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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520

July 3, 1967

Sent 7/5/67

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BENJAMIN H. READ

Herewith are some notes on the Rostow memcon of the President's discussion with the King of Thailand and Foreign Minister Thanat on June 29.

Please use these as you think most appropriate.

1 S
2 ~~U~~
3 G
4 EA - Bundy
5 WH - Rostow

Graham Martin

POL THAI-US

NODIS REVIEW
Cat. A — Caption removed; transferred to O/FADRC
Cat. B — Transferred to O/FADRC with additional access controlled by S/S
Cat. C — Caption and custody retained by S/S
Reviewed by: Raymond L. Parkins FSO-2
Date: 6/12 1975

(2)

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#1 S

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from Amb Graham MART

July 3, 1967

Notes by Ambassador Martin on certain aspects of Mr. Rostow's memcon of the President's discussion with the King of Thailand and the Thai Foreign Minister.

2. When Thanat mentioned 50,000 volunteers, he was "rounding off" rather liberally. My recollection is that the final figure was under 40,000

3. The proportional argument was the same as that used most effectively by the President in October in a conversation with the King, the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister and the Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Army, the Foreign Minister and myself. In later conversations with me the Thai rejected the applicability of this kind of precise mathematical approach to the problem, citing then, as did the King on 27 June, the much deeper involvement of the Thai in both their extensive cooperation with us and their own internal situation, however, I was able to use this argument to raise the original 1000-man contingent to 2,500 which was scaled back to 2,300 by General Stilwell on technical military grounds.

4. When the King was referring to the modernization of Thai forces, he was obviously talking about the repeated request from General Praphat for complete modernization of the entirety of the Thai Armed Forces, including bringing all the units into a MAP-supported status, and including training and equipment costs for the units to be mobilized to replace those sent to Vietnam as was done in the case of Korea. Secretary McNamara, as I read his comment on the memcon, was limiting his statement that "he could guarantee their training and equipment" to the 10,000 he hoped the Thai might furnish. The gap between the two is rather large.

5. Similarly, when the King referred to helicopters, he was obviously referring to three squadrons, not three helicopters. (They already have over 50 in the RTAF and a few more in the police.) The 20 they wanted was 20 squadrons not 20 additional helicopters. If the King and Thanat inform the Thai that we have commited to furnish 20 squadrons of helicopters, we will be in for some interesting sessions.

(The 20 squadrons is not an unrealistic figure. Two independent studies -- one by MACTHAI, Bangkok 2328, May 2, 1966, and one a study by Defense Attache, Embassy Bangkok -- established the desirability for an augmentation of this magnitude.)

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6. It is unlikely that Thanat will be permitted by the RTG to deal directly with the Department of Defense. If he is, we will be in for a very rough time indeed. He will press, as a minimum, for a full-blown bilateral defense agreement, which I have heretofore successfully avoided by dealing directly with the Prime Minister and the Deputy Minister of Defence on all military matters.

AMB. MARTIN:wm

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