1950

F

SOUTH-EAST ASIA DEPARTMENT

SIAM

F S 10381/8

FROM Mr. Willington
Bangkok

No. 510
Dated 26
Received in Registry— 28 July

Siamese assistance in Korea - record of conversation with Field Marshal Pibul on 26th July.

Refers to Bangkok tel 506 (FS 10381/7)

REFERENCES

MINUTES

This seems a probable explanation

ERD [illegible] 28/7
PUS(Offg) Sir W. Strang
UN(P&I) Mr Ross
Ambassador Dept.

Yes. The last sentence rather disposes of our dilemma as to what we should say to the Siamese if they approach us for a guarantee against Chinese attack.

Pilcher 28/7
D 29/7

(Print)

(How disposed of)
8/Major Willington.
N.I.2. WD
28 July

(Action completed) D 10/8

(Index) A-11-1 3/11/5

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FROM BANGKOK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Whittington
No. 510 D: 4.5 p.m. 26th July, 1950.
26th July, 1950. R: 5.48 p.m. 26th July, 1950.

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 510 of 26th July
Repeated for information to Singapore
and Saving to Rangoon
Saigon.

FS 1022/17
1-2

INDEXED
S 1038/1/18

My telegram No. 506: Korea.

Field Marshal Pibul told me in conversation this morning that although his Government realised that Siam was now in the front-line fighting against the Communists and that its military strength could well be preserved at home for the defence of the country, yet it was felt that the offer of 4,000 troops should be made in order to demonstrate the country's solidarity with the United Nations. His Excellency added "of course someone will have to provide these troops with arms".

2. I am sure and I understand my United States colleague agrees with me, that the Siamese offer has been made in the hopes of (a) obtaining arms more easily and (b) establishing better claim for receiving Anglo-American military assistance in the event of an attack on Siam by China. In regard to (b) Pibul pointed out to me that he proposed to hurry ahead with completion of the highway from the Malayan border to Bangkok because he regarded Singapore as "base" of resistance of Communists and that if the need arose, the Anglo-Siamese cooperation which already existed on the Siamese - Malay border in fighting the Communist banditry might perhaps be extended to fighting the common enemy oven on the borders of Kengtung ? He thought however that no Chinese Communist attack was contemplated on Siam or on Burma; Mao Tse Tung had, he believed, other and more pressing [gp omitted] in hand for the present.

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