the Army, who resented the rise of any power which might limit their own dominance. Relations of Police and armed services were usually poor: the Water Division sometimes came into conflict with the Navy over the custody of smuggled goods which had been seized; and relations with the Army were worse. In many instances the trouble was due to the arrogance of military personnel: thus military officers were likely to interfere when the police tried to arrest soldiers guilty of misconduct. For example, in 1952 the Police arrested some soldiers at a fair at Pachi, in Ayuthia province, and a party of soldiers then attacked the police post where the arrested men were held; the soldiers actually opened fire on the Police, who replied in kind.

13. In addition to this service rivalry, there was personal rivalry between General Phao and General Sarit Thanarat, commanding the First Army stationed in the Bangkok area. Sarit had his own ambitions, and his aspirations and Phao's were not reconcilable. The two were of an age, both having been born in 1908, and both entertained thoughts of the succession in the premiership to Marshal Pibul, who was ten years their senior, though Sarit perhaps disguised his hopes more successfully than did Phao and gave the impression that he sought rather to exclude his rival from the succession than to attain it for himself. Rivalry between them was apparent at least as early as 1951, and from this time onwards there were frequently recurring reports of tension between them and their adherents and alarmist rumours that one of them might employ force against the other. At times, however, common interest compelled them to co-operate: thus in November 1951, Police and Army combined to effect the coup which reintroduced the 1932 Constitution and which led to the appointment of Phao as Deputy-Minister for the Interior and of Sarit as Deputy-Minister for Defence. Yet a few months later their rivalry was again intense. In November 1952, General Phao tried to arrest a number of Army officers on a charge of conspiring to subvert the Government, and the

/Premier

Premier, Marshal Pibul, fearing the consequent wrath of the Army, had to intervene and insist that Phao turn his attention against the Communists. The Phao-Sarit struggle for place and influence arose not merely from their political ambitions: their commercial interests were also incompatible.

14. On the whole, in this struggle for position, General Sarit was the better placed. It is true that he was notorious for his dissolute personal life and that this brought him into disrepute and seemed at times likely to provide General Phao with a good pretext for pressing for his rival's removal; but on the other hand, he could be more assured of the loyalty of his subordinates than could Phao. Marshal Phin became more and more an aged figurehead and Sarit came to be looked on as the real leader of the Army. Admittedly, so long as Marshal Phin remained Commander-in-Chief Sarit could not count on the complete loyalty of the Army, but in 1954 Sarit succeeded Phin in the supreme command. Moreover, Phao could count even less on the complete loyalty of the Police. He had brought in more officers of his own choosing from the Army and had promoted likely adherents from among the younger Police Officers; in 1952, in a general review of the organisation, he managed to insert his own men into key positions, not so much by removing more senior officers as by putting his nominees into important secondary positions and allowing them direct access to him over the heads of their superiors. But though Phao seems to have managed to eliminate from the senior ranks any surviving attachment to the exiled Nai Pridi, his measures caused frustration and annoyance among the officers and led also to confusion and inefficiency. Thus Phao did not at any time enjoy the wholehearted support of the Police, while in seeking to secure his own control he sacrificed efficiency. Any advantage, too, which he gained from becoming Deputy-Minister for the Interior and for Finance was offset by Sarit's elevation to the office of Deputy-Minister for Defence.

15. The Police, too, could not hope to compete with the Army in the use of force. The Police had from 1951 onwards the benefit of American equipment and training, but so had the Army; and the Army's possession of American-supplied tanks and artillery gave them an overwhelming superiority in fire-power. The Army, in addition, numbered about 85,000 men as against somewhat over 40,000 for the Police, so that even if the Civil Defence Volunteers - of little military value - be included among Phao's supporters, he was outnumbered. The Police had the advantage of being a volunteer force whereas the rank and file of the Army were conscripts; and the senior Police officers were generally regarded as being younger and abler than the senior Army officers; but the jealousy prevailing between officers imported from the Army and the old hands weakened the position. So, though within the Police there was certainly a proportion of officers who could be depended on to follow Phao in whatever course he might adopt, it is improbable that at any time the force as a whole would have supported him if he had attempted to resolve his differences with Sarit by armed conflict.

16. Thus Phao could not hope to win the race for power by the use of force alone, and he sought to establish his position as the inevitable successor to the Premiership by means of intrigue and by collaboration with dissident political elements. This produced an equivocal attitude towards subversive forces. Though at times the Police would take action against, for

/example

example, Chinese accused of Communism, it was commonly suspected that others, who might well have been proceeded against, somehow escaped detection; and at times the Police appeared to deny that Communism represented any serious menace. There was little doubt that General Phao himself was in touch with subversive elements at home, such as Tiang Sirikhand who led the left-wing separatist movement in the north-eastern provinces, and with similar personages abroad, such as Son Ngoc Thanh of Cambodia, who used Thailand as a base for operations; his relations with the dissidents in Laos were equally dubious. In general, Phao seemed to have closer links with left-wing subversive elements than was at all healthy; and this doubtless arose from his need for political support wherewith to counter-balance the greater physical strength of the Army. He seems, too, to have sought to obtain financial aid by undesirable means. In this, he was equalled by Sarit: both, apart from their commercial interests, engaged in dubious transactions in respect of opium smuggling so as to gain funds wherewith to reward their followers; and Phao was almost certainly involved as well in the provision of illicit supplies for the Kuomintang forces operating in the Burma Shan States and in illicit deals with the Karen rebels in Burma.

17. One means whereby General Phao sought to strengthen his position was his control over intelligence work. From the early days of his connexion with the Police, he used his own adherents in the force as a means of obtaining information which did not always pass through the normal channels to higher authority. Thus he built up his own intelligence network which tended to duplicate and vie with the Special Branch; and in 1952 he established a special anti-Communist branch of the CID which, though nominally part of the Special Branch, came in fact to be its rival. In the same year he secured the abolition of the Central Security Committee. This was an interdepartmental organisation, composed of representatives of the Ministry of the Interior, the Army and the Police, working directly under the orders of the Prime Minister's office; there were corresponding sub-committees in the provinces. The main purpose of this organisation was to combat sedition, and General Phao provided much of the driving force. In 1952, however, the Central committee disappeared, and the local security sub-committees thereafter sent their reports to the Ministry of the Interior, where the Police compiled the necessary submissions to the Cabinet. In this way the control of security reporting to the Cabinet became Phao's monopoly.

18. This position did not last very long, however. Both General Sarit and Marshal Pibul disliked the situation and in 1953 a new inter-service intelligence organisation, known as the Department of Central Information, or DCI, was set up, largely under American guidance. Nominally the new intelligence agency was under the control of the Police and so under the control of Phao, but senior appointments in it were occupied by officers of other services and the Department as a whole was answerable to the Prime Minister. The special anti-Communist branch of the CID was detached from the Special Branch and became Division III of the DCI, but it remained located in the main Police headquarters and continued to be staffed exclusively by policemen: this measure was taken on Phao's instructions, and it no doubt helped to strengthen his position in relation to the new organisation. But the ensuing lack of co-operation between this Division of the DCI and the Special

/Branch

Branch led Brigadier-General Rath Watanamahat, Commander of the Special Branch, to recreate his own special anti-Communist section: this had of course the effect of further increasing duplication and jealousies in the intelligence field. Obviously, with these conflicting and rivalling bodies at work, intelligence was bound to be poor even by Thai standards, and this weakness in security-reporting was another consequence of Phao's bid for power.

19. Yet another intelligence organisation appeared when in 1953 a Joint Special Branch Headquarters was set up at Songhkla, containing officers from both the Thai and the Malayan Police, with the object of carrying out the newly signed Border Agreement by which, subject to certain conditions, Malayan and Thai Police patrols were authorised to cross the frontier into each other's territory in pursuit of Communist terrorists. On the whole, the arrangement worked well; and there is so far no indication that the advent of Malayan independence will adversely affect co-operation on the frontier.

20. For some time Marshal Pibul's political skill enabled him to maintain an uneasy equilibrium between Police and Army and between Phao and Sarit; but by 1955 Phao evidently thought that the time was ripe for a determined bid for power. Early in the year, Sarit came under attack in the press, and in particular in those newspapers which Phao could influence, on account of his private habits; and the departure of Pibul on a foreign tour seemed to give an opportunity to move against him also. There was reason to believe that Phao devised a plan for effecting a coup by arresting Sarit just before Pibul arrived home and installing himself as Commander-in-Chief; if this plan had succeeded, Pibul would have arrived to find Phao master of the country. As the plan leaked out, however, Sarit was able to take necessary precautions; and when Pibul arrived he took prompt action to clip Phao's wings. He was aided in this by a very bad opium scandal in which the Police were involved. Phao, seeing that he could not prevent Pibul from reasserting his authority, himself went abroad for a time, and in his absence his father-in-law, Marshal Phin, was removed from the office of Deputy-Minister for Defence; and though, despite losing the office of Deputy-Minister for Finance, Phao still remained Deputy-Minister for the Interior, Marshal Pibul himself took over the Interior Ministership and so brought Phao and the Police immediately under his personal authority. General Phao was also relieved of the appointment of Press Officer, i.e. censor. Other measures to reduce the power of the Police were taken: the Premier, as Minister for the Interior, ordered them to give up third-degree methods of interrogation and forbade them to engage in business activities; Phao's associates were removed from influential positions on Government committees, and efforts were made to check their monetary gains through their operation of Government monopolies and privileged companies. A redistribution of forces was announced by the Premier, who said that the Bangkok force was to be reduced and the provincial force enlarged, so weakening the influence which the Police could exercise in the capital. The Director-General was deprived of the right which he has so far enjoyed to put his force in a state of alert, and the exercise of this authority was confined to the Minister of the Interior. The relaxation of control over the public expression of opinion which the Premier allowed as part of his liberal policy in this period enabled the press to indulge in a good deal of criticism of the Police, and accusations of corruption,

/unlawful

unlawful detention, and even murder were bandied about. Thus the influence of the Police was seriously diminished.

21. Nevertheless, Marshal Pibul was not willing so much to weaken Phao as to leave Sarit with no rival; moreover, with general elections approaching, none of the three could afford to let their differences go to extremes. Hence during 1956 General Phao was able to regain something of his former position: in particular, he was appointed Secretary-General of the new Seri-Manangasila Party, set up in succession to the Leglisative Study Commision as the political organisation of the régime, and in this capacity he was responsible for the management of the Government's electoral campaign. An uneasy equilibrium, with Pibul trying to hold the balance, was re-established between Phao and the Police on the one hand and Sarit and the Army on the other.

22. When the general elections took place in February 1957, however, General Phao suffered a severe loss of face. There was much complaint that he had tampered with the election returns in the Bangkok constituencies, and criticism of the Seri-Manangasila's conduct in the elections was such that on March 1 the Premier proclaimed a state of emergency and put General Sarit in command of all armed forces, including the police. Though the state of emergency lasted only fourteen days and Sarit then ceased to command the Police, Phao's position was naturally shaken, while Sarit's handling of incipient disorder in Bangkok was so successful as greatly to enhance his reputation and to lead the Government's supporters to conclude that he was the man of the future.

23. Phao, however, was appointed Minister for the Interior in the new Cabinet formed at the end of March 1957, Sarit becoming Minister for Defence. Overtly, therefore, their relative position were little changed, but although, in pursuance of his former policy of supporting whichever of his two aggressive subordinates seemed at the moment the weaker, Marshal Pibul leaned heavily on the side of Phao, Sarit and his henchmen in the Army were no longer to be deterred from asserting themselves. When the issue came to a head in September 1957, Sarit and the Army seized control in Bangkok, unopposed; Pibul fled to Cambodia, Phao was put on a planefor Switzerland, and Sarit was left master of the field. No effort was made by any of the Police to resist the coup. So, as experience had shown before, in Thailand power rests with whoever can command the loyalty of the Army, and authority over the Police provides an inadequate alternative source of power.

Foreign Office,
Research Department

October 1, 1957.

CONFIDENTIAL 206

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

:CM

INWARD SAVINGRAM. I.12381

Dated: 22nd August, 1957.

Rec'd: 3rd September, 1957. 1215

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
BANGKOK

copy to 3010/9/1

Sav.17. CONFIDENTIAL

Netherlands New Guinea.

1. Your telegram 360 of 20th August 1957.

2. I spoke to Prince Wan as directed and used line taken by Sir Percy Spender on 25th February 1957.

3. Wan said that Indonesia had asked Thailand to co-sponsor a resolution. This they had declined to do although if it were realised in Bangkok that he had refused, he would be the target of political criticism. However, the Indonesian Government understood his attitude in refusing to co-sponsor. Thailand could not however oppose inscription. It had been their policy that the Assembly was the forum of the small nations and if they had a grievance, real or imagined, they were entitled to put it on the agenda. Thailand would therefore vote for inscription.

4. I argued at some length on the lines of your paragraph 2(a) but without much success. Wan said that, had there been discussions, Thailand might have felt able to abstain but nothing was happening and they therefore could not oppose inscription.

5. On the question of the resolution, he was entirely non-committal. Thailand's view was that there was a dispute under Article 33 and an effort must be made to resolve it. He saw little likelihood of it being resolved in the near future but if a dispute existed, then the Assembly provided machinery for settling it. He had sufficient oriental patience to be prepared to wait a long time for such a solution. Politically he was a realist and saw that Indonesia had little chance of effectively administering Dutch New Guinea at present. I interrupted to say that I had hesitated to dwell on this aspect but since he had mentioned it, I felt free to do so. On the one hand, the Netherlands, with considerable wealth and experience in colonial affairs had solemnly promised that the people of Dutch New Guinea should have the right of self-determination. On the other hand we had Indonesia, recently risen to nationhood, but at present in a state of political chaos, which wished to annex a piece of Dutch territory irrespective of the rights of the indigenous inhabitants. I described briefly the primitive tribal life etc. and the injustice which an act of incorporation would involve.

6. Wan did not comment on this but reiterated that a dispute existed. The Indonesians had asked him to use his good offices but he had suggested the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General had declined to act but Wan still felt there should be discussions. I then used Sir Percy Spender's arguments on the propriety of the General Assembly being used as a forum for territorial claims and instanced Thailand's own position vis-a-vis Cambodia. Wan smiled blandly but did not comment. He said that their attitude on a resolution would depend on its nature. He did not agree with our view that any resolution would amount to

INWARD SAVINGRAM. I.12381

an endorsement of Indonesia's claim.

7. I felt that I made little progress with Wan whose innate love of compromise inclines him to a weak resolution urging further discussions. It might be possible however to persuade Rak (Deputy Foreign Minister) to abstain if resolution is debated after Wan leaves New York.

A/MIN & DEPT E A

3rd September, 1957.

204

File No. 72/2/5.

Memo No. 1162/57.

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY.

BANGKOK.

In reply quote No.: .....

Memo No.: .....

15th August, 1957.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

THAI DELEGATION TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The Thai delegation to the forthcoming session of the General Assembly will be -

The Foreign Minister, Prince Wan, head of the delegation;

Deputy Foreign Minister, Major Rak, deputy head delegation;

The Thai Ambassador to Washington, delegate;

The Deputy Thai Permanent Delegate to UN, delegate;

Nai Prasart Chaiyatho, Secretary to the Foreign Minister, Alternate delegate;

Nai Yuad Lertrit, Chief of the Translation Division of the Office of the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, alternate delegate and Secretary-General;

Nai Bantern Amartayakul, First Secretary to the Thai Permanent Delegation to the UN and Thai Consul General to New York, alternate delegate;

Nai Sawet Komolputi of the office of the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Alternate delegate;

Nai Padung Pattamasang, third secretary to the Thai Permanent Delegation to the UN, advisor;

Nai Sanan Plangprayoon, third secretary to the Thai Permanent Delegation to the UN, secretary;

Nai Ket Nawarat, attache to the Thai Permanent Delegation to the UN, secretary;

Nai Preecha Pahitdhanukorn, Chief of the Social Affairs Section, Social Affairs Division of the UN Department, Foreign Affairs Ministry, private secretary to the head of the delegation.

2. Yuad Letrit who is designated as alternate delegate and Secretary General was recently attached to the Thai Embassy in Canberra. He should prove a good contact for members of our delegation.

3. I am sending a copy of this memo to the Mission In New York.

(W. L. Morrison)
Second Secretary.

South East Asia:
for information

3010/9/1

Name of Paper: The Prime Minister's Press Conference File No: 401/1/4

Published at: Bangkok. Date: 22nd June 1956.

Algeria.

Nai Thongbai said that he had seen that the New York Times had criticised the action of the Arab bloc in voting that the Security Council examine the problem of Algeria. As Siam was onethe nations that supported the resolution of the Arab Bloc, he wanted to know the Prime Minister's opinion.

The Prime Minister said that it had always been the policy of Siam to support any resolution that was passed according to the Charter of the United Nations. Siam just wanted the matter to be discussed for she thought it better than to leave it as it was. Discussions often resulted in compromise he said. The Government did not think a special session of the General Assembly necessary and that was why Siam did not support that resolution.

To another question by Nai Thongbai, the Prime Minister said that he would be very glad to receive Colonel Nasser as a guest of the Government if he were to stop in Siam on his way to Red China.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA. 202

Name of Paper U.S. Information Service *File No.* 401/1/4

Published at Sydney *Date* 21st June 1956.

THAI PRINCE ENTERTAINED BY TROOPS IN ROK (2ØØ)

SEOUL, JUNE 2Ø -- A THAI PRINCE VISITING THE EAST CENTRAL FRONT IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA LAST WEEK WAS ENTERTAINED WITH KOREAN SONGS BY THAI TROOPS SERVING WITH THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND.

"ALL OUR BOYS ARE FOND OF KOREAN SONGS," THE THAI OFFICIAL SAID. "THEY ARE SIMILAR TO OUR OWN SONGS."

PRINCE JOTISI DEVAKUL, THAI REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA (UNCURK) VISITED A ROYAL THAI COMPANY COMMANDED BY MAJOR RUASAK CHOOMSARATOOL.

IT IS THE SEVENTH GROUP OF THAI TROOPS TO SERVE IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA. IN RESPONSE TO A UNITED NATIONS' CALL, THAILAND SENT A 4,ØØØ MAN TEAM, THE FIRST COMBAT TEAM OF UN TROOPS SENT TO JOIN UNITED STATES TROOPS TO COMBAT COMMUNIST AGGRESSION.

THE PRESENT UNIT RETURNS TO THAILAND SOON AFTER A 12-MONTH TOUR OF DUTY. MAJOR THAVARACHANT PARAMOCH, THE NEW COMMANDER, IS ALREADY HERE WITH OTHER OFFICERS TO WORK ON THE TURNOVER OF TROOPS.

AT THE PEAK OF THE KOREAN WAS, THAI TROOPS WERE CALLED THE "LITTLE TIGERS", A NICKNAME THEY STILL CARRY. ATTACHED TO A U.S. DIVISION, THE THAI TROOPS ADVANCED TO PYONGYANG, THE NORTH KOREAN CAPITAL CITY. MANY OF THEIR MEN RECEIVED U.S. COMBAT AWARDS.

***

SEA

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

UNCLASSIFIED. 201

WM:HMcC

I.16667

Dated: 19th December, 1955
1600
Rec'd: 20th December, 1955
0900

FROM:-

Australian Legation,
B A N G K O K.

404/1/4

319. UNCLASSIFIED.

Your telegram 380.

Twelfth Session E.C.A.F.E.

Regional Chapter Economic Survey whould arrive Canberra end of December. Other documents now coming forward.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A. (702/21/12)
MIN. & DEPT. C & A (C.M.)
MIN. & DEPT. T & C (C)
TREASURER & TREASURY
MIN. & DEPT. N.D.
E.P.D.
P.M'S.

20th December, 1955

SEC A/Ss ER@ S&SEA SEA INF

CONFIDENTIAL

200

AUSTRALIAN LEGATION.
BANGKOK.

FILE: 72/4/2.

MEMO NO. 520/55.

7th October, 1955.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

401/1/4

W.F.U.N.A.
(Your file 895/2)

I refer to our memorandum No.498/55 of the 30th September, 1955, in which it was mentioned that the Secretary of the United Nations Association of Thailand (Dr. Manu) had announced that the Thai Government is not prepared at present to accept establishment in Bangkok of a regional headquarters of WFUNA.

2. The Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Prince Dilokrit) was unable to give any reasons for the decision. However, an editorial in the Bangkok Post of 1st October suggests that the Thais have cooled off from the enthusiasm which surrounded the holding of the meeting in Bangkok. In retrospect, they find it a little odd that they have played host to representatives of communist countries (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, East Germany, Roumania and Red China - in the guise of observers from the International Broadcasting Organisation). None of these countries has diplomatic relations with Thailand. They find it disturbing too that these representatives were able to move about freely during their stay.

3. It is perhaps not surprising therefore that despite the fact that the wife of the Prime Minister (Lady La-iad Pibulsonggram) is now President of WFUNA, the Thais are not happy to commit themselves more deeply by establishing a regional headquarters here. The editorial suggested too that the communist countries would welcome the opportunity to operate from a WFUNA office in Bangkok, the headquarters of SEATO.

4. We have received confidentially a copy of a letter written by the Chinese Charge d'Affaires to Madame Pibulsonggram protesting against the exclusion of China from WFUNA. In this he has mentioned the coincidence of the visit of the three Communist Chinese with the distribution within the Chinese community in Bangkok of a propaganda leaflet urging the overthrow of the Thai Government by violence. We shall try to obtain a translation of this leaflet for you.

5. A copy of this memorandum is being forwarded to the Australian Commission, Singapore.

(Sgd.) W. H. Bray
(W.H. Bray)
Second Secretary.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

401/1/4 199

SHA. I.12346.

PRESS. Dated: 27th September, 1955.
1521

FROM: Recd.: 28th September, 1955.
0830

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK.

511. UNCLASSIFIED.

Thailand, Paraguay, Poland, Haiti and Iran spoke in General Debate. Wan supported SEATO, hoped for admission of the 14 recommended by Bandung after the forthcoming Geneva Conference, endorsed holding Charter Review Conference, referred to Bandung resolution suggesting Asian-African countries should have chance to serve on Security Council. Paraguay supported. Poland opposed review of Charter.

General debate will end on Friday.

A/MIN. & DEPT. OF E.A.
MR. GOSS
P.M.'s

28th September, 1955.

SEC A/Ss UN TA ER CR PAC&AM EA AM&SP S&SEA SA SEA
EAF&ME E AF&ME INF DL C&P

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OA:VA

CABLEGRAM. I. 10197

Sent: 12th August, 1955
1214
Rec'd: 13th August, 1955
0900

FROM:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

364. RESTRICTED.

We learn that Thailand is considering possibility of candidature for Eco. Soc at next year's election i.e. 11th General Assembly. They have in mind Pakistan Seat.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M's.

13th August, 1955.

SEC A/Ss L. & T. (DIV.4) M.R HOOD UN@ ER PAC&AM EA AM&Sr S&SEA SA SEA EAF&ME E AF&ME INF DL C&P

G

401/1/4

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. RESTRICTED

SAVINGRAM.

ABK/ABK. I. 10105. A7

Dated: 5th August 1955.

FROM: Rec'd: 11th August 1955. 1205.

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

SAV. 190. RESTRICTED.

Savingram 190 (repeated Austunat).

Assembly Presidency.

1. Ward Allen told us today that although the United States had given no commitment as yet, its support of Chile's candidature was almost certain; in any event, State Department knew of no other candidate.

2. Prince Wan had stated he was not interested this year, but would be interested in 1956. He therefore wanted this year the chairmanship of the first committee. Allen said State Department at this stage would prefer Munro (New Zealand) as chairman of first committee and Wan as chairman of Ad Hoc.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'S. 11th August 1955.

SEC A/Ss L&T(DIV.4) MR.HOOD UN@ PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA SEA E.AF&ME E INF DL C&P.

9

401/1/4

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

MK:SHA

CABLEGRAM. I.10004.

Dated: 9th August, 1955.
1118

FROM: Recd.: 10th August, 1955.
0830

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

355. RESTRICTED.

Security Council.

Your memorandum 429. The question of candidacy of Thailand not being actively pursued. Memorandum by tomorrow's bag.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'s

10th August, 1955.

SEC A/Ss L&T(DIV 4) MR HOOD UN@ PAC&AM AM&SP S&SEA SA SEA EAF&ME E INF DL C&P

9

401/1/4

RESTRICTED

COPY

OF LETTER FROM
AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS
4510 EMPIRE STATE BUILDING, NEW YORK 1, N.Y.

11th July, 1955.

File No. 105/2

Memorandum No. 870/55

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra, A.C.T.

General Assembly Presidency 1956

Attached is copy of a letter from Prince Wan (Thailand) requesting Australian support for his candidacy for the Presidency of the General Assembly next year, 1956.

Minister.

WDF/emc.

→ ~~South East Asia~~ - for your files

401/1/4

C
O
P
Y

194

Permanent Delegation of Thailand
to the United Nations
20 East 82nd Street, New York 28, N.Y.

No. 154/2498

23 June B.E. 2498 (1955)

Dear Minister Forsyth,

I have been asked by friends whether I am standing for President of the Tenth Assembly. My reply is in the negative, for, this year, it is the turn of a Latin American. I am therefore postponing my candidacy to 1956 when it will be the turn of an Asian or African to be the President of the Eleventh Assembly. I would be grateful for your support and the support of your Government at that time.

Sincerely yours,

(Wan Waithayakon)
Permanent Representative of Thailand

Mr. W. D. Forsyth
Minister
Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Australian Mission to the United Nations
350 Fifth Avenue, Room 4510
New York 1, N.Y.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS File No. 401/3/4

Published at ..... Date February 15 1955.

S.E.A.

OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES

THAILAND

SEA

DELEGATION TO UN CONFERENCE ON ATOMIC ENERGY At a meeting of the Council of Ministers on 9th February (Bangkok 13.00) the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Committee reported that the UN had invited member nations to attend a conference on atomic energy in New York in August. The Council approved the dispatch of a Thai delegation led by the Deputy Premier, Air Vice-Marshal Muni Mahasantana Wechayant Rangsarit.

NITED NATIONS

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Distr.
GENERAL

A/2708
23 August 1954

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Eighth session

401/1/4

REQUEST FOR THE INCLUSION OF AN ADDITIONAL ITEM IN THE AGENDA OF THE EIGHTH REGULAR SESSION: ITEM PROPOSED BY THAILAND

REQUEST OF THAILAND FOR OBSERVATION UNDER THE PEACE OBSERVATION COMMISSION

Note by the Secretary-General: The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate herewith to the Members of the General Assembly the text of a letter dated 20 August 1954 which he has received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Thailand.

New York, 20 August 1954

With reference to my letter No. 259/2497, dated 7 July B.E. 2497 (1954),[1/] concerning a proposed additional item for inclusion in the agenda of the eighth session of the General Assembly, I have the honour to inform you that I have been instructed by my Government not to press for a resumed session of the Eighth Assembly.

I am, however, to reserve the right of my Government to raise the question, if need be, during the forthcoming session of the General Assembly.

(Signed) Wan WAITHAYAKON
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Thailand
Permanent Delegate to the United Nations

1/ See document A/2665.

Room 7. Please check 401/1/4 & see if there is a copy of this on it. If so, destroy this. G.P. 28/10.

→ F.E.A. for [illegible] 191 27/10

THE REQUEST OF THAILAND FOR OBSERVATION BY THE PEACE OBSERVATION COMMITTEE.

Subsequent Developments.

After the conclusion of the Armistice in Indo-China on 21st July, Prince Wan made it known that he would not now request a special session of the Assembly to consider the Thai request. It was felt that the urgency of the question had disappeared with the settlement in Indo-China, and the Secretary-General and most Delegations considered that there was little immediate need for the request.

During August, however, it was confirmed that Prince Wan was contemplating proceeding with a "modified proposal" which would not necessarily contemplate any immediate action but would be inscribed on the agenda of the Ninth Session and "disposed of". It later appeared that Prince Wan had in mind the establishment of a Sub-Commission of the P.O.C. in New York so as to be available at short notice if the situation should deteriorate.

This move was supported by the State Department on the following arguments:-

(a) Since it was uncertain whether the armistice would endure, there would be advantages in having United Nations observers in the area.

(b) It would be undesirable to drop the appeal at the point where it was vetoed in the Security Council.

(c) The Indo-Chinese settlement was bound to be raised anyway.

(d) With the Thai item on the agenda, the cessation of the war in Indo-China could be covered by inserting an appropriate phrase into a resolution designed primarily to put the P.O.C. machinery into action. Reference to the settlement could be made more palatable to the United States in this context than in isolation.

It appeared that the United States was prepared to go further than Prince Wan intended, for in their view the P.O.C. should be authorized to establish a sub-Commission and despatch observers at once.

The United Kingdom, however, immediately endeavoured to dissuade Prince Wan from submitting the item to the agenda. It was argued that such action would be tantamount to a vote of no confidence in the Geneva agreements, that debate would probably re-open the question of Indo-China, and that Thailand might fail to obtain a majority for the inclusion of the item. France also strongly opposed the submission of the item.

Following these representations Prince Wan agreed not to proceed immediately with the submission of the item. He reserved, however, the right to do so during the course of the Ninth Session. This decision was accepted by the United States.

GCL:JJ.

FILE COPY
GJP:HMS

190

CONFIDENTIAL.

401/1/4
MEMO. NO: 370

21st October, 1954.

The Australian Legation,
BANGKOK.

THAI APPEAL TO THE UNITED NATIONS

I enclose for your information a copy of a communication from the United Kingdom High Commissioner's Office setting out the United Kingdom Government's reaction to the Thai Appeal to the United Nations for a Peace Observation Commission in Thailand, received on 14th October, 1954.

JPQ
(J.P. Quinn)
for Secretary.

Similar to: Australian Commissioner's Office, SINGAPORE. 959
Australian Legation, SAIGON. 289.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

SAVINGRAM.

401/1/4 189

CONFIDENTIAL.

file

MB

I. 11812.

Dated: 14th October, 1954.

FROM:

Rec'd: 21st October, 1954. 1215

Australian High Commissioner's Office,
LONDON.

Saving 66. CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated New York Saving 9, Bangkok Saving 1, Singapore Saving 18.

From External.

Siamese Appeal to United Nations.

You will probably have heard that the Government of Thailand have been contemplating renewing their appeal to the United Nations for the despatch of observers to Thailand to keep an eye on the activities of the Free Thai movement in Yunnan. United Kingdom High Commissioner's Office in Canberra may have shown you telegram Y. 452 from the Commonwealth Relations Office, together with an accompanying memorandum containing United Kingdom Government's views on the Siamese suggestion.

2. In brief the United Kingdom authorities, while they will support the Siamese request if it is pressed, are not very keen on the idea, and will do their best to talk the Siamese out of it. While they consider that the presence of United Nations observers in Northern Siam could be a useful means of keeping a watch on developments on the border facing Laos, they feel that a premature appeal by the Siamese for the invocation of the Peace Observation Commission machinery might damage their chance of assistance on a future and more urgent occasion. The fact is that the United Kingdom do not consider that the so-called Free Thai Government movement at Cheli represents a threat to Thailand, and they discount Siamese allegations that Pridi is building up forces and infiltrating Communist agents into Thailand in preparation for an attack. They consider the Thai Autonomous Area to be a normal and legitimate part of the Chinese administrative system and have no new information to show that it necessarily has sinister implications in the immediate future. In conversation with us the Foreign Office have said further that they do not believe that Pridi now enjoys worth while support inside Thailand.

This seems a very sane assessment

3. I do not know how the activities of Pridi and the Free Thai Government are now regarded by our people in Bangkok and Singapore. A year ago I recall that there was some degree of anxiety about them in Singapore. I myself was inclined to feel that the difficult terrain, apart from anything else, limited the danger of any direct threat from Cheli against Thailand, but that the Chinese might be keeping Pridi and his associates in reserve for future use if a threat to Thailand could be mounted from a wholly Communist Indo-China. I would accordingly suppose that the Foreign Office are justified in their view that Siamese action on the lines proposed would be premature at this stage. But you may have more recent reports from Singapore and Bangkok that suggest otherwise.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A. MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE. P.M'S. 21st October, 1954.

SEC A/Ss Cr(L & T) UN EA SEA@ WEST A E CEN INF DL C & P G

189

MR QUINN

Please have copies of this sent in this week's bags to Singapore and Saigon.

J. Rumbold
18/10/54

P. Dove
21/10.

401/1/4.

CONFIDENTIAL

SIAMESE APPEAL TO THE UNITED NATIONS

The Siamese have recently asked the United Kingdom authorities to support them if in view of the alleged disturbing reports about the activities of the free Thai movement in Yunnan Province they should decide to renew their appeal for the despatch of United Nations observers to Siam.

2. Although the United Kingdom Government are concerned at the possibility that a threat might develop from Yunnan or Laos, the evidence so far adduced by the Siamese does not confirm the allegation of an immediate threat from Yunnan. The United Kingdom Government fear that a premature appeal by the Siamese on this ussue may fail and the United Kingdom are therefore trying to dissuade them.

3. But the United Kingdom Government are anxious to help the Siamese and will support them if they decide to proceed. To refuse support would be damaging to relations with Siam and the United Kingdom authorities do not think that the appeal need give rise to a general debate on Indo-China. If it is successful, the presence of observers in Northern Siam might be useful.

4. The United Kingdom would not be prepared to agree without further consideration however to a formula which gave observers freedom of entry into Laos as, in the United Kingdom view, nothing should be allowed to distract the International Commission from their vital task of ensuring that the Communists abide by the terms of the cease fire agreement. Communist consolidation in Laos would present the far greater threat to Siam than activities based on Yunnan.

5. A memo on this subject will be forwarded shortly.

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

14th October, 1954.

401/1/4

187

THE REQUEST OF THAILAND FOR OBSERVATION BY THE PEACE OBSERVATION COMMITTEE.

Subsequent Developments.

After the conclusion of the Armistice in Indo-China on 21st July, Prince Wan made it known that he would not now request a special session of the Assembly to consider the Thai request. It was felt that the urgency of the question had disappeared with the settlement in Indo-China, and the Secretary-General and most Delegations considered that there was little immediate need for the request.

During August, however, it was confirmed that Prince Wan was contemplating proceeding with a "modified proposal" which would not necessarily contemplate any immediate action but would be inscribed on the agenda of the Ninth Session and "disposed of". It later appeared that Prince Wan had in mind the establishment of a Sub-Commission of the P.O.C. in New York so as to be available at short notice if the situation should deteriorate.

This move was supported by the State Department on the following arguments:-

(a) Since it was uncertain whether the armistice would endure, there would be advantages in having United Nations observers in the area.

(b) It would be undesirable to drop the appeal at the point where it was vetoed in the Security Council.

(c) The Indo-Chinese settlement was bound to be raised anyway.

(d) With the Thai item on the agenda, the cessation of the war in Indo-China could be covered by inserting an appropriate phrase into a resolution designed primarily to put the P.O.C. machinery into action. Reference to the settlement could be made more palatable to the United States in this context than in isolation.

It appeared that the United States was prepared to go further than Prince Wan intended, for in their view the P.O.C. should be authorized to establish a sub-Commission and despatch observers at once.

The United Kingdom, however, immediately endeavoured to dissuade Prince Wan from submitting the item to the agenda. It was argued that such action would be tantamount to a vote of no confidence in the Geneva agreements, that debate would probably re-open the question of Indo-China, and that Thailand might fail to obtain a majority for the inclusion of the item. France also strongly opposed the submission of the item.

Following these representations Prince Wan agreed not to proceed immediately with the submission of the item. He reserved, however, the right to do so during the course of the Ninth Session. This decision was accepted by the United States.

Supplement to U.N. Brief
prepared by O.N

GCL:JJ.

14.10.54

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

UNCLASSIFIED.

::HP

I.10875

Dated: 28th September, 1954.
2217
Rec'd: 29th September, 1954.
1500

EN CLAIR FROM:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

480. UNCLASSIFIED.

General Debate continued with speeches by Uruguay, Thailand, New Zealand and Pakistan.

2. Wan reserved right to raise Peace Observation Commission Item during Ninth Session. Thai Government believed preparations being made for large scale Communist infiltrations from Yunan through Vietminh into Thailand, to subvert Thai Government. Question of subversion in all its aspects should be studied so as to be considered by the General Assembly at a later session. Supported admission Laos and Cambodia.

3. Munro after reviewing current international issues, strongly deplored trend to disregard Article 2 (7): "We cannot but regard as fallacious and dangerous apparent view in some quarters that Assembly's duties are to remould domestic policies of States, liquidate their overseas possessions and arrange transfer territorial sovereignty from one state to another". Referred specifically to Cyprus but not to New Guinea. Described at some length forthcoming Samoan Constitutional Convention.

4. Zafrullah Khan stressed need for sound economy to maintain under-developed countries. Spoke of winning over uncommitted people of Asia. Referred to unaggressive nature Pakistan commitments.

A/Min. & Dept. of External Affairs.
" " " " Defence.
Mr. Goss.
P.M.'s.

401/1/4

29th September, 1954.

SEC A/Ss Cr(L&T) UN@ ER EA SEA WEST A E CEN DL INF C&P G

SECRET

401/1/4

The Request of Thailand for Observation by the Peace Observation Commission

Background

Following the invasion of Laos by Vietminh forces from Vietnam early in April, 1953, the Prime Minister of Laos, Prince Souvanna Phouma, issued an appeal addressed "to the United Nations, to the allied countries, and to free peoples" in which, after expressing the conviction that the free world would follow the struggle with sympathy, he requested "formal condemnation of the aggression". This appeal was later supported by the French Government. It appeared that although its appeal was made in somewhat unspecific terms the Laotian Government would have wished the matter to be brought before the United Nations. The French, however, did not favour this course for the reasons indicated below.

The Vietminh invasion of Laos caused widespread concern, particularly in Thailand and in the United States. The United States felt that the events in Laos should not pass unnoticed by the United Nations and exerted considerable pressure on France to bring it before the Security Council. The French, however, were opposed to United Nations intervention on the following grounds:

(a) They feared that internationalisation of the war in Indo-China might provoke overt Chinese intervention;

(b) they feared that a discussion of French Union matters in the United Nations would invite a general debate on the French colonial system, which would provide an opportunity for criticism by anti-colonial powers and for extraneous issues, such as the Moroccan question, to be raised;

(c) They considered the invasion to be an internal affair of the French Union, and contended that United Nations intervention would imply some recognition of the status of the Vietminh as a Government, rather than a rebel movement. They pointed out that, as a member of the French Union, the Government of Laos could not refer the matter to the United Nations itself without French consent;

(d) They pointed out that any United Nations action would not in any case be effective in stemming the invasion.

The Thai Government, alarmed at the threat which the invasion presented to Thailand and presumably acting to some extent on the advice of the United States, decided early in May, 1953, to bring the situation in Laos before the Security Council under Articles 34 and 35 of the Charter. A draft resolution was drawn up by the Thai Ambassador in

SECRET

Washington which, according to our information:-

(a) treated the question as a threat to the territorial integrity of Thailand;

(b) suggested the establishment of United Nations observation machinery under the Peace Observation Commission to observe the situation;

(c) avoided the term "aggression", although referring to the "invasion of Laos".

The Thai Government envisaged the establishment of a sub-commission of the Peace Observation Commission to be available in the event of an emergency. They had not precisely formulated their ideas on the scope of the observation to be requested, e.g. whether their request would confine itself to the Thai border with Laos, or to the situation in Laos, or would embrace the general South East Asian area.

On 11th May the Thai Government decided not to proceed with its request to the Security Council at that time, presumably as a result of the slackening of the advance of the Vietminh forces into Laos and also because of French opposition to the reference of the matter to the United Nations. They did not, however, abandon the idea altogether. They held it in abeyance and at several times during 1953 were reported to have been on the point of raising it in the Security Council. They continued to regard the situation in Laos as dangerous, however, and their failure to proceed with their submission of the case to the United Nations must be put down to the attitudes of other Governments.

France was opposed to reference to the United Nations of the situation in Laos itself or of the threat to Thailand for reasons given above. The French did, however, favour some expression of international interest. One tentative suggestion made concerned a "declaration of solidarity" by the nations with forces under the U.N. Command in Korea or by the countries recognizing the Bao Dai Government. Another French suggestion was that the Korean Political Conference should also consider the situation in Indo-China.

The United States, while anxious not to embarrass the French, felt that the invasion of Laos should not go without some formal notice by the United Nations, and favoured the action proposed by Thailand.

The United Kingdom did not favour an appeal to the United Nations on the part of France concerning Laos, and was apparently somewhat doubtful of the desirability of the action proposed by Thailand.

Canada was not unfavourable but felt that international cognizance of the situation might be achieved by discussion at a Political Conference, either that to follow the Korean armistice or a special conference on Indo-China.

New Zealand was at first doubtful about the Thai proposal but would have been prepared to serve on a sub-commission of the Peace Observation Commission.

The Australian attitude was, on balance, favourable. While not wishing to see French opposition overridden or to increase France's difficulties, it was thought that there would be advantages in having U.N. observation on the spot and that action of the kind contemplated by Thailand would not necessarily weaken the French position either in Indo-China or in North Africa. On the other hand, it was felt that there would be dangers in submitting the situation in Laos to the United Nations without knowing in advance precisely what we wanted to emerge. This would have needed prior consultation to discover how far the Western nations would have been prepared to go in resisting possible Vietminh aggression against Thailand. If New Zealand had not been prepared to provide an observer to a U.N. subcommission we would have been, and would possibly have asked for an Australian observer to be attached to the United Nations team in any case.

Recent Developments

The Thai Government held its hand until, during May, 1954, the possibility of an appeal by Thailand to the U.N. for observation of its borders was revived at the Geneva Conference. On 18th May, at a meeting with M. Bidault and Mr. Eden during the Geneva Conference, General Bedell Smith said that the U.S. Government thought the time had come to bring the United Nations into the South East Asian picture by reverting to the Thai plan. It seems likely that the urgency with which the Thais proceeded to make their appeal to the Security Council on this occasion, if not the revival of their plan, was due in part to United States pressure.

The United Kingdom and France were very doubtful of the wisdom of the appeal being made during the Geneva Conference, on the following grounds:-

(a) the threat to Thailand was not acute;

(b) the possible effect on public opinion. The appeal might be regarded as a "transparent manoeuvre on the part of the United States to secure United Nations cover for their intervention in Indo-China";

(c) the danger of opening up the whole Indo-China question for debate in the U.N. while under discussion at Geneva and thus confusing the situation and embarrassing the French;

(d) the lack of Asian support for the move. For example, India was violently opposed to it.

Nevertheless, the U.K. and France did not want to open up another source of friction with the United States, and therefore reluctantly agreed to support an appeal made by Thailand. They did, however, insist that the appeal should be handled in the United Nations in such a way that the Geneva discussion would not be prejudiced.

Consequently, although the Thai Representative in New York addressed his Government's appeal to the U.N.

Secretary-General on 29th May, the Security Council took no substantial action on it until 16th June. It was "vetoed" by the Soviet Representative on 18th June but no action has yet been taken to refer it to the General Assembly.

Security Council Action

In his letter to the U.N. Secretary-General of 29th May the Representative of Thailand drew the attention of the Security Council to a situation which in the view of the Thai Government "represents a threat to the security of Thailand, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security". The Thai Government therefore suggested that the Security Council consider the provision of "observation under the Peace Observation Commission".

The issue raised in this letter was placed on the agenda of a meeting of the Security Council held on 3rd June. This agenda was adopted by ten votes to one (the Soviet Union). The Soviet Representative opposed its adoption on the grounds that discussion of the Indo-China question to which the Thai letter was clearly related was unnecessary and would prejudice the Geneva discussions.

The Thai Representative was invited to take part in the Security Council discussion of his letter. He described the situation in Indo-China which prompted the Thai Government to lodge its request and suggested that a sub-commission of the Peace Observation Commission should be established as soon as possible with authority to despatch observers to "any part of the general area of Thailand on the request of any State or any States concerned".

The Representative of the Lebanon then proposed the adjournment of the debate under Rule 33(2), leaving the date of the next meeting to be decided by the President in the light of developments at Geneva. This was adopted by ten votes to nil. The Soviet Representative did not participate in the vote.

The Security Council next discussed the question on 16th June. In the interval attempts were made to reconcile the conflicting positions of the United States and Thailand on the one hand, who wished to press on quickly with the Thai request and to authorize the sub-commission to operate in any part of the general area of Thailand and the United Kingdom and France on the other, who wished to postpone United Nations action on the Thai request until the outcome of the Geneva negotiations was clearer, and to restrict the area of observation to Thailand itself. An agreed draft resolution was finally worked out and was presented to the Security Council on 16th June by the Representative of Thailand. It requested the Peace Observation Commission to establish a sub-commission composed of not less than three nor more than five members with authority:-

(a) to despatch as soon as possible in accordance with the invitation of the Thai Government such observers as it may deem necessary to Thailand;

(b) to visit Thailand if it deems it necessary

(c) to consider such data as may be submitted to it by its members or observers and to make such reports and recommendations as it deems necessary to the Peace Observation Commission and to the Security Council.

The draft resolution went on -

"If the sub-commission is of the opinion that it cannot adequately accomplish its mission without observation or a visit also in the states contiguous to Thailand it shall report to the Peace Observation Commission or to the Security Council for the necessary instructions."

In presenting this draft resolution the Thai Representative drew attention to his statement at the previous meeting of the Council in which he had suggested that the sub-commission should have authority to despatch observers to any part of the general area of Thailand on the request of any state or states concerned. He admitted that the wording of the proposed draft resolution was a compromise and added that it in no way altered Thailand's view that the observing body should be as close as possible to "the disturbed area".

The Representatives of New Zealand, Turkey, Brazil, China, the United Kingdom and the United States spoke in support of the draft resolution.

At the next meeting of the Council (18th June) the draft resolution was put to the vote after the Representatives of Denmark, Colombia and France had spoken in favour. It was vetoed by the Soviet Representative. The Representative of the Lebanon abstained.

The original plan of the United States and Thailand was that, immediately following the expected Soviet veto in the Security Council, the Thai request for U.N. observation would be referred to the General Assembly under the provisions of the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution. This was to be achieved either by requesting the reconvening of the Eighth Session or by requesting a special session.

The favourable developments in Geneva, however, coupled with the deadline set himself by M. Mendes-France for securing a settlement in Indo-China led the United Kingdom and France to urge the Thais to refrain from initiating action to refer the matter to the General Assembly until at least the 20th June deadline had been passed.

Prince Wan had in the meantime arrived in the United States for consultations with the representatives of interested countries. On 7th July he sent a letter to the U.N. Secretary-General which noted the rejection by veto of the Thai request to the Security Council proposed that the request be placed as an additional item on the agenda for the Eighth Session of the General Assembly as it "is still in session"; and indicated that a further communication would be made in regard to the date for ascertaining the concurrence of a majority of member states for reconvening the Eighth Session.

SECRET

Australia was not directly involved in the discussions of the Thai request to the Security Council, not being a member of that body. When the request was first made the Philippines and Indonesia were considering the desirability of seeking an invitation to attend the Security Council proceedings on it as an "interested" state under Article 31 of the Charter and we were approached as to whether we were considering a similar request. Although it was decided that we should not seek to take part in the Security Council discussions, the developments were followed with interest While we sympathised with the Thai request and could see advantages in having U.N. observers on the spot we agreed with the U.K. that the question of timing was most important. We felt that it would be unwise to raise this matter in the General Assembly and risk a possibly damaging full-scale debate on Indo-China until the Geneva negotiations on Indo-China had been given a fair chance to produce a settlement. It was thought that, in any case, the Thai request would not provide an appropriate basis for future U.N. action if the Geneva Conference failed to produce a settlement, in which case we would have preferred to start de novo and not on the basis of the Thai request. Moreover, the Thai request was opposed by India and we were anxious that any United Nations action in South East Asia should be based on wide Asian support.

AUSTRALIAN ATTITUDE

On 14th July, the Minister told the Thai Minister in Canberra that we were prepared to see the appeal dealt with as soon as possible after 20th July -- the Mendes-France deadline -- but that our position was, to a large extent dependent on that adopted by the United States and the United Kingdom. We have an interest in seeing that the Laotian border with Thailand is not violated. But, in the light of the Geneva settlement, which seems to imply that the Vietminh will not remain a substantial problem in Laos, at least in so far as her borders with Thailand are concerned, the urgency may seem to have gone out of the Thai appeal. All the same, there could be no harm in there being U.N. observers in Thailand who would be in a position to be quickly used in the general area on authorisation from the proper U.N. body. They should, however, not be authorised to operate in Laos and Cambodia (except in an emergency) since these states are "neutralised" under the Geneva settlement.

In view of our interest in the negotiations leading up to the setting up of a South-East Asia Defence Organisation, we are intimately concerned with any action which might have the effect of buttressing the peace of this area. U.N. involvement through observers might well have a useful purpose, and there seems to be no reason, from the point of view of Australian security and interests in the area, why we should not give support to the Thai appeal if it comes before the Assembly.

If observers are sent to Thailand, the delegation may indicate our interest in providing one or two of them.

182

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

V.:88

CABLEGRAM. I.10324

Dated: 14th September, 1954
1856
Rec'd: 15th September, 1954.
1410

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

898 CONFIDENTIAL 401/1/4

Assembly Presidency.

We raised your memorandum 651 of 6th September with Wainhouse (Deputy Assistant Secretary, United Nations) today. He said that decison to support Wan had been based not only on his personal qualifications but also on desirability of giving boost to South East Asia Area. Although United States has undertaken not to lobby further against either candidate United States commitment to Wan is firm. United States could not take any action which might be interpreted as withdrawing support from Wan.

2. Wainhouse added parenthetically United States might equally suggest to us desirability of persuading Van Klefflens to withdraw.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M's.

15th September, 1954.

SEC A/Ss CR(L&T) UN @ EA SEA WLST A L CLN INF DL C & P
G

LWG
GP

81

GG:MFP

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CONFIDENTIAL.

CABLEGRAM.

1.10122

FROM:

Sent: 8th September, 1954
1930

Rec'd: 9th September, 1954
1400

Australian Legation,
RANGOON.

401/1/4

162 CONFIDENTIAL.

United Nations Assembly.

Foreign Minister HKUN HKIO told me yesterday, he did not yet know what Burma would ask for in the K.M.T. troops item. He thought likely the delegation would make a statement that Burma was not fully satisfied and wanted the matter kept alive. He did not give the impression of wanting to force the pace.

Regarding Tunis he personally thought the French had made a genuine effort, but was not so sure about Morocco. In general Burma saw eye to eye with her co-sponsors, and would fall in with their wishes.

I do not think HKUN HKIO will over burden himself at the Assembly, and will leave things as much as possible to Barrington and Tun Shein.

He assured me that Burma would take more active interest in the Colombo Plan.

Moodie.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M'S

9th September, 1954

SEC A/Ss CR(L&T) UNO EA SEA WEST A E CENTRAL DL
INF C&P
G

8

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

GGA:SHA

I.9847

Dated: 1st September, 1954.
1651

FROM:

Recd.: 2nd September, 1954.
1100

Australian Mission to the United
Nations,
NEW YORK.

401/#1/4

409. CONFIDENTIAL.

General Assembly.

Netherlands Delegation have heard Prince Wan will make his final decision on Presidential candidacy after South East Asia conference and they infer from this that Wan may try to do some bargaining at Manila.

Forsyth.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'s

2nd September, 1954.

SEC A/Ss Cr(L&T) UN@ EA SEA WEST A E CENT PI DL
C&P
G

COPY

OF LETTER FROM
AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS
4510 EMPIRE STATE BUILDING, NEW YORK 1, N. Y.

179

1st September, 1954

File No. 105/2

Memorandum No. 1255/54

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra. A.C.T.

460/1/4

Ninth General Assembly - Presidency

The Netherlands delegation say that there are twenty-eight probable votes for Dr. Van Kleffens. These include seventeen commitments and eleven benevolent expressions of varying degree of reliability.

2. United Kingdom and United States delegation sources mentioned a figure of twenty-nine but we have not obtained details.

3. Von Balluseck speculates as follows on the Soviet position: they would probably feel that at this time they could not vote against an Asian candidate but on the other hand could not vote for an American sponsored candidate, especially from Thailand, which has not recognized Peking China. The Netherlands has recognized Peking and is not sponsored by the United States for this office. However, the Netherlands is a colonial power and there is an item of specific interest to the Netherlands on the provisional agenda and, further, the Netherlands is a NATO member. On these counts it would seem that the Soviet bloc would abstain in the Presidential election.

4. Balluseck added that he had heard that Prince Wan had said he would decide his future course as regards the Presidency after the South-East Asia Conference in the Philippines. Balluseck speculates that Wan may think that he can do some bargaining at the Manila Conference.

5. In totting up the chances of the rivals, Balluseck mentioned also that a second defeat for Prince Wan would be more damaging and therefore less likely to be risked than a defeat for van Kleffens. Although Kleffens has been a Foreign Minister, he is at present (by his own choice, on account of his wife's health) only Minister in Portugal whereas Prince Wan is a Foreign Minister actually in office.

Minister

WDF:fdb

Sean J. Plimsoll 8/9/54

Mr Plimsoll for info.

9/9

9/9

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS CONFIDENTIAL

CABLEGRAM.

I.9293
CET:CET Dated: 18th August, 1954.
1826
Rec'd: 19th August, 1954.
1130

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
W A S H I N G T O N

801 CONFIDENTIAL

Thai Appeal.

Today we saw Ward Allen of State Department who had little to add to New York's 384 to you. We did not, however, gain impression that United States was positively urging Thais to raise matter. Allen, however, said that United States favoured Thai proposal in general terms because:-

(A) It meant that United Nations would be formally seized of S.E.A. situation -

(B) United States has all along favoured establishment of Peace Observation Subcomission whatever results of the Geneva Conference might be.

(C) Russia (or possibly India) might attempt Assembly Resolution on Indo-China approving settlement "welcomed by all peace loving peoples" and generally indicating that tension has eased, that everything was now "all sweetness and light" and consequently that everybody could relax. In the event of such a move United States feel it would be advantageous to have United Nations seized of S.E.A. through Thai appeal.

Spender.

19th August, 1954.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M's.

401/1/4

SEC A/Ss CR(L&T) UN@ EA SEA WEST A E CEN INF C&P G

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

401/1/+ 177

RESTRICTED.

SA:HP

I.9229

FROM:

Dated: 17th August, 1954.
1625
Rec'd: 18th August, 1954.
9 a.m.

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

384. RESTRICTED.

Indo-China. Thai complaint.

United Kingdom and French Delegations saw Prince Wan yesterday in an endeavour to persuade him not to place item on Supplementary Agenda (which would have to be done by 22nd August). United Kingdom feel that specific debate on Indo-China would in view of Geneva decisions and establishment of Commission serve no useful purpose and might do harm. Wan admits that reason for Thai request had now largely disappeared but he still feels inclined to request Item on Assembly Agenda and United States is urging him to do so. Wan would request establishment of P.O.C. Committee which would sit in New York and decision will probably be taken by Wan by Thursday next before his departure for Baguio.

Min. & Dept. of External Affairs.
" " " " Defence.
P.M.'s.

18th August, 1954.

SEC A/Ss UN@ EA SEA WEST A E CEN INF C & P
G

SOUTH EAST ASIA

176

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

J. Plimsoll, Esq.

Dear Plimsoll 17/8/54

With

Mr. R. G. Casey's

Compliments.

RGC

And 14/d

COMMONWEALTH OFFICES,
TREASURY GARDENS,
MELBOURNE, C.2.

13/8/1954.

RGC/CVH

File 401/1/4 175

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

Commonwealth Offices,
Treasury Place,
MELBOURNE, C.2.

13th August, 1954.

I have only recently heard that you have decided to be a candidate for the Presidency of the next Session of the United Nations General Assembly.

I am indeed sorry that I did not hear such earlier about your decision on this matter as if we had known of it earlier in the year it would have been hard to look beyond you for this post, by reason of your wide experience and your undoubted and outstanding qualifications for such a position.

You will know, of course, that Dr. van Kleffens of the Netherlands has been interested in securing this position for some time and made it known to many delegations in New York as far back as December, 1953.

We took the position here that Europe had not held the Presidency since M. Spaak in 1947 - and that Dr. van Kleffens was himself an experienced and capable presiding officer. When therefore I was approached in Australia by the Netherlands Ambassador earlier in the year, I told him, after careful consideration, that Australia would support Dr. van Kleffens.

I know you will realise that it would not be possible for me to recede from this understanding and I must therefore tell you with great regret that Australia will be unable to support you in New York in September.

I would hope that some means might be devised whereby we could support you for this position at a later stage, perhaps next year. This would avoid the embarrassment, which I know we all feel, at having two good friends competing for this important position.

(Copies also sent to Mr. Tange & Mr. Shaw.)
Copy also sent to Australian Legation, Bangkok

R. G. CASEY

H.R.H. Prince Wan Waithayakon,
Embassy of Thailand,
WASHINGTON, D.C. U.S.A.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

174

O. 7352/3/4/5.

MK:MFP

Sent: 5th August, 1954
1800

TO:

Australian Legation,
BANGKOK.....103

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK....167

Australian High Commissioner's Office,
L O N D O N..1625

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON...517

CONFIDENTIAL.

Your 59. Australia committed herself two months ago to support van Kleffens of the Netherlands for Presidency. You should accordingly inform Thai Government that while we agree that Prince Wan is eminently suitable for this office we are precluded from supporting his candidature.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M'S

(Cost £29.6.4)
6th August, 1954

SEC A/Ss UN EA SEA PI DL
G

401/1/4

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

GG:HP

I.8692

Dated: 3rd August, 1954.
1800
Rec'd: 4th August, 1954.
8.30 a.m.

FROM:

Australian Legation,
BANGKOK.

401/1/4

59. UNCLASSIFIED.

My memorandum 280.

The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has formally requested Australia's support for Prince Wan's candidature. Request (of which full text follows by bag) invokes precedent of Asian President in 1949 and 1950 as well as Prince Wan's experience.

Min. & Dept. of External Affairs.
P.M.'s.

4th August, 1954.

SEC A/Ss Cr(L&T) UN EA SEA@ PI DL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

172

Name of Paper NEW YORK TIMES File No 401/1/4

Published at NEW YORK. Date 3rd AUGUST 1954

U.S., With Eye on Far East, Backs Thai to Head Next U.N. Assembly

EA

Special to The New York Times.

UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., Aug. 2—The United States will vote for Prince Wan Waithayakon, Thai Foreign Minister, for president of the United Nations General Assembly next fall.

This early and unusual announcement was first made in Washington by Pote Sarasin, Ambassador of Thailand, and then confirmed here by a United States spokesman. No other nation has formally announced backing for any candidate, and the United States has never before officially made known its choice.

It was understood that the United States had decided to back Prince Wan in view of the situation in Indochina, Thailand's neighbor.

Recently, the Prince led an effort that he later dropped temporarily to send United Nations observers to the border of Thailand and Indochina. His Government has consistently supported the United States policy in Southeast Asia.

The United States move came as a surprise to the Netherlands delegation. The Dutch have been campaigning for their Dr. Eelco N. van Kleffens who, like Prince Wan, is an old United Nations hand.

The Netherlands delegation said it formally started the campaign for Dr. van Kleffens two months ago, and informally as far back as the end of the Assembly session last year. It had reached the assumption that the United States would support its man.

It was understood that the United States never had made a hard commitment in favor of Dr. van Kleffens, and that the Dutch probably had misunderstood the United States opinion that Dr.

Continued on Page 2, Column 5

U. S. BACKING THAI FOR HIGH U. N. POST

SEA

EA.

Continued From Page 1

van Kleffens was thoroughly qualified for the job. A Netherlands spokesman commented that it was irregular for one Asian to follow anothre in the presidency, which is now held by Mme. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit of India. The Dutch insist that the next president should be a European, since the last European to hold the position was Paul-Henri Spaak of Belgium, who headed the first Assembly.

The Dutch also say they have had what they consider firm pledges of support from sixteen nations "from all areas," although they do not have the same formal promise of support that Prince Wan obtained from the United States.

The Thai position is not only that it would be preferable to have an Asian in the chair in view of the delicate situation in that part of the world, but also that it is not the turn of the Europeans. The Thais say it is the turn of the South Americans, and that those countries have indicated to Prince Wan that they would gladly trade this year's Presidency for next year's.

Prince Wan is said to have received a friendly ear from the Latin Americans he has approached. He is leaving for Latin America later this week on a trip that will include some campaigning. There seems no doubt that the promise of a vote by the United States will help him.

The United States decision to come out for early support of Prince Wan was understood to have been a difficult one, especially in view of the Netherlands key role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The blow to the Netherlands was said to have been softened by United States assurances that its decision did not constitute a reflection on the qualifications of Dr. van Kleffens, and that it did not prejudice United States support should he choose to run in the future.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
2 AUG 1954
CANBERRA

171

72/1/3/1.

AUSTRALIAN LEGATION,
BANGKOK.

Memo. No. 280/54.

29th July, 1954.

CONFIDENTIAL

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

Prince Wan for President?

The announcement of Prince Wan's candidature came as a surprise here, and was first made public in press despatches from New York. I cannot find out how soon the Ministry of Foreign Affairs knew of it, but one member has admitted to me that he only knew two or three days beforehand. Presumably Prince Wan would have at least got the Prime Minister's approval, but whether the matter was taken to Cabinet is also not known. If the Prime Minister's approval were given, Cabinet might well have approved ex post facto.

2. As late as early April, just before he left for Geneva, Prince Wan was not thinking of standing. The Netherlands Minister saw him then and asked for Thai support for Dr. Van Kleffens. Prince Wan then gave a conditional promise of support, the condition being that no Latin-American candidate came forward. He referred to the convention that the Presidency should rotate between European, Latin-American and Asian holders, and the classification of Dr. Evatt and Mr. Pearson as Europeans by many members. On this interpretation, a Latin-American candidate might well be proposed and in that event Thailand would support him. He said he had been approached to stand, but did not intend to do so.

3. What has made him change his mind can only be guessed at, but his presence in New York in connection with the Thai request for an observation commission will have provided him with opportunities for assessing the degree of support which he might expect. Perhaps the Delegation to the United Nations can throw some light on this. Apparently he did not mention the matter during his conversation with Mr. Casey in Geneva on 16th June, and we have received no communication from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

4. In the first place, there is no doubt that, like others before him, he covets the distinction; he was greatly disappointed by the emergence of Mrs. Pandit's candidature after his own last year and the transfer to her of much of the support which he had been virtually promised. In view of the rotation principle, it was the general impression, which I think he shared, that by failing to secure election last year he had missed his chance. However the Second and Third General Assemblies provide a precedent for a candidate defeated at one Assembly having a successful shot in the following year, though it is true that this was before the convention noted above had fully emerged.

5. Next, there is the Asian aspect of the matter. The press reports say that his candidature is based on the fact that "world conditions focus attention in Asia and the Far East." I have on various occasions given my analysis of the elements on which Thai foreign policy is founded, and among these have given a high place to Thailand's natural and

....2/

CONFIDENTIAL

170

inescapable position as an Asiatic nation. Thailand's anti-communist stand has thrown her very much into the company of non-Asiatic states which also oppose Communism, but we should beware of underestimating the pull of Asia, and of assuming that, if an acute and unhappy conflict between the several elements of Thai policy arose, Asia would necessarily lose.

6. The polished and westernised Prince Wan, who personifies modern Thailand to many western diplomats who meet him at international conferences, and who can meet them on their own ground, has by no means deserted Asia nor neglected his Asiatic and non-European friends. As was recalled in my memorandum No. 243 of 9th June, 1953, he provided evidence of this during the last war.

7. The "colonial" aspect of the matter may be connected with this. The Asian-African bloc are quoted as saying that Colonialism would be the most explosive topic at the forthcoming Assembly and that therefore a representative of a non-colonial power should be President. The logic of this is not very apparent. My recollection of Thailand's attitude on the Trusteeship Council, when Prince Wan was the Thai representative, is that it was among the most moderate of the non-administering authorities. The United Kingdom however have tabulated that on 21 occasions when votes were taken in the Fourth Committee last year on matters affecting the United Kingdom, Thailand voted only once with the United Kingdom, abstained 7 times and voted against 13 times. This seems a fairly dramatic reversal of form, which I cannot explain because I do not think that there has really been any fundamental change in Thailand's attitude to colonial questions. On the contrary, I think that the Prime Minister and General Phao would, on a short-term basis at least, not have been displeased to see French strength maintained in Indo-China.

8. Would you let me know whether Australia is firmly committed to Dr. van Kleffens; also whether we have been asked to support Prince Wan and, if so, what is our attitude?

Cable to Bangkok of Australian position

B.M. Ballard

Minister.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

SHA.

I.7789

EN CLAIR

Dated: 8th July, 1954.
1148

FROM:

Recd.: 9th July, 1954.
0915

Australian Mission to the United
Nations,
NEW YORK.

401/1/4

339. UNCLASSIFIED.

Thailand letter 7th July circulated as document A/2665 draws attention to tension in the area and dangerous potentialities, notes rejection of appeal by veto of 18th June proposes under rule 15 additional item "request of Thailand for observation under Peace Observation Commission" on agenda 8th General Assembly as this Assembly "is still in session" and indicates further communication will be made in regard to date for ascertaining concurrence of majority member states for reconvening session.

Today's press quotes Prince Wan as saying in New York yesterday that if acceptable agreement on Indo China not reached by 20th July he would move immediately to get Assembly to consider Thai appeal for observers and that nature of guarantees for neutralization of Laos and Cambodia would be crucial. Further that some form of United Nations guarantee was desired by Thailand.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M.'s

9th July, 1954.

SEC A/Ss Cr(L&T) UN PAC EA SEA WEST A E CENT PI C&P G

Km
G

4R 401/1/4
SEATO

UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

163

Distr.
GENERAL

A/2665
7 July 1954

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Eighth session

REQUEST FOR THE INCLUSION OF AN ADDITIONAL ITEM IN THE AGENDA OF THE EIGHTH REGULAR SESSION: ITEM PROPOSED BY THAILAND

REQUEST OF THAILAND FOR OBSERVATION UNDER THE PEACE OBSERVATION COMMISSION

Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate herewith to the Members of the General Assembly the text of a letter dated 7 July 1954 which he has received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Thailand.

In this connexion, the Secretary-General wishes to draw attention to the penultimate paragraph of the letter in which the Minister for Foreign Affairs states, with regard to the date for ascertaining the concurrence of the majority of Member States in the reconvening of the eighth session for the consideration of the proposed additional item, that he will communicate with the Secretary-General further in the light of the developments now in progress with respect to the Indo-China situation.

54-19013

Letter dated 7 July 1954 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Thailand, addressed to the Secretary-General

New York, 7 July 1954

I have the honour to inform you that by a letter dated 29 May 1954 (S/3220), my Government, in conformity with Articles 34 and 35, paragraph 1, of the United Nations Charter, brought to the attention of the Security Council a situation which, in their view, represents a threat to the security of Thailand the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. Large-scale fighting has repeatedly taken place in the immediate vicinity of Thai territory; there is in the view of my Government a possibility of direct incursions of foreign troops into its territory. Moreover, the whole world is well aware of the tension in the area and of its dangerous potentialities which go to the very heart of the main purpose of the United Nations - to protect humanity from the "scourge of war". Therefore, in the opinion of the Thai Government, it is essential for the United Nations to have authentic and objective observation and reports, and my Government accordingly requested that the Security Council provide for observation under the Peace Observation Commission.

The Security Council placed the appeal of Thailand on its agenda on 3 June 1954 by a majority of ten votes to one and, on 18 June 1954, voted upon the draft resolution submitted by the representative of Thailand with the following result: nine votes in favour, one against and one abstention. As the one negative vote was that of a permanent member of the Security Council, action by the Security Council was thus frustrated.

The Thai Government are, therefore, obliged to have recourse to the General Assembly, and I have the honour, under instructions from my Government and in conformity with Article 35, paragraph 1, of the United Nations Charter, to bring to the attention of the General Assembly the situation set forth above, to the end that the General Assembly may provide for observation under the Peace Observation Commission.

As the eighth General Assembly is still in session, I have the honour, under rule 15 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, to propose for inclusion in the agenda of the eighth session an additional item entitled "Request of Thailand for observation under the Peace Observation Commission".

An explanatory memorandum is forwarded herewith in accordance with rule 20.

With regard to the date for ascertaining the concurrence of the majority of Member States in the reconvening of the session for the consideration of this proposed additional item, I shall have the honour to communicate with you further in the light of the developments now in progress with respect to the Indo-China situation.

I shall be grateful if you will be so good as to bring the above to the notice of Her Excellency Madame Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, President of the General Assembly, and to the attention of the Member States.

(Signed) WAN WAITHAYAKON
Krommün Naradhip Bongsprabandh

Minister for Foreign Affairs of Thailand
Permanent Delegate to the United Nations

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

On the item "Request of Thailand for observation under the Peace Observation Commission"

On 29 May 1954, the Government of Thailand instructed its Representative to the United Nations, in conformity with Articles 34 and 35, paragraph 1, of the United Nations Charter, to bring to the attention of the Security Council a situation which, in its view, represents a threat to the security of Thailand the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

This situation has arisen from large-scale fighting which has repeatedly taken place in the vicinity of the Thai territory for some years already. During the past year and in the course of this year, that situation has become so explosive and the tension is so high that there is a genuine danger that fighting may spread to the general area of Thailand and that foreign troops may effect direct incursions into Thai territory. During the period just mentioned, large hostile foreign forces penetrated into the Kingdom of Laos which is contiguous to Thailand and, at one time, came to occupy the Laotian town of Thakhek on the Thai-Laos border. In the course of this year and up to the present moment, those hostile foreign forces started and have ever since kept up their military operations in the Kingdom of Cambodia which is situated on the eastern border of Thailand. These armed interventions which have received and are receiving material and political support from outside of Indo-China are designed to overthrow the legal Governments of Laos and Cambodia and to establish Vietminh supremacy in those countries.

At the same time, the Vietminh regime and its foreign associates have stepped up their propaganda campaign against Thailand by making serious and false charges against it, while urging within Thailand itself those elements which are subservient to them to undertake and intensify subversive acitivities which are directly related to the war which is being fought on Thailand's eastern and north-eastern frontiers.

From the foregoing military and political developments, it is evident that there exists a clear danger of further extension of the war, thereby gravely threatening the peace and security of Thailand and the general region of south-east Asia as well.

For the reasons described above, the Government of Thailand requested the Security Council to provide for observation under the Peace Observation Commission, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 377 (V) (Uniting for peace).

The Security Council undertook, at its 672nd, 673rd and 674th meetings held on 3, 16 and 18 June 1954, the consideration of the request of the Thai Government as well as the draft resolution introduced by its Representative. At the meeting held on 18 June 1954, despite the overwhelming support of nine affirmative votes, the one negative vote of the Soviet Union prevented the adoption of the draft resolution introduced by the delegation of Thailand.

The Government of Thailand strongly feels that the reasonable and well-founded character of its request has not been impaired by the lone dissenting vote of the Soviet Union. On the contrary, it is firmly convinced that in submitting its request for observation under the Peace Observation Commission, it is not only acting within the normal rights of any Member of the Organization to receive protection from threats to its security, but that it is also strictly fulfilling its duty as a Member in calling the attention of the Organization to the existence of such a threat.

For these reasons, the delegation of Thailand has proposed to place on the agenda of the resumed eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly this additional item "Request of Thailand for observation under the Peace Observation Commission".

401
~~470~~/1/4 165

CONFIDENTIAL.

SIAMESE APPEAL TO THE UNITED NATIONS.

Since the Security Council meeting of the 18th June, United States, French and United Kingdom representatives in New York have exchanged views on future procedure.

2. As regards the date of the Assembly meeting, the United States were in favour of working for an Assembly meeting about the 15th July. The French view is that there should be no meeting before August, and that the Siamese should be discouraged from putting forward any request for a meeting of the Assembly until after the 20th July (the date by which M. Mendes-France has committed himself to getting a settlement in Indo China). They have made representations to this effect in Bangkok, Washington and London. The United Kingdom position is close to that of France. The United Kingdom Government think it would be wiser to see how things develop at Geneva before deciding on a date for the meeting of the Assembly, and they doubt whether the necessary 31 votes could be obtained if the Assembly procedure was put into action now.

3. Rather than convene a special session of the Assembly, it will probably be more satisfactory to aim at reconvening the 8th Session, in which event the United Kingdom line might be that the Assembly should postpone discussion of the Korean question (which would be the first item on the Agenda) until the 9th Session in September.

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.
29th June, 1954.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

I.7431

SHA:CET

Dated: 28th June, 1954
1446
Rec'd: 29th June, 1954
0930

FROM:

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK

401/1/4

319 CONFIDENTIAL

Repeated Washington UNE 144.

Indo-China Thai complaint.

Prince Wan arrived New York this morning. His intention is to consult with the United States and other Delegations on desirability of requesting Special Session of Assembly. Thanat Khomay informs us that Thai Government is anxious that Assembly should convene as soon as possible, but there is no decision yet to submit request to this effect. They would not wish to take action in the face of opposition from "certain important powers" (presumably United Kingdom and India, who are reported in today's press to oppose immediate calling of Assembly Session in view of current Geneva discussions)

29th June, 1954

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M's.

SEC A/Ss CR(L&T) UN PAC EA SEA SP NZ WEST A E
CEN PI C&P

G

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

163

Name of Paper The New York Times File No. 401/1/4

Published at New York Date 28th June, 1954

S.E.A.

THAI AIDE CONFIDENT U. N. WILL SIFT PLEA

Special to The New York Times.

UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., June 28—Prince Wan Waithayakon, Thai Foreign Minister, voiced confidence today that a majority of the United Nations would agree to call the General Assembly to consider Thailand's appeal for a team of peace observers in Southeast Asia.

He arrived today from Geneva to discuss arrangements for summoning a summer session of the General Assembly. Under the United Nations rules, thirty-one countries must give their consent before a session can be called.

Thailand first put her request for a "peace patrol" before the Security Council, warning that the war in Indochina might spill over into her territory. The appeal received the backing of nine Council members, but was blocked by a Soviet veto. That veto had been taken for granted and a request to the veto-free Assembly was a follow-up plan.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM. **SECRET.**

HMC:KC

I.7250.

Dated: June 23 1954.
1730.
Recd: June 24 1954.
0830.

FROM:

Australian Delegation to Geneva Conference,
G E N E V A.

GC210. S E C R E T.

Thai Appeal.

The French are approaching Prince Wan on instructions urging him to agree to postponement of discussion of Thai appeal in Assembly preferably until end of August when Geneva should have ended. United Kingdom are supporting this approach. United Kingdom delegation, New York, had already been asked to seek delay until at least 20th July.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M.'s

June 24 1954.

SEC A/Ss CR(L&T) UN PAC EA SEA SP NZ WEST A E CEN FI C&P

401/1/4

G

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

161

HMC:KC

I.7105.

Dated: June 18 1954.
2029.
Recd: June 20 1954.
1100.

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

598. CONFIDENTIAL.

1. Commenting today on Soviet veto of Thai appeal Dulles noted that Russia's 59th veto blocked creation of Peace Observation Mission "which would have no authority to take decisions but which would serve merely as eyes and ears of United Nations". Soviet veto was to be deeply regretted since it denied Thailand minimum protection against possible new Communist aggression.

2. State Department thinking on next step is fluid. If anything they incline to favour reconvening eighth session rather than convening special Assembly. No specific approach has yet been made by Laos or Cambodia and State Department officials for present have no concrete views as to how any approach if made would be handled. For time being officials are prepared to wait until Bedell Smith returns from Geneva after which United States will consult other Governments.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M.'s

4011/1/4 June 20 1954.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC EA SEA NZ WEST A E CEN PI C&P

G

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

160

:HP

CABLEGRAM.

I.7088

Dated: 18th June, 1954.
1454
Rec'd: 19th June, 1954.
9 a.m.

EN CLAIR FROM:

Australian Embassy,
PARIS.

313. UNCLASSIFIED.

Security Council.

Thailand proposal vetoed 9 - 1 (Soviet) Lebanon abstaining. Denmark, Colombia and France spoke in support resolution. Debate concluded with U.S.S.R. statement. Argument was that observer proposal must be seen in light of whole Indo-China and Geneva situation; threat against Thailand was fabrication and Council action was really initiated by United States choosing time when settlement which they do not want was in sight at Geneva; Thailand request is formal camouflage of American manoeuvre which was first step towards internationalization in Indo-China conflict under a United Nations cover. Sending observers was serious matter constituting threat to people of Indo-China. United Kingdom replied to Soviet before vote.

A/Min. & Dept. of External Affairs.
" " " " Defence.
Mr. Goss.
P.M.'s.

401/1/14

19th June, 1954.

SEC A/Ss Cr(L&T) UN PAC EA SEA SP NZ WEST A E
CEN PI C & P
G

Name of Paper The London Times File No. 401/1/4

Published at London Date 18th June, 1954

SIAM'S REQUEST VETOED

RUSSIA FORBIDS U.N. OBSERVER TEAM

FROM OUR CORRESPONDENT

NEW YORK, JUNE 18

The expected Soviet veto to-day prevented the Security Council from granting Siam's request for United Nations military observers.

The arguments offered by the Soviet delegate, Mr. Tsarapkin, caused as little surprise as his solitary negative vote. The Siamese appeal in his view was mere camouflage engineered by the United States to prevent the success of the Geneva conference and prepare for military intervention and enlargement of the Indo-China conflict; nothing and nobody threatened Siam, rather did her American-inspired appeal constitute a threat against the people of Indo-China who had been engaged for years in a conflict that Mr. Tsarapkin alternately called "domestic" and "national."

Sir Pierson Dixon for Britain called Mr. Tsarapkin's speech very regrettable and his attack against United States policy unjustifiable. The Siamese proposal was a question entirely separate from the Indo-China problems under discussion at Geneva, and nothing could be less helpful than to try to bring the latter into the Council now, which only the Soviet delegate had done.

Sir Pierson Dixon found the Soviet allegations about Siam extraordinary. She was a sovereign State and the Council debate showed that a majority considered her apprehensions legitimate. Being a member of the peace observation commission created precisely to deal with this type of situation, the Soviet Union should enable it to perform its function.

PRECAUTIONARY REQUEST

On a vote nine of the 11 Council members supported the Siamese request, Lebanon abstaining. M. Hoppenot (France) in aligning himself with the majority pointed out that the measures Siam requested were only precautionary and the Council was not asked to pronounce itself on the existence or non-existence of a threat to Siamese security. The encouraging turn the Geneva talks had taken in the last 48 hours permitted a hope that the work of the proposed sub-commission could be rapidly and successfully concluded, and if in the course of events all threat to Siamese frontiers were eliminated he did not doubt the Siamese Government itself would be the first to draw consequences.

The Soviet action in blocking the Council decision was denounced by the United States delegate, Mr. Lodge, as "singularly ill-advised." When listening to the Soviet charges against the United States as "a number one colonial Power," he took comfort in Mr. Eden's recent remark that "no one in the world had been enslaved by the United States" and added that no one in the world ever will be.

The American position in the present situation, Mr. Lodge said, was not unlike that proclaimed at the recent Colombo conference. To her previous vetoes directed against the interest of Asian peoples the Soviet Union had now added one which, if left unchallenged, would make it easier for aggression to strike across the Siamese borders. But Siam undoubtedly would seek a remedy elsewhere in the United Nations and would have United States support when it does so.

"Thank heaven we can still go to the Assembly," Mr. Lodge concluded.

Consultations among the western Powers with a view to bringing the Siamese request before a recalled Assembly session are now being avenged. No doubt developments at Geneva will be taken into account during these discussions. The prevalent view is that the Assembly may be reconvened in about four weeks' time.

S.E.17

ECA

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper... News from America ..... *File No*... 401/1/4 .....

Published at... Washington ..... *Date*... 18th June, 1954. .....

* * * * *

401/1/4

THAILAND'S PEACE MOVE
BACKED IN SECURITY COUNCIL

United Nations, N.Y., June 16 -- (USIS) -- Thailand's formal move today for a special observation mission in Southeast Asia won quick backing from six members of the eleven nation Security Council.

The U.S., Great Britain, New Zealand, Turkey, Brazil and Nationalist China immediately supported the resolution offered by Thailand.

The Thai resolution calls on the Security Council to direct the U.N.'s permanent Peace Observation Commission to set up a special sub-group of three to five members to report on the threat to Thailand arising out of the communist-led Vietminh invasion of Laos and Cambodia.

Thai Ambassador Pote Satasin, presenting the resolution, expressed dissatisfaction over limiting the group's present scope to Thailand alone, but said he had accepted the limitation in order to meet the views of others.

Speaking for the United States, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., noted that the Council is not being asked now to make a finding on the Indochina situation, but only to authorize a fact-finding body to provide impartial reports. If the reports bear out Thailand's estimate of the situation, he said, then the Council will be in a position to consider the danger and take steps to avert it.

Name of Paper... The New York Times ... File No... 401/1/14

Published at... New York ... Date... 17th June, 1954

The Text of Thai Resolution

S.E.A.

401/1/14.

Special to The New York Times.

UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., June 16—Following is the text of a resolution submitted today to the United Nations Security Council by Thailand:

The Security Council

Noting the request of Thailand;

Recalling General Assembly Resolution 377 (V) (Uniting for Peace), Part A, Section B, establishing a Peace Observation Commission which could observe and report on the situation in any area where there exists international tension, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security;

Taking into consideration the legitimate apprehensions entertained by the Government of Thailand in regard to its own security, caused by a condition of international tension in the general region in which Thailand is located, the continuance of which is likely to endanger international peace and security;

Requests the Peace Observation Commission to establish a sub-commission composed of not less than three nor more than five members, with authority:

(A) To dispatch as soon as possible, in accordance with the invitation of the Thai Government, such observers as it may deem necessary to Thailand;

(B) To visit Thailand if it deems it necessary;

(C) To consider such data as may be submitted to it by its members or observers and to make such reports and recommendations as it deems necessary to the Peace Observation Commission and to the Security Council. If the sub-commission is of the opinion that it cannot adequately accomplish its mission without observation or visit also in states contiguous to Thailand, it shall report to the Peace Observation Commission or to the Security Council for the necessary instructions.

S.E.A

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

I. 6991.

...:OA.
EN CLAIR

Sent: 16th June, 1954.
1219

FROM:

Recd: 17th June, 1954.
0830.

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
N E W Y O R K.

307. UNCLASSIFIED.

Security Council, 16th June.

Thailand proposed Resolution operative paragraphs as follows; "requests Peace Observation Commission to establish a Sub-Commission composed of not less than 3 nor more than 5 members with authority.

(a) To despatch as soon as possible in accordance with invitation of Thai Government such observers as it may deem necessary to Thailand.

(b) To visit Thailand if it deems it necessary.

(c) To consider such data as may be submitted to it by its members or observers and to make such reports and recommendations as it deems necessary to Peace Observation Commission and to Security Council.

If Sub-Commission is of opinion that it cannot adequately accomplish its mission without observation or visit also in States contiguous to Thailand it shall report to Peace Observation Commission or to the Security Council for necessary instructions".

2. New Zealand emphasised distinction between Thailand item and subject matter of Geneva Conference and fully supported Thai request. Turkey, Brazil, China, United Kingdom and United States also spoke in support. United Kingdom mentioned advantages of last sentence of draft resolution.

3. Next meeting Friday.

401/1/4

A/MIN & DEPT. E.A.
MIN & DEPT. DEFENCE
MR. GOSS
P.M'S.

17th June, 1954.

SEC A/Ss Cr(L&T) UN@ PAC EA SEA SP
NZ WEST A E CEN PI C&P

G

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper.... The New York Times File No.... 401/1/4

Published at.... New York Date.... 15th June 1954

SEA.

SECURITY COUNCIL TO WEIGH THAI BID

11 Members Will Consider Nation's Appeal for Team to Police Indochina War

By A. M. ROSENTHAL

Special to The New York Times.

UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., June 14—The United Nations will take one more step Wednesday toward action to try to prevent the spread of the Indochinese war.

At the call of the United States and Thailand, the eleven members of the Security Council will meet at 10:30 A. M. On their agenda will be Thailand's request—now eleven days old—that the Peace Observation Commission send out a "peace patrol" to report any signs that the war was spreading to Thai territory.

The Western powers have followed a careful policy of moving slowly on Thailand's request which was denounced by the Soviet Union as a threat to the Geneva conference on Far Eastern affairs. Thailand and the United States both believe that the time has come to speed up the timetable—a decision apparently based on the continuing deadlock in Geneva.

Session Called by Lodge

Wednesday's meeting of the Council was called officially by Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., chief United States delegate. Mr. Lodge is president of the Council for June, under the monthly rotation system. He acted on the basis of a request for a meeting filed by Thanat Khoman, Thai delegate.

This is the probable outline of United Nations action in the weeks ahead:

Wednesday, Thailand will introduce a resolution calling for the fourteen-member Peace Observation Commission to send out observers from five countries, probably India, Pakistan, Sweden, Uruguay and New Zealand. The resolution eventually will be taken up in sponsorship by the United States and perhaps other countries

At a later meeting, the resolution will be put to the vote. The expectation is that it will get nine or ten votes and be vetoed by the Soviet Union.

The Western powers then will call the sixty-nation General Assembly into session sometime before the regularly scheduled meeting in September. The request for peace observers will be put to the vote in the veto-free Assembly. By that time, requests for observers also may have come in from Laos and Cambodia, which border on Thailand and face threats from the Communist-led Vietminh in Vietnam. The Assembly probably will find Korea also on its agenda.

Differences on Timing Arise

Differences as to the timetable to be followed and the scope of the observers' authority have existed in the Western camp but official observers were taking the line that they would be ironed out soon. On the question of timing, the British and French have been urging that every care be taken to assure that the council do nothing that might hurt the chances of success in Geneva.

A breakdown in Geneva would end that problem. But delegates are not overlooking the possibility that the Communists might make a sudden "concession" in Geneva just to try to halt action by the Council.

Still of top importance is the question as to whether the observers are to be restricted to Thailand alone, necessitating a new United Nations debate to send observers to Laos and Cambodia if those two countries request them. The British and French are known to have argued for restricting the observers to Thailand.

Thailand and the United States would prefer to have the observers empowered to go to Laos and Cambodia without any more United Nations discussion, if the requests come in. The probability is that some compromise will be reached.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

SAVINGRAM.

I.6917

:CET

Dated: 10th June, 1954

Rec'd: 15th June, 1954

FROM:

Australian High Commissioner's Office,
N E W D E L H I

SAV. 10 SECRET

Thai Appeal.

Reference your Savingram 15 (repeating Geneva GC151) of 1st June, paragraph 2, Clutterbuck had left Delhi for London two days before the meeting between Nehru and United States Ambassador had taken place. Further Nehru said that India would not serve on the P.O.C.

2. The United States Ambassador's account of the interview was correctly reported in our telegram No. 120 of 31st May. The High Commissioner saw the United States Ambassador ten minutes after he left Mr. Nehru.

3. The foregoing is not to argue, of course, that Nehru will not change his mind under the pressure of new developments.

16th June, 1954

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M's.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC SEA NZ WEST A E CEN PI

RH

401/1/4

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
15 JUN 1954
401/1/4
CANBERRA

153

AUSTRALIAN LEGATION,
BANGKOK.

File No. 160/1/3.

Memo. No. 216/54.

RESTRICTED

9th June, 1954.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

THAI APPEAL TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

During my absence Mr. Hutton called on the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at the latter's request, on 7th June. He was handed the enclosed letter and asked for Australian support. It seems that representatives from a number of "friendly" diplomatic missions, e.g. Norway, Denmark and China, also received letters similar to the attached text. I understand that the Thai Minister in Canberra has made an approach to the Department on the same matter.

2. During the interview the Under-Secretary of State commented that the French and U.K. Governments appear to be anxious that the Thai appeal proceed at a slow pace. Their reason was believed by the Under-Secretary to be a fear of possible adverse repercussions at Geneva. He understood that if the Communist delegates at Geneva did not agree to free elections in Korea by the middle of June, the U.K. would cease its efforts to achieve a compromise and then reconsider its position generally.

3. The Thai Government was stated by the Under-Secretary to feel that the present situation in Indo-China necessitated early action by the Security Council or General Assembly on the Thai request. He mentioned the continuing Vietminh offensive, the threat of new fighting near the Thai border and specifically referred to the ever-present danger from the pockets of Vietminh troops which are in Laos and Cambodia.

4. With reference to the last paragraph of our telegram No. 40 of 26th May, it is interesting to note that the Under-Secretary also spoke as if the Geneva talks were bound to collapse on the Korean question. When Mr. Hutton inquired as to whether he felt that this would necessarily mean the end of the talks dealing with Indo-China, the Under-Secretary indicated that he believed that this would be the case.

5. The Under-Secretary indicated at the end of the interview that he would be glad to receive any Australian views on the matters of Indo-China or South-East Asia defence.

B.B. Ballard

Minister.

Seen J. Plimsoll 17/6/54

(Copy sent 6 VII)

D

Name of Paper: Monitoring Digest — File No: 40/1/4

Published at: Malaya — Date: 4th June 1954

USSR

THAILAND'S APPLICATION TO U.N. IRRITATES BRITAIN AND INDIA:

SEA.

The Diplomatic Observer of The Times says that the application of the Government of Thailand to the U.N. to discuss the Indochina question has caused irritation on the part of the British Government.

He adds that it is natural that it should object to any actions that might add to public debate in New York simultaneously with talks in Geneva.

The observer speaks of acute differences between Britain and the U.S., and points out that the application of Thailand to the U.N. gives rise to suspiciousness in India.

May Disrupt Geneva Talks

The Associated Press correspondent in Delhi quotes authoritative circles as saying that India is against Thailand's application to the U.N. The Indian Government is of the opinion, he adds, that such a step may disrupt the Geneva Conference or hinder it.

The Government has instructed the Indian representative in the U.N. Mr.-Krishna Menon, to make this known to members of the Security Council. (Moscow Radio Voice English 2130 hrs June 3)

COPY

151

No. 15698/2497.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Saranrom Palace.

3rd June B.E. 2497.

Monsieur le Charge d'Affaires,

I have the honour to inform you that Thailand had submitted on May 29 an appeal in accordance with Articles 34 and 35 paragraph 1 of the United Nations Charter to the Security Council of the United Nations for the dispatch of a Peace Observation Sub-commission to Indochina on the ground that large-scale fighting carried on in Indochina represents a threat of direct incursions of foreign troops into Thailand and endanger the maintenance of international peace and security of the region.

In submitting this appeal Thailand is animated not only by the faith in the ideal and principles of the United Nations but also by its firm determination to play its part in the maintenance of international peace and security as already displayed in the case of Korean war. We wish to confirm the necessity of solidarity of mankind in serving the cause of peace, especially in these critical circumstances. We feel also that there is room for emergency measures designed to exercise a direct and immediate influence on the factors governing the peace of the world.

It is for that reason that we regard our appeal for the provision of observation under the peace observation commission in the above-mentioned area as most timely and earnestly trust that in case of failure of the Security Council to exercise its primary responsibility due to lack of unanimity of the permanent members, your Government will render support to have the General Assembly consider our appeal and take adequate measures to avert the threats lowering over South East Asia to-day. In so doing, your Government will bring to the United Nations' work for peace the swifter aid necessitated by perils of the threat to international peace and security, by which we are now surrounded.

I avail myself of this opportunity, Monsieur le Charge d'Affaires, to renew to you the assurance of my high consideration.

(Sgd.) Nai Khemjati Punyaratabhan.

Deputy Minister
Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Monsieur Pierre Norman Bruce Hutton,
Australian Charge d'Affaires,
BANGKOK.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

150

CABLEGRAM.

MK:SA

I.6891.

Dated: 14th July, 1954.
1139
Recd.: 15th July, 1954.
0930.

FROM:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

303. CONFIDENTIAL.

Security Council.

From New Zealand delegation we have text of proposed resolution on Thailand complaint but assume you have received this from Wellington.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M.'s

15th June, 1954.

401/1/4

SEC A/Ss Cr(L&T) UN@ PAC EA SEA SP NZ WEST A E CENT PI C&P

G

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

MK:EA

I.6896

FROM:

Dated: 14th June, 1954.
1648
Recd.: 15th June, 1954.
0945.

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

585. CONFIDENTIAL. PRIORITY.

Thai Appeal.

We understand from Ward Allen of State Department that -

(a) Eden has not agreed to suggestion reported in our 583 paragraph 1.

(b) Security Council may now met on 16th June possibly to discuss draft resolution to be submitted by Thai representative, either on basis of wider operational area for P.O.C. team (which is what Thais want) or on basis of suggestion referred to above.

Ward Allen thought that possibly United Kingdom might find it less easy to oppose suggestion in Council debate.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M.'s

15th June, 1954.

SEC A/Ss Cr(L&T) UN@ PAC EA SEA SP NZ WEST A E
CENT PI C&P

G

401/1/4

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

148

HMcC

CABLEGRAM.

I.10830

Dated: 12th June, 1954.
1256
Rec'd: 13th June, 1954.
0925

FROM:-

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

583. CONFIDENTIAL. IMMEDIATE.

Thai Appeal.

1. Late yesterday afternoon the United States and the United Kingdom agreed in New York to refer to their Governments the suggestion that the Security Council Resolution should request P.O.C. to appoint Sub-Commission of 3-5 members which would despatch observers to Thailand; subsequently if circumstances warrant it P.O.C. itself may authorise Sub-Commission to go beyond Thailand "at the request or with the consent of "the States concerned

2. The State Department hopes that if the above is approved the Security Council may be able to meet on 15th June. Soviet Veto is regarded as practically certain. Question as to procedure for convening Assembly (i.e. whether 18th Session will be resumed or special session called under Article 20) will be decided then.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M'S.

13th June, 1954.

SEC A/Ss CR(L & T) UN @ PAC EA SEA SP NZ WEST
A E CEN PI C & P

401/1/4

G

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

147

CABLEGRAM. SECRET.

HMC:KC

I.6827.

Dated: June 11 1954.
1950.
Recd: June 12 1954.
0900.

FROM:

Australian High Commissioner's Office,
WELLINGTON.

153. SECRET.

Thai request.

New Zealand, though favouring delay in view of Geneva discussions, doubts if action can be long deferred and hopes:

(a) For reasonably large observation group.

(b) For fairly free hand for group.

2. New Zealand Government thinks:

(a) Thai request is proper, even if inadvisable, and

(b) Public opinion in New Zealand tendsto favour some United Nations action (distinct from Geneva) on Indo-China.

3. I doubt this estimate of public opinion.

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A:
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M.'s

June 12 1954.

SEC A/Ss UNO PAC EA SEA SP NZ WEST A E CEN PI C&P

G

401/1/4

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

146

CABLEGRAM.

KC:MB

I. 6750.

Dated: 10th June, 1954.
1107

FROM:

Rec'd: 11th June, 1954.
0830

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK.

300. CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated Washington 159.

Indo-China.

1. According to a member of French Delegation Security Council may meet next week on Thailand complaint and French Delegation have been advised by Americans to be ready for a special session of Assembly anytime after 30th June.

2. Burma and Philippines (and we understand from the latter Indonesia also) are not applying to participate in Security Council debate, but Philippines representative is instructed to watch and report if participation should seem useful.

3. Secretary-General said to pressmen yesterday that in event of breakdown of Geneva Conference "the whole Far Eastern situation is likely to be somehow reviewed in the United Nations" and explained that he had in mind "this major political problem is its entirety". His answer to a question whether there has been any move to prepare for a special session was "no".

A/MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M'S.

11th June, 1954.

SEC A/Ss Cr(L & T) UN PAC EA SEA SP NZ WEST A
E CEN PI C & P

G

401/1/4

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

KC.

I.6522.

Dated: June 3 1954.
1654.
Recd: June 4 1954.
1040.

EN CLAIR

FROM:

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK.

297. UNCLASSIFIED.

Indo China.

Security Council this morning third June accepted Thailand complaint into agenda by 10 - 1 (Soviet). Tsarapkin opposed as unnecessary and as interfering with Geneva and charged United States sabotaging Geneva. France supported inclusion saying letter not intended to raise whole of Indo China situation but intended as precautionary measure in view of Thailand's real cause for apprehension.

Thailand representative Sarasin made statement. Situation in territories bordering Thailand explosive. Danger of spread of fighting. Extension of hositilities to Laos and activities of "alien elements" in Thailand have been direct threat to Thailand. United Nations should face up to situation as concern of all members. Request for P.O.C. observation could not be taken as unfriendly gesture and involved no imputation of blame or censure. He suggested that sub-commission of P.O.C. be established "to despatch observers" to any part of general area of Thailand on request of any state or states concerned but only to territory of states consenting thereto". Commission should also have authority to visit any area in which observation was being conducted. Thailand was requesting establishment of observation machinery now so that observer teams would be present in area and become familiar with local conditions as soon as possible. Consideration by Security Council would not hamper "negotiations now going on at another international gathering". Request aimed only at observation under P.O.C.

2. Lebanon then proposed adjournment to study Thai statement and motion was adopted by 10 - 0 Soviet Union not participating in vote.

3. No date was fixed for next meeting.

401/1/4

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
MR. GOSS
P.M.'s

June 4 1954.

SEC A/Ss CC(L&T) PAC EA SEA SP NZ WEST A E CEN PI C&P UNO

G

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

144

EGM:KC

I.6476.

Dated: June 3 1954.
1240.
Recd: June 4 1954.
0830.

FROM:

Australian High Commissioner's Office,
L O N D O N.

1563. CONFIDENTIAL.

Addressed Canberra 1563 repeated Geneva for Delegation 38.

From External.

Thai appeal to United Nations.

You will no doubt have received an account of the strong Indian reaction against proposed appeal which the Indians regard as untimely and as patently engineered by United States. This has served to increase United Kingdom misgivings but United Kingdom authorities are resigned to submission of appeal to today's meeting of Security Council. For what it may be worth, news from New York suggests that neither Lodge nor Vishinsky is anxious for substantive discussion today. Whitehall therefore hopes perhaps without overmuch conviction that the matter will merely be placed on agenda and left to cool for at least a couple of weeks.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M.'s

June 4 1954.

SEC A/Ss CR(L&T) UN PAC EA SEA SP NZ WEST A E CEN PI C&P

401/1/4

G

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

HMc:MK

I.6467

Dated: 2nd June, 1954.
2113
Rec'd: 3rd June, 1954.
1520

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

550. CONFIDENTIAL.

Thai Appeal.

Wainhouse of State Department today commented as follows:-

(1) In reply to French and British concern lest Security Council Meeting have adverse impact on Geneva, American maintain.

(a) that any impact Security Council meeting may have on Geneva would be wholesome,

(b) consideration of problem in Security Council would be complementary to negotiations in Geneva not duplication thereof.

(2) Up to now no way has been found of reconciling American views with those of French and British on area of operation of P.O.C team.

(3) Present plan is for Security Council to meet tomorrow simply to hear Thai complaint and then to adjourn without debate and to resume not before end of next week. Adjournment was an attempt by United States to meet United Kingdom position on timing.

(4) Tsarapkin who has already made it plain that he wants no meeting is expected to raise various technical objections and in any event will probably veto any resolution.

(5) In this case British and French and Americans have now agreed that best plan would be to hold resumed session of Seventh Assembly (under Chairmanship of Madame Pandit). Wainhouse thought that in spite of probable Indian objections it would probably not take more than 2 weeks to poll United Nations members and obtain necesarry 31 votes in favour of resumed session.

6. On membership of P.O.C. team British and French agreed that it was not possible to have any satellite member as this would amount to having "enemy behind our lines".

401/1/4

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M's.

3rd June, 1954.

XEC A/Ss UN PAC EA SEA NZ WEST A E CEN PI C & P

G

401/1/4

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

142

CABLEGRAM. SECRET.

O. 5372/3/7

EC:OA. Sent: 2nd June, 1954.
1810

TO:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK. 136.

(Pass to Washington 388)

Repeat to -

Australian High Commissioner's Office,
LONDON. 1218.

SECRET.

Your 291. Thai complaint. At present Australia has no intention of applying to be heard in the Security Council.

Cost £7.17.8

MIN & DEPT. E.A.
MIN & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M's.

3rd May, 1954.

SEC	A/Ss	Cr(L&T)	UNB	PAC	EA	SEA
SP	NZ	WEST	A	E	CEN	PI	C&P

G

Extract from
P.I. Bulletin
No 11/54
3rd June 1954.

File 401/1/4 Pt

THAILAND'S APPEAL TO THE UNITED NATIONS

On 29th May, the Permanent Representative of Thailand at the United Nations (Mr. Thanat Khoman) lodged with the President of the Security Council (Sir Pierson Dixon, of the United Kingdom) a letter drawing the attention of the Security Council to a situation which, in the view of the Thai Government, "represents a threat to the security of Thailand, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security".

The letter went on to point out that large-scale fighting has repeatedly taken place in the immediate vicinity of Thai territory, and that the Thai Government feels that there is a possibility of "direct incursions of foreign troops into its territory". The Thai Government therefore suggested that the Security Council should consider the provision of "observation under the Peace Observation Commission", and that Thailand be represented at the meetings of the Council called to consider its appeal.

Should the Thai proposal that the Peace Observation Commission appoint an observation team to watch developments in Thailand be vetoed in the Security Council (as most observers expect), it is probable that the procedures provided for in the "Uniting for Peace Resolution" of 3rd November, 1950, will be applied. Section A(1) of this Resolution provides as follows :

> "Resolves that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to members for collective measures, including, in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression, the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security. If not in session at the time, the General Assembly may meet in emergency special session within twenty-four hours of the request therefor. Such emergency special session shall be called if requested by the Security Council on vote of any seven members, or by a majority of the members of the United Nations."

The present Thai appeal was made under Chapter VI of the Charter, and therefore does not call for an urgent meeting of the Security Council. The President of the Council has not yet taken any action to place the appeal before the Council, and it is not expected that the appeal will be discussed for some days.

FRENCH POLITICAL REACTIONS TO INDO-CHINA CRISIS

The increasing gravity of the situation in Indo-China during April was reflected in France in the growing uneasiness among members of the French Parliament, which has led to successive demands for a debate in the National Assembly. On 9th April, the Premier, M. Laniel, restated in the Assembly the French Government's policy on Indo-China. He said that the first objective was to win the battle of Dien Bien Phu and to bring about a successful military outcome of the war. This consideration, however, did not exclude a determined effort on the part of the French Government to achieve a peaceful solution of the conflict which would safeguard the integrity of the Associated States. This problem would be one of the major topics to be discussed at the Geneva Conference due to begin on 26th April.

Meanwhile, conversations were taking place between the French and United States authorities concerning the speech made by Mr. J.F. Dulles on 29th March, 1954, in which he suggested that "concerted action" might have to be taken if the threat of substantial Communist success in the area became greater. A communique issued after the meeting between Mr. Dulles and M. Bidault on 14th April stated, inter alia: "We recognise that the prolongation of the war in Indo-China, which endangers the security of the countries immediately affected, also threatens the entire area of South-East Asia and of the Western Pacific. In close association with other interested nations, we will examine the possibility of establishing within the framework of the United Nations Charter a collective defence to assure the peace, security and freedom of this area. We recognise that our basic objective at the Geneva Conference will be to seek the re-establishment of peace in Indo-China, which will safeguard the freedom of its people and the independence of the Associated States".

Since M. Laniel's announcement in July last year of his Government's intention "to complete the independence and sovereignty of the Associated States" within the French Union, negotiations have been proceeding between the French Government and the Associated States concerned. On 28th April, 1954 - two days after the commencement of the Geneva Conference - a joint declaration by the French and Vietnamese Governments was made, in which both parties declared "their agreement in regulating their mutual relations on the basis of two fundamental treaties." The declaration continued: "The first of these treaties recognises the full independence of Vietnam and its complete and entire sovereignty. The second sets up a Franco-Vietnamese association within the French Union, founded on equality and designed to foster co-operation between the two countries."

It appears, from the terms of the declaration, that the French Government acceded to the wishes of the Gaullist parliamentary group that all details of the treaties and related conventions should be completed before the sovereign independence of Vietnam was recognised. It is possible, however, that the declaration will strengthen the positions of both France and Vietnam in the negotiations on Indo-China at the Geneva Conference.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM. SECRET.

OA:KC

I.6461

Dated: June 2 1954.
1718.
Recd: June 3 1954.
0830.

FROM:

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK.

401/1/4

295. SECRET. PRIORITY.

Repeated Washington 135.

Indo China.

Thanat Khoman (Thailand) in informal conversation today informed us that Thai Government feels that P.O.C. observation team should not be limited in its operations to Thai territory, but should, by agreement of Laos and Cambodia, be free to investigate situation in those countries since it is from there that threat to Thailand in fact emanates. This view will probably be reflected in the Thai statement to Security Council tomorrow, which will be made by Pojna Sarasin (Thai ambassador to Washington).

This view on territorial scope of observation team is understoodto coincide with that of United States. United Kingdom delegation, however, separately inform us that they would hope that activities of observation team should be limited to Thai territory.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M.'s

June 3 1954.

SEC A/Ss CR(L&T) UN PAC EA SEA SP NZ WEST A E CEN PI C&P

G

401/1/4

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM. SECRET. 139

EGM:HP

I.6381

Dated: 1st June, 1954.
1830
Rec'd: 2nd June, 1954.
8.30 a.m.

FROM:

Australian Delegation,
GENEVA.

SECRET. IMMEDIATE.

Addressed Canberra GC151, repeated Washington 55.

My GC148. Siamese Appeal.

The United States Ambassador New Delhi saw Nehru yesterday and was given views on lines of those already reported to you. Nehru said that fighting in Indo-China threatened not only Siam but whole of South East Asia and indeed the World. The way to deal with this danger was to secure a cease fire followed by political settlement and this was what Geneva Conference was seeking. Siamese appeal was irrelevant and mistimed and would divert attention from Geneva at a critical moment. Failure at Geneva would transform the whole situation which would have to be considered afresh.

2. Nehru did not allude to United States pressure on Siam nor did he say India would refuse to serve on P.O.C. though both Clutterbuck and the United States Ambassador think this is more than probable.

3. Drafting of Resolution. (My GC129). Agreement to limit terms of draft resolution to Thailand (omitting general area of") which had been secured by Dixon from Lodge now seems to be in question. Bedell Smith yesterday told Eden that it was important that resolution be so worded as to allow P.O.C. to operate "in region of Thailand" i.e. outside Thai borders if invited by other Governments without need for further United Nations action. Eden reserved his position on this point and has asked Dixon to impress on Dulles his view that decision on area in which the Commission should operate should not be taken until views of Colombo Governments and others can be considered. He has referred to the possible effects on voting in Assembly and obtaining agreement of countries to serve on P.O.C.

4. Timing. Eden, Bedell Smith and Bidault agreed yesterday that agreement on tactics should be left to representatives in New York where Mr. Dulles is to arrive tomorrow.

401/1/4.

Min. & Dept. of External Affairs.
" " " " Defence.
P.M.'s.

2nd June, 1954.

SEC A/Ss UN@ PAC EA SEA WEST A E CEN PI C & P G

Repeated as savingram to Bangkok.

H/b GP.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

RESTRICTED. 135

CCA:MB

I. 6410.

Dated: 1st June, 1954.
1611

FROM:

Rec'd: 2nd June, 1954.
1045

ACTION COPY

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK.

Unnumbered. RESTRICTED. IMMEDIATE.

Repeated Washington UNE.132.

Indo-China.

Lodge has called meeting of Security Council for Thursday morning 3rd June. He is then leaving Friday for Europe to represent Eisenhower at D-day commemoration. During his absence Wadsworth will act.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M'S.

2nd June, 1954.

401/1/4

SEC A/Ss UN PAC EA SEA@ NZ WEST A E CEN
PI C & P

G

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM. SECRET.

MB:MK

I.6411

Dated: 1st June, 1954.
1611
Rec'd: 2nd June, 1954.
1045

FROM:

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK.

293. SECRET IMMEDIATE.

Repeated Washington UNE133.

Indo-China/Thai complaint.

Our 291.

1. United Kingdom Delegation have also enquired as to whether we would wish to be invited to participate in Security Council discussion, and whether we would wish them to take any action on our behalf.

2. Philippines and Indonesian Delegations have sought instructions reference Article 31.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M's.

2nd June, 1954.

401/1/4.

G.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC EA SEA NZ WEST A E CEN PI C & P

G

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

136

Name of Paper The Daily Telegraph File No. 3401/1/4

Published at Sydney N.S.W. Date 1st June, 1954

THAILAND "TO FIGHT FOR U.N."

GENEVA, Mon.—Thailand would answer any United Nations call to fight the Communists in Indo-China, United Press reported today.

The news agency quoted a statement by a Government spokesman, Lieutenant-General Homluang Kharb Kunjara.

The statement said Thailand would not send an expeditionary force except upon the absolute condition that United Nations carried a resolution deciding to send troops to fight Communism in Indo-China.

Thailand has appealed to United Nations to send observers to watch the threat to her borders from Indo-China.

But the Security Council is not likely to meet immediately to consider the request.

Delay of the Security Council debate until next week would fit in with the notice given the Communists last week by the British Foreign Secretary (Mr. Anthony Eden).

Secret talks

Mr. Eden said then that Britain expected results in the Geneva cease-fire negotiations within two weeks.

The nine-nations Geneva conference on Saturday agreed that officers from the opposing commands in Indo-China should meet at Geneva later this week to negotiate details for a ceasefire.

The conference today will begin secret talks on how to control the armistice.

In Washington yesterday Senator Mike Mansfield (Democrat, Montana) said the Eisenhower Administration had apparently begun a campaign to "educate the American people" preparatory to United States intervention in Indo-China.

He cited a speech made by Admiral Robert Carney, the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations.

The Admiral said the time had come when the United States and her Allies must decide whether to intervene in Indo-China or surrender all of South-east-Asia to the Communists.

(From United Press—A.A.P.)

S.E.A.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

401/1/4. 135

CABLEGRAM.

OA:MFP

I. 6324
Sent: 29th May, 1954.
1908
Rec'd: 1st June, 1954.
0830

FROM:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

290. CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY.

Indo China. Reference our 288 and 289.

Letter was lodged this morning May 29th. Dixon told us he is letting it be known that Security Council will not meet immediately, probably not for over a week.

Delayed in transmission
due to technical defect.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
" " " DEFENCE
P.M'S.

1st June, 1954.

SEC A/Ss Cr(L&T) UN PAC EA SEA SP NZ WEST
A E CENTRAL PI C&P

G

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

134

CABLEGRAM. **SECRET.**

DB:HP G U A R D. I.6352

Dated: 31st May, 1954.
1915
Rec'd: 1st June, 1954.
8.30 a.m.

FROM:

Australian High Commissioner's Office,
NEW DELHI.

401/1/4.

120. SECRET.

Thailand Appeal.

Further to my 117.

On Friday evening, Allen, United States Ambassador, delivered a note to Pillai regarding the Thailand Appeal for a Sub-Committee of P.O.C. to function in Indo-China area in view of the threat to Thailand security, mentioning that the United Kingdom, France and other countries were prepared to support the appeal and expressing the hope that India would support it.

2. On Saturday, the United Kingdom High Commissioner delivered a message from Eden which did not wholly tally with the above.

3. On Sunday, Nehru returned to Delhi though he left again today. This morning Allen, under further instructions, called on Nehru to press verbally for Indian support for the Thailand Appeal. In reply, Nehru told Allen that the appeal was ill-timed and ill-conceived, that the biggest threat to Thailand security was war in Indo-China so that the first need was to stop fighting there, that it was precisely this which the Geneva Conference was trying to do, and to raise the Thailand Appeal at this stage would endanger the Conference. India therefore would not support the Appeal and she would not participate in the proposed observation team.

4. According to Pillai and the United Kingdom High Commission, Nehru, who has long been critical of Thailand, is annoyed at the American handling of the matter. Phrases about Thailand such as American stooges, catspaws etc. were used. He is now strengthened in his old suspicion that the Americans do not want Geneva to succeed.

5. United States Embassy here, possibly due to instructions from Washington, has not been fortunate in their handling of the matter. Allen has made an appeal twice but the Thailand Ambassador has not yet put in an appearance. Nehru was bound to react to such an implication of an Asiatic country being a satellite of the United States of America. Also reference to United Kingdom and French support was erronious and has since been largely denied.

Min. & Dept. of External Affairs.
" " " Defence.
P.M.'s.

1st June, 1954.

SEC A/Ss UN@ PAC SEA EA NZ WEST A CEN PI C & P E G

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM. **SECRET.**

I. 6331
Sent: 31st May, 1954.
1622
Rec'd. 31st May, 1954.
1600

MFP

FROM:

Australian High Commissioner's Office,
WELLINGTON.

401/11/4.

141. SECRET & GUARD. PRIORITY.

Your 148.

Thai request for peace observation Commission. New Zealand, while seeing some force in original United Kingdom objections to United States suggestions for POC, thinks it would have stabilizing influence and is preferable to "Nutral Fact-Finding Commission".

2. New Zealand also thinks

(a) Veto in Security Council almost certain.

(b) Interim Committee is so discredited that should not be used.

(c) Special assembly therefore preferably necessary.

(d) Question is not of getting necessary majority but of getting representative support especially of Asian Countries, e.g. Pakistan.

(e) Action should not be taken so as to predjudice chances of success at Geneva.

3. New Zealand is considering calls likely to be made on her as member of POC.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE
P.M'S

SEC A/Ss UN PAC EA SEA WEST A E CENTRAL
PI C&P

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM. **SECRET.**

I. 6331
Sent: 31st May, 1954.
1622
Rec'd. 31st May, 1954.
1600

MFP

FROM:

Australian High Commissioner's Office,
WELLINGTON.

141. SECRET & GUARD. PRIORITY.

Your 148.

Thai request for peace observation Commission. New Zealand, while seeing some force in original United Kingdom objections to United States suggestions for POC, thinks it would have stabilizing influence and is preferable to "Nutral Fact-Finding Commission".

2. New Zealand also thinks

(a) Veto in Security Council almost certain.

(b) Interim Committee is so discredited that should not be used.

(c) Special assembly therefore preferably necessary.

(d) Question is not of getting necessary majority but of getting representative support especially of Asian Countries, e.g. Pakistan.

(e) Action should not be taken so as to predjudice chances of success at Geneva.

3. New Zealand is considering calls likely to be made on her as member of POC.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE
P.M'S

401/1/4

SEC A/Ss UN PAC EA SEA WEST A E CENTRAL
PI C&P

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

MK:MK

I.6307

Dated: 28th May, 1954.
2214

FROM:

Rec'd: 30th May, 1954.
0900

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK.

401/1/4

289. CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY.

Repeated Washington UNE128.

Indo-China.

Following is probable text of letter from Thai Delegation to Presidnet of the Security Council referred to in our immediately preceding telegram.

"I have the honour, under instructions from my Government and in conformity with Articles 34 and 35, paragraph 1, of the United Nations Charter, to bring to the attention of the Security Council a situation which, in the view of my Government, represents a threat to the security of Thailand, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

Large scale fighting has repeatedly taken place in the immediate vicinity of Thai Territory; in the view of my Government there is a possibility of direct incursions of foreign troops into its territory.

The whole world is well aware of the tension in the area and of its dangerous potentialities which go to the very heart of the main purpose of the United Nations - to protect humanity from the "scourage of war". Therefore, in the opinion of the Royal Thai Government, it is essential for the United Nations to have authentic and objective observation and reports, because the truth is the best foundation for the mainteance of peace.

I have the honour to bring this situation to the attention of the Security Council to the end, that the Security Council may provide for observation under the Peace Observation Commission.

The Royal Thai Government makes this appeal to the Security Council not only as a firm supporter of the United Nations, but as a power firmly determined to play its part in the maintenance of International Peace and Security in South-East Asia.

Finally, I have the honour to request that you call a meeting of the Security Council to consider this matter and, as representative of Thailand, I may be invited, in conformity with Rule 37 of the Rules of Procedure of the Security Council to participate in the Council discussion of the question.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration"

T

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M's.

30th May, 1954.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC EA SEA NZ WEST A E CEN PI C & P

G

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. 130

CABLEGRAM.

MB:MB

I. 6308.

Dated: 28th May, 1954.
2214
Rec'd: 30th May, 1954.
0900

FROM:

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK.

40/1/14

288. CONFIDENTIAL. PRIORITY.

Repeated Washington UNE.127.

Indo China.

Meeting of Commonwealth representatives was called this evening by Sir Pierson Dixon, who informed meeting that Thailand will tomorrow submit letter to President of Security Council drawing attention to "a situation", which represents a threat to the security of Thailand. Our immediately following telegram contains probable text of the letter which will be submitted. It should, however, be noted that there is a possibility that some minor changes may be made before submission. It is understood that Thanat Khoman obtained approval to proceed from Prince Wan by telephone today.

Sir Pierson said that United States, United Kingdom and France had agreed at Geneva to submission of matter to Council, but were not agreed on timing. United States originally were anxious to have geographic area covered by observer team extended beyond Thai borders, and to see question submitted under Chapter VII, and not Chapter VI, of the charter. These views were revised (presumably on pressure from United Kingdom and France) and United States now agree to submission in the terms set out in the Thai letter. United States nevertheless desired immediate action by Thailand. United Kingdom and France, while not being able to concur in such immediate submission, will support request contained in the letter.

Sir Pierson Dixon drew particular attention to fact that letter (text of which was based on advice of United Kingdom, United States and France) brings situation to attention of the Council under Chapter VI of the Charter, and does not call for an urgent meeting of the Council. He thinks then Council will probably not consider matter for about a week or even more. In this connection it is understood that Lodge (who becomes President on Tuesday) will be absent all next week in Europe.

In reply to questions Sir Pierson said that the resolution envisaged would call on Peace Observation Commission to appoint sub-commission and arrange for field observers to be appointed and that Security Council would not itself lay down membership of sub-commission. He stated that he does not consider that veto of resolution by Soviet Union should be regarded as inevitable, in view of modest nature of Thai request. If, however, there is a Soviet veto, the question would have to be considered in the light of the then existing circumstances. Thailand could of course request emergency session under part A of uniting for peace resolution or have ordinary session (or special session if conditions were satisfied) consider matter under part B. Question of reconvening eighth session should also be considered and in this connection Dayal (India) expressed view that eighth session is still in being and that Thais could at any time request

that an item should be placed on its agenda, and assembly would be called to consider this request. United Kingdom for its part would not consider that action under part A of unities for peaceresolution should be taken but United Kingdom, United States and France (while not firmly committed) would think that reference to the Assembly should be made.

There was also some discussion on the possible effect of the Geneva meeting on Security Council discussion.

While this could not be foreseen, it was felt by Sir Pierson Dixon and others that if discussion in Geneva were successful in removing threat to Thailand (e.g. by agreement for withdrawal of Vietminh troops from Laos and Cambodia), Thais would probably withdraw request or council would decide threat no longer existed.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M's.

30th May, 1954.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC EA SEA NZ WEST A E CEN
PI C & P

G

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

MK:MK

I.6307

Dated: 28th May, 1954.
2214

FROM:

Rec'd: 30th May, 1954.
0900

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK.

289. CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY.

Repeated Washington UNE128.

Indo-China.

Following is probable text of letter from Thai Delegation to Presidnet of the Security Council referred to in our immediately preceding telegram.

"I have the honour, under instructions from my Government and in conformity with Articles 34 and 35, paragraph 1, of the United Nations Charter, to bring to the attention of the Security Council a situation which, in the view of my Government, represents a threat to the security of Thailand, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

Large scale fighting has repeatedly taken place in the immediate vicinity of Thai Territory; in the view of my Government there is a possibility of direct incursions of foreign troops into its territory.

The whole world is well aware of the tension in the area and of its dangerous potentialities which go to the very heart of the main purpose of the United Nations - to protect humanity from the "scourage of war". Therefore, in the opinion of the Royal Thai Government, it is essential for the United Nations to have authentic and objective observation and reports, because the truth is the best foundation for the mainteance of peace.

I have the honour to bring this situation to the attention of the Security Council to the end, that the Security Council may provide for observation under the Peace Observation Commission.

The Royal Thai Government makes this appeal to the Security Council not only as a firm supporter of the United Nations, but as a power firmly determined to play its part in the maintenance of International Peace and Security in South-East Asia.

Finally, I have the honour to request that you call a meeting of the Security Council to consider this matter and, as representative of Thailand, I may be invited, in conformity with Rule 37 of the Rules of Procedure of the Security Council to participate in the Council discussion of the question.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration"

T

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M's.

401/1/4

30th May, 1954.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC EA SEA NZ WEST A E CEN PI C & P

G

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

127

CABLEGRAM.

MB:MK

I.6282

Dated: 28th May, 1954.
1450

FROM:

Rec'd: 29th May, 1954.
0930

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK.

284. CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated Washington UNE126.

Indo-China.

Thanat Khoman, who returned yesterday, has confirmed that Thailand has decided in principle to submit---complaint to Security Council (details of which have not been settled) will raise general question of the situation in Indo-China, but with reference to threat to Thailand from that situation. Thanat says Thai Government feels that recent developments are imminent threat to Thailand. Complaint will request appointment by Council of a P.O.C. observation team to investigate and observe situation as a matter of urgency. Thanat envisages that team would preferably consist of India, Pakistan, Sweden, Uruguay and New Zealand.

Thanat intends to discuss the wording of the complaint and the procedure to be followed with friendly members of the Security Council immediately. Timing of submission of complaint has not yet been determined, but Thanat is anxious to submit question as rapidly as possible. Submission will be subject to final approval of Prince Wan. He mentioned that it would probably be done within a few days or at most within the next week.

Thanat will also discuss procedure with Secretary-General today.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M's.

401/1/4

29th May, 1954.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC EA SEA NZ WEST A E CEN PI C& P

RAP

G

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

126

CABLEGRAM.

MB:MK

I.6282

Dated: 28th May, 1954.
1450

FROM:

Rec'd: 29th May, 1954.
0930

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK.

284. CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated Washington UNE126.

Indo-China.

Thanat Khoman, who returned yesterday, has confirmed that Thailand has decided in principle to submit---complaint to Security Council (details of which have not been settled) will raise general question of the situation in Indo-China, but with reference to threat to Thailand from that situation. Thanat says Thai Government feels that recent developments are imminent threat to Thailand. Complaint will request appointment by Council of a P.O.C. observation team to investigate and observe situation as a matter of urgency. Thanat envisages that team would preferably consist of India, Pakistan, Sweden, Uruguay and New Zealand.

Thanat intends to discuss the wording of the complaint and the procedure to be followed with friendly members of the Security Council immediately. Timing of submission of complaint has not yet been determined, but Thanat is anxious to submit question as rapidly as possible. Submission will be subject to final approval of Prince Wan. He mentioned that it would probably be done within a few days or at most within the next week.

Thanat will also discuss procedure with Secretary-General today.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M's.

401/1/4

29th May, 1954.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC EA SEA NZ WEST A E CEN PI C& P

G

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

RESTRICTED.

JC:SA

I.6209

Dated: 27th May, 1954.
1330
Recd.: 28th May, 1954.
0830.

FROM:

Australian Legation,
BANGKOK.

41. RESTRICTED. PRIORITY.

Repeated Sav. 4 to Singapore.

Your telegram 73.

The Official Cabinet spokesman was reported in a Press statement on 25th May as saying - if the Geneva Conference fails and if the Communists should again invade Laos and Cambodia, Thailand would consider the movement as a threat to its safety and would request the Security Council to send observers to study the situation. He also gave the personal opinion that the chances of an Indo China settlement at Geneva is only 5 per cent.

Suggest above should not yet be regarded as definite policy statement.

MIN. &DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M.'s

28th May, 1954.

401/1/4

SEC A/Ss UN PAC EA SEA NZ WEST A E CENT PI C&P

G

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

124

CABLEGRAM. SECRET.

MB:EGM:

I. 6205

Dated: 27th May 1954
1710
Rec'd: 28th May 1954
0830

FROM:

Australian Delegation,
GENEVA.

GC131. SECRET. PRIORITY.

Addressed to Canberra GC131 repeated Washington 48.

My GC129. Siamese Appeal.

United Nations Secretary-General has expressed to Eden serious misgivings about Siamese appeal. He feels that there is no guarantee how things may go in United Nations. Secretary-General who will arrive in New York from Geneva on May 28th understands that Siamese will act within the next few days.

MIN. & DEPT: E.A.
MIN. & DEPT: DEFENCE
P.M.'s

28th May 1954

SEC A/Ss UNO PAC EA SEA NZ WEST A E CENT PI
C&P
G

401/1/4

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

GUARD. **CABLEGRAM.**

KC:MK I.6188

Dated: 26th May, 1954.
1903
FROM: Rec'd: 28th May, 1943.
1400

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

401/1/4

527. CONFIDENTIAL IMMEDIATE.

Repeated London 85, Geneva Misc.57.

Thai request to United Nations.

1. We discussed your 360 with Ward Allen of State Department today with following results.

(a) British and French have agreed to support Thai appeal. Thais are now drafting letter to Security Council on basis of letter submitted last year. It will specifically request activation and despatch of P.O.C. team to Thailand.

(b) Russians my veto request.

(i) in general terms

(ii) because Czechoslovakia is not included in team which it is hoped Security Council will request Peace Observation Commission to appoint or

(iii) for any other reason. In which case of course appeal will go on to Assembly.

(c) State Department strongly prefers General Assembly Meeting to Interim Committee main reason being that Soviet has always boycotted Interim Committee as being illegal and would, therefore, argue that P.O.C. team was not legally activated. This might in turn lead to greater hesitation on part of "wobblers" (e.g., Asians and Arabs).

(d) While there is no means of preventing Russians or anyone else from talking in security Council or Assembly Americans hope it will be possible to confine debate to specific Thai request.

(e) State Department hopes that within the next day or so informal discussions may begin among Delegations in New York where United States will first contact "friendly" members of Security Council.

2. Ward Allen again requested that our possession of above information should not be disclosed to American Delegations at Geneva or New York at present stage.

3. Haydon Raynor told us later that talks in New York are expected to take place tomorrow and that State Department is anxious that Thai appeal be made by end of this week.

4. Presume you will by now have seen cables which have passed between Eden and London indicating that:

(a) Eden reluctantly agrees to United Kingdom support of Thai request if United States continues to insist.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

2.

I.6188

(b) Bedell Smith agrees to Eden's suggestion that three powers consider in New York various tactical problems arising out of Thai request.

(c) Smith agrees that pending outcome of those talks no action by Thailand be taken.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M's.

27th May, 1954.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC EA SEA WEST A E CEN PI C & P

G

(2)

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

HMcC:MB

I. 6182.

Dated: 26th May, 1954.
1659

FROM:

Rec'd: 27th May, 1954.
1130

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK.

283. CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated Washington UNE. 123.

Indo-China.

Your 127.

2. No action has been taken by Thai Delegation to place question on agenda. Thanat Khoman (Head of Thai Delegation) is expected to arrive on 28th May from Geneva after discussion with Prince Wan and Pojna Sarasin (Ambassador to Washington, who has just visited Bangkok for discussion with Government).

3. There has been considerable speculation and discussion among Delegations as to probable Thai initiative, but there is no real knowledge of their intentions. Prasong Bunchoem who is at present in charge of Thai Mission here, has no knowledge of action intended. Situation may be clearer after Thanat's arrival but it is thought that he might be instructed to sound out various groups of delegations before Thailand takes any action.

4. It is generally assumed that, if the Thais do bring the question before United Nations, the first move will be to submit complaint to Security Council, where it is possible that any resolution to send peace observer team will be vetoed by Soviet Union. Way would then be open to call special session of Assembly under uniting for peace resolution. Possible alternative is reconvening of Eighth Session on Korea item, and adding Indo-China item to agenda. There seems little enthusiasm for use of interim committee.

5. We shall endeavour to see Thanat as soon as possible after his return.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M'S.

27th May, 1954.

SEC A/Ss Cr (L & T) UN PAC EA SEA NZ WEST
A E CEN PI C & P

G

401/1/4

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM. SECRET.

HP:MB

I. 6171.

Dated: 26th May, 1954.
2114
Rec'd: 27th May, 1954.
0830

FROM:

Australian High Commissioner's Office,
L O N D O N.

1508. SECRET. PRIORITY.

Addressed External Canberra 1508 repeated Australian Embassy, Washington 66 (please pass New York and Ottawa) repeated Australian Consulate General, Geneva 32.

From External.

Your 1174. Thai appeal to United Nations.

Paterson (Acting Head South East Asia Department Foreign Office) said to-day that procedure aspects of proposal were currently being examined by American, French and United Kingdom Delegations in New York.

2. United Kingdom did not favour appeal because they were confident that no matter how carefully drafted it would be impossible to limit discussion to proposed Thai request for despatch of observers once it came before General Assembly. If so a general debate in Assembly on situation in South East Asia would probably torpedo any chance of reaching a settlement at Geneva.

3. Despite United Kingdom misgivings on subject Paterson said United Kingdom would not maintain opposition if Americans were determined to go ahead. He described Thailand's attitude was "not unwilling".

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M'S.

27th May, 1954.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC EA SEA NZ WEST A E CEN PI
C & P

G

401/1/4

401/1/4.
119

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM. **SECRET.**

HMC:KC

I.6178.

Dated: May 26 1954.
2127.
Recd: May 27 1954.
0900.

FROM:

Australian Delegation to Geneva Conference,
GENEVA.

GC.129. SECRET.

Repeated Washington 47.

Your GC32.

Siamese appeal to United Nations.

1. Eden told Bedell Smith yesterday that he still thought that any action while Geneva Conference was still in progress would give impression that hope of any results had been abandoned but that if United States insisted on action, the United Kingdom would agree.

2. In view of difficulties and differences of opinion on United Nations procedure to be followed, Eden proposed that United States, United Kingdom and French delegations in New York meet to examine implications of the proposal and work out the best way to handle it. Smith agreed that no action should be taken until delegations had reported and that the effect of any United Nations proceedingson the work of the Conference and situation in Indo-China would then be considered. Presumably Washington or New York will advise whether Smith's attitude is endorsed by Dulles and Lodge.

3. Eden suggested following questions to be considered in New York:

(1) Whether appeal should go through the Security Council to the Assembly in accordance with the uniting for peace procedure or direct to special Assembly.

(2) How problem of Chinese representation should be handled.

(3) What Governments if any should participate in the Security Council and Assembly debates (Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam and Vietminh might seek to participate).

(4) Terms of draft resolution. United Kingdom thinks phrase "general appeal of Thailand" (my GC116 paragraph (2) dangerously vague.

(5) Areas to be visited by sub-committee.

(6) Composition.

(7) Prospects of obtaining sufficient majority in Assembly and of controlling course of debate.

4. Siamese intention to appeal has already been reported in press from Washington with comment that action has been suggested by United States.

Our own/.....

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

118

CABLEGRAM. SECRET.

O. 5084/5/6/7/8/9/90/1.

SHA:CA.

Sent: 26th May, 1954.
1700

TO:

Australian Embassy
WASHINGTON. 360.

(Please pass to Australian Mission to the United Nations, New York 127, and to Ottawa 103.)

Repeated to -

Australian High Commissioner's Office,
L O N D O N. 1174.

Australian High Commissioner's Office,
WELLINGTON. 148.

(Please convey to New Zealand Government).

Australian Legation,
B A N G K O K. 73.

Australian Delegation,
G E N E V A. G.C.32.

Australian High Commissioner's Office,
D E L H I. 103.

SECRET.

Reported Thai move to place question of threat to peace before United Nations.

1. We have not heard definitely whether Thai Government have conveyed an appeal to United Nations nor, if so, whether appeal is in general terms or a specific request to Security Council to ask Peace Observation Commission for observer team for Thailand. If issue can be confined to simple one of having available observer team to go to Thailand at Thailand's request we would see considerable value in clearing the decks to this end. On the other hand, it seems unlikely that U.S.S.R. would agree unless observer team included Czechoslovak representative as Czechoslovakia is a member of P.O.C. In event of Soviet veto in Security Council, matter would then come before Interim Committee of the General Assembly or the General Assembly if majority of Council agree. Again, simple endorsement of observer corps for Thailand could be sought this is an objective we would support. But if whole question of South East Asian threat to world peace were to be before the Interim Committee or General Assembly in some form or other it is difficult to see course of debate and ultimate outcome and effects on Geneva negotiations.

2. The drafting of the question will therefore be important. Please advise reactions and whether it is believed that Thai request for observer group if this is all that is involved, could be so handled without/effecting seriously Geneva negotiations.

401/1/4

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM. **SECRET.**

 0.5084/5/6/7/8/9/90/1

Cost: Washington £30.0.0.
London £25.0.0.
Wellington £ 7.10.0
Geneva £37.10.0.

MIN & DEPT. E.A.
MIN & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M'S.

27th May, 1954.

SEC WEST | A/Ss A | UN E | PAC CEN | EA PI | SEA C&P | NZ

G

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper The New York Times File No. 401/1/4

Published at New York Date 21st May, 1954

S.E.17.

THAIS MAY URGE U.N. TO ACT ON REDS

Bangkok's Fear of Vietminh's Advance in Laos May Bring Call for Special Session

By THOMAS J. HAMILTON
Special to The New York Times.

GENEVA, May 20—Thailand is concerned over the spread of Communist influence in Indo-China and is considering whether to submit an appeal to the United Nations. If she does so, well-informed sources believe the General Assembly may be called into special session this summer.

Authoritative sources say Thailand is considering the situation created by the fall of Dienbienphu. The loss of the French fortress has resulted in the advance of Communist Vietminh forces farther into Laos, and correspondingly nearer the Thailand frontier. Pote Sarasin, Thailand's Ambassador in Washington, recently returned to Bangkok to report on the situation.

If the appeal is submitted it will take the form of a request that the Security Council direct the United Nations Peace Observation Commission to send observers to Thailand.

'Observe and Report'

The "uniting for peace" resolution adopted by the General Assembly Nov. 3, 1950, authorized the fourteen-member commission to "observe and report on the situation in any area where there exists international tensions, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security."

A Soviet veto on a Thailand appeal to the Security Council is inevitable. But under the terms of the "uniting for peace" resolution the General Assembly would be permitted to assume jurisdiction.

Since the 1954 session will not convene until September, it is believed Thailand would request a special session this summer.

Backed by U. S. and France

The prospective Thai move has the backing of the United States and France. It is understood Britain fears such a move might prejudice the chances of an Indo-China settlement at the Far Eastern conference now in session here. Discussions are taking place in Washington, at the United Nations and here.

Reports here about the Vietminh's advance in Laos are scant, but since its forces already held a number of pockets near the Laos-Thailand border, Thailand's concern is easily understood.

There is considerable feeling in Thailand, it is reported, that the best policy would be to remain silent, or at least to await the outcome of the Geneva conference before appealing to the United Nations.

The three days of secret sessions on Indo-China this week offer little hope of an armistice. Debate will be resumed tomorrow. The Western Big Three decided today to accept conditionally a Soviet proposal to negotiate a settlement for Laos and Cambodia separately from that on Vietnam.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

118



FOR THE MINISTER

The French Ambassador called on me yesterday and said that a short time ago you had asked him about the French Government's attitude towards the suggestion that, in view of the Vietminh's threat to Laos, United Nations observers might be stationed in Thailand. He stated that he had now received a reply from his Government which indicated that although they were most grateful for your interest in the matter they considered that such a proposal should not be put forward at the present time. They felt that the resulting discussion in the United Nations might get out of hand and also that it might give provocation to the Russians at a time when this was perhaps best avoided.

I informed the Ambassador that I would pass these views on to you.

In other words, ~~that~~ French opposition has not changed.

13th February, 1954.

16/2/54

MR. TANDY

Mr Rowland 24/2

DW

RG

Our file please 401/1/4

1 → WN to see Mr Ralph 1/3 Mr Critchley 11/3

2 SEA file 401/1/4.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

:MK

I.16315

Dated: 3rd December, 1953.
1847

FRP,:

Rec'd: 4th December, 1953.
1450

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK.

1399. UNCLASSIFIED.

On the recommendation of the Fourth Committee it was agreed in plenary without objection that the following countries should constitute the Committee on South West Africa: Brazil, Mexico, Norway, Pakistan, Syria, Thailand, Uruguay.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. TERRITORIES.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
MR. GOSS.
P.M's.

4th December, 1953

SEC A/Ss UN @ TA ER EA SEA SP WEST A E CEN PI

G

Record of conversation with
Mr. Kakitsubo.

Mr. Kakitsubo, Counsellor the the Japanese Embassy interviewed me on 14th September, at his request.

Referring to elections for the F.A.O. Council, Mr. Kakitsubo said Japan was considering standing for election, although she had not finally decided whether to do so; she was exploring the position. He said that Thailand was seeking election to the Council.

I explained that seats on the F.A.O. Council were allotted with regard to the principle of geographic distribution. Three seats were held by Asians. Of these only the one held by India would become vacant at the F.A.O. Conference to be held in November, 1953. The remaining two, held by Pakistan and the Philippines would not fall vacant until 1955.

Mr. Kakitsubo volunteered the opinion that India should retain her seat.

He then referred to the possibility that the number of Council members might be increased from 18 to 23. I said that this was so and that one of these would probably be allotted to Asia. I said that Japan, a new and important member of F.A.O. might have a claim to the seat. I said this would apply also to Indonesia, if she were a candidate. Thailand, as a large producer and exporter of rice would also have a claim. I added that we would normally take account of the choice favoured by the Asian region.

Mr. Kakitsubo asked whether Thailand had sought our support for election and I said she had. Mr. Kakitsubo then remarked that a Japanese Ambassador in South America had been told that there were "reasons" why Thailand would not be elected. Mr. Kakitsubo would not elucidate.

Asked whether we would support Japan if she decided to stand I said it seemed that Japan should await the Council's decision on new seats and determine its decision in the light of the possibilities, and other nominations.

RG (F) — Thailand - internal
Wyn 8

→ S.E.A. for your file —— 16/9

401/1/4

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

M GL

I. 10523

Dated: 5th August, 1953.
1711
Rec'd: 6th August, 1953.
1140

FROM:

Australian Mission to the
United Nations,
NEW YORK.

633. CONFIDENTIAL.

8th Assembly.

Khalidy (Iraq) told us today that Pakistan is considering possibility of Sir Zafrullah Khan being candidate for Presidency. He commented that Asian delegations would be somewhat embarrassed at having to choose between two Asians (Wan and Madame Pandit) and more so with three.

2. Urquia (El Salvador) says Perez Venezuela is likely to have Latin support for Ad Hoc Committee Chairmanship and that El Salvador Government wishes Urquia to be candidate for 6th Committee. These candidacies will be considered in Latin American group in due course.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'s

6th August, 1953.

SEC A/S(GR) A/S(ADMIN) UN@ PAC EA SEA NZ WEST A E PI CEN

G

Did we file telegram referring to Prince Wan's candidature?

401/1/4

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

ML:GG

I.10519.

Dated: 5th August, 1953.
2000.
Rec'd: 6thAugust, 1953.
0930.

FROM:

Australian HighCommissioner's Office,
LONDON.

2838. CONFIDENTIAL.

From External.

Our 2792. Korea.

Siamese have expressed concern at their ommission from Butler's list of countries who should be invited to Political Conference. They have been assured that Foreign Office favour their inclusion if numbers permit and that Siam was implied in Butler's reference to "others". See also composition suggested in Commonwealth Relations Office telegram Y263 30th July.

2. Reports from Tokyo suggest likelihood of Japanese also wishing to participate. Dening, while agreeing there would be no reason for them to participate or have observer, suggests they should be kept officially informed of proceedings and that account be taken of their views if questions wider than Korea came up for discussion. Foreign Office are considering what reply should be given to any Japanese approach and are inclined to favour something on the lines suggested by Dening.

MIN.AND DEPT.E.A.
MIN.AND DEPT.DEFENCE.
P.M'S.

401/1/4.

6th August, 1953.

SEC WEST A/S(GR) E A/S(ADMIN) GEN UN@ PI PAC EA SEA SP NZ

G

COPY FOR SOUTH EAST ASIA

110

852/17/8/1

Memo No.....

CONFIDENTIAL

4th August, 1953.

MEMORANDUM for :-

The Australian Legation,
BANGKOK

8th General Assembly - Prince Wan

I refer to your memorandum No. 306 of 22nd July, 1953, and Note enclosed therewith.

2. We are not yet in a position to make a public or categorical statement on the election to the Presidency. There are, as you may know, other candidates in the field, including at least one from another Commonwealth country, which fact obliges us at this stage to move with some circumspection in the matter.

3. Our feeling, however, is very much in favour of Prince Wan's candidature, and you may inform him confidentially of this. We hope very shortly to be in a position to come out in open support of him.

4. In the meantime, it is suggested that you also reply to the Thai Foreign Ministry's Note, saying that the Australian Government are impressed by Prince Wan's qualifications for election as President, and that his candidature will receive our most sympathetic consideration.

(K.C.O. Shann)
for Secretary

A.M.

401/1/4

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

19

DBB:GG

I.9877.

Dated: 22nd July, 1953.
1500.
Rec'd: 23rd July, 1953.
0850.

FROM:

Australian Legation,
B A N G K O K.

65. UNCLASSIFIED.

Note formally requesting Australian support of candidature of Prince Wan for presidency of eighth General Assembly has been received.

2. Note invokes Prince Wan's United Nations experience as well as understanding that next president should be representative of an Asian nation.

3. Full text follows by bag.

MIN.AND DEPT.E.A.
P.M'S.

23rd July, 1953.

SEC A/Ss UNO PAC SEA PI

G

Mr Morris.

HK. + 7 Thai + us

401/1/4

401/1/4.

108

PRIME MINISTER'S PRESS CONFERENCE

At Government House on 22nd June Phibul Songgram told Press correspondents that Thailand's appeal to the U.N. concerning the aggression against Laos by the Viet Minh requested the U.N. to acknowledge the present Communist threat to Thailand and other territores in South East Asia; if the U.N. approved, the Thai Government would request a U.N. observation team to come to Thailand to investigate the real situation and its violence. Thailand's appeal was an effort to prevent possible aggression, and, if necessary to resist Communist aggression, the Army would be "mobilised with the help of the U.S.A.". Thailand would establish a defence line along the Mekong River - police and troops had already been dispatched to safeguard order. If an emergency should arise, a mobilisation of the reserve would be called for, but the present situation was "not critical enough to warrant this action". After thorough investigation, the Government had begun evacuation of pro-Viet Minh Vietnamese refugees, might be evacuated. Communists in Thailand had been quiet since the arrest of Communist suspects. The Premier confirmed the story that an unidentified submarine had appeared in the Gulf of Thailand. It had been learned that the Communist Chinese had maintained a naval base on Hainan for the past two years. Furthermore, this base had undetaken to transport arms to Chinese guerrillas in Malaya; if the submarine appeared in the Gulf of Thailand, the Thai Navy would take appropriate measures to drive it away. The Premier emphasised that the present situation in Thailand was "more critical than at any time since the last war". (Bangkok 13.00, 3.6.53).

to Nakhon, and was considering other provinces to which the refugees

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON D C

201/20/1

CONFIDENTIAL

10th July 1953

Memorandum No 1003/53

MEMORANDUM for:

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra, A.C.T.
Australia

Presidency of Eighth General Assembly

Further to our memorandum No 949/53 of 30th June attached is a copy of a letter dated 22nd June from the Thai Ambassador regarding the intention of Prince Wan to seek election to the Presidency of the Eighth General Assembly.

Attached also is a copy of the Ambassador's reply.

+ Missing

J.L. Allen
Second Secretary

Atts.
JLA:gf

Mr. Gilbert

Asst Sec Minister (Mrs)

7: Thailand file.

401/1/4 to retain

KGM 7

COPY

106

THE ROYAL THAI EMBASSY
WASHINGTON 8, D.C.

No. 1034/2496

22nd June 1953

Excellency,

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that the Foreign Minister of Thailand, His Royal Highness Prince Naradhip Bongprabandh (formerly His Royal Highness Prince Wan Waithayakon), intends to seek election to the presidentship of the United Nations General Assembly at its eighth session. His Royal Highness's eminence both in the diplomatic and international legal sphere is, I am sure, already well-known to Your Excellency. There can therefore be no doubt that His Royal Highness is fully qualified as a candidate to this high office which he will certainly uphold with dignity and impartiality if elected.

I shall therefore be very grateful if Your Excellency will kindly communicate with your Government to the end that its support may be given to the election of my Foreign Minister as President of the next General Assembly.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

The Honourable
Sir Percy C. Spender, K.B.E., Q.C.,
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of
Australia,
Washington, D.C.

(Pote Sarasin)
Ambassador

CONFIDENTIAL

1. → ~~Western Section~~ to see

2. → SEA S/ " " retain

-- 2435

Confidential

3/10/3

Memo. No. 594/53

2nd July, 1953.

MEMORANDUM for : The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra, A.C.T.

Presidency of Eighth General Assembly

With reference to your memorandum No. 379 of 11th June, 1953 on file 852/17/8/1, we spoke informally today to Mr. Michael Williams, Head of United Nations (Political) Department, Foreign Office, who said that they had not yet formed any firm views regarding the next Presidency and that they were unlikely to do so for a further three or four weeks.

2. Williams said that they would probably prefer on the whole to see a European elected this time if that were possible. He understood that the Belgians and the Dutch were thinking of sponsoring a European candidate and the thought that, if there were other strong support for the proposal, the United Kingdom might also be inclined to back it, Williams thought, however, that the majority feeling in United Nations would probably be that an Asian should be elected this time. In that event Prince Wan would probably be acceptable to the United Kingdom unless there were some other very outstanding candidate from Asia. (Williams knew of none at present.) He said that Prince Wan had considerable experience and a very satisfactory record as Chairman of various committees and he was regarded by the Foreign Office as a reasonable and well-balanced person.

3. Williams promised to go into the matter further with their Mission in New York and to let us know how their ideas were developing later in the month.

4. I am forwarding a copy of this memorandum to the Australian Mission to the United Nations in New York.

(C. T. Moodie)
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICER

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON D C

CONFIDENTIAL

201/20/1

30th June 1953

Memorandum No 949/53

MEMORANDUM for:

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra, A.C.T.
Australia

Presidency of the Eighth General Assembly

We discussed your memorandum No 440 of 11th June (your file 852/17/8/1), regarding the candidacy of Prince Wan Waithayakon, with Mr Ward Allen of the State Department. The Committee of Officers (which includes Mr Allen) in the State Department dealing with United Nations appointments has not yet met to discuss this question. Mr Allen however expressed the view that the United States would in all probability favour Prince Wan's election as President of the Eighth General Assembly, not only because suitable alternative candidates seemed unlikely to be forthcoming (with the possible exception of Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan), but also because of the appreciation in the State Department of Prince Wan's work to date in the Assembly.

Noted on file 401/6/1
- relations with ECA

J.L. Allen
Second Secretary

→ 1. Vth Gochel A to see

→ 2. Vth Updated SEA to retain

JLA:gf

HC 7/7

Mr Morris + file — 401/1/14

MG 8/7

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

RESTRICTED. 103

MD - MC

I.8448.

Dated 23rd June, 1953.
1858.
Recd. 24th June, 1953.
1400.

FROM:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

519. RESTRICTED.

Repeated to Washington.

Eighth General Assembly.

Reference your telegram 174, we have received formal notice from Thai Delegation of candidacy of Prince Wan for presidency of Eighth Assembly. Thai Delegation believe President should on this occasion be chosen from an Asian nation. Note expresses hope Australia will support Wan.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.

P.M.'S.

24th June, 1953.

SEC A/S's UNO PAC SEA NZ PI.

Mr Morris

F. Thailand - 401/1/4.

HG 24/6

I have passed to UN Division the biographical notes on Wan sent to us by our Bangkok Legation.

HG

COPY

OF LETTER FROM
AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS
4510 EMPIRE STATE BUILDING. NEW YORK 1. N. Y.

23rd June, 1953

File No. 105/2

Memorandum No. 1041/53

→ Mr Gilchrist
to retain or destroy.
to 3/7

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra. A.C.T.

Thai Candidature for Assembly Presidency

Reference is made to our telegram No. 519 of today's date concerning the formal request from the Thai delegation for support for the candidature of Prince Wan for the office of President of the General Assembly.

.... 2. Attached are copies of the note from the Thai delegation.

3. A formal acknowledgment has been sent to the Thai delegation.

Minister

KHR:fdb

COPY
fdb
101

Permanent Delegation of Thailand
to the United Nations
20 East 82nd Street, New York 28,N.Y.

No. 389/2496

Sir,

Under instructions from His Majesty's Government, I have the honour to inform you that Thailand proposed to seek the election of His Royal Highness Prince Wan Waithayakon Krommun Naradhip Bongsprabandh to the Presidency of the General Assembly during its Eighth Session.

My Government believes that, on the basis of the understanding and practice currently adopted for the election of the President of the General Assembly, this high Office should devolve, for the forthcoming Eighth Session, upon a representative of an Asian nation. Since Prince Wan who is presently Foreign Minister of Thailand, has not only participated closely in the work of the United Nations as Permanent Representative of Thailand to the U.N. for the past six years but has also contributed to the carrying out of the duties and responsibilities of the United Nations General Assembly in the capacity of Chairman of the Trusteeship, Economic and Financial as well as the Legal Committee consecutively during the past three years, he should be, in my Government's view, well qualified to assume the high responsibility of the Office of President of the General Assembly.

My Government, therefore, expresses the hope that your Government will favourably consider the above-mentioned candidature and that it will receive your Government's support at the forthcoming election.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Thanat Khoman
Acting Permanent Representative
of Thailand to the United Nations

H.E.Mr. W.D.Forsyth
Minister
Permanent Representative of Australia
to the United Nations,
Empire State Building, Room 4510
New York 1, N.Y.

401/1/4.

100

Confidential.

Note for file:

Peace Observation Commission in Thailand

15.VI.53

Copy of letter from Acting Secretary to Sir Frederick Shedden regarding the possible provision of an Australian military observer filed on 401/2/1 – U.N. Activities in Thailand.

17. VI

G.O.'s Nos. 40, 164, 194. COMMONWEALTH PUBLIC SERVICE. Form P.S.B. 9.

Appointments, Furlough, Vacations of Office, and Allowances Granted to Officers.

Department..... *State*.....

RETURN FOR FORTNIGHT* ENDED.....

(To be forwarded in duplicate to the Public Service Board immediately after the close of each pay period.*)

Nil return should be submitted when no action is to be reported.

N.B.—Particulars in this return should be furnished in Permanent Staff List order.

P.S. List.		Name of Officer.	Designation and Station.	State whether New Appointment, Furlough, Retirement, Allowance, &c.	Date.		Allowance or Salary (Amount). £
Page.	No.				Instructions issued to New Appointees to Commence Duty.	Commenced Duty, Furlough, Retirement, Death, Allowance, &c.	

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

HMC:ML

I.7896

Dated: 13th June, 1953
2230
Rec'd: 15th June, 1953
0830

FROM:

Australian High Commissioner's Office,
LONDON.

2044. CONFIDENTIAL.

Addressed Canberra 2044, repeated Washington 202 (Please pass Austunat New York) repeated savingram to Paris 27.

From External.

Our 1780. Siamese appeal to United Nations.

Tahourdin, head of the South East Asia Dept., Foreign Office said yesterday that departmental opinion was now somewhat firmer in favour of appeal.

2. United States had suggested that Siamese should hold action until political situation in France became clearer. Tahourdin thought it unlikely that Siamese would press ahead without further consultation with United States, United Kingdom and perhaps others. French were still trying hard to discourage or further water down appeal but he thought it unlikely they would succeed.

15th June, 1953

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M's

SEC A/S(GR) A/S(ADMIN) UN@ PAC SEA NZ WEST E

401/1/4 16.vi

File - 401/1/4

Copy is already filed on 401/2/1.
12.VI.53

CONFIDENTIAL

98

POSSIBLE U.N. OBSERVATION GROUP IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA.

THAI DECISION

The Thai Government will probably address a complaint to the United Nations Security Council before the end of May, 1953, directing attention to Vietminh activity near the Thai border and possibly also to the threat of Communist expansion in South-East Asia. United Nations action on such a complaint by Thailand will most probably take the form of an authorisation to the Peace Observation Commission (set up by the Fifth General Assembly under "Uniting for Peace") to observe areas of tension in South-East Asia upon the request of Governments in whose territory U.N. observation is desired.

FORM OF U.N. ACTION

2. Were the Security Council (or, in the event of its failure to act, the General Assembly, under "Uniting for Peace") to recommend the appointment of a military observer group, it could either work through the Peace Observation Commission, or request the Secretary General to call directly upon the Panel of Military Observers. The former appears far the more likely course.

THE PEACE OBSERVATION COMMISSION

3. The Peace Observation Commission was established by General Assembly resolution 377 A (v) B (known as "Uniting for Peace"), whereby it was decided that the Commission should have authority "in its discretion to appoint sub-Commissions and to utilise the services of observers"; at the same time the Secretary General was requested to provide the necessary staff and facilities, "utilising, where directed by the Commission, the U.N. Panel of Field Observers"..

4. The P.O.C. consists of the following 14 members:-

Balkan Sub C"

1.	Colombia	8.	Czechoslovakia
2.	France	9.	India
3.	Pakistan	10.	Iraq
4.	Sweden	11.	Israel
5.	U.S.A.	12.	New Zealand
6.	United Kingdom	13.	U.S.S.R.
7.	China	14.	Uruguay

(Australia is not a member of the P.O.C., having been appointed to the other important group established under "Uniting for Peace", the Collective Measures Committee).

THE P.O.C. Balkan Sub-Commission

5. When the Balkan situation was referred to the P.O.C. following the winding-up of U.N.S.C.O.B. by the Sixth General Assembly, the P.O.C. was requested by G.A. resolution 508 (vi) B of 7th December, 1951 to establish a Balkan Sub-Commission with authority to despatch "such observers as it may deem necessary" to areas of tension on the request of States concerned. Accordingly, on 21st January, 1952 a Balkan Sub-Commission was set up with the above authority, its members being the first five countries in the above list. Two days later, the Greek Government requested the immediate dispatch of observers to Greece, and on 31st January, 1952, the Balkan Sub-Commission, at its first meeting, invited its own five members each to send one observer, and invited the United Kingdom to provide a principal observer, "utilising where desired the individuals listed in the Panel of Field Observers". The P.O.C. Balkan Sub-Commission itself has

so far not visited Greece and its activities have been confined to studying reports from its Military Observer Group stationed in Greece. Representation for the P.O.C. Balkan Sub-Commission has been provided from the Permanent Mission to the United Nations (in New York) of the five Member States. The terms of reference of the P.O.C. Balkan Sub-Commission provide, however, that it should proceed to the Balkans (Greece) if an emergency arose there.

MILITARY OBSERVERS FOR THAILAND, ETC.

6. A precedent has thus been created of drawing military observers, if not entirely from among the members of a regional sub-commission, at least from among the States which are members of the P.O.C. Were the P.O.C. to concern itself with Thailand, it might well be that military observers would be drawn from among the remaining 8 members. In any event, it is very likely that New Zealand would be asked to provide an observer.

NEW ZEALAND DEPARTMENTAL VIEWS ON PROVISION OF MILITARY OBSERVERS

7. The New Zealand Department for External Affairs has commented as follows in a recent telegram to the New Zealand High Commissioner in Canberra:-

> "Decision on such a request would be a matter for very serious consideration..... Although it is not possible to say what attitude the New Zealand Government would adopt if confronted with a request for assistance in any limited U.N. action such as the despatch of observation groups, they would have to take into account the fact that any participation by us would be an additional point of pressure upon us to give material assistance should hostilities occure and collective measures be decided upon .... Possibility of New Zealand being able to give effective aid is very remote."

8. Thus, there is a possibility that New Zealand would not wish to make military observers available, although it would seem unlikely that the New Zealand Government, as a P.O.C. member, would refuse appointment to any P.O.C. Sub-Commission for South-East Asia.

POSSIBLE AUSTRALIAN PARTICIPATION IN P.O.C. MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP

9. Australia is not a member of the P.O.C. and could not secure appointment to such a Sub-Commission for Thailand (or South-East Asia). For political reasons - and particularly if New Zealand did not wish to make officers available - it would be desirable for Australia to seek the appointment of an Australian officer (or officers) to the military observer group. Theoretically, there would be no bar to this, as none of the resolutions referred to above envisaged that the provision of observers should be restricted to the countries represented on the P.O.C. It is relevant that Australia has undertaken to provide up to six officers for such purposes under the "Panel of Field Observers" arrangements.

THE PANEL OF FIELD OBSERVERS.

10. This Panel was established under G.A. resolution 297B(iv) of 1949, which requested the Secretary-General to "establish and maintain a list of persons qualified to assist U.N. missions in the functions of observation and supervision...." In response to a request from the Secretary-General, the Australian Government advised him that it would be willing to supply up to 6 (un-named) officers at any time for duty as observers. The Secretary-General acknowledged this offer.

AUSTRALIAN PARTICIPATION IN PREVIOUS U.N. OBSERVATION:

11. The United Nations has not found it easy in previous cases to obtain the services of qualified officers from suitable countries to undertake the duties required of military observers in areas of international tension. Australia has a good record in this field, both in Korea (observers attached to UNCOK) and in Kashmir where Major-General Nimmo has for some years been Chief United Nations Military Observer with a group of officers under his control drawn from various countries, including Australia.

POSSIBLE AUSTRALIAN PARTICIPATION IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA:

12. Arrangements for provision of military observers are usually made "behind the scenes" between the U.N. Secretariat and a few leading Delegations in New York. It is felt that Australia could obtain the appointment of Australian officer (s) to any U.N. group established in South-East Asia, provided we let it be known in good time in appropriate quarters that such appointment (s) would be welcome to us. Any such move by Australia should be made only after consultation with New Zealand, as we would wish to avoid the impression of pushing them out. If New Zealand decided to send officers, Australian participation would probably not be required - we might, however, make arrangements with the New Zealand authorities to see reports from the New Zealand member.

13. Under normal conditions, any Australian officer so appointed would not be in a position to report direct to the Australian Government. However, it should be possible for him to keep in fairly close touch, either privately with Australian Services or through Australian diplomatic missions in the area (Bangkok, Saigon, etc.). In view of Australia's interests in the area, the opportunity afforded for first-hand Australian observation of the situation as it develops, would be most valuable.

RECOMMENDATION:

14. It is recommended that this paper, if approved, be passed to the Defence Department with a covering letter requesting comments and advice as to whether a suitable Australian officer (or officers) could be made available to serve on any U.N. military observation group established in South-East Asia.

(K.C.O. Shann)

United Nations Section
File 854/10/13/7
852/10/23/2
BCH/PMH/SCB
25/5/53

Summary of Telegrams

Name of Paper Pacific Section. File No. 401/1/4.

Published at during the Secretary's absence. Date 23 May to 1st June 1953.

Thailand

32. (a) Request to Security Council for a Peace Observation Committee has been postponed. We are inclined to favour it, although border observation could hardly be effective except in noting movements of large groups. We have mentioned to Sir Frederick Shedden the political desirability of an Australian officer being included as a military observer if a P.O.C. is sent out. (United Nations are handling).

b) The threat which Australian tin-mining interests saw in a recent Thai Government policy announcement on tin-mining seems to have receded. It was apparently directed against the Chinese. Representations were made by Ballard and the U.K., Embassy, and the companies are now having direct discussions with the Thai Ministry concerned. Satisfactory Thai action on one company's request for a lease-extension is encouraging. We have kept Singapore informed.

401/1/4
~~410/4/4~~

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

MB:GL

CABLEGRAM. I. 7666

Dated: 9th June, 1953.
1737
Rec'd: 10th June, 1953.
1115

FROM:

Australian Mission to the
United Nations,
NEW YORK.

491. CONFIDENTIAL.

Laos.

Thanao Khoman today informed us that while he has received no clear instructions from Bangkok where the question is still under consideration he does not believe that Thai proposal to the Security Council will be made at present in view of imminent possibility of truce in Korea. He feels himself that it would be most inopportune to raise the question at this stage.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M.'s

10th June, 1953.

SEC A/S(GR) A/S(ADMIN) UN@ PAC EA NZ WEST E PI

SEA

For your files.
WE 10/6.

Mr Bowen
Min. Melbourne

Mr Spender
401/1/4

CONFIDENTIAL 93

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE,
NEW DELHI.

In reply quote No. 53/26.

Memorandum No.543.

9th June, 1953.

→ S.E.A.

to retain

tb 16/6

MEMORANDUM for: -

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.

Thai Reference of Laos Invasion
to the United Nations.

It has been reported in the press from New York that the Thai delegation to the United Nations has been urged by the Indian delegate there not to proceed with this proposal, to which the Government of India is opposed. Confirmation of the Indian Government's attitude has since been obtained from the Thai Embassy here. When the new Thai Ambassador, Luang Bhadravadi, called at the Ministry of External Affairs the question was raised by Mr. R. K. Nehru, Foreign Secretary, who stressed the various undesirable consequences of this move as the Government of India saw it. It is not known what reply was made by the Ambassador, but the Thais did not welcome Mr. Nehru's initiative.

(F. H. Stuart)
Counsellor.

1. Mr Munro ~~[illegible]~~ Hwy.
2. Minister ~~[illegible]~~ CW
~~3. [illegible]~~
3. File SEA.

401/1/4

HK 11
6

F401/1/4

→ Mr Echenberg, P. to retain 92

We'll bring the H.C. up to date on UN evolution — see his para. 2. HC 23/6

2/4/5/2/9/2/ 5612

CONFIDENTIAL

Memo. No. 173

MEMORANDUM FOR:

6th June, 1953.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

With reference to your Savingram No. 4 of the 18th May, 1953, relative to the position in Laos, Indo-China, I desire to inform you that I have discussed this question with several senior officials of the Department of External Affairs. They admit that it is a difficult and complicated position and the Government has not expressed any firm views as to any positive action. In the meantime, they have advised their Missions abroad to consort with the Governments to which they are accredited and obtain all available information on the views of the respective Governments. Generally speaking, the Union Government is prepared to act in conformity with the opinion of the majority of the Western Powers and particularly in accordance with the views of the other members of the Commonwealth, France and the United States.

2. I must admit that I find some difficulty in following your Savingram because in some parts you speak of referring to the Security Council and in others to the United Nations. It seems to me that there would be quite different procedures if the matter were referred to the Security Council. I, personally, think that France would not hesitate to use the veto and thereby nullify any positive action in the Security Council. On the other hand, you speak of the establishment of United Nations observation machinery under the resolution "Uniting for Peace" adopted by the General Assembly in 1950. It would seem that the establishment of observation teams with its budgetry commitment visualises a possible appeal to the General Assembly. I should be glad, therefore, if you would clarify this particular point.

3. The Department of External Affairs and this Mission have little information on the military operations in Indo-China and the political intentions of France as regards the full independence of the three associated states. Of course, we have seen the recent statement of the King of Cambodia in the United States and the uneasiness of France in regard to the diverse reaction caused by it in some quarters.

4. If I could express my personal opinion, I do not think that any appeal to the United Nations would bring any more help from the United Nations. On the other hand, it might well provoke direct Chinese military assistance and turn Indo-China into another Korea. The ensuing debate, whether in the Security Council or in Committee One or a Plenary Session of the General Assembly, would certainly tempt several delegations to attack "colonialism" which would play into the hands of the Communists.

W. R. HODGSON.

(W.R. Hodgson)
HIGH COMMISSIONER.

Mr. Eichelbaum

HC 24/6 HAS. Mitchell-file.

Mr. M. Ng

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper The New York Times File No. 401/1/4

Published at New York. Date 4th June, 1954

Address by Thai Ambassador to U.N. Security Council

Special to The New York Times.

UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., June 3—Following is the text of an address today before the United Nations Security Council by Pote Sarasin, Thailand's Ambassador to the United States:

Mr. President:

On May 29 the Government of Thailand brought to the attention of the Security Council a situation which represents a threat to the security of Thailand, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

Although up till now my country has not been directly attacked, the situation in territories bordering on Thailand has become so explosive and tension is so high that a very real danger exists that fighting may spread to Thailand and the other countries of the area and that foreign troops may effect direct incursions into Thai territory.

This is the situation my Government decided to bring before the Security Council for its consideration. For nearly eight years war has been going on in Vietnam, but up to April of last year its character was not such as to give great concern to my Government. Much as we have deplored its continuation, it has been largely within the borders of the state of Vietnam and had only indirect effect on Thailand's immediate neighbors, Laos and Cambodia. Bands of Vietminh guerrillas then operated in remote regions of both countries, while the Vietminh regime in Vietnam attempted from time to time to propagate the illusion that it was allied with so-called indigenous "national resistance movements" in Laos and Cambodia. At that time, however, the effect of these efforts on international peace and security did not appear critical.

The first unmistakable signs began to show in early 1953 that the conflict which had been raging in Vietnam could not be contained but was to spread westward. In the spring of 1953, the situation described above changed drastically for the worse when regular units of the Vietminh armed forces entered Laos. In early April, 1953, one Vietminh division and elements of two other divisions crossed the northern border of Laos, were reinforced by still other Vietminh units. All of these forces were composed of Vietnamese personnel. At one time, these forces came as close as fifteen miles from the Thai frontier and no one would then dare predict that the momentum gained during their march through the Laotian territory would come to an abrupt halt once these forces reached the western border of the Kingdom of Laos.

The 1953 Vietminh campaign in Laos fell short of its apparent objectives of reaching the Thai border at Pakkan and of seizing the royal capital of Luang Prabang. With the onset of the rainy season, the foreign forces withdrew from part of Lao territory which they had overrun and most of the regular Vietminh units returned to Vietnam. Some regular forces remained, however, and supported the efforts of Vietminh guerrilla forces and political cadres to organize a base area for the Vietminh-created "Resistance Government of Laos."

Drive Into Central Laos

This withdrawal of Vietminh forces and the resulting diminution of their threat to Laos and to international peace and security proved to be only temporary. In late December, 1953, Vietminh regular forces, coming primarily from the Vinh area in north central Vietnam, again launched a drive into central Laos. This operation was initially successful and Thakhek, a Lao town on the bank of the River Mekong, which serves as border between Thailand and Laos, was seized. French Union forces, however, succeeded in reoccupying Thakhek and the Vietminh units began to expand their operations southward toward the Lao-Cambodian frontier. They conducted propaganda, recruiting and guerrilla operations, the latter being directed primarily against national Route 13 and the Mekong River lines of communication.

This created a situation of great danger to Thailand, which was aggravated by the fact that 60,000 persons of the Vietnamese race live within Thailand along the Lao-Thai frontier; in the area fronting the scene of this military operation. The presence of this group has made it possible for Vietminh agents to infiltrate these Vietnamese communities.

In late January, 1954, a further military operation was undertaken by the Vietminh in the north of Laos, again directed against the city of Luang Prabang. Approximately eleven battalions of regular Vietminh



The New York Times

AT U. N. SECURITY COUNCIL SESSION: Pote Sarasin, left, Ambassador to the U. S. from Thailand, chats with Dr. Charles Malik, Lebanon delegate, after the morning session.

tion of overthrowing the legal Governments of Cambodia and Laos.

It should be noted that the Vietminh are racially Vietnamese; they are a people of different ethnic origin from the Cambodians and Lao; their language, cultural and political institutions are completely separate.

It should further be noted that the propaganda of the Vietminh and the foreign Governments with which it is associated have made serious and false charges against Thailand. Within Thailand itself, alien elements obedient to the political philosophy of the Vietminh and its masters have maintained a certain disquieting activity which is directly related to the war which is being fought on our eastern and northeastern frontiers.

Recent military and political developments have brought my country to a realization of the clear danger that exists of a further extension of the war. Thailand considers itself to be directly threatened by these developments.

It has therefore been my duty, on the instructions of the Government of Thailand, to request that this situation be officially brought to the attention of the Security Council. In bringing this situation to the attention of the Council, my Government is prompted by the desire not only to assure the safety and well-being of our nation, but to fulfill faithfully our duty as a loyal member of the United Nation. No responsible government anxious to preserve the security of its own country can remain impassive when forces of unrest are active near its frontiers.

Faced with a threatening situation, elementary reason dictates that we should first and above all do all that is necessary to provide for our own safety. This duty has not been neglected. We have taken and are continuing to take all the precautionary measures within our power. We have done this in the hope not only of safeguarding our own security but also of preventing the spread of the conflict which has ravaged neighboring territories for the past eight years.

Discusses Aims of Charter

The question which my Government has been obliged to resolve is whether the measures it can take by itself are for the time being sufficient and whether we should let the matter rest in the hope that no actual incursion into our territory will take place. After serious consideration my Government has come to the conclusion that such a decision would not be in keeping with the obligations my Government has deliberately and voluntarily assumed in becoming a member of the United Nations.

The provisions of the Charter, from the preamble to its succeeding chapters, clearly show that the primary and paramount objective of the United Nations is to preserve the peace and not to delay our united efforts until the peace has been actually breached.

Thus the Charter provides, in Article 1, that the first purpose of the United Nations "is to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace," and throughout the Charter emphasis is properly

are being and have already been exerted for some time but so far have yielded no solution.

It is hardly necessary for me to point out that these efforts are independent of, and by their very nature different from, my request of this organization. The successful conclusion of efforts made elsewhere may therefore be reached irrespective of whether or not this particular request is considered by the United Nations. On the contrary, and in the unfortunate event of a failure of the above efforts, the consideration by the United Nations of this dangerous situation and the provision of impartial observation will have the salutary effect of preventing the situation from deteriorating and helping to avoid the extension of conflict and bloodshed. This, I hope, will be recognized by all who desire to see peace firmly strengthened in Southeast Asia.

Finally, Mr. President, it is the firm conviction of my Government that in asking the United Nations to provide authentic and objective observation and reports it is its earnest hope that the world organization will successfully accomplish one of the main purposes for which it has been established, namely, to protect the people of Southeast Asia from "the scourge of war."

I feel convinced that all members of this organization are deeply conscious of the grave responsibility they have assumed in respect of international peace and security and are not prepared to take chances when the stake is so great.

I, therefore, submit, Mr. President, that this is the time for the Council to act. In acting in this manner the efforts which are being made elsewhere to ensure peace in the same region will not be unfavorably affected. Rather the adoption of measures designed to obtain true facts about the situation will contribute toward the desired peace settlement and also toward the relieving of international tension elsewhere. In this spirit, my Government has submitted its request to the Security Council and my fervent hope is that Council will share the apprehensions of my Government and will see fit to adopt the proposed measure which no one can doubt will greatly help in the maintenance of international peace and security.

pense will be infinitely small compared with the incalculable loss in human lives and material resources which might be a consequence of letting events take their own turn without taking steps in advance to curb them.

I do not think any objection can be raised by anyone to the general proposition that the United Nations requires an adequate system of observation if it is to function most effectively to prevent outbreaks of violence. That general thesis is embodied in Part B of the Uniting for Peace Resolution, which established the Peace Observation Commission of the United Nations.

All great powers have accepted this part of the resolution. In fact, three of these powers, France, the United Kingdom and the United States, were among the co-sponsors of the resolution.

'Peace Patrol' Is Sought

In setting up the Peace Observation Commission, the General Assembly provided that the commission was to "observe and report on the situation in any area where there exists international tension, the continuation of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security." The underlying idea of the proposal was that the commission should be used wherever there is an area of tension.

It has been the hope of the authors of the proposal that the observers would function as a "peace patrol" ready to deal with problems anywhere in the world where there is a real state of tension and a real danger of international conflict. These observers should represent the calm and impartial judgment of the world community in a troubled and disturbed area where detachment and impartiality and calm judgment are necessary. Under this concept a request for such observation should really be a matter of more or less routine procedure. It could not be taken as an unfriendly gesture by one state against another state. It involves no imputation of blame or censure against any party.

Besides, I need hardly remind you, Mr. President, and the honorable members of the Council that the Peace Observation Commission machinery has already been successfully employed in the Balkans. The example of the Balkan sub-commission is, I believe, still in the minds of all of us. The valuable service it has rendered for the preservation of peace and security in the Balkan area should testify to the advisability of adopting similar machinery and similar procedures in the problem now before the Council.

It was with this objective in mind that in the letter which had been addressed to the President of the Security Council it was suggested that the Security Council utilize the Peace Observation Commission with respect to the situation described in my letter. I have no doubt that such action would contribute materially to the maintenance of international peace and security.

In consequence, Mr. President, I would suggest that a subcommission of the Peace Observation Commission be established with the authority to dispatch observers to any part of the general area of Thailand on

an abrupt halt once these forces reached the western border of the Kingdom of Laos.

The 1953 Vietminh campaign in Laos fell short of its apparent objectives of reaching the Thai border at Paksan and of seizing the royal capital of Luang Prabang. With the onset of the rainy season, the foreign forces withdrew from part of Lao territory which they had overrun and most of the regular Vietminh units returned to Vietnam. Some regular forces remained, however, and supported the efforts of Vietminh guerrilla forces and political cadres to organize a base area for the Vietminh-created "Resistance Government of Laos."

Drive Into Central Laos

This withdrawal of Vietminh forces and the resulting diminution of their threat to Laos and to international peace and security proved to be only temporary. In late December, 1953, Vietminh regular forces, coming primarily from the Vinh area in north central Vietnam, again launched a drive into central Laos. This operation was initially successful and Thakhek, a Lao town on the bank of the River Mekong, which serves as border between Thailand and Laos, was seized. French Union forces, however, succeeded in reoccupying Thakhek and the Vietminh units began to expand their operations southward toward the Lao-Cambodian frontier. They conducted propaganda, recruiting and guerrilla operations, the latter being directed primarily against national Route 13 and the Mekong River lines of communication.

This created a situation of great danger to Thailand, which was aggravated by the fact that 60,000 persons of the Vietnamese race live within Thailand along the Lao-Thai frontier, in the area fronting the scene of this military operation. The presence of this group has made it possible for Vietminh agents to infiltrate these Vietnamese communities.

In late January, 1954, a further military operation was undertaken by the Vietminh in the north of Laos, again directed against the city of Luang Prabang. Approximately eleven battalions of regular Vietminh troops, previously located in the vicinity of Dienbienphu in north Vietnam, moved south across the Laotian border. These troops engaged defending forces in the vicinity of Muong-sai and Luang Prabang. The bulk of these foreign forces retreated to the north toward the end of February, 1954.

The Vietminh troops in the center of Laos continued southward, and in April of 1954 moved for the first time against the Kingdom of Cambodia, which is situated on the Eastern border of Thailand. These Vietminh units, made up entirely of Vietnamese, are still engaged in operations in northeast Cambodia.

The Vietminh troops remain in Laos and Cambodia, continuing their military operations against the armed forces of these two neighbors of Thailand which have received support from the military forces of the French Union. These Vietminh forces are large, powerful, and well organized. There is considerable evidence that they have received material and political support from outside of Indochina.

Situation Believed Worse

Thailand had hoped that the war in Vietnam would continue to be confined to that country, and after the greater part of the forces in the initial campaign against Laos had withdrawn to Vietnam, it was hoped that the situation was improving, and that it would not be necessary to bring this problem before the Security Council.

Recent events have made it clear that the situation is becoming worse, and that the Vietminh forces have the intention of overrunning the whole country. Thailand has therefore requested the Government of Thailand, to request that this situation be officially brought to the attention of the Security Council. In bringing this situation to the attention of the Council, my Government is prompted by the desire not only to assure the safety and well-being of our nation, but to fulfill faithfully our duty as a loyal member of the United Nation. No responsible government anxious to preserve the security of its own country can remain impassive when forces of unrest are active near its frontiers.

Faced with a threatening situation, elementary reason dictates that we should first and above all do all that is necessary to provide for our own safety. This duty has not been neglected. We have taken and are continuing to take all the precautionary measures within our power. We have done this in the hope not only of safeguarding our own security but also of preventing the spread of the conflict which has ravaged neighboring territories for the past eight years.

Discusses Aims of Charter

The question which my Government has been obliged to resolve is whether the measures it can take by itself are for the time being sufficient and whether we should let the matter rest in the hope that no actual incursion into our territory will take place. After serious consideration my Government has come to the conclusion that such a decision would not be in keeping with the obligations my Government has deliberately and voluntarily assumed in becoming a member of the United Nations.

The provisions of the Charter, from the preamble to its succeeding chapters, clearly show that the primary and paramount objective of the United Nations is to preserve the peace and not to delay our united efforts until the peace has been actually breached.

Thus the Charter provides, in Article 1, that the first purpose of the United Nations "is to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace * * *" and throughout the Charter emphasis is properly placed on the concept that every practicable and proper means should be used to forestall and prevent the outbreak of hostilities. An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. Of course, if all the efforts of the United Nations fail and violence is used in disregard of Charter pledges, and contrary to international law and morality, then it is imperative for the United Nations to face up to that situation. But I am sure that every member of the Security Council would agree that this is a situation we should do everything possible to avoid.

Under these circumstances, when a threat to peace begins to appear, it is the duty of members to call the attention of the organization to the existence of such a threat. As far as we are concerned, my Government is of the opinion that even if it has adequate means at its disposal to cope with the danger, the problem of a threat to the peace should be the concern of all members of the organization and should not be considered as a problem particular to a certain country or group of countries, for no one can say for certain how such a threat will develop or whether it can be confined to a limited area and not extend further to engulf the whole region.

Consequently and because of its firm belief and faith in the United Nations, my Government is confident that if this great international body takes into consideration this problem, it will not fail to produce certain deterring effects upon those who may be bent upon disturbing the peace of the area. The existence of international tension, the continuation of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security." The underlying idea of the proposal was that the commission should be used wherever there is an area of tension.

It has been the hope of the authors of the proposal that the observers would function as a "peace patrol" ready to deal with problems anywhere in the world where there is a real state of tension and a real danger of international conflict. These observers should represent the calm and impartial judgment of the world community in a troubled and disturbed area where detachment and impartiality and calm judgment are necessary. Under this concept a request for such observation should really be a matter of more or less routine procedure. It could not be taken as an unfriendly gesture by one state against another state. It involves no imputation of blame or censure against any party.

Besides, I need hardly remind you, Mr. President, and the honorable members of the Council that the Peace Observation Commission machinery has already been successfully employed in the Balkans. The example of the Balkan sub-commission is, I believe, still in the minds of all of us. The valuable service it has rendered for the preservation of peace and security in the Balkan area should testify to the advisability of adopting similar machinery and similar procedures in the problem now before the Council.

It was with this objective in mind that in the letter which had been addressed to the President of the Security Council it was suggested that the Security Council utilize the Peace Observation Commission with respect to the situation described in my letter. I have no doubt that such action would contribute materially to the maintenance of international peace and security.

In consequence, Mr. President, I would suggest that a subcommission of the Peace Observation Commission be established with the authority to dispatch observers to any part of the general area of Thailand on the request of any state or any states concerned but only to the territory of states consenting thereto. The commission should also have the authority to visit any area in which observation is being conducted.

The selection of the observers and the establishment of the observation machinery with the necessary transportation and communications equipment takes time. For this reason, my Government requests the establishment of the observation machinery now, so that the observer teams will be present in the area and become familiar with the terrain and local conditions as soon as possible.

I have stated the reasons of a positive character which prompted my Government to make this request.

Mr. President, I wish to emphasize that the Government I have the honor to represent does not in any way seek any political or psychological gain by making this appeal to the United Nations except that which may result from the removal of the threat to the peace and security of its own country and the area surrounding it.

Furthermore, to suggest that the consideration of this matter by the Security Council might hamper or have adverse effects on the negotiations now going on at another international gathering is to misrepresent the true object of my Government's request, which aims only at obtaining observation under the Peace Observation Commission. In our view this request cannot and will not under any circumstance produce any detrimental effects upon the efforts which

401/·/4

Note for file:

Memorandum from U.N. Division (854/10/13/7) of 28th May on "Possible Observation in South-East Asia by Peace Observation Commission" filed on 401/2/1.

S.E.A.
5.vi.53

Additional names may be typed on the back of this form.

By Authority: L. F. JOHNSTON. Commonwealth Government Printer, Canberra.

SECRET

89

Ref: L. 175/1



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
401/1/4
- 4 JUN 1953
CANBERRA.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs.
~~854/10/13~~

With the compliments

of the

Official Secretary

Office of the High Commissioner
for the United Kingdom.
Canberra, A.C.T.

3rd June, 1953.

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM,
CANBERRA.

3rd June, 1953.

Ref: L.175/1

SECRET

- 4 JUN 1953
CANBERRA

Sir,

I am directed by the High Commissioner to refer to my letter of the 12th May about Indo-China and to say that paragraph 5 of the enclosure to that letter said that the Siamese had decided to withhold their appeal to the United Nations. However, Field Marshal Pibul, on his return from a tour of north-east Siam expressed concern at the potential threat to Siam and gave instructions that the question of raising the matter in the Security Council should be re-examined.

2. It now appears that the Siamese have definitely decided to go forward with their appeal. It is understood that, though the subject was likely to be tabled on the 1st June, it has not yet been brought before the Security Council and that the text asks that the Security Council "adopt measures it may deem appropriate, such as the despatch to the threatened area of observers appointed by the Peace Observation Commission".

3. The Siamese decision has certain advantages. Continued Siamese adherence to the anti-Communist cause is vital to the stability of South-East Asia. If Siam now held back or were dissuaded from appealing, her will to resist might be undermined by Communist subversion and infiltration. Furthermore, provided the Siamese appeal refers only to the threat on her frontier and asks for a Peace Observation Commission with discretion to send observers to Siam, it might be possible to avoid serious embarrassment to France. A reference designed to prevent the violation of the Siamese frontier might, if carefully handled, avoid acrimonious discussion in the United Nations about Indo-China. It might also restrict assistance

/to

The Secretary,
Prime Minister's Department,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

to the Vietminh in Laos from Vietminh elements in Siam.

4. The United Kingdom are, of course, anxious to avoid an acrimonious debate in the Security Council, particularly before the situation at Panmunjon has become clearer. It has, therefore, been suggested to the Siamese that their appeal should not imply that the Vietminh are receiving foreign assistance or that the Vietminh are a legally constituted authority.

5. The High Commissioner for Australia in London has been informed of the above.

6. I am sending two copies of this letter to the Secretary, Department of External Affairs.

I am, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,

(Sgd.) G. DAVEY

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: Radio Malaya Monitoring Digest File No: 401/1/4

Published at: [redacted] Date: 4/6/53

BANGKOK DECIDES TO REFER RED ATTACK IN INDOCHINA TO U.N:

Premier Songgram told a press conference on June 2 that Thailand has decided to refer the Indochina question to the U.N. Thailand will request the U.N. to send a mission to survey the situation, in view of the Communist threat to South-East Asia.

The Premier added that unless the Communists have decided to give up their intrigues to enslave the world, they will not cease to commit aggression even if the Korean war ends; they may simply commit new aggression in S.E.Asia or Europe. (Taipeh Radio Voice Kuo-yu 2030 hrs June 3)

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM. SECRET. 86

O.6538

Sent: 4th June, 1953.
1400

TO:

Australian Legation,
BANGKOK.

95. SECRET.

Following telegram has been received from the Australian Embassy, Washington.

Begins.

566.

Repeated London 45.

We have just learned from State Department that as result of strong representations made by French, Dulles agreed on 1st June to endeavour to persuade the Thais to postpone reference of their complaint to Security-Council. Dulles still feels that complaint should go forward in due course but that for time being its submission may be postponed in view of special difficulties involved just now in change of French Government.

He spoke in this sense to the Thai Ambassador on evening of 1st June. Sarasin agreed to hold up Thai approach to Security Council (which he was to have made today) pending further instruction from Bangkok.

Presumably his message to Bangkok arrived after Thai Premier made his statement on 2nd June (reported in this morning's "New York Times") to the effect that Thailand was eager to lay resolution before United Nations as soon as possible since delays might make it difficult for United Nations to act swiftly enough if situation suddenly deteriorated.

Ends.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M's.

Mr Morris
F. 401/1/4
KG.

4th June, 1953.

SEC A/S(GR) A/S(ADMIN) UN @ PAC SEA WEST E PI

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

85

CABLEGRAM. SECRET.

MC:SA

I.7320

Dated: 3rd June, 1953.
1233

FROM:

Recd.: 4th June, 1953.
0830.

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

566 SECRET. PRIORITY.

Repeated London 45.

We have just learned from State Department that as result of strong representations made by French, Dulles agreed on 1st June to endeavour to persuade the Thais to postpone reference of their complaint to Security-Council. Dulles still feels that complaint should go forward in due course but that for time being its submission may be postponed in view of special difficulties involved just now in change of French Government.

He spoke in this sense to the Thai Ambassador on evening of 1st June. Sarasin agreed to hold up Thai approach to Security Council (which he was to have made today) pending further instructions from Bangkok.

Presumably his message to Bangkok arrived after Thai Premier made his statement on 2nd June (reported in this morning's 'New York Times') to the effect that Thailand was eager to lay resolution before United Nations as soon as possible since delays might make it difficult for United Nations to act swiftly enough if situation suddenly deteriorated.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M.'s

4th June, 1953.

SEC A/S(GR) A/S(ADMIN) UNO PAC SEA WEST E PI

Mr Morris.

This explains why we have heard of no recent development in Thai approach to UN.

HG. 4/6.

401/1/4

5.vi

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: [illegible] File No. 401/1/4 84

Published at: Date: 3/6/53

SEA

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 3, 1

THAILAND TO PRESS U. N. ON RED THREAT

Will Introduce Resolution This Week, Says Premier, Calling Danger Greater Than Ever

By HENRY R. LIEBERMAN

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

BANGKOK, Thailand, June 2—Premier Pibul Songgram declared today that Communist military, political and propaganda activities in this area had made the threat of international aggression in Southeast Asia greater than at any time since the end of the Japanese war.

He told a press conference Thailand was determined to introduce her resolution in the United Nations this week urging that body to recognize the threat and to send a committee of observers here. He added that Thailand was eager to lay the resolution before the United Nations as soon as possible, pointing out that delays might make it difficult for the United Nations to act swiftly enough if the situation suddenly became serious.

"What already has happened tends to show that the aggressive action of the Communists is getting more menacing and we are interested in stopping it," the Premier said. "The propaganda is getting stronger and aggressive action may come after the propaganda. It may come after the rainy season in October by infiltration and actions linked to Germany and Korea."

Concern Is Intensified

Thailand's concern over the safety of her borders has been intensified by such developments as the Vietminh invasion of Laos, the establishment by Chinese Communists of a "Thai autonomous nationality area" in Yunnan Province and reports that two unidentified submarines had appeared in the Gulf of Siam during the past month. Officials here also are studying the possible implications of a Korean peace for this area and problems posed by the presence of Gen. Li Mi's Nationalist guerrillas in eastern Burma.

"If the Korean war is not ended the contagion may spread," Premier Pibul said. "But if the Korean war is ended the Communists may hit hard this way or through Europe. There is danger either way. The only solution is for the Communists to give up their ideology of world conquest."

From the Thai viewpoint the presence of the estimated total of 12,000 Chinese Nationalist guerrillas in eastern Burma near Thailand's northwestern border involves another dilemma. The Premier said the Nationalist guerrillas had served as a buffer for Thailand but observed that they also were abusing the territory of Burma.

Thai representatives are participating in the four-power military group that has been discussing measures to evacuate General Li Mi's guerrillas from Burma in accordance with the United Nations resolution of April 22. Marshal Pibul said his government had proposed that the guerrillas be evacuated to Formosa by air once they cross the border into northern Thailand.

Asked what steps Thailand had taken to cope with Communist activities in this area Premier Pibul replied that his regime had mobilized all personnel for which military equipment was available and also had asked the United States to expedite shipments of arms here under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. He said police and Army garrisons had been strengthened west of the Mekong River along Thailand's border with Laos and added that troops also were on the alert in the northwest frontier zone facing Burma.

"We will make the Mekong our main resistance line," he said. "We are also planning to call up more manpower."

Marshal Pibul said conscripted Thai soldiers normally released into reserves after fifteen months of service now were being required to serve their full two-year terms of active duty.

About 400 Vietnamese nationals suspected of having close connections with the Communist-led Vietminh movement in Indo-China have been evacuated from Thai border areas adjoining Laos, he noted. Another official source disclosed that this group had been sent to Phatthalung, on the Kra Isthmus, about 430 miles south of Bangkok.

Meanwhile the Thai Government now requires all vessels entering the Gulf of Siam to give advance notice of their entry into these waters. Premier Pibul said the Thai Navy and Air Force had been ordered to maintain a special lookout for unidentified craft.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper: Summary of Happenings in Pacific Section during Secretary's Absence — File No: 401/1/4 — 83

Published at: — Date: 23 May to June 1953

South East Asia

Regional

401/1/4

27. Thailand may refer to the United Nations, as problems affecting the peace and stability of South East Asia (a) the Viet Minh invasion of Laos and (b) the King of Cambodia's complaint against French withholding of complete independence. (See below 32(a) and 29(b)). Reference of (a) has been postponed. The Thai Government are treating the King of Cambodia's appeal rather gingerly, apparently hoping that they will not be pushed into action by outside pressures.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

OUTWARD TELEPRINTER MESSAGE.

MESSAGE NO368 1540 ,29/5/53

TO PLIMSOLL MELVOURNE

FROM HARRY CANBERRA

SIAMESE APEAL TO U.N.

LONDON ADVISE RESULTS OF FRENCH DEMARCHE NOT YET KNOWN, ALTHOUGH SIAMESE MAY BE READY TO AMEND LETTER TO REPLACE ''FOREIGN MILITARY FORCES'' SY ''ARMED FORCES''. U.K. ''WOLD BE SATISFIED'' WITH FRENCH FORMULA IF ACCEPTABLE TO SIAMESE.

MESSAGE ENDS CET CTR 1543

81

PLIMSOLL, MELBOURNE

HARRY, CANBERRA

Siamese Appeal to U.N.

London advise results of French demarche not yet known, although Siamese may be ready to amend letter to replace "foreign military forces" by "armed forces". U.K. "would be satisfied" with French formula if acceptable to Siamese.

Mr. Gilchrist

GR 29.5.53.

HG / WE 3/6. Mr. Eckersley

Mr Monk copies. 401/1/4 & ri Mrs.

80

The Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

Repeated to:- London (for External)

SECRET

Your 479. LAOS

Please support JEBB who (see London Savingram No. 4) is urging Siamese to omit references to foreign interference and to make despatch of observers discretionary.

We would prefer to see no reference to "the region".

PMH'HLD

854/10/13/7 United Nations. 29th May, 1953.

McEckersley

External Affairs,
Defence,
Prime Minister's.

Discussed with Shann. Agreed that it was probably too late to do much in New York - UK & ~~US~~ France seemed to have had some effect in eliminating constant references in Thai letter. Hold till we see whether text is still open for discussion

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM **SECRET.**

GG:ML

I.7137

Dated: 28th May, 1953.
1646
Rec'd: 29th May, 1953
1110

FROM:

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

SECRET. PRIORITY.

Addressed Canberra 552 Repeated London 42.
Thai complaint. Austunat's 478 and 479.

Tomlinson of British Embassy told us that Foreign Office commented yesterday that the phrase "Foreign Military Forces" could raise complications which might be avoided by substituting "Armed Forces". In general Foreign Office felt that the negotiations at Panmunjom at critical stage, it would be helpful if Security Council consideration could be deferred for few days.

We understand Courier is expected from Bangkok to-day and possibly final text will be available either this evening or to-morrow.

29th May, 1953.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M's

SEC A/S(GR) A/S(ADMIN) UNP PAC SEA WEST PI

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

HM of C: ER

CABLEGRAM. I.7116

Dated: 28th May, 1953
2020
Rec'd: 29th May, 1953
0830

FROM:

Australian High Commissioner's Office,
LONDON.

1780. CONFIDENTIAL. PRIORITY.

Repeated saving New York 6 Paris 24.

From External.

Siameseappeal to United Nations.

We have now seen text of report from United Kingdom Embassy Bangkok which does not support impression which we obtained yesterday and mentioned in our 1749.

Report states that Siamese Foreign Minister confirmed that immediate Siamese objective would have been obtained once United Nations was seized of the matter and he appeared not to envisage immediate visit by United Nations observer but rather establisment of machinery to be invoked by Siamese if emergency arose in October or later. No report received yet of result of French demarche but United Kingdom Foreign Office are by no means enthusiastic about Siameseappeal in the form proposed and would be satisfied with French formula if it were acceptable to the Siamese.

3. Siameseseemed ready to accept 'armed forces' to replace 'Foreign Military Forces'(Austunat 479) but were unwilling to delete all reference to Foreign support as it is prospect of eventual Chinese attack which lies behind Siamese apprehensions and motivates appeal.

MIN. &. DEPT. E.A.
" " " DEFENCE
P.M.'s

29th May, 1953

SEC A/S(GR) A/S(ADMIN) UNO PAC SEA WEST E PI

Mr Boomsma.
Miss N to see.
Mr Morris re minute

401/1/4.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

77

CABLEGRAM. **SECRET.**

MB:GL

I. 7071

Dated: 27th May, 1953.
1756
Rec'd: 28th May, 1953.
1330

FROM:

Australian Mission to the
United Nations,
NEW YORK.

479. SECRET. PRIORITY.

Repeated Washington and London for Watt No. 8.

Laos. Our 478 London.

Following is text of draft letter to President of Security Council:-

"Sir, I have thehonour, under instructions from my Government, and in conformity with Articles 34 and 35 paragraph 1 of the United Nations charter, to bring to the attention of the Security Council a situation which, in the view of my government, represents not only a threat to the security of Thailand but is likely to endanger the international peace and security of the region.

The invasion of the Kingdom of Laos, carried out by Foreign Military forces which have been receiving and continue to receive foreign support and the possibility that these forces may effect direct incursions into contiguous territories including Thailand, constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security.

Furthermore, the fact that the extent of the invasion of the Kingdom of Laos may have varied does not diminish such a threat. I, therefore, have the honour to bring the situation set forth above to the attention of the Security Council to the end that the Security Council adopt measures it may deem appropriate such as the despatch to the threatened area of observers appointed by the Peace Observation Committee.

The Royal Thai Government makes this appeal to the Security Council not only as a firm supporter of the United Nations but also as a power firmly determined to play its part in the maintenance of international peace and security in South East Asia.

Finally, I have the honour to request that you call a meeting of the Security Council to consider that matter and, as representative of Thailand, I be invited in conformity with rule 37 of rules of procedure of the Security Council, to participate in the debate of the Council".

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M.'s

28th May, 1953.

SEC A/S (GR) A/S(ADMIN) UNO PAC SEA WEST PI

UN discussed despatch Mr. Eckersley
Mr Harry on 29/6 Have you any views on action? What do
UN see think? Rill 28/5
WE 1/6.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

70

HP:GG

CABLEGRAM. SECRET.

I.7067.

Dated: 27th May, 1953.
1800.
Rec'd: 28th May, 1953.
1200.

FROM:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
N E W Y O R K.

478. SECRET. PRIORITY.

Repeated Washington and London for Watt.

Laos.

Your 176.

Our immediately following telegram contains text of draft letter to the President of the Security Council. Please note that this text is not final and has yet to be cleared by Thai Government. Delegation is discussing here with "some other Delegations". Thai Delegation has not asked us to discuss. Submission expected early next week. Draft has been obtained confidentially.

MIN.AND DEPT.E.A.
MIN.AND DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M'S.

28th May, 1953.

SEC A/S(GR) A/S(ADMIN) UN@ PAC SEA PI

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

HMC:MB

I. 7029

Dated: 27th May, 1953.
2810

FROM:

Rec'd: 28th May, 1953.
0830

Australian High Commissioner's Office,
L O N D O N.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Canberra 1742 repeated Saving Australian Mission to United Nations, New York 4, Paris 22.

From External.

Our 1647. Siamese appeal to United Nations.

You will have heard from New York that Siamese had decided on 22nd May to proceed with bringing situation to attention of Security Council under Articles 34 and 35(1) and asking Council to "adopt measures it may deem appropriate such as despatch to threatened area of observers appointed by Peace Observation Commission".

2. Preliminary view of United Kingdom Ministers was that Siamese decision to proceed had certain advantages from United Kingdom point of view. Continued Siamese adherence to anti Communist cause is vital to stability of area. Siamese Government pin their hopes on United Nations and attempts to dissuade them from appealing might discourage them. If Siam waited it might be too late as her will might then be undermined by Communist subversion and infiltration. On the other hand it was felt that disadvantages of appeal to United Nations by France were only partially relevant to appeal by Siam. If Siamese appeal referred only to threat on her frontier and asked for P.O.C. sub-committee in New York with discretion to send observers to Siam if situation deteriorated, it might be possible to avoid serious embarrassment to France. In any case renewed military reverses in Laos might make eventual reference to United Nations inevitable. Reference designed to prevent violation of Siamese frontier might if carefully handled avoid acrimonious discussion in United Nations about Indo-China.

3. Jebb was instructed to urge Siamese representative to omit references to "foreign" forces and "foreign support" and to alter draft to make despatch of observers discretionary. Siamese draft was otherwise acceptable.

4. Jebb has commented -

(a) That however moderately Siamese appeal is worded it will be impossible to avoid somewhat acrimonious debate as Pakistanis and Lebanese will not miss opportunity of attacking France,

(b) that if Security Council decided to act it would be likely to order immediate despatch of observers,

(c) that advantages of United Nations action must be weighed against disadvantage of acrimonious debate and danger that situation in Laos may get mixed up with armistice negotiations to possible prejudice of the latter,

2./ that.....

CABLEGRAM.

(d) that it might, therefore, be desirable to slow up proceedings particularly as threat to Siam is not imminent.

5. United Kingdom Embassy, Paris reported on 24th May that Hoppenot and French Embassy, Bangkok had been instructed to urge Siamese to confine themselves to letters to Chairman of Security Council and Secretary General calling attention to "abnormal situation" on their frontier without mentioning source of danger or asking for particular action. This would avoid debate and Council could merely note communication. If danger to Siam increased later, the fact of such communication would enable the Council to meet the new situation more rapidly. French were anxious to avoid despatch of observers but assistant political director speaking personally thought it would be politically impossible for them to use veto to block this or other action which they considered contrary to their interests. Other disadvantages which French saw to any appeal going beyond the scope of letters which they suggested would be -

(a) danger of acrimonious debate involving great embarrassment to them,

(b) danger of Russian veto with adverse effect on United States opinion,

(c) if no practical result were achieved it would demonstrate ineffectiveness of United Nations.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M'S.

28th May, 1953.

SEC A/S(GR) A/S(ADMIN) UN@ PAC SEA NZ WEST E PI

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

73

CABLEGRAM.

HM&C:ER

I.7027

Dated: 27th May, 1953
2046

FROM:

Rec'd: 28th May, 1953
0830

Australian High Commissioner's Office,
LONDON.

1749. CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated Saving Austunate New York 5, Paris 23.

From External.

Our 1742.

Siamese appeal to United Nations.

F.O. see no objection procedure proposed by French (our paragraph 5) which seems also to be broadly acceptable to Siamese. Understand Ballard has already telegraphed you on latter point.

MIN. &. DEPT. E.A.
" " " DEFENCE
P.M.'s

28th May, 1953

SEC A/S(GR) A/S(ADMIN UN@ PAC SEA NZ WEST E PI

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM. SECRET.

[redacted]:HMcC

I.6982

Dated: 26th May, 1953.
1800
Rec'd: 27th May, 1953.
0830

FROM:-

Australian Legation,
BANGKOK.

51. SECRET.

1. Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday discussed with me some aspects of Thai approach to the Security Council. Material for the Tha.. case and supporting documents have left today by air for Washington. Assume Australian Delegation, New York has passed to you first draft of the Thai letter to the President of the Security Council.

2. The Minister does not envisage immediate visit of P.O.C., but rather establishment now of machinery to be invoked by Thailand if an emergency arises, perhaps next October or later. He said under uniting for peace resolution, P.O.C. could only go where it was invited. Thailand would invite it but it might not be allowed across the border. When I suggested the Laotians would surely not object, he agreed, but said the French would be reluctant. He added tactically, however, he had the French on toast because world public opinion expressed through the United Nations would force the French to agree.

3. I (group omitted) thought Vietminh (as opposed to the Chinese) really threatened Thailand and he replied that there was potential threat - a free Laos Government might try to detach the North East provinces and possibly link up with "free Thailand" Government. Pridi had had idea of this kind.

4. When he referred to the policing of 800 odd miles of the Mekong, I asked him how in these circumstances P.O.C. could observe it effectively. His reply was that trained military observers, without patrolling every inch of the river, were quite able to estimate military capability of potential attackers.

5. I asked him what concrete gain he thought remained to Vietminh after their recent offensive and he thought the most important was retention of Sam Neua as a headquarters for free Laos movement, and the fact that their agents could now move about more openly.

Mr Critchett
Copy to London

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M's.

ø corrupt group

27th May, 1953.

SEC A/S(GR) A/S(ADMIN) UN @ PAC SEA WEST E PI

Miss Lilley
PS P/S
401/1/4
attached telegram refers to it, to Mr Morris

P/S on file with papers, thanks

Arranged with Redpath, Commons

Mr Morris

PS. arrange for copy to go. PL.

S.M.

OK H.P.

file 5/vi

very important date

any Ministerial other also go

H.P.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

RESTRICTED.

SERC:ML

I.6981

Dated: 26th May, 1953
1900
Rec'd: 27th May, 1953
1900

FROM:

Australian Legation,
BANGKOK.

52. RESTRICTED.

Your telegram 81.

Committee Ø on 23rd May at United States Embassy and has met daily since then. United States member is presiding. As the Burmese and Chinese will not meet each other formally, the Committee meets alternate days without one of them; nevertheless, the United States Embassy has the impression the Chinese want to co-operate. No progress reports have been issued, but discussions so far have been preliminary and organizational.

Fuller report follows by bag.

27th May, 1953

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE Ø Corrupted Group
P.M's

SEC A/S(GR) A/S(ADMIN) UN PAC SEA© PI

Mr Gilchrist
Copy to London

Arranged with Redpath. Ex Comms 3.vi

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

RESTRICTED.

HMC:HG

O.6234

Sent: 27th May, 1953.
1845

TO:

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK. (pass to Washington).

176. RESTRICTED. PRIORITY.

Laos.

1. As a result of conversation with Thai Foreign Minister on 25th May, Australia Minister Bangkok assumes that first draft of Thai letter to President of Security Council will be available to you in New York.

2. Please advise urgently.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A. (854/10/13/7)
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M'S

28th May, 1953.

SEC A/S(GR) A/S(ADMIN) UN@ PAC SEA WEST PI.

F. 401/1/4

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM. **SECRET.**

MC:HMcC

I.7020

Dated: 26th May, 1953.
1953

FROM:- Rec'd: 27th May, 1953.
0130

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

547. SECRET.

Your 412 and Australian Mission to the United Nations' 468.

Thai complaint.

We consulted Landon of Thailand desk this afternoon with following results:

(i) With regard to France's hope that Thai would send letter only to Secretary-General and President without requesting session of Security Council, Landon said that he thought it most unlikely Thais would agree to this and added that State Department feeling was also that letter by itself would be inadequate to meet present situation.

(ii) When asked whether complaint would go beyond Thailand or even beyond Indo-China (your paragraph 2), Landon said that his present understanding was that no area would be specified and that Thais were thinking of asking Council to determine that Laotian invasion constituted "a threat to International Peace and Security" with no specifiedreference to any area or nation.

(iii) Landon said that United States agreed with French apprehensions regarding Communist observer and United States would oppose Communist member on P.O.C. team. If such objections were over-ridden, Landon said United States was thinking of proposing that P.O.C. team should visit Communist as well as non-Communist areas.

(iv) Landon emphasised that above views represented State Department's tentative thinking only, and that firm decisions could not be expected until Thais had decided on exact terms of their appeal.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A. (854/10/13/7)
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M's.

27th May, 1953.

SEC A/S(GR) A/S(ADMIN) UN @ PAC SEA NZ WEST PI

File: 401/0/4

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

RESTRICTED.

GG:HG

I.7016

Sent: 26th May, 1953. 1050

FROM: Rec'd: 27th May, 1953. 1115

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK.

475. RESTRICTED.

Laos.

We understand Thai appeal to Security Council will be made next week and today's press reports Sarasin to this effect. Lodge will then be President.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. &NDEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M'S

27th May, 1953.

SEC A/S(GR) A/S(ADMIN) UN@ PAC SEA NZ

WEST A PI.

401/1/4.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM. **SECRET.**

GG:HMcC AMENDED COPY 1.8902

Dated: 26th May, 1953.
1800
FROM:- Rec'd: 27th May, 1953.
0830

Australian Legation,
BANGKOK.

51. SECRET.

1. Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday discussed with me some aspects of Thai approach to the Security Council. Material for the Thai case and supporting documents have left today by air for Washington. Assume Australian Delegation, New York has passed to you first draft of the Thai letter to the President of the Security Council.

2. The Minister does not envisage immediate visit of P.O.C., but rather establishment now of machinery to be invoked by Thailand if an emergency arises, perhaps next October or later. He said under uniting for peace resolution, P.O.C. could only go where it was invited. Thailand would invite it but it might not be allowed across the border. When I suggested the Laotians would surely not object, he agreed, but said the French would be reluctant. He added tactically, however, he had the French on toast because world public opinion expressed through the United Nations would force the French to agree.

* 3. I asked whether he thought Vietminh (as opposed to the Chinese) really threatened Thailand and he replied that there was potential threat - a free Laos Government might try to detach the North East provinces and possibly link up with "free Thailand" Government. Pridi had had idea of this kind.

* 4. When he referred to the indefensibility of the 800 odd miles of the Mekong, I asked him how in these circumstances P.O.C. could observe it effectively. His reply was that trained military observers, without patrolling every inch of the river, were quite able to estimate military capability of potential attackers.

5. I asked him what concrete gain he thought remained to Vietminh after their recent offensive and he thought the most important was retention of Sam Neua as a headquarters for free Laos movement, and the fact that their agents could now move about more openly.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M's.

* Amendments

27th May, 1953.

SEC A/S(GR) A/S(ADMIN) UN @ PAC SEA WEST E PI

401/1/4.

Mr M
Min.

HG.

1/6

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

I.6901

GL:MK

Dated; 22nd May, 1953.
1751
Rec'd: 24th May, 1953.
1030

FROM:

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK.

468. CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated Washington.

Laos.

1. Reference our press telegram 466. We learn from French Delegation that French remain opposed to any move to bring Laos question to United Nations, and have tried both in Bangkok and Washington to discourage Thai initiative. Delegation, however, appears resigned to probability of matter coming before Security Council. They had hoped United States might not persistin favouring reference to United Nations and are disappointed in this and say that the feeling in the French Foreign Office is bitter. They still hope, though without much confidence, that Thailand will merely raise the question by letter to Secretary-General, and President of Security Council and not request summoning of Council. They see no good resulting from Council consideration and possibility of considerable harm. Informant says Sir G. Jebb shares this view, but as President, would be obliged to summon Council if requested. Sarasin (Thai Ambassador Washington) is expected in New York this weekend.

2. French Delegation point out that membership of Peace Observation Commission includes two Communist States, and while constitution of a sub-committee (as in Balkans) without Communist membership might be aimed at, it might prove impracticable to exclude at least one of the Communist members. According to French Delegation, decision to send observers has to be taken by Security Council, and is thus subject to veto. If decision adopted, Peace Observation Commission then decides on membership of the observing body. French fear possibility of an attempted deal by which Soviet would be assured in advance as to membership of the observing body before voting on the decision to send observers. What official French attitude in such event would be is not clear at this stage but personal opinion of informant is that French representative might have to vote against such a deal. Security Council action might thus be abortive. Doubtless, in that event, attempt would be made to bring matter to General Assembly and France would have very strong objections to this as all aspects of Indo-China problems would inevitably be raised in Assembly discussions.

3. In short, French object to question being brought before United Nations, specifically to proposal to bring it before Security Council, and to suggestion that any observing body enter Indo-China and especially to membership of any Soviet nation in such a body. They seem, however to regard some discussion in Security Council as inevitable.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M's.

24th May, 1953.

SEC A/Ss UN @ PAC EA NZ WEST E PI SEA

Mr Bitchus

You might find this useful for your files

401/1/4 65

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

GEMK

CABLEGRAM. I.6[illegible] **SECRET.**

Dated: 22nd May, 1953.
1758
Rec'd: 23rd May, 1953.
0900

FROM:

Australian High Commissioner's Office,
WELLINGTON.

119. SECRET.

Thai appeal to United Nations.

The Minister of External Affairs told me today that though earlier he had doubted the wisdom of the Thai proposal to appeal to the Security Council and although he had now not considered the new situation fully he felt that there might be real value for the Thais in case of later actual invasion to "get on the record in good time". It might bring some support from Asiatic Nations and it might even deter the Vietminh.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M's.

23rd May, 1953.

SEC A/Ss UN @ PAC SEA WEST PI

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

H01/1/4

64

:MK

I.6884

Dated: 22nd May, 1953.
1150
Rec'd: 23rd May, 1953.
0900

FROM:

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK.

466.

UNCLASSIFIED.

Laos.

"New York Times" this morning under United Nations dateline reports French Delegation is angry at "United States sponsored" decision by Thailand to bring case before the United Nations, but is nevertheless expected to agree to limited military observation by United Nations Sub-Commission. French opinion is reported aside from legalities United Nations actions will serve no good purpose. However, French would not use veto though they have not committed themselves as to attitude on particular proposals for United Nations action.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
MR. GOSS
P.M's.

23rd May, 1953.

SEC A/Ss Cr(L & T) UN @ PAC SEA NZ WEST A E PI

THAILAND TO REQUEST U N STUDY OF COMMUNIST THREAT

WASHINGTON, MAY 21 -- (USIS) -- THAILAND HAS DECIDED TO ASK THE U N SECURITY COUNCIL TO STUDY THE DANGER IN SOUTHEAST ASIA RESULTING FROM THE VIETNAM COMMUNIST ATTACK ON THE INDEPENDENT KINGDOM OF LAOS.

THAI AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES POTE SARASIN SAID HERE WEDNESDAY THAT HIS GOVERNMENT EXPECTS TO BRING THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COUNCIL NEXT WEEK. UNDER PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 34 OF THE U N CHARTER, THE SECURITY COUNCIL MAY INVESTIGATE ANY DISPUTE OR SITUATION WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO INTERNATIONAL FRICTION OR GIVE RISE TO DISPUTE.

THE THAI AMBASSADOR EMPHASIZED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT'S COMPLAINT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL "WILL NOT CONDEMN ANYONE." INSTEAD, HE SAID, THA ILAND WILL ASK THAT A U N COMMISSION BE SENT TO SOUTHEAST ASIA TO INVESTIGATE THE SITUATION.

DURING A CONFERENCE TUESDAY WITH WALTER S. ROBERTSON, U.S. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, SARASIN SAID HIS GOVERNMENT CONSIDERED THE COMMUNIST INVASION OF LAOS A THREAT NOT ONLY TO THAILAND BUT TO ALL SOUTHEAST ASIA.

HE STRESSED THAT THE RECENT WITHDRAWAL OF COMMUNIST FORCES FROM LAOS DID NOT LESSEN THE PERIL, ALTHOUGH THAILAND WAS NOW IN LESS PHYSICAL DANGER.

COLONEL CHARLES A. SHELDON, RETIRING CHIEF OF THE U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP AND U.S. ARMY ATTACHE IN THAILAND, WEDNESDAY EMPHASIZED THE PROGRESS OF THE U.S. MILITARY AID PROGRAM TO THAILAND.

IN A MESSAGE TO THE THAI PEOPLE, SHELDON SAID THE ADVANTAGES OF THE PROGRAM "HAVE AT NO TIME BEEN MORE EVIDENT THAN SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE VIETNAM COMMUNIST AGGRESSION AGAINST THE KINGDOM OF LAOS ON THAILAND'S NORTHEAST BORDER."

HE SAID U.S. MATERIAL SUPPORT PROVIDED DURING THE PAST 2 YEARS, AUGMENTED BY ACCELERATED SHIPMENTS SINCE THE EMERGENCY AROSE, AND U.S. ASSURANCES OF CONTINUING SPEEDY SHIPMENTS OF

MILITARY SUPPLIES," ENABLES THAILAND TO MEET THE THREAT OF AGGRESSION IN A STATE OF PREPAREDNESS AND CONFIDENCE."

****

401/1/4

61

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM. **SECRET.**

O.6002/6003/103/4.

Sent: 22nd May, 1953

1800

TO: Australian Embassy, WASHINGTON. ...D.C. Australian Legation, BANGKOK.....Sav. 6.

REPEATED SAVINGRAM TO: Australian Legation, SAIGON.....Sav.6.

Australian Legation, BANGKOK.....SAV. 6.

SECRET. IMMEDIATE.

Laos. - Your 500.

See also our Savingram No.32.

1. New York reports that Thais are now thinking of broadening scope of submission to Security Council and of bringing matter forward as "a threat to South-East Asia generally". Bangkok reports that Thai Ambassador in Washington is drafting terms of actual submission on basis of instructions from Thai Foreign Minister.

2. You may feel it appropriate to talk to Thai Ambassador in Washington while he is preparing submission and to advise us of forms likely to emerge and whether scope of matter to be brought before United Nations would go beyond Thailand or even beyond Indo-China. State Department views would also be appreciated on this latter point which would obviously require careful consideration and on which pending more definite advice we do not consider it necessary to comment. But we can see a great deal of merit in establishing United Nations observers on Thai border.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A. (854/10/13/7)
" " " DEFENCE
P.M.'s

25th May, 1953

SEC A/Bs UNO PAO SEA WEST PI

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

60

CABLEGRAM.

::MB

I. 6837

Dated: 21st May, 1953.
1436

FROM:

Rec'd: 22nd May, 1953.
1030

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK.

463. UNCLASSIFIED.

New York "Times" under Washington dateline reports this morning as follows -

"Thailand has decided to place issue of Communist invasion of Laos before United Nations next week. Thai Ambassador said Bangkok Government would introduce subject under Article 34 of Charter. He explained that it was not his Government's intention to condemn anyone but he added that the threat to the area was one that should be brought before the United Nations. His Government considered the Communist invasion of Laos constituted a threat to all South-East Asia. He added that the recent withdrawal of Communist troops in Laos did not lessen the peril although Thailand herself was now in less physical danger.

United States officials said it was likely a peace observation team would be sent to Laos to determine whether a threat to world peace actually did exist. United States has notified Bangkok that this Government will fully support Thailand's move before United Nations. Britain and France have been inclined to resist it, fearful of precipitating an allied split on the issue.

Thailand at first was reluctant to place the matter before the United Nations and as recently as a week ago it appeared that decision would be against such action. To-day, however, the Ambassador said he believed that talks with foreign diplomatic representatives in Bangkok had resulted in an understanding that made it possible at least to use Article 34 for investigating the threat to peace. State Department authorities said that it had been United States viewpoint from the start that Communist aggression in Laos should be brought before the United Nations. On 9th May John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, said at a news conference that this Government would look with sympathy on any action along the lines that Thailand might choose to take.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
MR. GOSS.
P.M'S.

22nd May, 1953.

SEC A/Ss Cr(L & T) UN@ PAC SEA NZ WEST A E PI

7

401/1/4

401/1/4

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

RESTRICTED.

MK/MD

I. 6836

Dated 21st May, 1953.
206 pm
Rec'd 22nd May, 1953.
1030

FROM:

Australian Mission to the
United Nations,
NEW YORK.

462. RESTRICTED.

Repeated to Washington UNE386.

Laos.

Reference our press cable 463 Thai Delegation state submission to Security Council will be made, presumably next week. However, Thanat Khoman is at present in Washington for consultation with Sarasin.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M.'S.

22nd May, 1953.

SEC A/S's Cr(L & T) UN@ PAC SEA NZ WEST A E PI

401/1/4

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

MC:ML

CABLEGRAM. SECRET.

I.6787

Dated: 21st May, 1953.
1130
Rec'd: 22nd May, 1953
0830

FROM:

Australian Legation,
BANGKOK.

49. SECRET.

My telegram 46.

Documents are now to be drafted by the Ambassador in Washington on the basis of instructions sent here. Prince Naradhip had previously intended to do the drafting himself.

Cannot assess reasons on significance of change but it seems to expose draft to greater United States influence.

22nd May, 1953.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M's

SEC A/S's UNO PAC SEA NZ WEST E PI

401/1/4

59

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM. SECRET.

GG:ER

I.6731

Dated: 20th May,1953
1600

FROM:

Rec'd: 21st May,1953
0830

Australian Legation,
BANGKOK.

46. SECRET.

My telegram 44.

Laos.

The Prime Minister has apparently had second thoughts, owing to the continued presence of some Vietminh forces in Laos, and now desires approach to the security Council to be proceeded with. The Minister for Foreign Affairs is not unwilling; he has said that he sees advantage in taking action now while the border is in a state of calm. Cabinet is said to have approved.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
" " " DEFENCE
P.M.'s

21st May,1953

SEC A/Ss UNO PAC SEA NZ WEST E PI

401/1/4

56

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

B:HP

I.6701

Dated: 19th May, 1953.
1639
Rec'd: 20th May, 1953.
10.45 a.m.

FROM:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

457. CONFIDENTIAL.

Laos.

From Forsyth.

Thai Delegation are proceeding with plans to bring Laos question to Security Council. Timing not yet decided and formulation of a submission not yet definite. As regards the latter, Thai Delegation say that whereas formerly the situation was regarded as a threat to Thailand they are thinking of broadening the scope of the submission and of bringing the matter to the attention of the Security Council as a threat to South-East Asia area generally. Thailand Government regards the Laos situation as still dangerous and Government feel it necessary to bring question to United Nations. Question will be handled for Thailand by Thai Ambassador Washington.

This confirms report in this morning's 'New York Times' (see our press cable 458).

Min. & Dept. of E.A.
" " " " Defence.
P.M.'s.

20th May, 1953.

SEC A/Ss UNO PAC SEA NZ WEST E PI

Mr. Gilchrist.
This makes table
to Barwick unnecessary
20/5.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

410/ 55

401/1/4

MD

I. 6698

Dated 19th May, 1953.
1639

FROM:

Rec'd 20th May, 1953.
1050

Australian Mission to the
United Nations,
NEW YORK.

458. UNCLASSIFIED.

Under heading Thailand may appeal United Nations and date line Bangkok 18th May,"New York Times" this morning reports as follows -

Thailand was reported today to be planning to ask United Nations Security Council to investigate Communists led Viet Minh invasion of Laos in Indo-China to determine whether it was a threat to international peace. It was understood the Government was cabling decision to Thailand's Delegates to United Nations, New York. Decision was said to have been reached at Cabinet Meeting following Premier Pibul Songgram's return from ten day tour of frontier.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
MR. GOSS.
P.M.'S.

20th May, 1953.

SEC A/S's UN@ PAC SEA NZ WEST E PI

Maj/N
HK. Mr R.
20
3

7/ Thai
Laos etc

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

MD:GG

I.6653.

Dated: 19th May, 1953.
2010.
Rec'd: 20th May, 1953.
0830.

FROM:

Australian High Commissioner's Office,
LONDON.

1647. CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated Washington 77.

From External.

Our 1541 and Washington 500.

Siamese Appeal to United Nations.

United Kingdom Embassy Bangkok reports that Prime Minister on return from tour of North East on 17th May had unexpectedly expressed concern at potential Vietminh threat to Siam and had requested Foreign Minister to look further into possibility of apprising Security Council, of situation without advocating any particular course of action. King shared Prime Minister's concern but Foreign Minister still thought appeal should be postponed. Cabinet was to discuss matter yesterday.

2. We understand opinion in Foreign Office is still divided about Siamese appeal. No decision yet taken and position remains substantially as reported in our 1541.

MIN.AND DEPT.E.A.
MIN.AND DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M'S.

20th May, 1953.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC WEST FI

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

HO1/1/4 53

SAVINGRAM.

..HC

I.6684

Sent: 8th May, 1953.

FROM:

Rec'd: 20th May, 1953. 0905

Australian High Commissioner's Office, LONDON.

SAV. 364. CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeat to Australian Embassy, Washington 43.

Following is text of a telegram from United Kingdom Embassy, Bangkok, to Foreign Office, dated 7th May, 1953.

The sensational headlines in the London and Singapore papers, now reaching us, stressing the possibility of an imminent invasion of Siam suggest that our press have not fully grasped the real nature of the present danger as we see it here. Neither I nor my American and French colleagues (nor of course the Siamese Government) believe that a military invasion of this country is likely in the near future. Such action would surely be much more likely to precipitate a general conflagration in South East Asia for the Communists to risk it, all the more so now that the Siamese, as I have learned today, are thinking of submitting the threat to their fontier to the United Nations.

2. Moreover, even from the military stand - point, aproach of the rains makes a large scale invasion in the coming weeks improbable. At the worst, we might face a direct military threat in six months' time.

3. The real point to be stressed now, I venture to suggest, is the general political deterioriation in South East Asia as a result of

(a) the military reverses inside Indo-China, which are sure to have an adverse effect on the Asian mind, and

(b) the increased danger of ideological pressure and infiltration of all kinds in the adjacent countries to Siam.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M'S

20th May, 1953.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC WEST PI.

401/1/4

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

SAVINGRAM.

GG:GG

O.5647 to 5664.

Dated: 18th May, 1953.
1115.

TO:

Australian High Commissioner's Office,
L O N D O N.....Saving 48. (For External)

Australian Embassy,
W A S H I N G T O N.....Saving 32.

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
N E W Y O R K.....Saving 18.

Australian Embassy,
P A R I S.....Saving 5.

Australian High Commissioner's Office,
O T T A W A.....Saving 13.

Australian High Commissioner's Office,
W E L L I N G T O N.....Saving 13.

Australian High Commissioner's Office,
P R E T O R I A.....Saving 4.

Australian High Commissioner's Office,
K A R A C H I.....Saving 6.

Australian High Commissioner's Office,
N E W D E L H I..... Saving 6.

Australian Legation,
R A N G O O N.....Saving 3.

Australian Commissioner's Office,
S I N G A P O R E..... Saving 18.

Australian Legation,
S A I G O N..... Saving 4.

Australian Legation,
B A N G K O K..... Saving 4.

Australian Embassy,
M O S C O W..... Saving 3.

Australian Embassy,
D J A K A R T A..... Saving 7.

Australian High Commissioner's Office,
C O L O M B O..... Saving 12.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

SAVINGRAM.

O.5847 to 5864. 51

Australian Embassy,
T O K Y O.....Saving

Australian Legation,
M A N I L A..... Saving 7.

SECRET.

Laos.

1. On 11th May, 1953, the Thai Foreign Minister informed the British Ambassador in Bangkok that in view of the improved situation in Laos, Thailand would not proceed for the present with submission of the situation to the Security Council. It appears therefore, that the various proposals for some "Internationalization" of the situation in Laos may not develop. The following may however be useful to you by way of background in case the issue again becomes "live", as the Australian Minister in Bangkok believes that Thailand will proceed with its approach if the Vietminh reach the Mekhong River. You should of course continue to keep us informed of the views of the Government to which you are accredited using if appropriate and necessary the views below (paragraphs 2 to 8) as your personal estimate of what the Australian position would be.

Terms of Reference to Security Council contemplated by Thailand.

2. At the time the Thai decision to postpone action was taken, the terms of Thailand's submission to the Security Council were still being formulated. According to the Thai Minister in New York, however, the emphasis was to be on the threat to the territorial integrity of Thailand (the matter being brought forward under the general provisions of Charter Articles 34 and 35). The Thai Minister in New York stated that the term "aggression" was unlikely to be used, although reference might have been made to the "invasion of Laos".

Thai aims in referring situation to Security Council:

3. The Thai Minister in NewYork also stated that the Thai Government's purpose would be to seize the Security Council of a situation dangerous to Thailand and to authorize the Peace Observation Commission to patrol the Thai border (according to the Thai Ambassador in Washington, not necessarily immediately but to be available in the event of an emergency). Thailand would have welcomed the association of observers from Laos with the P.O.C. group.

"Internationalization" of Invasion of Laos:

4. There have been reports recently of various proposals for some other form of "internationalizing" the invasion of Laos. France, however, is opposed to reference to the United Nations either of the "invasion" itself or of the threat to Thailand, and has been said to favour instead a measure of "internationalization" by means of "declarations of solidarity by interested governments". The United States, while anxious not to embarrass the French, felt that the invasion of Laos should not go without some formal notice by the United Nations. The United Kingdom were opposed to the appeal to the United Nations which the United States were urging the French themselves to make, but Foreign Office opinion was divided on the desirability of the more limited submission contemplated by the Thais. Canada

was"completely opposed" to the French idea of "declarations of solidarity" and felt "internationalization", if required, might possibly be achieved by discussion at a political conference, either that to follow a Korean Armistice or another. New Zealand views on the Thai proposals were not known, but New Zealand departmental thinking doubted whether a general appeal to the United Nations would have positive results.

Australian Attitude on Reference to United Nations.

5. We are seeking details of French thinking regarding "declarations of solidarity by interested governments". No approach has been made to Australia on this subject and careful study of any such proposals (if action along these lines is still being considered) would be necessary before the Government could be in a position to express a view.

6. Basically, before reaching any decision on United Nations recommendations of a positive nature, we consider there would need to be full consultation to discover how far the Western nations would be prepared to go in resisting continued Vietminh aggression. We see dangers in submitting such a question to the United Nations without knowing what we want to emerge. We share United Kingdom doubts regarding the wisdom of a general appeal to the United Nations to deal with the invasion of Laos because of (a) French opposition and likelihood that United Nations intervention would not result in material aid of real assistance to French; (b) on the other hand, opportunity afforded for anti-colonial agitation against French position in Indo-China and elsewhere which might -

(i) increase France's difficulties;

(ii) force France into concessions in Indo-China, from a position of military weakness;

(iii) weaken French determination to continue the struggle against Vietminh; and

(iv) weaken the structure of the French Union with repercussions in other regions where France is being criticized.

7. While not wishing to accelerate action in the United Nations, we feel an appeal to the United Nations of the kind contemplated by Thailand would not be open to all the objections mentioned in paragraph 6 above. In the first place, its aim would be the establishment of United Nations observation machinery to meet any emergency on the Thai border and this action would be taken under "Uniting for Peace" resolution adopted by the General Assembly in 1950. (We are seeking information from the Australian Legation, Bangkok, regarding the practicability, in the physical sense, of effective United Nations observation on this border. Difficulty of observation would be increased if Vietminh proceed by methods of infiltration. Smuggling, movements of refugees across the border, etc. raise practical difficulties about the scope of any United Nations observation machinery. The Thai Ambassador in Washington has stated that if the P.O.C. were authorized to observe, it might not be necessary for it to proceed immediately to the area, but it would be available in the event of a future emergency). Secondly, Thai reference would be based on the existence of a threat to Thailand, reducing likelihood of anti-colonial attacks on France. On balance, French would seem likely to reap net advantage. (Jebb is Security Council President for May, Lodge for June, which provides hope that

Anti-French agitation could be ruled out of order.) Thirdly, such limited reference would permit United Nations to take cognizance of situation(without commitment to meet possible developments with force), a step which might have good effect on morale and stability in South-East Asia. Moreover, it may be that some Asian countries(e.g. India and Burma) will be influenced in this matter to a greater extent by considerations of resistance to Communist encroachment in Southern Asia than by their suspicions of French "colonial" policy in Indo-China. Fourthly, there may be real advantages in having some international body in Thailand which could perform in an emergency the same role as U.N.C.O.K. performed in Korea in 1950 - i.e. establish the fact of aggression against Thailand.

8. However, in view of the diminished threat to Laos and Thailand, no immediate decision now seems necessary on reference of these questions to the United Nations. We are seeking more information on the situation in Laos, and in particular on the extent to which Communist control or influence persists there.

"Free Thai"Movement.

9. In January, 1953, Peking Radio announced the establishment of an "autonomous regional Government" for the Thai minority in Southern Yunnan, with Cheli as its capital. Its leader is said to be a Lactian, Chao Chun Hsin. Yunnan is the historic home of the Thai race, most of whom have migrated South. The largest concentration of Thais is in Thailand where they predominate. Large groups also exist in Burma(the Shans), in Laos (the Lactian Thais) and in Vietnam (the tribal Thais of the North), while inSouth West China theThais form one of the largest minority groups estimated at about 2 millions. The Thais have common cultural characteristics and a common language. Establishment of a "Free Thai Government" may be motivated by such aims as the establishment of a base for future Communist operations, thus providing a centre for Siamese opposition leaders now in exile or creating a general focus of disaffection among people of the Thai race in Laos and Burma as well as in Siam itself. There is not much evidence as yet however of common political consciousness between these Thai groups.

Australia's Interests and Contribution in Indo-China.

10. As you know, our interest in these matters stems in large measure from the importance, of holding Indo-China in friendly hands. The loss of Indo-China, and particularly theTonkin Delta, would have serious consequences in Burma andThailand and might threaten the security of Malaya (see Minister's Statement in House 1951, Current Notes Vol.22.P.512). There is no question of any commitment to support friendly nations in the area should the situation deteriorate. Nevertheless, the visit to Australia recently of M. Letourneau, The French Minister in charge of relations with the Associated States in Indo-China, at theAustralian Government's invitation, is a demonstration of our interest. In addition, we have offered certain naval, army and air force equipment not immediately required by Australian services as a gift to the French. A technical mission fromSaigon is now in Australia inspecting the equipment to decide what items would be useful in Indo-China.

Colombo Plan.

11. Although we have not yet provided any economic or technical aid under the Colombo Plan, we have made clear our

I.6347 to 5364.

willingness to do so and are examining lists of equipment covering many fields, required for development projects in Vietnam. It is probable that we shall shortly make offers of certain items of equipment and some shipments might commence early in the financial year 1958-59 although it is too early yet to make any definite forecast.

12. Attached for your background information are copies of the following telegrams:-

(a) Telegram No. 500 from Washington (I.6362).

(b) Telegram No. 181 from Djakarta (I.6207).

MIN.AND DEPT.E.A.(854/10/13/7)
MIN.AND DEPT. DEFENCE,
P.M.S.

16th May, 1958.

SEC A/Ss UNG PAC WEST PI

401/1/4 47

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM. **SECRET.**

SHA/MD

I. 6362

Dated 12th May, 1953.
2053

FROM:

Rec'd 14th May, 1953.
0830

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

SECRET.

Addressed External Affairs 500 repeated London 29.

From Ambassador.

Thai appeal to United Nations, your 361.

This morning I saw Thai Ambassador, Pote Sarasin. Following is summary of Sarasin's remarks.

(1) Thais are still actively exploring the position. Thai Government hoped that matter could be brought before United Nations. It was no use waiting until events overtook them; it was wise to have some machinery on hand to deal with any situation that might arise.

(2) If question came before United Nations, Thais did not contemplate branding anyone an aggressor. What they had in mind was action under article 34 of Charter drawing the attention of Security Council to the situation and requesting the use of peace observation Commission not necessarily to proceed to the area now but to be available in event of future emergency.

(3) Thais could see no objection to Security Council having its attention drawn to the situation. Sarasin[9] pointed out that there was always a danger that some other nation might bring the matter up. When I asked whether he had any particular nation in mind he said that he had not. On the question of "encouragement" from Laos, Sarasin was distinctly "cagey" but I have little doubt that Laos, has, in fact, been in touch with Thais and has supported their approach.

(4) I asked whether he thought danger had receded. He replied with emphasis that he did not. He added that he thought it would be mistake for anyone to think that it had. No one could be sure as to why the invaders had come or why they had withdrawn. But of one thing all could be sure and that is they came at will and withdrew at will. They had shown to the people of Laos that from the military point of view they could come and go as they wished.

(5) This, according to Sarasin, represented an important factor. It was not so much the military activity as its underlying purpose that mattered. Sarasin expressed the view that long range purpose of the Communists was conquest by subversion or otherwise of Thailand, Burma and Malaya. He added that road would then be open to India.

(6) Sarasin emphasised that the Communist proposal to establish "Thai autonomous state" represented a real danger to Thailand particularly through bait which Communists invariably offered of land reform.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM. **SECRET.**

I. 6362

Sarasin pointed out that there were some 50,000 refugees of Thai Organ inside the Thai Border. These I gathered had come largely from areas where fighting had been going on during the past 7 years. These refugees had been confined to limited areas. On the whole they were quiet and law abiding, but no doubt there were substantial elements of subversion amongst them which could, and no doubt, would become extremely troublesome if the Vietminh proved victors.

(7) Sarasin said there was still one Vietminh Division close to the Thai Border. When I asked how many men were comprised within this Division he could give no clear answer.

(8) Sarasin concluded by expressing his personal hope that all nations would see the urgency of the matter including the necessity of taking minimum precautionary action e.g. as contemplated by Thais under article 34. He was unable to say what his Government's final decision would be. Consultations were continuing in Washington, Paris and London. British view he understood was not to press the matter just now. French of course were opposed to any appeal to United Nations regarding Laos invasion. While he appreciated the French views, Sarasin said he personally hoped that they would not oppose another nation e.g. Thailand (that was directly threatened) bringing the matter before the United Nations. He said he thought it would be serious if there were any division in the United Nations between France and the United States. His Government was most anxious to do what it had in mind with full support of its friends.

(9) I told him of Australian Government's interest in events in area. He said he would be glad to let me know of developments.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M.'S.

14th May, 1953.

SEC A.S.'s Cr(L & T) UNO PAC SEA NZ WEST E. FI

401/1/4

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM. **SECRET.**

SHA/MD

I. 6362

FROM:

Dated 12th May, 1953.
2053
Rec'd 14th May, 1953.
0830

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON.

SECRET.

Addressed External Affairs 500 repeated London 29.

From Ambassador.

Thai appeal to United Nations, your 361.

This morning I saw Thai Ambassador, Pote Sarasin. Following is summary of Sarasin's remarks.

(1) Thais are still actively exploring the position. Thai Government hoped that matter could be brought before United Nations. It was no use waiting until events overtook them; it was wise to have some machinery on hand to deal with any situation that might arise.

(2) If question came before United Nations, Thais did not contemplate branding anyone an aggressor. What they had in mind was action under article 34 of Charter drawing the attention of Security Council to the situation and requesting the use of peace obs ervation Commission not necessarily to proceed to the area now but to be available in event of future emergency.

(3) Thais could see no objection to Security Council having its attention drawn to the situation. Sarasin' pointed out that there was always a danger that some other nation might bring the matter up. When I asked whether he had any particular nation in mind he said that he had not. On the question of "encouragement" from Laos, Sarasin was distinctly "cagey" but I have little doubt that Laos, has, in fact, been in touch with Thais and has supported their approach.

(4) I asked whether he thought danger had receded. He replied with emphasis that he did not. He added that he thought it would be mistake for anyone to think that it had. No one could be sure as to why the invaders had come or why they had withdrawn. But of one thing all could be sure and that is they came at will and withdrew at will. They had shown to the people of Laos that from the military point of view they could come and go as they wished.

(5) This, according to Sarasin, represented an important factor. It was not so much the military activity as its underlying purpose that mattered. Sarasin expressed the view that long range purpose of the Communists was conquest by subversion or otherwise of Thailand, Burma and Malaya. He added that road would then be open to India.

(6) Sarasin emphasised that the Communist proposal to establish "Thai autonomous state" represented a real danger to Thailand particularly through bait which Communists invariably offered of land reform.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM. **SECRET.**

2.

I. 6362

origin

Sarasin pointed out that there were some 50,000 refugees of Thai ~~Organ~~ inside the Thai Border. These I gathered had come largely from areas where fighting had been going on during the past 7 years. These refugees had been confined to limited areas. On the whole they were quiet and law abiding, but no doubt there were substantial elements of subversion amongst them which could, and no doubt, would become extremely troublesome if the Vietminh proved victors.

(7) Sarasin said there was still one Vietminh Division close to the Thai Border. When I asked how many men were comprised within this Division he could give no clear answer.

(8) Sarasin concluded by expressing his personal hope that all nations would see the urgency of the matter including the necessity of taking minimum precautionary action e.g. as contemplated by Thais under article 34. He was unable to say what his Government's final decision would be. Consultations were continuing in Washington, Paris and London. British view he understood was not to press the matter just now. French of course were opposed to any appeal to United Nations regarding Laos invasion. While he appreciated the French views, Sarasin said he personally hoped that they would not appose another nation e.g. Thailand (that was directly threatened) bringing the matter before the United Nations. He said he thought it would be serious if there were any division in the United Nations between France and the United States. His Government was most anxious to do what it had in mind with full support of its friends.

(9) I told him of Australian Government's interest in events in area. He said he would be glad to let me know of developments.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M.'S.

14th May, 1954.

SEC A/ S's Cr(L & T) UNO PAC SEA NZ WEST E PI

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

401/1/4

CABLEGRAM. SECRET.

MD:MB

I. 0806

Dated: 12th May, 1953.
1144

FROM:

Rec'd: 13th May, 1953.
0830

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK.

444. SECRET.

(Passed to Washington).

Laos. Further to our 441.

Thanat Khoman informs us this morning that Bangkok has directed that application to Security Council is not to be made at present. Reasons not given.

2. Thanat Khoman in answer to question thought there might be "other reasons" in addition to change in situation in Laos.

3. He regards Thai initiative as being in suspense rather than abandoned and thinks it possible he might get further instructions in next few days.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M'S.

13th May, 1953.

SEC I/Ss Cr(L & T) UNO PAC SEA WEST PI

Mr Watson
Mr Bowden

HG 13/5

401/1/4

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

MK:HMcC

CABLEGRAM. SECRET.

Dated: 11th May, 1953.
1702
Rec'd: 12th May, 1953.
1330

FROM:-

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

443. SECRET. IMMEDIATE.

Repeated to Washington.

Laos.

United Kingdom Delegation inform us that they received a cable from Bangkok this morning to the effect that the Thailand Foreign Minister had just told the British Ambassador that in view of the improved situation in Laos, Thailand would not proceed with the suggestion to the Security Council. (This cable was despatched from Bangkok around 2.30 May 11th Bangkok time).

2. We learned the above after conversation reported in our 441. Unable to contact Thanat this afternoon.

3. United States Mission profess to have little information and say they have not been canvassing possible votes for admission of item to Security Council Agenda and have not discussed the question with Thailand Mission.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M's.

12th May, 1953.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC SEA WEST PI

(HEADS OF DIVISIONS)

401/1/4

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM. **SECRET.**

MC:MB

I. 6283

Dated: 11th May, 1953.
1445

FROM:

Rec'd: 12th May, 1953.
1130

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK.

441. SECRET. PRIORITY.

Your 162. Laos.

1. Precise terms of Thai submission to Security Council not yet available.

2. Reference our 440 and your 361 to Embassy, we have spoken to Thanat who has returned from Washington. Terms of submission to Security Council still being formulated. Thanat says emphasis will be on threat to territorial integrity of Thailand. "Invasion" of Laos may possibly be mentioned but term "aggression" unlikely. Submission intended under Articles 34 and 35.

3. Date of submission indefinite and depends on developments in Laos. If danger were removed Thailand would probably suspend application to Security Council. If, however, Vietminh movements in immediate future were such as to receive or increase Thai apprehensions of danger to Thailand application would be made at once. Vietminh activity near Thai border is key factor.

4. Reference paragraph 5 of your 361 to Embassy Thanat states that Thai Government received request from Government of Laos to take some action that would assist Laos and that he has no knowledge of any request from other sources.

5. General comment by Thanat is along the following lines:-

Thailand was shocked by ease with which Vietminh moved into Laos creating situation giving Thailand reason to fear for its own security and territorial integrity. Despite reported movements of withdrawal by Vietminh forces, danger remains, even if it may not be so acute as a few days ago. Thailand for its own sake felt compelled to draw attention of Security Council to the situation as very serious for Thailand. Danger still exists and Thailand cannot abandon intention to submit question to Security Council unless it is completely removed. Thai Government does not propose to seek condemnation of Vietminh. Purpose is to bring situation to knowledge of Security Council and to ask Council to send some members of Peace Observation Commission to Thai border. Thailand would welcome association of observers from Laos.

6. Thanat inquired Australian attitude to which I replied I had no specific indication but I could be assured of Australia's interest in these events. He hinted that Thailand would be interested to know Australian attitude towards Thai intention to bring matter to Security Council.

2./ I told.....

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM. **SECRET.**

 I. 6283

I told him I had no information on this. He has undertaken to inform me further (e.g. on terms of submission to Security Council) as soon as he is able to do so.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M'S.

12th May, 1953.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC WEST PI

(HEADS OF DIVISIONS)

401/1/4

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

MC:SA

CABLEGRAM. SECRET.

Dated: 11th May, 1953
2104
Recd.: 12th May, 1953
1045

FROM:

Australian High Commissioner's
Office,
L O N D O N.

1541. SECRET. PRIORITY.

Repeated Washington 68 Saving Paris 16.

From External.

Your 1407.

Laos.

United Kingdom Ambassador, Bangkok reports today that Thais have decided to hold their hand "as danger has receded."

2. Thai decision to appeal to United Nations clearly owed much to representations by Dulles to Thai Ambassador but idea was adopted enthusiastically by Thai Prime Minister and Foreign Minister and it seems possible that they had been thinking independently on the same lines.

3. Although Foreign Office had received conflicting reports previously as to French attitude to appeal by Thais we were assured today that French were strongly opposed to it. This may have influenced Thai decision to hold hand.

4. Foreign Office were opposed to appeal which United States were urging French themselves to make. Their first reaction to idea of appeal by Thais was that this would not be open to all of same objections but opinions were still divided as to its desirability. It was felt on the one hand that the situation could not be ignored indefinitely in United Nations. On other hand ventilation in that quarter would be likely to revive anti-colonial campaign and to force France into further political concessions made from position of military weakness which could have serious repercussions on general position of French and even on their determination to continue shouldering the burden. It was also considered unwise to bring matter to United Nations without clear idea of object which it was desired to achieve and of how far western nations would in the final result be prepared to commit themselves in the event of continued Vietminh aggression. The matter had been referred to Churchill who was expected to make some statement during Foreign Affairs debate tonight or tomorrow.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M.'s

12th May, 1953.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC WEST PI

(HEADS OF DIVISIONS)

401/1/4 f 8

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CABLEGRAM. SECRET.

GL:SA

O.5262/3.

Dated: 10th May, 1953.
1555

TO:

Australian Embassy,
WASHINGTON..... 361

REPEATED TO:

Australian High Commissioner's
Office,
LONDON..... 1407.

SECRET. IMMEDIATE.

For Ambassador from Watt. Laos.

On 9th May we received advice from Ballard that, subject to Cabinet approval, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Thailand had decided to "refer situation to Security Council under Article 34". On 10th May Ballard reported that, without waiting for formal cabinet approval, but "with general support", Foreign Minister had instructed Thai Delegation in New York to inform Delegations that Thailand "intends to inform Security Council of the matter under Article 34 on 11th May." Thai Ambassador at Washington will handle the matter. Ballard adds that Foreign Minister "envisaged appointment of a Sub-Committee of Peace Observation Committee for purpose of inspecting both sides of the border". Fact that Thai delegation in New York has received instructions is confirmed by Forsyth's telegram 440, copy of which I assume you have seen.

2. We have cabled Ballard seeking more precise information as to exact terms of Thai approach to Security Council. Presumably Thai Government will not raise question of invasion of Laos by Vietminh, which French Government has declined to raise, but some situation in relation to Thailand itself.

3. We should like to be kept informed of any developments, particularly attitude of United States and United Kingdom. Has Thai Government taken action on its own initiative? Has it been encouraged to take initiative by United States Government, following upon refusal of French to follow American advice?

4. Telegram from Ottawa No. 78, repeated Washington Saving. 25, states that Canadian Department of External Affairs are thinking there may be need to 'internationalise' the Indo-Chinese problem in some way, possibly by discussion at a political conference dealing with Korean or Far Eastern matters.

5. Glad advice and comments on above and related matters.

Washington please pass urgently to New York and Ottawa.

London please pass urgently to Paris.

M. Gilchrist

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M.'s

11th May, 1953.

SEC A/Ss Cr(L&T) UN PAC SEA NZ WEST E PI

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

401/1/4 37

CABLEGRAM.

O.5257

MB:CET:

Dated: 10th May, 1953.
1210

TO:

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK.

162. CONFIDENTIAL. PRIORITY.

Please advise exact wording of item which Thailand proposes to bring before Security Council. It is not clear whether it is (a) aggression against Laos by Vietminh or (b) threat to their border.

11th May, 1953.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M's.

SEC A/S's cr.(L & T) UNs PAC SEA WEST E PI

Gilchrist.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

401/1/+ 36

JC:ER

I.6210

Dated: 9th May, 1953
1600

FROM:

Rec'd: 10th May, 1953
0900

Australian Legation,
BANGKOK.

40. CONFIDENTIAL. PRIORITY.
Laos.

1. Without waiting for formal cabinet approval but with general support, the Minister for Foreign Affairs has instructed the Delegation in New York to inform Delegations other than the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that Thailand intends to inform the Security Council of the matter under article 34 on 11th May. He is drafting the document but the Ambassador at Washington will handle the matter.

2. He envisaged the appointment of a Sub-Committee of the Peace Observation Committee for the purpose of inspecting both sides the border.

3. Any crossing of Mekong by Vietminh, even where it is not the boundary, would be seriously regarded, and the Minister personally regards the presence of Annamite refugees as a possible source of friction.

4. The Minister told me he hopes the French will "rally around".

5. This action probably originates here with the Minister himself but as you probably know it has been discussed in Washington.

6. I think it should be seen principally as a precautionary move against possible aggression by Communist Chinese, which is Thailand's great preoccupation.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
" " " DEFENCE
P.M.'s

10th May, 1953

SEC A/Ss UN PAC WEST PI

spare copy M. Gilchrist Mg. 13/5
Mr Bourchier
Mrs. Nelson to me.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

401/1/4 38

MK:MB

ACTION COPY

I. 6205

Dated: 8th May, 1953.
1539

FROM:

Rec'd: 10th May, 1953.
0900

Australian Mission to United Nations,
NEW YORK.

440. CONFIDENTIAL.

Laos.

Thai Delegation inform us that they have been instructed by Thai Government to submit question of Laos for consideration by Security Council. Thaiat Khoman, Head of Delegation, has gone to Washington to confer with Thai Ambassador, who will have conduct of the question before the council, and it is not yet known when the question will be submitted.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M'S.

10th May, 1953.

SEC A/Ss UN PAC@ WEST PI

(HEADS OF DIVISIONS)

Mr. Gilchrist

Pls. discuss with UN if not already done

11/5

Mr. Hill is drafting a savingram summing ~~up~~ essential information for our posts, & will consult with S.E.A. tomorrow re this.

H.G. 14/5

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

401/1/4

HEADS OF DIVISIONS

JERC/MD

ACTION COPY

I. 6159

FROM:

Dated 8th May, 1953. 1730

Rec'd 9th May, 1953. 0830

Australian Legation,
BANGKOK.

39. CONFIDENTIAL. IMMEDIATE.

Laos.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister have decided, subject to Cabinet approval, to refer the situation to the Security Council under article 34.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M.'S.

9th May, 1953.

SEC A/S's UN PAC@ WEST PI Heads of Divisions.

M. Gilchrist
11/5

NOTE: For previous papers on Thai reaction to invasion of Laos see file 384/3/3 - Indo-China/Thai Relations.

9.vii

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

A01/1/4 35

CABLEGRAM.

MW - MC

I.2026.

Dated 13th February, 1953.
0805.
Recd. 15th February, 1953.
0900.

FROM:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

72. CONFIDENTIAL.

Korea our 65.

1. We gather from a participant that at Arab Asian meeting this morning, Indonesia, without formulating any specific proposal, suggested the possibility of some further effort being made by Arab Asian Representative to settle Prisoner of War issue, and also other East Asian problems including Formosa and representation of China. There was no agreement from other members of the Group on submission of any such proposal and no decision was reached. India, in particular, showed no desire to participate in this proposal. Thailand deprecated suggested initiative. Meeting realised the prime importance of ascertaining United States policy, and further meeting of the group will be held on 19th February by which time it is expected United States policy will be known.

2. Indirectly we glean impression that the Palar Plan is felt to be obsolete since American Formosa initiative, and that issues are now seen by the group as much wider than settlement of Prisoner of War question.

3. French Delegation believe Soviet likely to build ill treatmentof Prisoners of War into major propaganda theme and are suggesting that Americans obtain full report from United Nations Command on camp conditions and recent riots.

4. Arab Asian Group was in agreement that Americans obtain full report from United Nations Command on camp conditions and recent riots.

5. Arab Asian Group was in agreement that only one Committee of Assembly is necessary.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
" " " DEFENCE.
P.M.'S.

15th February, 1953.

F
452/1/4
401/1/4

SEC A/Ss Cr(L & T) UNO PAC EA SEA NZ WEST CENTRAL PI

COPY

OF LETTER FROM
AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO UNITED NATIONS
4510 EMPIRE STATE BUILDING, NEW YORK 1, N. Y.

F 401/1/4

12th February, 1953.

File No. 103/1.vii(2)

Memorandum No. 268/53 CONFIDENTIAL

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra, A.C.T.

...

We enclose a report on a private conversation which Mr. Loomes to-day had with Nai Thanat Khoman, Acting Permanent Representative of Thailand,

Minister

→ S.E. Asia Sub-Section
for your files.
HL(UN)
20/2/1953

cc. Washington

AHL/del

FEA FP Sec

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTES ON PRIVATE CONVERSATION BETWEEN MR. LOOMES AND NAI THANAT KHOMAN, ACTING PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THAILAND, ON 12TH FEBRUARY, 1953.

Soviet Sponsored Items

Nai Thanat had clearly discussed these items with the United States Mission, and, subject to instructions, agrees with the method of handling which the United States suggests.

Korea:

Thanat appears generally to agree that it is probably desirable that no new action should be taken at the forthcoming Assembly, but Thai policy will, I gather, depend very largely on the policy of the United States.

Thanat said that he has been invited to attend a meeting of the Arab-Asian group which is to be held tomorrow (13th February). He has been told that the principal item of business will be to discuss a proposal by Indonesia that a resolution should be introduced providing for a political conference to discuss all Far Eastern problems, including the question of Korea, the prisoners of war issue, the Formosa question and the representation of Communist China. This proposal, he said, goes further than the Soviet proposal, since it covers all Far Eastern problems. He has been instructed to refuse to join any group in putting forward any resolution on these lines, and will oppose the submission of it. He said that such a proposal is a complete surrender to the Soviet view, and, particularly in its even wider terms, would play directly into the Communists' hands. He promised to inform me of the results of tomorrow's conference, and a separate report will then be forwarded to the Department.

Secretariat Personnel Policy:

Thanat agrees with the United States views that, as far as possible, detailed discussion on this subject should be avoided. He also agrees that it would be better for this question to be dealt with in Plenary session only.

Appointment of Secretary-General:

Thanat was somewhat reticent on this question, although he said his Government could probably support "either Romulo or Pearson". (It is probable that Romulo's candidacy has been strongly pressed on the Asian Governments).

Thai Representation:

Thanat does not think Prince Wan Waithayakon will attend the forthcoming session, and he expects to lead the delegation himself.

AHL:bef

12th February, 1953.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

H01/1/4 30

CABLEGRAM.

HP .. NC I.1954.

Dated 12th February, 1953.
1755
Read. 13th February, 1953.
1145.

FROM:

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

65. CONFIDENTIAL.

Repeated to Washington U.N.E.54.

Korea.

We learn that a meeting of the Arab-Asian Group (to which Thailand has also been invited) will be held tomorrow. We understand it will discuss a proposal by Indonesia that a resolution be introduced in forthcoming Assembly recommending a Political Conference which would consider all Far Eastern problems, including the Prisoner of War issue in Korea, a general Korean settlement, Formosa and representation of Communist China. Thailand will refuse to join in any such proposal, and will oppose the submission of it.

We shall endeavour to ascertain results of meeting and report further.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
" " " DEFENCE.
P.M.'S.

13th February, 1953.

SEC A/Ss Gr(L & T) UNO PAC EA SEA NZ WEST PI

Note for file 401/1/4

Commonwealth Office of Ed. memo d/15/10/52 on UN file 863/20/7 refers to candidature of MOM LUANG PIN MALAKUL (Under-Sec of State for Education in Thailand) for election to the Executive Board of UNESCO.

UN advised that we know of no polit. reason why we shld not support his candidature -

CM
23/10

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

SHA.

I.14237

Dated: 14th October, 1952.
1911

FROM:

Recd.: 15th October, 1952.
1430

Australian Mission to the United Nations,
NEW YORK.

324. UNCLASSIFIED.

Seventh session of General Assembly convened this morning. Mayor Impelliteri, Warren Austin and Lie made appropriate statements about the opening of the new building and Padillo Nervo spoke along familiar lines giving an account of his stewardship. Pearson was then elected as President by a vote of 51 to 4 (Madame Pandit) and 5 abstentions.

After adjournment Pearson made opening remarks setting forth some major problems such as -

(a) an armistice in Korea on honourable terms
(b) the need for an armistice in the cold war if the world is to make progress towards peace
(c) freedom of actions and of individuals essential if peace is to be achieved.

He pointed out that these problems imposed a severe test on the United Nations and that all countries should work towards their resolution without violating the charter In this connection, he commented that the United Nations was not a "super government".

2. Pearson suggested that Chairman of Ad Hoc Committee should be accorded full membership in general committee, and, no objection being expressed, he stated that he regarded this suggestion as adopted.

3. Assembly then resolved itself into various committees seriatim to elect Chairman of Committees. Results were 1st committee Brazil, 2nd Czechoslovakia, 3rd Pakistan, 4th Argentina, 5th Philippines, 6th Thailand, Ad Hoc Greece, i.e. previously published slate. Gromyko called for ballot on Ad Hoc Committee Chairman, result being 59 for, 9 abstentions, 1 informal vote. Byelorussia proposed Poland for 6th Committee but this was defeated by vote of 50-10.

4. Before the election of Vice Presidents, Gromyko challenged Pearson's assumption that the Assembly did not object to the chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee being a full member of general committee. He quoted rules 38 and 102 in support of his stand. Pearson maintained that the Assembly had already reached a decision on this point but put it to a vote whether his assumption should be reconsidered. Pearson was upheld by vote of 27 to 25 with 8 abstentions.

5. Elections for vice presidencies resulted in big five, Honduras and Egypt. Egypt polled 34 votes and Israel 33.

A/Min. & Dept. E.A.
P.M.'s.

401/1/4

15th October, 1952.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

RESTRICTED.

27

TP:ER

I.12653

Dated: 12th September, 1952
0930

Rec'd: 13th September, 1952
1635

FROM:

Australian Legation,
BANGKOK.

122. RESTRICTED.

United Nations Assembly.

My despatch 443/52, 3rd September. In response to the Secretary General's enquiry Thailand will agree to postponement of General Debate in plenary. Minister will nevertheless, arrive beginning of session as planned.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M's

13th September, 1952

F 401/1/4

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

DBB:SA

I.12291

Dated: 4th September, 1952.
1130

FROM:

Recd.: 5th September, 1952.
0830.

Australian Legation,
BANGKOK.

118. UNCLASSIFIED.

Your telegram 158. Your despatch 308 not yet received.

E.A. (701/9/34)
P.M.'s.

5th September, 1952.

E 401/1/4

DIST:
SECRETARY
A.S. (U.N.)
A.S. (G.R.)
A.S. (Admin)
(L. & T.)
U.N.
Tec. Ass.
E.R.
Pac.
West
Central

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

G. Fedkes as you requested this

MG:ER

0.12530

Sent: 3rd September, 1952

1640

TO:

Australian Legation,
BANGKOK.

158. UNCLASSIFIED.

Lokanathan has cabled for advice of our representatives at Working Party on Mobilisation of domestic capital. Please pass to him urgently advice contained in our memorandum 308 that Mr. P.E. Davies will be our representative.

E.A. (701/9/34)
P.M's

4th September, 1952

→ S.E. Asia Sub. Section F401/1/4

DUPLICATE. for your files. H 8/9

Australian Legation,
Bangkok, Thailand.

File No. 72/1/1/1. SECRET

Memo. No. 443/52. 3rd September, 1952.

~~Australia~~ H 8/9

Original with Secretary: Please let S.E. Asia have this copy. H 8/9

MEMORANDUM for:

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY (VII):
AUSTRALIAN BRIEF.

Your Memo.286 of 15th August, 1952 (852/17/7).

I have been able to have discussions with the Director-General of the Department of United Nations Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and also with the Minister for Foreign Affairs. From the former I derived the clear impression that there is no body of departmental thinking on the forthcoming Assembly items. The Ministry receives no assessments or worthwhile reports from its Mission in New York, which virtually acts as a post office. (This situation will probably be remedied next year as it is proposed to make a senior appointment to the Mission from here.) Policy and attitudes are very much the domain of the Foreign Minister himself, who will be leading the delegation, and who will probably make decisions on the spot. I do not think, therefore, that it would be profitable to pursue discussions on the Agenda items departmentally.

Prince Naradip has views on the interpretation of Article 2(7) of the Charter which coincide with our own to some extent but in some ways go further than we would like. While agreeing that the word "essentially" should be given its full force (by which he means, as I understand you to mean, that the incidental emergence of a domestic aspect of a matter does not withdraw the whole substantive matter from U.N. competence), he regards Article 2(7) as to be read subject to and controlled by the statement of Purposes and Principles, especially so far as human rights are concerned. I urged upon him your point that if there is to be pressure on members with respect to their under-developed or backward areas or peoples, it must be based firmly on a legal foundation such as a convention, and he countered by claiming that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, although admittedly not a convention, was not wholly devoid of legal effect: it was what he called a "maximum", whereas the Covenant, if and when made, would be a "minimum".

Pursuing this line of thought he added that "as a philosopher rather than a man of action" he did not see that substantive political matters should be excluded from discussions on non-self-governing territories. The information supplied under Article 73 e was not supplied for library purposes and could legitimately be discussed in all its aspects.

This gave me an opportunity to speak fairly frankly (as I had to the Director-General of the United Nations Department) of our views on this and on the mounting unconstitutional pressure to which the administering authorities are being subjected and I added that, things being what they are, if a discussion was opened on these matters, as he claimed it would be proper to do, without any doubt resolutions would be proposed which could and most probably would be carried irrespective of the constitutional position. To that he replied that we could count on him to oppose such resolutions "if they went too far". I think it was in connection with this that

/he referred ....

he referred to the pressure he himself is under from the other Asian countries and I judge that academically his position is somewhere between theirs and our own. In spite of his general attitude of support of U.N. action, however, there is no doubt that he is aligned with the Asian, and not European, countries, if this distinction has to be made.

Concerning the general debate in the Plenary, he expects it to take place as usual at the beginning of the Session and he will himself be there for the opening. This is a matter to which he has obviously given some thought and on which I think he has made up his mind. I put to him your practical considerations in favour of deferment but he feels that the Latin Americans in particular will never agree to it, and sees no great harm if "the professors of international law" make their usual two hour speeches. He does not think that the Americans themselves would ask for a postponment but you may have better information on this. His main point is that the questions of real moment which might otherwise have been discussed in the Plenary could quite easily be discussed in the First Committee after the elections (and the general discussion Plenary) are over and that the Foreign Ministers can make their big speeches there.

Two other points were touched on briefly, which were the Tunisian item and the election to the Trusteeship Council. So far as Tunis is concerned, he agrees that this matter is at present "essentially" domestic. As far as the Trusteeship Council is concerned, it appears that Khalidy has formally sought the support of Thailand for a further term for Iraq. Prince Naradip thinks it is wrong of Khalidy to try and "monopolize" a seat and feels like supporting Syria, but thinks that the Arab League will probably come to an arrangement among themselves.

(Sgd.) B. C. Ballard

Minister.

Australian Legation,
Bangkok, Thailand.

File No. 64/1.

Memo. No. 421/52.

Duplicate.

F401/1/4

25th August, 1952.

MEMORANDUM for:

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

E.C.O.S.O.C. ELECTIONS.

Your memorandum No. 267 of 1st August, 1952 (852/18/1).

noted on 401/1/1

I have had an opportunity of passing on the contents of your memorandum to the Minister of Foreign Affairs (whose name is now Prince Naradhip), and he told me we could rely on Thailand's vote in support of our candidature for the seat vacated by Canada.

He asked me to mention that Thailand will in due course seek election to the seat to be vacated by the Philippines next year, and would like our support. Apparently the Philippines have ambitions towards the Security Council, but Thailand is not for the present attracted either by the glamour or the hard work associated with that Council. He has no evidence that the Philippines will try to get back on the Trusteeship Council.

Minister.

7 South-East Asia -
Copied on U.N File 852/18/1.

5/9.

Nine Nelson

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Summary of Items of General Interest

Name of Paper ..... *File No.* 401/1/4

Published at Australian Legation Thailand *Date* 31/7/52

Bangkok

ITEMS OF INTEREST.

PERIOD 17th TO 30th JULY, 1952.

An official communique released on 16th July by the Department of Public Relations states that casualties suffered by the Thai Expeditionary Force in Korea up to 30th June, 1952, have been as follows:-

Casualties resulting from fighting:-

Dead	...	47
Wounded	...	152
Missing	...	4

Casualties from other causes:-

Dead	...	17
Sick	...	395

A Royal Proclamation was issued on 20th July promoting Lt.-General Srisd Dhanarat to the rank of General and Police Lt.-General Phao Sriyanond to the rank of Police General. (Phao retains his army rank of Lt.-General).

UN Office to see
2) East Asia
3) & return to S.E.A.

Aust. Legation, Bangkok, Thailand
Annual Report, 1951

38. In accordance with the United Nations recommendation for economic sanctions against Communist China, a Royal Decree, issued on 23rd July, prohibited the export, without a special licence, of tin ore, iron ore, wolfram, antimony, lead, lead ore, zinc, para rubber, castor beans, castor oil and kapok. No difficulty has been experienced by exporters of these materials in obtaining licences provided the destination is not Communist China or the iron curtain countries.

/39. It is of some

CONFIDENTIAL

19

Amer. Legation, Bangkok, Thailand.
Annual Report 1951

401/1/4

24. The participation of Thai forces in Korea has continued to evoke friendly feelings from the Western powers. The Thai Government for its part, considers that its efforts in this direction are, now that Thailand has clearly declared its position, well worth while, and there has been little if any opposition to the maintaining of a Thai contingent in Korea.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

401/1/4

RESTRICTED

CABLEGRAM.

JG - MC

I.8304.

Dated 12th June, 1952.
1800.
Recd. 13th June, 1952.
0830.

FROM:

Australian Legation,
BANGKOK.

72. RESTRICTED.

Your 94 and 95.

The Thai representative will leave for Korea on 18th June accompanied by an alternate and a secretary (both members of the United Nations Department of Foreign Ministry).

The Foreign Ministry views accord generally with your telegram 95 and Prince Pridi can be expected to behave accordingly. I should think Plimsoll could carry him along comfortably.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.

P.M.'S.

13th June, 1952.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

401/1/4

17

CABLEGRAM.

ACR/MD

O. 8824

Dated 11th June, 1952
1645

TO:

Australian Legation,
BANGKOK.

95. UNCLASSIFIED. PRIORITY.

Your 70.

If opportunity offers, you might point out that U.N.C.U.R.K., as principal representative body of the United Nations General Assembly in Korea, is concerned to promote stable and democratic Government there and respect for constitutions. President Rhee's arbitrary and unconstitional acts have caused U.N.C.U.R.K. to intervene with advice which stressed possible injurious effects on world support for United Nations action in Korea. U.N.C.U.R.K.'s latest communication to Rhee was on 7th June outlining above consideration and urging lifting martial law in Pusan and release of Assemblymen now in unconstitutional detention. Communication emphasized that U.N.C.U.R.K. was not taking sides in Korean internal politics but that United Nations had special interest in view of circumstances of establishment of R.O.K. and of present United Nations sacrifices in Korea.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
P.M.'S.

12th June, 1952.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. 401/1/4

CABLEGRAM. SECRET.

DBB:MFS

0.870

Sent: 6th June, 1952.
2040

TO:

Australian Legation,
BANGKOK.

94. SECRET. IMMEDIATE.

You will be aware of situation in Pusan where President Rhee declared martial law, arrested members of Paliament and is taking other unconstitutional steps.

2. Representations have been made to Rhee by United States, United Kingdom and Australia, including message from Minister to Rhee. U.N.C.U.R.K. has also been attempting to persuade him to return to democratic procedures, but so far without success.

3. As it is possible that further steps might have to be taken by the Commission, or of which its approval would be desirable, we would appreciate advice as to likely attitude of Thai representative.

(Your memorandum 271.)

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
" " " DEFENCE
P.M's.

9th June, 1952.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

401/1/4

CABLEGRAM.

TWWP:MFS

O.8701

Sent: 6th June, 1952.
2230

TO:

Australian Delegation to U.N.C.U.R.K.
P U S A N.

47. CONFIDENTIAL.

Your 42, paragraph 5.

Prince Pride was Foreign Minister April, 1948 to June 1949, and led Thai delegation to 1948 Assembly. Legation Bangkok describe him as "pleasant but ineffectual". Further biographical details by airmail. We are asking Legation to advise likely Thai attitude.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
" " " DEFENCE.
P.M's.

9th June, 1952.

F. 401/1/4 14

(COPY)

Australian Legation,
Bangkok.

File No. 100/25/1

28th May, 1952.

Memo No. 271/52

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

UNCURK - THAI REPRESENTATION

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has now replied to Mr. Loomes's demarche of 18th March.

2. They state that the Thai Government fully recognize the importance of UNCURK for the future of the Republic of Korea, particularly in the next few months to come, and have therefore appointed Major-General Prince Pridi debyabongs Devakula, a former Minister of Foreign Affairs, as representative of Thailand on the Commission. They add that he will soon leave for Korea to take up his post.

3. Prince Pridi was Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Pibulsonggram Government from 15th April, 1948, to 28th June, 1949, when he resigned with the Government. He was succeeded as Foreign Minister by Pibul.

4. He was leader of Thai Delegation to the General Assembly in September, 1948, and may therefore be known to some officers of the Department.

5. He was appointed a Senator on 4th November 1949, and again, after the expiration of his term, on 18th November, 1950. The Senate was dissolved during the Coup of November 1951 and he is not now in Parliament.

6. Mr. Eastman, it will be recalled, described him in his memorandum C263/49 of 29th June 1949 as "a pleasant but ineffectual 'dug out' who had proved of little or no use in the Ministry".

7. The U.S. Embassy received the news of his appointment with modified rapture, but on reflection now think that the demarche has been as fruitful as could have been expected. Prince Pridi cannot be expected to as good a representative as Nai Phot Sarasin, (who has just left Thailand to be Ambassador in the U.S.A.), but is not without experience in foreign affairs. The U.S. Embassy feels that, on balance, it is satisfactory that a Thai Representative has been appointed at all, and that this appointee is as good as could have been hoped for.

B.C. Ballard
Minister

orig. on 505/17
copy also on 395/1/4

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. 401/1/4 B

CABLEGRAM. **SECRET.**

DB/MD

I. 7347

Dated 22nd May, 1952
1610

FROM:

Rec'd 23rd May, 1952
0830

Australian Consulate General,
BANGKOK.

66. SECRET.

Tunis.

I have gathered informally from Prince Wan that he doubts whether Thailand's point of view was adequately expressed at the recent meeting in New York.

His present approach is that he does not know enough about the facts. While "ready to help, noticeably believers in the United Nations", he would not wish lightly into calling a special session of the Assembly, and in particular, would require to know in what precise way the situation might lead to a breach of peace.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE.
P.M.'S.

23rd May, 1952.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM. I.7713

AP:HG

Sent: 30th May, 1952.
1630

FROM:

Rec'd: 20th May, 1952.
0830

Australian Legation,
BANGKOK.

68. UNCLASSIFIED.

Tunis.

My telegram 66. Minister for Foreign Affairs Ualp issued a statement, the full text of which is available at Siamese Delegation, New York. Substance is that it does not appear that the present circumstances require the calling of a special session of the General Assembly as the question of Tunis might more appropriately be taken up at an ordinary session. The Siamese Government will, however, continue to watch the situation closely and will be glad to receive further information for its consideration.

MIN. & DEPT. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M'S

2nd June, 1952.

401/1/4
BTR. Lonsdale No 66

DE
SECRETARY
A.S. (U.N.)
A.S. (G.R.)
A.S. (Admin.)
(L. & T.)
U.N.
Tec. Ass.
E.R.
Pac.
West.
Central
P.I.
Con. & Pol.
Ant.
Admin.
Finance
Ec. Organ.

11

Lab 401/1/4.

Ref memo No 271/52 of 28 Aug 64,

from Amb-Legation, Bangkok,

regarding Thai representation at UNCTAD.

- Lubis 5 05/17.

CONFIDENTIAL

401/1/4 10

Extract

U.K. Annual Review of Siam for 1951.

401/1/4

Relations with the United Nations - Siamese support of the United Nations is 90 per cent. an effort to secure American aid and protection, and 10 per cent. a bid to "put Siam on the map". On both counts it has been eminently successful. The Siamese Expeditionary Force in Korea was maintained throughout 1951, where it has apparently been as useless militarily to the command as it has been useful politically to Siam. In New York Prince Wan Waithyakorn, Siamese Ambassador at Washington and permanent delegate to the United Nations, never fails to enhance his country's reputation by sound and intelligent work.

U.S.S.R. POLICY

1. Telegram from World Peace Council on 27th June, 1951, to J. Malik, President of the Security Council. ...."We call for the termination of the intervention by U.S. armed forces on the Chinese island and the cessation of hostilities against the Republic of Vietnam as being military actions which contain the danger of World War."

2. Meeting of Bureau of World Peace Council at Helsingfors 20-23rd July, 1951. Resolution on reinvigoration of the Peace Campaign includes the hope of "honest people" for an armistice in Korea and the "importance for this purpose that negotiations to end the war in Vietnam be started".

3. Meeting of World Peace Council in Vienna from 1-6th November, 1951.

Resolution on South East Asia and Vietnam:

The resolution on South-East Asia and Viet Nam, adopted at the session of the World Peace Council held here, states :

The World Peace Council, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, has always recognised the right of the peoples to resolve their own affairs and to settle their conflicts without interference from without. It declares that possible conflicts, and those which have already broken out, in South-East Asia can be resolved only by applying these principles.

As regards the conflicts now in progress in South-East Asia, the World Peace Council notes that the expanding of the war in Viet Nam, embracing Laos and Cambodia, increases the danger of a new world war.

The World Peace Council calls for an immediate cease-fire in Viet Nam and demands that negotiations should begin there at the same time for a general settlement of the conflict, a settlement which would make compulsory the withdrawal of foreign troops.

All other possible conflicts and all the conflicts that have already broken out in Burma, the Philippines, Malaya, etc. must be resolved in accordance with the principles indicated above and by the same methods.

410/4/1

Sa file 424/3/4 facsimi.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CABLEGRAM.

RESTRICTED.

JG:MB

ACTION COPY

I. 20607

Dated: 6th December, 1951.
1330
Rec'd: 6th December, 1951.
2000

FROM:

Australian Legation,
BANGKOK.

138 RESTRICTED. IMMEDIATE.

Coup d'etat.

1. The King has still not given indication of his attitude though his approval of the composition of the new Cabinet and Assembly under the 1932 Constitution was sought on 2nd December. There have been unconfirmed reports of his refusal to approve. Meanwhile he has cancelled large reception scheduled for 8th December to which all members of the Government as well as the Diplomatic Corps had been invited.


2. Grateful for advice whether any action is being taken in Paris vis a vis the Thailand delegate to the General Assembly. Unconfirmed report here indicates possibility of this.

3. Please acknowledge this telegram and also my telegrams 130 to 135 inclusive.

A /Min. & Dept. E.A.
MIN. & DEPT. DEFENCE
P.M's

7th December, 1951.

401/1/4



401/1/4

THAILAND

Nov. 7, 1951

THAI PARTICIPATION IN KOREA MARKED

Bangkok, Thai Home Service, Nov. 6, 1951, 0030 GMT--B

(Address by Prime Minister Phibun Songgram, in his capacity as Minister of Defense, on the first anniversary of the Thai troops fighting in Korea)

(Summary with Quotations)

"Today, Nov 6, is the first anniversary of the Thai troops' joining the U.N. Armed Forces to fight in Korea. It is an important day, on which the Thai people and the soldiers of the Nation should recall the armed aggression in Korea which is now threatening all democratic countries, including Thailand.

"This dreadful danger has been resisted and coped with throughout, although it has not been completely eradicated. However, the armed aggression which was threatening has been curbed and reduced. This has brought about a direct effect on the Thai Nation, allowing it to maintain its perfect independence and sovereignty.

"It is therefore a great boon to the world that the United Nations has been founded. If there had been no United Nations, all the free democratic countries would undoubtedly have been in danger of such aggression."

When there was aggression in Korea, the U.N. appeal was unanimously supported by all the democratic nations. If this aggression had not been opposed, other aggressions would have been unavoidable. When all the free democratic peoples decided to oppose this aggression, it became clear that any other aggression in the world would be opposed. The results of the opposition to aggression by the free democratic countries have proved to be beyond expectation.

Therefore, today is of great importance and a matter of great pride to the Thai people and soldiers, for besides taking part in maintaining security among the world's democratic countries, Thai troops have helped oppose a danger which is threatening the peace and happiness of free democratic peoples throughout the world.

"I and all the Thai people hereby express highest appreciation and gratitude to all the Thai soldiers who have joined the U.N. Armed Forces to fight in Korea under the Thai National Flag and the U.N. flag.

"May the Lord Buddha and all the holy gods in the world protect all the soldiers who are fighting in Korea from all dangers."

Extract from
Summary of Items of General Interest
23.31/10/51.

The Ministry of Defense on 25th October issued a casualty list in respect of the Thai Expeditionary Force in Korea. Casualties comprise:-

Killed in action	24
Wounded in Action	87
Missing	1
Dead from Other Causes	12
Sick	180

Extract from
Summary of Items of General Interest
28.31/10/51

The Thai delegation to the UN General Assembly in Paris left Bangkok by air on 28th October. The delegation comprises:

Nai Varakarn Bancha (Minister of Foreign Affairs)
Nai Phairote Jaiyanam (Head of the Treaty and Protocol Divisions Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
Nai Thanadkit Korman (Head of the Economic Affairs Division and Actg. Head of the UN Division M.F.A.)
Nai Chaem Thipkomuk (Chief of Western Political Affairs Divisions Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
Nai Puen Chongprasert (Chief of Communications Section, UN Divisions, M.F.A.)
Nai Savet Komolbhut (Protocol Divisions M.F.A.)

4

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CABLEGRAM. I.18972.

PJK[redacted]

Dated: 5th November, 1951.
1310.

FROM:

Rec'd: 6th November, 1951.
0830.

Australian Embassy,
PARIS.

325. UNCLASSIFIED.

Your 256 UNESCO agreement so far ratified by Thailand and Yugoslavia only. 11 others have officially advised the Director General of intention to ratify.

E.A.
C.C.E.
P.M'S.

6th November, 1951.

401/1/4

DISTRI
SECRETARY
S. (U.N.)
S. (G.R.)
S. (Admin.)
R. (L. & T.)
U.N.
Pac. Aus.
S. &
Pac.
West
General
U.
Gen. & Pac.
Int.
Town
Trade

D.m.a.

NEW YORK. 29/7/51 - 7.15 p.m.

MORE THAI FORCES FOR KOREA. Thai reinforcements are en route to Korea to join the U.N. A contingent of Thai troops has left Bangkok to augment the Thai units already fighting under the U.N. command. The group, all volunteers, includes 850 soldiers and a small number of naval personnel.

U.N. Acts

401/1/4

DUPLICATE

CONFIDENTIAL

File No.100/5/1.

Memo. No. 315/51.

Australian Consulate-General,
Bangkok, Thailand.

24th July, 1951.

MEMORANDUM for:

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

I refer to your memorandum No. 110 of 6th July 1951 (file No.453/2/1/2) seeking elaboration of certain statements by Thai officials which purported to quote the views of the United States Government on conditions in Indochina and South East Asia generally.

2. The matter has recently been discussed with Mr. Hannah First Secretary (Political) at the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok.

3. Mr. Hannah was clearly anxious to minimise the significance of the statements of the Thai officials. He stated that the U.S. government had indicated to the Thai Government a considerable time ago (presumably in early January of this year) that conditions in Indochina were deteriorating. The situation had since improved in that country, however, and the Thai Government was aware of America's less pessimistic views in this connection. The U.S. Government is well known to have long held fears that the Chinese Communist Government might at any time choose to interfere substantially in the South East Asian area, whether through open aggression with "volunteer forces" or by a substantial increase in the supply of arms to and general logistic support for presently active rebel forces.

4. These fears had naturally been communicated to the Thai Government. The extent of these fears does furthermore normally fluctuate to some extent with current trends in the wider field of East West relations. However no special fears of increased Chinese Communist or other communist interference in this region have in recent months been communicated to the Thai Government.

5. Mr. Hannah explains the misleading statements of the Thai officials quoted in my Summary of 13th to 19th June as being issued solely for the purpose of covering up the real reason for the recent decision to limit the Thai contribution of troops to the Korean war from the earlier proposed figure of 4,000 to the present actual figure of 1,200 (approx.) The real reason, in Mr. Hannah's view, behind this decision was that the financial cost of maintaining a fighting unit in Korea is far higher than the Thai Government had originally anticipated and would, if the present force of some 1,200 men were increased, become a financial burden at home so prejudicial to the economy (and hence to the security) of Thailand as to more than offset the value of the increased contribution to U.N. fighting strength in Korea. The removal from Thailand of an additional first class fighting unit of some 3000 men might equally be less advantageous to the U.N. than prejudicial to Thai security.

...../6. It is the view

401/1/4

6. It is the view of the U.S. Government that Thailand's position in the United Nations is, by virtue of its unusual situation in a troubled and threatened region, unlike that of the majority of members of the United Nations. The U.S. therefore feels that Thailand's contribution of rice to the Korean people should be supplemented rather by only a token expeditionary force than by any more substantial unit. These views have been communicated frequently to the Thai Government and were undoubtedly taken fully into account when the decision to limit the T.E.F. in Korea was made.

7. Commenting on more recent reports that Thailand is prepared to double the size of its expeditionary force in Korea (see my Summary of Items 20th to 27th June) Hannah stated that the statement was in his opinion irresponsible or at least, made with an eye on press reports then current that truce talks might soon be called in Korea.

8. In the course of his remarks Hannah acknowledged that the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok is not at all closely acquainted with the present situation in Burma. It was evident from his discussion however that, in at least his own view, of all the countries in this region Burma presents at present perhaps the most insecure appearance. He postulated tentatively future Communist activity amongst the Shan and Kachin peoples with or without military or logistic support from China. I have at present no evidence which would either favour or contradict such a postulation but will, if opportunity offers, endeavour to obtain a picture of conditions in that area.

(Sgd.) A. H. Loomes

CONSUL-GENERAL.

453/1/1 (2)

NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF AUSTRALIA
A1838 A1838/2
3010/9/1 PART 1
446 1 364 4 7 2 (B1132373)
ITLJ: 2020/00228265
Search room PIN 222380
Indicators: 69
Date Printed: 22/6/2020
547783

OPEN WITH EXCEPTION
ACCESS
3. 11. 98
(CP 1968-1972)

CLOSED

File No. 3010/9/1.