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RG	ENTRY	BOX
84	Bangkok General Records 1956-1963	13

RG 84 Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State

Thailand

U.S. Consulate, Legation and Embassy, Bangkok

General Records, 1936-1942, 1945-1963

1959-1961: 312

to

1959-1961: 350

Box 116 [Old Box 13] Entry UD 3267

13

AIRGRAM

Foreign Service of the United States of America

OUTGOING

Amembassy PHNOM PENH

	ACT.	INF.
AMB		
POLIT	2	
PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES		
ACR.C		
FILES	6	
ACTION NOTE		

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Date Sent: March 18, 1961

28 MAR 1961

FROM: Amembassy PHNOM PENH

TO: Secretary of State

NO: G-195

Rptd info to: Amembassy SAIGON G-114, Amembassy BANGKOK G-113,

Amembassy MOSCOW G-10

Ref G-192 to Dept, G-112 to Saigon, G-11 to Bangkok, G-9 to Moscow.

Received E & C Sec

Date- 3 MAY 1961

PLW
PFD
SW
JVN
LTR
PMN
AN
JCD

Begin UNCLASSIFIED

AKP article March 15 lists following as included Soviet economic delegation currently in Phnom Penh:

Name	Position
Tarassov	Chief of delegation
Bosovski	Hydroelectric engineer
Vaschiline	Hydraulic engineer
Lytchkin	Leader, geological survey team
Prof. Predtetchensky	Professor of civil engineering, advanced education specialist
Nacumov	School architect

Article comments that above list supplemented by specialists in hydraulics, electricity, planning and geology. Also states group will study possibilities of hydroelectric projects, perform geological survey, and collect basic data for project entailing Soviet construction Phnom Penh of technological institute. (End UNCLASSIFIED)

Begin OFFICIAL USE ONLY

COMMENT: Tarassov arrived Phnom Penh February 25. On February 28, Vaschiline, Bosovski, seven other Soviet engineers, three interpreters arrived. Duration of talks not yet known.

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3/16/61

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Phnom Penh G-195

320 Pol Rel - Cambodia/USSR

3-18-2

AIRGRAM

OUTGOING

Foreign Service of the United States of America

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PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

14 MAR 1961

Date Sent: March 10, 1961

FROM: Amembassy PHNOM PENH

TO: Secretary of State

DNB IGP JR WWH JSR
CFE RGB JEM PFB

NO: G-192

RPTD INFO: Amembassy SAIGON G-112 BANGKOK G-111 NEW DELHI G-13 (for ECAFE)

MOSCOW G-9

Following is translation of article appearing AKP March 7, 1961 (unnecessary words omitted):

BEGIN UNCLASSIFIED

"On March 4, in conference room of Ministry Public Works and Industry, meeting took place between Cambodian, Soviet technicians (in mining, hydroelectricity). Meeting under chairmanship Tum Kim Heng, Under-Secretary of State for Industry. Soviet technicians led by Mr. TARASSOV. During meeting, lasting about an hour, working schedule for each speciality was decided."

END UNCLASSIFIED

COMMENT (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Announcement first information Embassy has received on Soviet technicians, whose arrival without the fanfare accorded recently departed Czech delegation. Technicians presumably will negotiate arrangements for mineral survey specializing in petroleum resources and for preliminary survey proposed hydroelectric dam at Kamchay.

Possible that subject of Sambaur will be raised during talks. Exact number of Soviet technicians or duration of talks not yet known. Embassy will submit further information as it develops.

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Received E & C Section
Date 31 MAR 1961
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PHNOM G-111

220 Cambodia/USSR

3-10-61

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the United States of America

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Control: 639

Recd: March 26, 1959 11:13 A.M.

JCG DNB FNR MAR 26 1959
JIG IR MT

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Authority NND 9488.32

ACTION

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INFO

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ACTION
FILE
DATE Mar 26 59
INITIALS DNB

FROM: PHNOM PENH

NO. 419, 25th

ROUTINE:

SENT DEPT 1261 RPTD INFO SAIGON 566 BANGKOK 419 CINCPAC

POLAD 212 LONDON 21 PARIS 39 MOSCOW UNN

RKG COMMUNIQUE PUBLISHED AKP MAR 25 MAKES PUBLIC "ESSENTIAL PORTION" TEXT SOVIET MESSAGE TO RKG. SUMMARY FOLLOWS:

Soviet Govt pronounced itself and pronounces itself always against foreign interference internal affairs other states. Soviet Govt believes it necessary clauses Geneva accords supporting national independence Cambodia and its non-participation any military groupings be respected.

Soviets follow Cambodian Eevents attentively. Soviet people who overcame great difficulties in fight for independence their country feel deepest sympathy valiant fight people and Govt liberty-loving Cambodia against menances of imperialist powers who attack sovereignty, territorial integrity Cambodia creating delicate (strained) situation Indochina.

Birth independent Cambodia was one important victory national liberation movement in Asia...application Geneva accords by Cambodia and decisions of Bandung Conference as well as its intervention in favor peaceful solution difficult international questions, for ending production and tests nuclear arms, and number other serious international problems raises role Cambodia as State loving peace.

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FORM FS-501
2-21-58

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320 Cambodia-US SR

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the United States of America

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Control:

Recd:

PAGE TWO

The independent foreign policy followed by RKG has found understanding and widespread support. "This policy exerts influence upon countries of SEAsia which for one reason or another have been dragged into military blocs and whose foreign policy is not free".

It is for these reasons that certain powers bend all their efforts to change the present orientation of Cambodia's foreign policy. For this purpose they use such means as antigovernemental subversive activities, plots, political, economic, and military pressure.

It is with understanding and deep sympathy that Soviet Govt and people welcome will of RKG and people defend independence and sovereignty their state and are sure Cambodian people are not alone in their courageous fight.

With unalterable freindship twoard Cambodia, Sovt Govt is convinced people and RKG with support of other peace loving countries will overcome temporary difficulties created by foreign forces and their agents inside country and achieve new success in consolidation political and economic independence their State.

Text by pouch.

KELLOGG

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Foreign Service of the United States of America

INCOMING

Phnom Penh 97 - Confidential - US

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UNCLASSIFIED
Classification

Control: 200

Rcvd: SEPT 8, 1960 1:00 P M

- 8 SEP 1960

ACTION

DATE 15 Sept 60
INITIALS BMB

JCG DNB LGP JR JBR
ELM JTK RGB JEM

ACTION
POL 2
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FILE
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FROM: PHNOM PENH

NO: 97 SEPTEMBER 7

ROUTINE

SENT DEPT 286 RPTD INFO BANGKOK 97 SAIGON 111 VTIANE 44 CINCPAC POLAD 90

DEPARTMENT POUCH: LONDON, PARIS

SEMI-OFFICIAL WEEKLY NEAK CHIET NIYUM (NCN) SEPTEMBER 4 CARRIED (1) ENGLISH AND CAMBODIAN TEXTS OF PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO SIHANOUK AND RUSSIAN AND CAMBODIAN TEXTS KHRUSHCHEV'S MESSAGE TO PRINCE ON OCCASION SOVIET HOSPITAL INAUGURATION, FACING EACH OTHER ON DOUBLE PAGE, NO COMMENT; (2) EDITORIAL DEALING WITH CAMBODIAN DEMOCRACY (REPORTING BY AIRGRAM); AND (3) SECOND UNSIGNED REPORT ON LAOS FROM "SPECIAL ENVOY" KNOWN TO BE MICHAEL FIELD (EMBTEL 236). NO SIHANOUK MESSAGE TO PEOPLE THIS ISSUE.

not rec'd

REPORT ON LAOS CALLED KONG LE "MILITARY COMMANDER LOVED BY HIS MEN", SAID NOT POSSIBLE DOUBT "PURITY" OF HIS AMBITION. QUOTED KONG AS SAYING "I ACCEPT THE INCLUSION OF GENERAL PHOUMI AND M. INPHENG IN THE CABINET. BUT IS IS ONLY BECAUSE PRINCE SOUVANNA PROMISED ME THAT THE GENERAL HAD CHANGED HIS MIND AND WAS IN PERFECT AGREEMENT WITH THE INSTALLATION OF A POLICY OF NEUTRALITY". BELIEVED THAT WHILE KONG'S STATEMENT MIGHT SEEM NAIVE, HE WOULD BE SURPRISED IF POLITICIANS SUCCEEDED IN DUPING KONG WHO REAL AUTHORITY IN VIENTIANE.

CALLED PHOUMI "FIGURE ABOUT WHOM COMMENTATORS OF RIGHT AND LEFT HAVE SPREAD INFORMATION GENERALLY FALSE." STATED HE "MORE THAI THAN LAOS," A YOUNGER EDITION OF MARSHAL SARIT. SAID DESPITE EXAGGERATED ACCUSATIONS OF HANOI AND PEIPING RADIOS, PHOUMI NOT EXACTLY LACKEY OF AMERICNAS. ADDED HE HAD "ALL THE CHARACTERISTICS OF A BUSINESSMAN DISGUISED AS A STATESMAN", BUT LESS ABLE DISSIMULATE THESE THAN OTHER "EMBEZZLERS" OF FORMER GOVERNMENT. ALLEGED THAT "SYMPATHETIC QUINIM PHOLSENA, APOSTLE OF A SOMEWHAT LEFTIST NEUTRALITY", HAD STATED PHOUMI HAD "SWEATED" WHEN HE HEARD KONG DEMANDED HIS WITHDRAWAL FROM NEW GOVERNMENT. ASKED IF GENERAL WHO TOOK THIS INSULT FROM SUBORDINATE WAS A "STRONG MAN?" CONCLUDED LAST HAD NOT BEEN HEARD RE PHOUMI AS GOVERNMENT MEMBER,

9-7-60

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Control: 200

Recd:

PARENTHETICALLY ALLEGING SOUVANNA HAD STATED PHOUMI'S INCLUSION " A SACRIFICE WE MUST MAKE TO REESTABLISH PEACE".

GAVE SHORT DESCRIPTION OF SOUVANNA PHOUMA AS ONE TO WHOM PRESENT PEACE IN LAOS DUE, "A RESPECTED FIGURE, APOSTLE OF LAO NEUTRALITY AND WHO (THANKS TO THE CONFIDENCE ACCORDED HIM BY CAPTAIN KONG LE) IS UNCONTESTED MASTER" OF LAO POLITICAL SITUATION. RECALLED MEETING SOUVANNA IN SAIGON 1956 WHO SPOKE OF MAKING LAOS "SWITZERLAND OF SOUTHEAST ASIA", ADDED THIS A SAD MEMORY TODAY CONSIDERING RECENT EVENTS AND DEFEAT OF SOUVANNA "BEFORE HYSTERICS OF CDNI". LATTER AFTER APRIL 1960 "RIGGED ELECTIONS" HAD BECOME PARTY OF DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL PROGRESS"(SIX)" HEADED BY PHOUMI. ALSO RECALLED OVEREXCITEMENT OF FOREIGN EMBASSIES VIENTIANE DURING PHENOMEMON OF "SPONTANEOUS" (NCN QUOTATION MARKS) ANTI-COMMUNIST MOVEMENT (CDNI) CFN 1956 1960
WHICH WELL KNOWN RECEIVING FINANCIAL SUPPORT ALTHOUGH THIS "ALWAYS DENIED BY A CERTAIN NUMBER OF FOREIGNERS."

SAID FOR SOUVANNA "WHOSE NEUTRALITY TIMOROUS (IF ONE COMPARES IT WITH KHMER NEUTRALITY)" LAST TWO YEARS BITTER SINCE HIS "MODEST IDEALS" DECRIED BY THOSE WHO CONSIDERED "ONE CANNOT REASON WITH THE COMMUNISTS" AS IF WISH TO BE NEUTRAL REVEALED "MENTALWEAKNESS". OPINED ONLY SOLUTION FOR LAOS, "ONLY HOPE TO SEE REALIZED THIS DREAM OF ALL ASIAN COUNTRIES WHICH IS NEUTRALITY", WAS ESTABLISHMENT OF SOUVANNA'S COMPROMISE GOVERNEMNT. ADDED ALTHOUGH LAOS HAD NO GREAT LEADER SUCH AS SIHANOUK, ELEMENTS OF "HEALTHY EVOLUTION" NOW VISIBLE. SAID SOUVANNA MUST LEAD GOVERNMENT IN INTEREST OF PEOPLE, CONCLUDED THAT COMPARED TO THAT TASK PROBLEM OF PATHET LAO "WHICH IS THE FRUIT OF FOREIGN INTERFERENCE FROM THE TWO BLOC" (NCN'S ITALICS) A SECONDARY QUESTION.

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FORM FS-501
2-21-56

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UNCLASSIFIED
Classification

Charge: Embassy

Control: 209

Date: Oct. 13, 1961

ACTION: Secstate WASHINGTON 552

INFO : Amconsul GENEVA 74

Amembassy LONDON 65

Amembassy PARIS 61

Amembassy PHNOM PENH 57

Amembassy SAIGON 120

Amembassy VIENTIANE 143

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GENEVA FOR FECON

Thai and English-language papers report following remarks by Primin Sarit yesterday on Laos situation.

Selection Souvanna as Primin Laos was danger signal, indicating possible victory for Communists. Thai must be pessimistic about situation in Laos. RLG approval of Souvanna was surprising. Even if British, French and US persuaded Vientiane to accept Souvanna, his nomination need not have been made if Laotians had firmly refused. Phoumi had little political experience and was afraid of becoming Premier but would have no fear in such matters if he had more experience.

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-2-

Control: 209

Date:

Primin did not believe Laos situation would become normal since Souvanna backed by Souphanouvong who in turn supported by Commie China. So how could there be true neutrality, he asked. Commies wanted Laos not because of its natural resources but because of its strategic location as possible base for expansion into neighboring countries. Possibility of such expansion was currently of great concern to US. There would be no change in RTG policy for moment but RTG would wait until formation new govt. If RTG perceived it was heading toward Communism, RTG could not cooperate with it.

YOUNG

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Authority NND 949832

POL:PAxelrod:mah:ls
October 13, 1961

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American Embassy,
Bangkok, Thailand.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Thai-Language Expert Attached to Soviet Embassy in Bangkok; Soviet Embassy Attentions to Thai Diplomat Formerly Stationed in the USSR.

PARTICIPANTS: Yong Polabun, International Organizations Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Laurence G. Pickering, Second Secretary of Embassy

DATE: January 24, 1961

COPIES TO: Amb
DCM
SA
Dept - FE:SEA, EUR:EE

Yong Polabun, who recently was transferred from the post of Chief of the Central Division to that of Chief of the International Conferences Division (International Organizations Department) of the Foreign Ministry, at one time served nearly six years in the Thai Embassy in Moscow (roughly 1947-1952). At lunch with him today the conversation came around to the interview between Prime Minister Sarit and the Soviet Ambassador of last October (Embtel 789), which interview was followed by the most glowing reports about the ability of the interpreter (a Russian lady) who accompanied the Soviet Ambassador. Yong volunteered the information that he had met the interpreter twice (once at the Soviet Commercial Counselor's house, where he was attending a film showing on the Russian ballet, and once at a reception given by the First Secretary of the Indian Embassy). He said that she could speak Thai, and knew a lot about Thailand, but that she spoke with a very pronounced accent. Yong said that she had studied the language (in Moscow) with a Russian professor, not with a native Thai-speaking teacher. Yong guessed that the fact that she was a very lively and attractive personality may have done more to inspire the admiration of the Prime Minister and of Luang Wichit than her ability to speak Thai well.

It is interesting to note that the Soviets are apparently keeping in touch with this man who was once stationed in Moscow. Yong commented on the friendly attitude being shown by the Soviet diplomats here. I noted the contrast between this activity and their propaganda output concerning the Thai role in the Lao situation. He had believed that this line was emanating only from Hanoi and Peiping and seemed slightly surprised to learn that the Soviets had also originated such material.

POL:LGPickering:la

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320 Pol 27 Thailand/USSR
1350 Memo of Conv.

1-24-61

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the United States of America

OUTGOING AmEmbassy, Bangkok

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Mr. Batson
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SA
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Files

Charge: Embassy

Control: 177

Date: Dec. 14, 1960

SENT TO: SecState WASHINGTON UNCLAS 999

RPTD INFO: VIENTIANE 534, PHNOM PENH 229, SAIGON 304,
CINCPAC/POLAD 332

BANGKOK WORLD Dec 14 reported fol comments by Col. Luang Wichit Wathakarn, Secy Gen Primin's Office:

Thailand will not ask Soviet Union for aid but will consider it only if Russia makes offer. No plans made for third visit by Russian Amb to Primin Sarit. Formation Boon Oum Gvt in Laos good event for Thailand because would decrease Commie influence in Laos. Primin Sarit completely recovered from influenza but at request senior Gvt officials and doctors has decided take two-week rest at Bangsaen. Cabinet mtgs will not be held at Bangsaen.

JOHNSON

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POL:JSRoy:la
Dec. 14, 1960

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320 Govt - Thailand/USSR

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 9488.32

Secstate 528

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the United States of America

OUTGOING Amembassy BANGKOK

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UNCLASSIFIED
Classification

Charge: Embassy

Control: 146

Date: October 11, 1961

ACTION: Secstate WASHINGTON PRIORITY 528

INFO : CINCPAC FOR POLAD 108

Amembassy MOSCOW UNN (by pouch)

320 Pol Rel - Thailand/U.S.S.R.

Soviet Amb Nikolayev returned Bangkok and called on Primin Sarit Oct 9. No official announcement but press quoted statements by Nikolayev and Asst to Primin Luang Wichit who present at mtg. Nikolayev reportedly assured Sarit Lao govt with Souvanna as primin would be truly and genuinely neutral. (One paper quoted Luang Wichit statement that Soviet Amb had in no way guaranteed Lao regime under Souvanna would be neutral but Soviet govt desired such neutrality.) Nikolayev said at present no opportunity increase Thai-Soviet trade because local merchants feared govt action, asked Primin for trade agreement. Sarit reportedly said this unnecessary, exchange of notes would be sufficient. Nikolayev also reportedly requested permission show Titov orbit film, stage performances by two groups three and twenty Soviet artists performing. Approved by Sarit on condition invitation lists and announcements

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Foreign Service of the United States of America

OUTGOING

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Classification

Charge: Control: 146

-2- Date:

about or during show had prior RTG approval. Troupes will arrive next month, Nikolayev said. Soviet Emb also requested and received permission (previously denied) print and disseminate locally news and info about Soviet Union so long as all such material received prior RTG approval.

Mtg also attended by Acting Fonmin Boon and Soviet interpreter.

DRB
YOUNG

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EOL:JReed:ls
October 11, 1961

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TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the United States of America

OUTGOING

Secstate 63

Charge: UNCLASSIFIED (Classification)

Control: 230

Date: July 14, 1961

DIST

AMB
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FILES

ACTION: Secstate WASHINGTON UNCLAS 63

INFO: MOSCOW UNN (POUCH) LONDON XXX7 PARIS SIX SAIGON XXX14
PHNOM PENH UNN (pouch) VIENTIANE 24 GENEVA 14
RANGOON (pouch) UNN Kuala Lumpur UNN (pouch)

GENEVA FOR FECON

Dept pouch MOSCOW.

1. PriMin Sarit told press July 13 of farewell call Soviet Amb Anatoly Nikolayev paid on him previous day inasmuch SovAmb returning USSR for leave.

2. Sarit said he made following points to SovAmb:

a. SovAmb improved USSR relations with Thailand through his friendship and contacts with Thai Govt.

b. (Agreeing with SovAmb) Better relations and understandings, even trade relations, could obtain. Thailand had previously indicated it willing promote trade with USSR.

c. Thai do not hate USSR but dislike Commie ideology. Ideology therefore should not enter Thai-Soviet relations (SovAmb agreed).

d. (When SovAmb said that USSR willing consider a Thai request for aid) If USSR sincere, then, as big country, USSR should make aid proposals and not await Thai request.

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320 Rel Thailand/USSR
7-14-61

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TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the United States of America

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Classification

Control:

Date:

3. Sarit made following comments to press:

a. Now that USSR has asked Thailand to make request for aid, Thai Govt will take under consideration. Thailand must be circumspect however for Soviet aid has both advantages and disadvantages.

b. Thailand will accept no aid with strings attached, and will accept no gifts from USSR. Aid from USSR should be like USSR-built roads in Burma, that is, investments and loans, which Thailand repays. Then Thailand would owe USSR nothing, not even gratitude.

c. In addition, Thailand must consider how acceptance of Soviet aid would affect attitudes of old friends.

d. (Answering question) Govt has no particular project in mind to ask USSR to finance.

e. Re trade, Thailand willing sell rice tin rubber and jute to all countries including USSR. Other countries have much closer relations with USSR. England for example has considerable trade with USSR.

f. Although Amb Nikolayev and PriMin had no common language, Amb always brought interpreter who spoke Thai fluently.

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AIRGRAM

Foreign Service of the United States of America

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G-409

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Date Sent: June 20, 1961

FROM: Amembassy BANGKOK

TO: Secstate WASHINGTON

NO: G-409

RPT INFO: CINCPAC FOR POLAD G-120, MOSCOW G-06, GENEVA FOR FECON G-06
VIENTIANE G-85

320 For Rel - Thailand/U.S.S.R.

Certain Emboffs received invitations from Soviet Amb for special showing documentary film "The Man Returned from Space" concerning Juri Gagarin, world's first space pilot, and including feature film "Ballad of a Soldier" which won prize at Cannes Intl film festival. Showing scheduled for June 29 at RTG Cultural Auditorium.

Comment: Emb understands Soviet Amb has been trying for some time get permission show Gagarin film at Cultural Auditorium. This first local showing Soviet feature film in many years. Fact that Thai have now agreed significant in that such concession, inconceivable only short year ago, reveals degree to which Thai have relaxed their treatment Soviet Emb. This latest example trend which began with permission TASS reestablish operations in Thailand and continued with optimistic exchanges between Soviet Amb and Primin Sarit referring possibility improved relations. Emb assumes similar invitations being sent RTG officials and others, although have seen no notice of showing for general public.

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POL:JSRoy:ls
June 20, 1961

6-20-61

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT : Indonesian Second Secretary on Thai/Russian Economic Relations

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Freddy Frits Pesik, Second Secretary (Economic), Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia
Mr. Floyd L. Whittington, Counselor of Embassy for Economic Affairs

DATE : November 7, 1960

PLACE : U.S.S.R. National Day Reception

Mr. Pesik sought me out at this reception and asked me to talk with him in private. Mr. Pesik said he was greatly disturbed over the reports that Thailand might accommodate itself to the receipt of economic assistance from Russia. He asked what I thought was the basis for such an announcement. I said I had searched but had not found a satisfactory answer at that point. I asked Mr. Pesik what he and his colleagues thought this announcement was designed to accomplish. Mr. Pesik replied that he personally believed it was an effort on the part of Sarit to get more economic assistance from the United States. I asked if this view was shared by his colleagues. He replied that he felt this was plain to all.

DIST

AMB, Batson, POL, SA
FE/SEA - Messrs. Cleveland and Swezey

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9/700.

ECON:FLWhittington:mvl

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1350 Memo of Conv

11-7-60

52

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the United States of America

OUTGOING AmEmbassy, Bangkok

UNCLASSIFIED
Classification

Charge: Embassy

Control: 52

Date: November 4, 1960

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SENT TO: SecState WASHINGTON ~~/197~~ 797

RPTD INFO: VIENTIANE 438, SAIGON 260, PHNOM PENH 197,
CINCPAC/POLAD 267

Sarit statements on report Thailand and USSR would seek closer relations (Embtel 789) carried by evening POST Nov 3 under banner headline "Sarit: Aid Acceptable from Anyone." Similar story frontpaged by WORLD following morning and by three Thai-language papers.

Primin quoted by POST as telling newsmen before yesterday's Constituent Assembly meeting "Soviet Amb came to talk about promoting friendly ties with Thailand. We glad promote friendship because both our countries already have treaty friendship.

"He said Russia willing cooperate with us in economic development Thailand. We happy to hear of this.

"We spoke frankly to him that we ready receive assistance from anybody but do not like Communist ideology. We apologized to him for this dislike.

"Soviet Amb said we spoke truly, commenting political ideology does not have much meaning, it being suitable for one country but inappropriate for another. Even countries with kings like Thailand have good relations with Russia citing Norway Sweden and Nepal.

"If Russia understands us, it is good.

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Authority NND 949832

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Declassified 797
320 Bur Rel - Thai/USSR
11-4-60

TELEGRAM

Foreign Service of the United States of America

OUTGOING

Charge: UNCLASSIFIED *Classification* Control:

Date:

"We told him at first stage we should cooperate in trade. He told us at present Soviet Russia buying only small amounts rubber and tin from Thailand. He said Russia should buy much more than these amounts.

"We must change our policy. About trade, we should accept. About other things, we do not want.

"There will be no real change in policy, but we have to find ways increasing monetary income. We need a considerable amount of money to give happiness to the people."

Asked if there will be detailed discussions with Soviet Amb later, Primin said "Not yet. It was a courtesy call. He spoke in goodwill. We replied in goodwill."

WORLD version generally accorded with above, with three exceptions. 1) On trade policy point, WORLD quoted Primin as follows: "We may need change in trade policy in future so that we can do everything that will best benefit the country." 2) On question following up these talks, WORLD quoted Primin saying "next step is for Gvt to consider what type of aid to be requested from Russia." 3) Para quoted above beginning "There will be no change in policy" omitted.

JOHNSON

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Authority NND 948832

POL:LGRickering:la
Nov. 4, 1960

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AIRGRAM

Foreign Service of the United States of America

OUTGOING

1. FILES
2. CHRON
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4. RF

UNCLASSIFIED
Classification

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

Date Sent: November 10, 1960

21 NOV 1960

FROM: American Embassy, Phnom Penh

TO: Secretary of State

NEA G-99

RPTD INFO: Amembassy Bangkok G-62
Amembassy Canberra G-2
Amembassy London G-24
Amembassy Moscow G-5
Amembassy New Delhi G-5
Amembassy Paris G-29
Amembassy Saigon G-63
Amembassy Vientiane G-58
CINCPAC/POLAD G-53

320 RU KET - THAI/USSR

Following is summary of editorial comment re Thai acceptance Soviet technical assistance which appeared front page leftist daily Dépêche (edited by Information Minister Chau Seng) November 7.

Noting Thailand had just accepted offer of Soviet technical and economic aid and that "commercial exchanges" also under study, stated this shift worthy of being brought to everyone's attention. Recalled that Cambodia object of "worst calumnies" when it accepted aid from all countries including "Socialist" although such aid accepted only if without political strings. Stated Cambodia's action had caused it be called Communist plaything and accused of following pro-Eastern neutrality, and had made Sihanouk object of base injuries not only at hands of press but from "responsible politicians". Remarked that "in brief" accepting aid from Eastern bloc had been equivalent of accepting contamination of Communist virus while admission refused by these critics that conditions attached to "important" (Dépêche's underline) Free World aid, "(joining a military pact, for example.)"

Stated Thais' acceptance Soviet aid thus an important event for Cambodians since it sanctioned their "wise and just" policy which had been tirelessly and courageously defended by Sihanouk. Concluded Thai action proved Cambodia's path under Prince's guidance "the wisest, the most just and the most viable for all the weak and under-developed nations."

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ADVISE NOTE		

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Authority NND 94488.32

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11-10-60

AIRGRAM

Foreign Service of the United States of America

OUTGOING

G-304

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ACOM
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SA

UNCLASSIFIED
Classification

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

Date Sent: May 26, 1960

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 9488.32

FROM: AmEmbassy BANGKOK

TO: SECSTATE

NO: G-304

RPTD INFO: AmEmbassy PHNOM PENH G-51

320 Pol 27 - S. Vietnam/Thailand

Fol editorial appeared vernacular KIATTISAK May 17:

"SIHANOUK's Editorial

Chart Niyon (Nationalist) newspaper in Phnom Penh on May 2, published editorial by Sihanouk in which he again attacked Thailand and South Vietnam. Editorial, which shows stupidity of writer, concludes Thailand and South Vietnam have conspired to put pressure on Cambodia until Cambodia has been forced cooperate with Communists and that Thai and Vietnamese plan is to ask for American aid which to be used in making war on Cambodia from both sides. This strategy, Sihanouk predicted, will be fruitless because Communists will be able supply weapons to Cambodia even though Laos is in way and American fleet on guard. In addition, if Cambodia were to be defeated in two or three days Cambodian army and people would join force and try to liberate country by means of guerilla warfare in same manner as Spanish defeated Napoleon. When war had reached that stage several thousand Cambodian nationals in Thailand and South Vietnam coupled with several million Thais who have been waiting for opportunity to overthrow their government for long time will rise up and revolt in collaboration with Cambodia. Thailand and Vietnam would then get themselves into trouble.

This editorial of Sihanouk shows once more his abnormality, but it sufficient for us to figure out why Sihanouk had written it attacking Thailand and South Vietnam. Every reader already aware that two or three days ago Sihanouk invited Red Chinese Premier Chou En Lai to visit Phnom Penh as its guest. Sihanouk's leaning toward Communism more and more evident while Cambodian politicians in no small number displeased with action of Sihanouk in leading Cambodia by nose in such way that will eventually turn Cambodia into satellite of Red China. Consequently, Sihanouk wrote editorial in attempt to cover up his action and to show it necessary that Cambodia have strong ties with Red China for self-defense.

5-27-60

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It is, however, generally-known fact that his advocacy of Communism and his willingness regard Chou En Lai as elder brother have long been characteristic of Sihanouk and for that reason he has several times attempted lead Cambodia to Red Chinese embrace. Time will tell whether Sihanouk is right or wrong in his action. We have no desire meddle in Cambodia's affairs but we would also like to observe that Sihanouk will soon make Cambodia slave of Red China. Cambodia will realize that it is considerably more bitter to be slave of Red China than to be slave of France. What has puzzled us is why Sihanouk, who was just freed few years ago, has struggled hard to return to slavery. To this question we would like to answer, as far as our intelligence allows, that it because Sihanouk was accustomed to being under domination of others and that he probably felt proud to have master or elder brother to support him because that support would enable him to threaten his neighbors as he pleases. Editorial written by Sihanouk is, it is understood, tantamount to exploiting influence of Red China in threatening Thailand and South Vietnam. According to history, Thai were on several occasions engaged in fighting against Chinese but nonetheless, Thai always capable of preserving independence. On account of that, Thai not afraid of Chinese to any extent. What we feel concerned about is that Cambodia might become slave of Red China just because of basic state policy of Sihanouk.

Sihanouk's hope that in case of outbreak of war Cambodia will likely receive weapons from Red China, that Cambodia people will resort to guerilla warfare in fighting with Thai and that Thais as well as Cambodians in Thailand and South Vietnam will rise up, is quite extraordinary. Sihanouk has right to hope and dream the way person who lacks intelligence would, but it evident from history that Cambodian administrators were not warriors and they were defeated every time war broke out. War is business of warriors only and since Cambodia's history replete with slavery, its painting of paper tiger does not frighten Thailand in any way. To expect Thais to rebel against their own country and turn to collaborate with Cambodia is viewpoint similar to that of Phaya Lawaek (Cambodian King beheaded by a Thai King for "treason"). Sihanouk must bear in mind that Thai have no Phaya Lawaek blood in them.

Cambodian nationals who reside in Thailand and South Vietnam are living happily and Thai and Vietnamese Gvts have not used stupidity and madness of Sihanouk as excuse to oppress Cambodians. Sihanouk's statement that Cambodians here would rise up is probably [redacted] attempt to cause Thai to distrust Cambodians in Thailand. His attempt this respect will fail because although Cambodians are not Thais they are still fellow human beings, and Thailand will not be so unkind to them as to expel them to Cambodia where they would face starvation.

Editorial written by Sihanouk is regrettable matter for in it Sihanouk has made it clear that making friends with Red China must be done by means of making as much trouble as he can with neighboring nations."

UNGER

POL:JIGetz/sra - 5/25/60.

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PRIORITY

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D-14

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : American Embassy BANGKOK

14
DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

July 12, 1960
DATE

13 JUL 1960

REF :

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	REC'D	INFO OTHER

SUBJECT: Discussions with Members of Soviet Embassy

320 Int'l Rel - US/USSR

There are attached two Memoranda for the Files written by U. S. Liaison Officer to ECAFE concerning recent social contacts which he has had with several members of the Soviet Embassy at Bangkok. These discussions were principally with Semyen Dyukarev and of a rather general nature. One of the conversations took place at a reception given by Dyukarev for a departing Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy. The second occurred at the American Fourth of July party.

Recently the Embassy has been making an effort to give to the Department a synthesis of contact with Soviets. However, the Embassy is not in the best position to determine whether these reports have been useful and, if so, what aspects of them are of particular interest. Guidance from the Department to the Embassy in respect of this would be appreciated.

For the Charge d'Affaires ad interim:

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 944832

Floyd L. Whittington
Counselor of Embassy
for Economic Affairs

Enclosures:
1. Memorandum for Files, July 1, 1960
2. Memorandum for Files, July 6, 1960

ECON:WFDeming:jbc
REPORTER

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7-15-60

FORM DS-1025
5-15-58

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOREIGN SERVICE POLITICAL REPORTING APPRAISAL

Security Classification of Appraisal
OFFICIAL USE ONLY

D-666

TO *(Post)*
American Embassy, Bangkok

DATE OF APPRAISAL
June 13, 1960.

DESPATCH NUMBER 666

DATED May 24, 1960.

SUBJECT
Contacts with Soviet Diplomats

1. A/DCM
2. Pol
3. Admin
4. Files

AUTHOR
J. Stapleton Roy

CONTRIBUTORS
- - - - - - -

These comments do not necessarily represent the views of all agencies concerned. Nothing in this document should be construed as instructional material or as altering outstanding instructions:

REPORT WOULD HAVE BEEN OF GREATER VALUE TO US IF IT HAD:

- ☐ Drawn conclusions and made recommendations
- ☐ Adequately presented conflicting viewpoints
- ☐ Indicated and evaluated sources of information
- ☐ Been received earlier
- ☐ Been more thorough
- ☐ Been more concise and better organized

REPORT IS COMMENDABLE FOR ITS:

- ☒ Timeliness
- ☐ Display of alertness and initiative
- ☐ Display of resourcefulness
- ☐ Thoroughness
- ☐ Comprehensiveness
- ☒ Clarity
- ☐ Good organization
- ☐ Interpretation and Analysis
- ☐ Objectivity
- ☐ Conclusions or recommendations
- ☒ Contributions to basic or current intelligence needs
- ☐ Use of other United States field sources of information

COMMENT:

The subject report is of considerable interest, both from the point of view of the light it throws on the attitude and background of the Soviet diplomat concerned and the description of the junior diplomatic dinners held in Bangkok and their attendance. The Department is, of course, aware that local conditions differ in various world capitals and determine to a great extent the degree and type of contacts that can be made with Soviet bloc officials. It is of interest to note that the Soviet Embassy in Bangkok appears to be following the current world wide trend of closer and more cordial relationships with American diplomats. Further reports of this nature will be appreciated whenever the occasion warrants.

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Authority NND 949832

Security Classification of Appraisal	APPRAISING AGENCY, BUREAU, OR OFFICE	APPRAISING OFFICER
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FOR TRANSMITTAL TO POST

320 Bangkok-USSR
123 Roy, S.
5-24-60

Air Pouch
PRIORITY

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(Security Classification)

26 MAY 1960
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D-666

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : Embassy, BANGKOK

666
DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

May 24, 1960
DATE

REF :

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	REC'D	INFO OTHER

SUBJECT: Contacts with Soviet Diplomats

Enclosed is a Memorandum of Conversation which took place between a Soviet diplomat and an Embassy officer at a junior diplomatic dinner on May 19, 1960. These dinners or luncheon have been held sporadically for about two years, and were originally organized to provide an opportunity for junior officers in the various Embassies in Bangkok to become better acquainted in a relaxed and friendly atmosphere.

As the Department is aware, contacts by official Americans with members of the Soviet Embassy in Bangkok have been kept to a minimum as a matter of Embassy policy. Embassy officers involved in these junior diplomatic gatherings have quietly sought to discourage the inclusion of Soviet Embassy personnel, but invitations have occasionally been issued due to the informal nature of the group. In recent months the Soviets have, in a rather heavy-handed fashion, attempted to increase their circulation in the local diplomatic colony. This was demonstrated by the heavy Soviet attendance at the Laos National Day reception on May 11 and by this most recent junior diplomatic dinner, which was attended by six members of the Soviet Embassy although only one was invited. In addition to a good American, British and Russian turn out, the 35-40 guests included members of the Malayan, Burmese, Japanese, Indian, Swedish, Norwegian, Turkish and Israeli Embassies, plus several Thai government officials.

The atmosphere of the dinner was exceptionally cordial although, with the exception of the enclosed conversation, only innocuous subjects were discussed. This may have been due in part to the efforts of the British hosts, one of whom, when introducing an Embassy officer to a Soviet diplomat, pointedly suggested that since the evening was meant to be a friendly social occasion, it would be well to avoid discussion of summit conferences, U-2s and similar topics, a suggestion he may well have made to others present.

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FOIeJMcCoy/srn
REPORTER

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330 SMI/RR Rel- US/USSR

5-24-60

The Embassy believes that the friendly attitude adopted by the Russians at this dinner was motivated largely by the Soviet Embassy's desire to end its virtual isolation in the Bangkok diplomatic community, and does not have any wider implications.

For the Chargé d'Affaires a.i.:

Douglas H. Eatson
First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosure:

Memorandum of Conversation.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 949832

(Classification)

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT : Conversation with Soviet Diplomat

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Yuri K. Totrov - Soviet Embassy Attache
J. Stapleton Roy - Embassy officer

DATE : May 19, 1960

At a dinner gathering of the Bangkok junior diplomatic group on May 19, I was seated next to Mr. Totrov of the Soviet Embassy. Mr. Totrov speaks very good Chinese and most of our conversation was in that language. He mentioned that there were altogether four officers at the Soviet Embassy who could speak Chinese.

After a brief discussion of the number of overseas Chinese in Thailand, Mr. Totrov inquired whether the U.S. considered the Chinese here politically inclined to the left or right. I replied that this was very difficult to tell; most of the Chinese were primarily concerned with their business interests and were not strongly politically oriented; what was the view of the Soviet Embassy? Mr. Totrov stated that at present it appeared that the majority of Chinese were favorably disposed towards the United States.

Mr. Totrov then criticized the emphasis on gangsterism and crime in U.S. movies, and said he felt that they had a bad influence on the people here. I explained that U.S. movie companies were commercial propositions and provided what the public wanted to see; it would be a mistake to think that U.S. films were an accurate reflection of U.S. society. Moreover, no one could be sure just how movies affected their viewers. We agreed that there appeared to be a general trend in movie making in the Far East to ape this type of U.S. picture, usually not very well (he cited several horrible Thai pictures he had seen).

Mr. Totrov then inquired whether I had ever seen any Soviet movies. My negative response elicited the comment that Americans were too unfamiliar with Soviet culture. I replied that we Americans similarly felt that Soviet citizens had too little opportunity to know and appreciate U.S. culture. We agreed that increased contacts between the two peoples would be helpful. Mr. Totrov noted that the McCarthy and Stalin periods had passed and proposed an exchange of visits between the Soviet and U.S. Embassies. I replied that this would be difficult to arrange because of the press of work.

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with regard to an increase in travel between our two countries, Mr. Totrov deplored the difficulties raised by our fingerprinting requirements, which, he said, foreigners considered insulting. I pointed out that these requirements had been eased, and moreover that Americans considered fingerprinting a normal identification procedure with no other connotations.

Mr. Totrov then suggested that incidents such as the recent U-2 flight over the Soviet Union made it difficult for our two countries to come closer together. I said this was true, but Americans were at a loss to understand why the Russians had chosen to magnify this incident out of all proportion, when they had obviously known about these flights for a long time. It appeared very much as though the Russians had concluded there was little hope for success at the Summit Conference and had used this incident as an excuse to wreck the conference. Mr. Totrov replied that this was not so; the Russians had been hopeful that the Summit Conference would accomplish something worthwhile. The United States apologized to Cuba when an American plane was shot down there; why was the U.S. unwilling to apologize to the Soviet Union when the U-2 was shot down.

I replied that the circumstances of the two flights were entirely different. The U-2 incident should be considered in the entire context of espionage operations. From a moral standpoint, all such operations were wrong. But they could not be discussed from this standpoint, since all major countries engaged in espionage. For example, the Swiss government had recently expelled two Soviet diplomats for spying. Mr. Totrov then interjected that he knew the two diplomats involved personally, and he was sure the Swiss government was mistaken. Moreover, the U-2 action was of a far more serious nature. I explained that the Swiss case was just an example; one could also point to the testimony of the Soviet defector in Burma in 1959 or to the Petrov case in Australia. There was ample evidence that the Soviet Union also engaged in espionage. In this context, flights by U.S. planes over the Soviet Union were similar in nature to spying by Soviet diplomats. The U.S. favored as few travel restrictions as possible. If the Soviet Union had accepted the U.S. "open skies" proposal at the Geneva summit conference in 1955, the present incident would never have occurred. Mr. Totrov replied that a plan such as that could not be put into effect all at once. I pointed out that if a start had been made in 1955, considerable progress could have been made by now. Mr. Totrov then returned to the Cuban example.

I noted that we Americans considered our society to be considerably more open than that of the Soviet Union. Mr. Totrov expressed surprise at this and pointed to the restrictions on Soviet diplomatic travel in the United States. I explained that these restrictions were imposed in response to Soviet restrictions on U.S. diplomats. We ended up agreeing that everyone was opposed to a third world war. The entire discussion had been very cordial.

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(Classification)

Encl. No.
Desp. No. 665
From Bangkok

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE: Mr. Totrov has been stationed in Bangkok for about 2½ years, following a one year assignment in Peiping. He studied Chinese at Moscow University before going to Peiping. He also speaks good English and Thai.

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POL:JHBay/srm
May 24, 1960.

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AIR POUCH
PRIORITY

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D-732

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : American Embassy BANGKOK

732
DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

June 30, 1960
DATE

REF :

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	REC'D	INFO OTHER

SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet Relations

320 Int'l Rel- US/USSR

There is enclosed copies of a memorandum of conversation between the U. S. Liaison Officer to ECAFE and a Soviet member of the ECAFE Secretariat. The principal theme put forward by the Soviet citizen was that relations between the United States and Russia were not as good now as they were previously but that the relations are not seriously impaired. Though not articulated, the strong inference of this conversation was that it was hoped this period of strained relations should be ended with return to full and friendly relations. This might have been said, had Mr. Savushkin not come into the room. Although Mr. Soloviev was trying to give the impression that he did not want Savushkin to suspect he had been in a discoursive mood, this may well have been intended only to create such an impression upon the listener.

Subsequent to the conversation with Soloviev, the U. S. Liaison Officer has had two casual conversations with other Soviets, the substance of which, with one exception, were not consequential. The exception is that both voiced exactly the same theme as Soloviev, indicated above. One went on to say what Soloviev did not say — that it was up to the United States to make the effort toward full friendly relations. The other, when questioned, was unwilling to say whether the United States or the Soviet Union had the responsibility of making amends.

For the Charge d'Affaires ad interim:

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 949832

Floyd L. Whittington
Counselor of Embassy
for Economic Affairs

Enclosure:
4 copies Memorandum
of Conversation

ECON:BFDixon:ho
REPORTER

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6-30-60

AIR POUCH
PRIORITY

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(Security Classification)

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : American Embassy BANGKOK — 684 (DESP. NO.)

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON. — June 3, 1960 (DATE)

REF : Embassy Airgram No. G-308

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 949832

SUBJECT: Conversations between Members of the Russian Embassy and the U. S. Liaison Officer to ECAFE

As a general rule in contacts with officers of the Soviet Embassy, members of the American Embassy have been civil but not overly friendly. They have not as a rule initiated contacts, but if approached by a member of the Soviet Embassy staff, they have responded and do not avoid discussions of subjects raised by them.

A variation to the foregoing has been the U. S. representation to and participation in the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. Soviet membership in ECAFE, and the fact that they maintain a healthy if somewhat changing and nebulous permanent representation to ECAFE, is evidenced by the frequent Soviet comings and goings at the Sala Santitham, ECAFE headquarters. Contacts are natural and frequent between these Soviets and American officers with duties at ECAFE. Although the U. S. Liaison Officer has not sought out the Soviets, the latter over the past year have very gradually fostered increased associations and discussions. As a result, the U. S. Liaison Officer currently has almost daily contact with Soviet officials either at the Sala Santitham or at social reunions. The persons with whom the Liaison Officer has more frequent contact are Semyen Dyukarev, Counsellor of the Russian Embassy, Aleksey Korolyev, Soviet permanent representative to ECAFE, and his Deputy, Vladimir Savushkin. In these contacts with the Soviets, subjects of discussion are increasingly moving beyond the borders of ECAFE matters as the Soviets have sought "official" or "personal" reactions on the broader issues outstanding between the Soviet Union and the United States. It is notable that Dyukarev in such discussions has adopted a humorous approach varying between dry humor to the jocular, which is unusual among the usually stolid members of the Soviet Embassy staff. On other than ECAFE matters, conversations with both Dyukarev and Korolyev have been fairly frank and open, but not unfriendly.

The U. S. Liaison Officer had a prolonged discussion with various members of the Soviet Embassy during the Argentine National Day party which may be of interest to the Department as a conversation in which one of the Soviets was actively hostile. A summary of this conversation is enclosed. The hostile Soviet, Obukhov, was aided and abetted by Soviet Press Officer Koptyakov who, however, feigned calm objectivity until Obukhov got out of hand. The U. S. Liaison Officer's views were sought as to the U-2 plane incident, the general subject of espionage, and peaceful co-existence. He had thrown at him the delay in starting a second front in Europe, overthrow of the Rhee regime, U. S. bases encircling the Soviet Union, and an accusation that ex-President Truman had suggested in 1940

ECON:BFDixon:hs

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that the Germans and Russians be encouraged to extinguish each other. During the time, Obukhov became extremely excited, and calmed down only after several admonitions from his colleague and the very visible effort he made to control himself. After Obukhov calmed down, the U. S. Liaison Officer deliberately made a remark intended to incite Obukhov again in order to see what else he might say in temper which differed so markedly from what his colleagues were saying at the same time. The inference to be drawn from the Soviet behavior was that they had instructions to be obviously friendly. While some needling was permissible, open argumentation and hostility were to be avoided.

For the Charge d'Affaires ad interim:

Floyd L. Whittington
Counselor of Embassy
for Economic Affairs

Enclosure:

Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 949832

American Embassy,
Bangkok, Thailand.

Enclosure No. 1
Despatch No. 684

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: General Conversation with Members of the Russian Embassy

Participants:		
	Ivan Yakushin -	Soviet Ambassador
	Semyen Dyukarev -	Counsellor Soviet Embassy
	Shaul Kariv -	First Secretary Israeli Embassy
	Alekseey Korolyev -	Soviet Representative to ECAFE
	Pyetr Romanchuk -	Second Secretary Soviet Embassy
	Vladimir Savushkin -	Second Secretary Soviet Embassy
	Anatoliy Koptyakov -	Press Officer Soviet Embassy
	Yuriy Obukhov -	Attache Soviet Embassy
	Nikolay Koshkin -	Soviet Export Film Representative
	Ben F. Dixon	U. S. Liaison Officer to ECAFE

Date: May 25, 1960

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 99[illegible]22

I noticed at the Argentine reception on May 25 that there was an exceptionally large attendance from the Russian Embassy. They seemed to come in at about the same time and fan out as if in extended order drill, but with big smiles. Being at the opposite end from the entrance, my area was penetrated only after some while. The first was Ambassador Yakushin who bid me good evening in a most high level manner. Not long after that, the area in which I was standing became fairly well saturated. I counted about seven or eight Soviets around me. The first to speak was my opposite, the Soviet representative to ECAFE, Mr. Korolyev, with whom I exchanged pleasantries and who told me that he was departing on June 1 for home leave. He then presented Mr. Romanchuk who, he said in a jocular fashion, would be Charge' for ECAFE Affairs during his absence. With a great rolling of r's, the latter instructed me in the correct pronunciation of his name, stating that it was a White Russian name. He explained the difference between the "chuk" which indicated Bylo Russian, "ko" which was Ukrainian, and "no such ending at all" which meant just plain Russian. Mr. Romanchuk gave me a beautifully engraved card. He then repeated all the explanations which he had just gone through -- just to make sure. This seemed to exhaust the subject of conversation, and the three of us stood for a moment rocking from one foot to the other with a smile, when Mr. Dyukarev, at whose back I was standing, turned.

Mr. Dyukarev announced to these two Soviets, as well as a few others standing about, that I had offended him. He explained that for many months he had been congratulating me on my moustache and making other complimentary remarks about it. He said that the result of this was that I had cut the moustache off. Although Mr. Dyukarev has told this story a few times, it still seemed to be good for laughs in the Soviet ranks. Mr. Dyukarev said to Mr. Savushkin that I held him personally responsible for everything that

happened. He then said in an attempt at whimsy that he was not responsible for the breakup of the Summit. I replied that, on the contrary, I had heard it rumored that he had been in Paris and had been personally and directly responsible for the failure of the Summit meeting. Mr. Dyukarev and the other Soviets laughed heartily. At this point, Israeli First Secretary Kariv bobbed up in the middle of this crowd and had something to say about the apprehension of Eichmann. Dyukarev asked if it had been found to be true that Eichmann was paid by the Americans. Again all laughed but Kariv, who started to protest but then laughed when he realized that Dyukarev was joking. When the laughter subsided, I asked if it weren't true that Eichmann was actually a Muscovite. Again there was laughter, and Dyukarev -- apparently convinced that he had spread a sufficient amount of good humor and comradeship -- moved on to other fields, leaving me to Mr. Koptyakov whom I had met once or twice before but did not know very well.

Mr. Koptyakov appeared to be singularly well versed in Communist ideology and argumentation. Indeed, he later appeared to be one of the keepers of the conscience at the Russian Embassy. When the shuffling about had settled down, Mr. Koptyakov asked me in a voice vibrant with confidence and understanding what I thought of the U-2 problem. I replied that I was rather pleased to see my Government was on its toes. As everyone knew, the Japanese surprised us at Pearl Harbor, and generally one gathered the impression that the American Government was overtrusting and ingenue. Thus I felt an even greater measure of confidence in my Government when I realized that for four years we had been keeping tabs on what his country had been up to secretly. Mr. Koptyakov remained urbane and inscrutable, but did not reply immediately. After some pausing, he replied that it was not permissible for a plane to fly over the international borders of Russia. He then described something about the location of the plane. In explaining how he knew about this part of the country, he digressed on over to Stalingrad where he said he had served as a soldier during the war. Perhaps fearing that I had not grasped the full meaning of this, he described at great length trials and dangers at Stalingrad. I attempted to express an appreciation of the trials and privations of the Russian soldier at Stalingrad. This only seemed to elicit fuller disclosures of the trials. I advised him that I was aware of wartime circumstances, having served most of the war in the Pacific with the Marine Corps. I had received some wounds which had helped to bring home a fuller comprehension of the ugly realities of war. This led to a comparison of warfare in cold and hot climates and eventually back to hopeful expressions in behalf of peace between the United States and Russia. I agreed with this. He explained that the United States and Russia were two of the biggest nations in the world and that if these two countries could agree, all the rest of the world would be peaceful. (The implications of this observation were several, but not pursued.) He said unfortunately the U-2 type of activity did not make for friendship, and he hoped that this would stop. I told him that reports made it pretty clear that this type of activity was stopped, but that I hoped the Soviets would reciprocate and cease their espionage activities. He asked where I got that kind of an idea and presumed that I had just been reading capitalistic newspapers. I replied that the newspapers were currently full of such reports and had been for several years. He asked me to name a

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specific one, so I said, "Colonel Abel". "Colonel Abel, Colonel Abel", he said. "I don't know any Colonel Abel" (as though he were fully aware of the entire list of Soviet agents and found Abel missing). "Colonel Abel must be an American plant." I replied that he was certainly a genuine Soviet spy. I said that the United States was certainly anxious to be friendly with the Soviet people and its government. However, this seemed an impossible objective to achieve as long as the Russian government failed to be honest in its dealings with the United States. He must be fully aware, as I was, of Soviet espionage, and a flat denial of this did nothing except to suggest Soviet insincerity and dishonesty. Mr. Koptyakov was in the process of saying that honesty was only relative, when he was interrupted by a short young gentleman who gave the impression of breathing fire and seething with emotion. He apparently had been eavesdropping on our conversation.

The gentleman (Mr. Obukhov) asked, "Why did the United States not start a second front sooner in Europe?" Mr. Koptyakov seemed equally startled as I was, but made no effort to recall the question. With both waiting for a reply, I asked why it was necessary to have a second front at all. The Germans had made war on the Soviet Union, and the Soviets were free at any time to march right into Germany and put an end to the threat. Mr. Obukhov said that I was being cynical and that everyone knew that Russia was fighting with her back to a wall, shedding her blood to rid the world of Fascism. I said that the United States' position was roughly the same. We had to build up our strength to assure a successful penetration of the continent. The fact that we have given so many billion dollars in supplies and aid to enable the Soviet Union to continue to fight the war, however, had undoubtedly contributed to retarding our ability to commence a second front. Mr. Obukhov appeared ready to hit me, and shouted that this was all propaganda. Mr. Koptyakov said that we were present in another's house on a social occasion and that, while he found it very interesting to exchange these personal points of view, nevertheless he thought we might choose a less controversial subject to discuss. Mr. Obukhov took the cue and calmed down.

Mr. Koptyakov made a new beginning by stating that peace was the important thing and that friendship between the United States and Russia was the thing that could bring about peace. He repeated generally the remarks he made shortly before. I said that I had understood that sometimes the Free World and the Soviets did not have precisely the same meaning for words. I asked what the Russian definition of the word "peace" was. Mr. Koptyakov said it was the absence of a state of war. I said I had the impression somewhere that the Communists' theory was, that until Communism took over the entire world, peace could not exist. Obukhov started to snarl something when Koptyakov uttered a few ha-ha-ha's, and with a sort of what-a-zany-idea tone of voice, he said, "You must be thinking of that fellow Marx. Yes, he was a theoretician of the Communist state, but actually in practice the Soviet's policy was co-existence." I said it seemed to change from time to time. The speeches of his leaders spoke alternately of peaceful co-existence and with communizing the world. Mr. Koptyakov, in very hearty voice, assured me that

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this was not the case, and only peaceful co-existence was practiced by the Soviets. Mr. Koptyakov said the Soviets made it a policy not to interfere in the affairs of other nations. Sometimes, because workers were poor in other parts of the world, humanitarian feelings brought them to give money to workers -- for example, in India -- but they never tied any strings. After a few minutes more of further observations in this vein, I interrupted Mr. Koptyakov to say that I was very happy to have a friendly personal conversation with him, but that I objected to his telling me these things which just weren't true. Such remarks would insult anybody's intelligence, and I did not intend to listen further. If he wanted to talk about the weather or some other topic of conversation, I was perfectly willing to continue.

After a pause, Mr. Obukhov said, "You must realize that the Communists were correct all along in telling us of the terrors of the Rhee regime of Korea. Now the South Koreans had themselves demonstrated that they would no longer tolerate this kind of regime which had been imposed by the United States". I told him I did not know much about Korean affairs but had the impression that the latter years of the Rhee regime were not the same as the earlier years. It was clearly on the record, however, that the United States along with the South Koreans favored a change of regime. In any case, the Korean people had effected a change in their regime which stood in strong contrast to Hungary, where the people were not able to effect a change of their regime. A dead silence followed. Then Obukhov, getting more excited, began to run over again what he had just said about Korea. I made the same response. Mr. Obukhov, who was running at a high emotional pitch, flailed his arms and flapped his fingers against the palm of his other hand, and asked if I thought it were right to have someone come into the bedroom. I professed not to understand this question. He repeated that, if he had been invited to my house next week and before that time had slipped surreptitiously into my bedroom and gone through drawers and read my papers, what would I think of that? I said I thought it was a bad idea and that I wished the Soviets would stop doing it. He looked somewhat surprised at this reply and repeated his question for the third time. I asked him if he were not referring to espionage being conducted inside the borders of another country. He said he was. I said it was not a good thing and that we were certainly tired of Soviet espionage in the United States and that we wished the Soviets would stop. The Soviets were certainly the leading espionage power, and it would be a good example if they gave it up. I again referred to Colonel Abel, and as a most recent case, the Soviet submarine just off Long Island. He replied that the Soviet ship off Long Island was not within the territorial limits of the United States. I replied that this depended on what definition of territorial limits was employed. It was certainly within the territorial waters as defined by the Peruvians: perhaps within the limits as the Soviets wished to define them: and perhaps not within the limits as defined by the United States at the time the submarine was sighted, although no one knew where it had been before that. In any case, the important thing seemed to be not the location where the espionage was taking place but the fact that espionage was taking place. Mr. Koptyakov coldly replied that the law, as defined, must not be broken. (At this time Koptyakov began again to say something intermittently to Obukhov about calming down.) He continued the

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conversation by asking me if I would like it if the Soviet Union had the United States surrounded by foreign bases. I said in effect to Mr. Koptyakov that the United States had made a serious effort to disarm after World War II, which was not emulated by the Soviet Union. The clearly antagonistic position of Russia toward the United States, and the Soviet actions in Berlin followed by a war initiated and conducted by Soviets with Soviet support against the Korean people, made it amply clear to anyone but a fool that a free nation must take steps to defend itself. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, did nothing to show its good intentions in the field of demobilization and disarmament but actually embarked upon and supported an aggressive policy involving hostilities against the Free World. I asked him if his government would be willing to dismantle Soviet bases. He replied that the Soviet Union had no bases in any foreign country. I pointed out that I had said nothing about foreign bases -- only bases. Would the Soviets be willing to dismantle their bases? He said bases within our own country should not be discussed. I said that the Soviet Union was in one sense fortunate in being so situated geographically as to make it unnecessary for them to locate their bases on foreign soil. Again, the question was not where the bases were located -- but the existence of the bases themselves.

Mr. Obukhov said that "Harry Truman" had urged the Germans and Russians be left to fight amongst themselves so that they would effect their mutual extinction. Hurling this remark at me, he said that it can be found on something like page 223 of the Congressional Record of 23 July 1940. I said that if the remark were made, and it were made in 1940, it did not reflect the opinion of the U. S. Government but the statement of a senator speaking only for himself. Mr. Truman was well known for occasional off-the-cuff opinions which did not necessarily reflect his considered views. After all, Mr. Truman spent several years as President in sincere efforts to cooperate with the Soviet Union. Obukhov had again reached the explosion point, flailing his arms wildly, and almost incoherent. Mr. Koptyakov then seriously endeavored to get Mr. Obukhov to control himself (for a while in English and then speaking rather sharply in Russian). Mr. Obukhov made a serious effort to control himself, coached himself quietly under his breath, straightening his coat and tie, and taking a calm stance. After a few minutes, he managed to screw up a little smile. Never having met Obukhov, I introduced myself and then said I must be running along.

Mr. Koptyakov said that he felt this had been a very valuable exchange of views and that he felt it was a good idea to have these exchanges, but felt that it was best to do this either at my house or his house where we could really go at it hammer and tong, but privately. Today we were in the home of the Argentine Minister celebrating the independence of Argentina where the only fitting conversation was purely social conversation. Friends must not argue in the house of a third person. After this lecture, which I took partially as being for myself as well as Mr. Obukhov, Mr. Obukhov (still with his little smile) took his cue and said that this was indeed a nice occasion to be here among friends celebrating independence of the Argentine Republic.

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I said I hoped that the Soviet Union did not celebrate this occasion by repeating the visit of their two submarines up the River Plate. Mr. Obukhov's temper went off like a shot. He said there never were any submarines in the Plate. I told him that I thought it was fairly clear that there were some submarines there. He said that, in any case, they were not Russian. I said that perhaps they weren't; I wasn't fully sure myself. Mr. Koptyakov and Mr. Obukhov both began to try to get Mr. Obukhov's temper back into the box. After several minutes of hard trying, he again regained his little smile. I said I must be getting along. Mr. Obukhov asked calmly why we lied about the U-2. This was shameful, he said. I replied that I was not at all sure that we had lied about it. It might have been an inadvertence, a mistake, or a not fully informed attempt to speak on the point quickly. In any case, if there had been intention to mislead, it was certainly corrected promptly enough. I was not aware that there were many, if any, instances in which the Soviets made an effort to set the record straight. Mr. Koptyakov said that he thought he and Mr. Obukhov should be running along. I said that I should also leave. Mr. Koptyakov walked off.

Mr. Obukhov lingered on and said that I should understand that he was just trying to have a friendly conversation -- that he had a wife and daughter and he wanted them to live in a peaceful world. I walked on a few feet but was followed by Mr. Obukhov who continued to tell me about the hopes for his family, the exchange of views, and the need for peace. I excused myself again, but again he followed me -- this time into another group -- and continued to talk. In a little while Mr. Koptyakov appeared -- this time with Mr. Koshkin. Mr. Koshkin told me that Mr. Obukhov was perhaps a little over-excited and that he should not have gotten so excited. By this time Mr. Koptyakov had put a friendly but firm clasp upon Mr. Obukhov's shoulder. Mr. Koptyakov said that he was very sorry that the exchange had been so "acid". He stressed the fact that everything he and Obukhov had said were personal views and that he hoped that I was not offended, and it was pleasant to have these exchanges. I told Koptyakov that I certainly was not offended over what had happened. However, I found it wasted time to discuss any of these matters unless he were willing to be candid and frank. I certainly felt no animosity toward Mr. Obukhov who was just a young fellow saying the things he had learned. Mr. Koptyakov said he was sorry and; with Mr. Koshkin, made off with Mr. Obukhov.

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